MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

New approaches through psychology and textual analysis of Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit sources

Tse-fu Kuan
MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

This book identifies what is meant by sati (smṛti), usually translated as “mindfulness,” in early Buddhism, and examines its soteriological functions and its central role in the early Buddhist practice and philosophy. Using textual analysis and criticism, it takes new approaches to the subject through a comparative study of Buddhist texts in Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit. It also furnishes new perspectives on the ancient teaching by applying the findings in modern psychology. In contemporary Buddhism, the practice of mindfulness is zealously advocated by the Theravāda tradition, which is the only early Buddhist school that still exists today. Through detailed analysis of Theravāda’s Pali Canon and the four Chinese Agamas—which correspond to the four main Nikāyas in Pali and belong to some early schools that no longer exist—this book shows that mindfulness is not only limited to the role as a method of insight (vipassanā) meditation, as presented by many Theravāda advocates, but it also has a key role in serenity (samatha) meditation. It elucidates how mindfulness functions in the path to liberation from a psychological perspective, that is, how it helps to achieve an optimal cognitive capability and emotional state, and thereby enables one to attain the ultimate religious goal. Furthermore, the author argues that the well-known formula of ekāyano maggo, which is often interpreted as “the only way,” implies that the four satipaṭṭhānas (establishments of mindfulness) constitute a comprehensive path to liberation, and refer to the same as kāyagatā sati, which has long been understood as “mindfulness of the body” by the tradition. The study shows that kāyagatā sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas are two different ways of formulating the teaching on mindfulness according to different schemes of classification of phenomena.

Tse-fu Kuan is an assistant professor at the General Education Centre, National University of Kaohsiung, Taiwan. He is interested in Indian Buddhism and is the author of An Introduction to Samatha and Vipassanā of the Mahāyāna (co-authored with Ven. Dr Huimin Bhikkhu, Taipei: Dharma Drum Culture, 1997) and several articles in leading journals including the Journal of Indian Philosophy.
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TO VEN. HUI MIN AND
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The present book is a revised version of my doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Oxford in 2004. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Professor R.F. Gombrich, my supervisor. From 1999 to 2004, while I worked on my thesis, his invaluable guidance and inspirational teaching hugely broadened my horizons on Buddhist studies, and his patient correction of the English in my work was also very helpful to me. I owe a great deal to Mr L.S. Cousins, who read my thesis carefully, provided constructive criticisms and suggestions, and generously directed me to many useful sources. Dr Alexander Wynne also read through my thesis and made valuable criticisms and gave me helpful advice, for which I am very grateful. I am greatly indebted to Dr William Pruitt for proofreading my work, for his many valuable suggestions and for helping me to polish my English. I would also like to thank the following people for their help: Dr Sarah Shaw and Mr Yuwen Yang kindly offered a number of useful suggestions. In the three examinations during the course of my D.Phil. studies, Professor Peter Harvey, Dr R.M.L. Gethin, Professor Brian Bocking, Dr Sue Hamilton and Dr Eivind Kahrs provided helpful comments and advice. Mr Moez Cherif and Mrs Ratiba Cherif translated part of a French book into English. My special thanks are due to Professor Peter Harvey for recommending my thesis to Routledge for publication. I am also grateful to Ven. Anālayo, Professor Paul Harrison, Professor Kin-tung Yit, Ms Georgia Vale, Ms Dorothea Schaefer and Mr Tom Bates for varied help. I would like to express my indebtedness to the Chung-hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, Fakuang Institute of Buddhist Studies and Seeland Education Foundation for their financial support for my studies at Oxford, and to National Cheng Kung University for giving me the grant to revise my thesis for publication as part of my post-doctoral research. Thanks are also due to the Satyābhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly, Springer Science and Business Media, which controls the copyright of my article published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (vol. 33 no. 3, 2005), and the BJK Institute of Buddhist and Asian Studies, which controls the copyright of my article published in the Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies (no. 8, 2007), for granting me permission to
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

re-use parts of my articles published therein. Finally, but not least, I would like to thank my mother, Pi-yun Huang, whose care and support were never attenuated even when I studied in England over six thousand miles away from home.
ABBREVIATIONS

Included here are primary sources, dictionaries and other works of reference. References to Pali texts are to the Pali Text Society editions, unless otherwise noted.

AN   Āṅguttara Nikāya.
Ap   Apadāna.
As   Atthasālinī.
BJT  Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series (electronic version).
BU   Bṛhadāranyaka Upaṇiṣad (references are to Patrick Olivelle, 1998).
Bv   Buddhavamsa.
Bv-a  Buddhavamsa-attthakathā.
ChS  Cāṭhāṅga Sangīti Piṭakaṁ, Rangoon, 1955.
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CU  Chāndogya Upaniṣad (references are to Patrick Olivelle, 1998).

DĀ  Dīrgha Āgama.

Dhp  Dhammapada (by verse).

Dhp-a  Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā.

Dhs  Dhammasaṅgāti.

Dīp  The Dīpavāṇśa: An Ancient Buddhist Historical Record, ed. and tr. by Hermann Oldenberg, London: Williams and Norgate, 1879.

DN  Dīgha Nikāya.


Ee  European edition (i.e. Pali Text Society edition).


It  Itivuttaka.


Khp  Khuddakaṇṭha.

Kv  Kathāvatthu.

Kv-a  Kathāvatthu Commentary (included in the Paramatthadīpāni).

LSC  personal communication with L.S. Cousins.

M  Ming Edition 明本, referred to in T.

MĀ  Mahāyāna Āgama.

Mhv  Mahāvamsa.


MN  Majjhima Nikāya.

Mp  Manorathapūraṇī (commentary on the Aṣṭasāhasrika Nikāya).


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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nidd I</strong></td>
<td>Mahāniddesa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paṭis</strong></td>
<td>Paṭisambhidāmagga.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Paṭis-a</strong></td>
<td>Saddhammapakāśīni (commentary on the Paṭisambhidāmagga).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ps</strong></td>
<td>Paṇcaśāsāṅdaṇī (commentary on the Majjhima Nikāya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q</strong></td>
<td>Qisha Edition 磚砂藏, included in Zhonghua Dazangjing First Division 中華大藏經 第一輯, Taoyuan Taiwan: 修訂中華大藏經會, 1974.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RFG</strong></td>
<td>personal communication with R.F. Gombrich.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S</strong></td>
<td>Song Edition 宋本, referred to in T.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SĀ</strong></td>
<td>Saṃyukta Āgama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ŚA</strong></td>
<td>Saṁyutānīkābhuddharma (舍利弗阿毘會論 Taishō Vol. 28, No. 1548).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skt</strong></td>
<td>Sanskrit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SN</strong></td>
<td>Saṁyutta Nikāya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sn</strong></td>
<td>Sutta-nīpāta (by verse).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Śp</strong></td>
<td>Saṭṭhasāhasīkā-prajñā-pāramitā, ed. Pratāpacandra Ghoṣa, Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spk</strong></td>
<td>Saṅrataṭṭhappakāśini (commentary on the Saṁyutta Nikāya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRTD</strong></td>
<td>長阿含十報法經 (Sūtra on the Ten Repeated Dharmas of the Dīgha Agama, T 1, 233b–241c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sv</strong></td>
<td>Saṃnāgalavilāśini (commentary on the Dīgha Nikāya).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T</strong></td>
<td>Taishō Shinshu Daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經 (Taishō Edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka), Tokyo, reprinted: 1978 (referred to by volume number and page number).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Th</strong></td>
<td>Theragāthā (by verse).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Th-a</strong></td>
<td>Theragāthā-āṭṭhakathā (included in the Paramatthadīpanī).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Thī  *Therīgāthā* (by verse).
Ud   *Udāna*.
Vism *Visuddhimagga*.
Y    Yuan Edition 元本, referred to in T.
MAP  The Cradle of Buddhism
INTRODUCTION

1. The scope of the research

Mindfulness (Pali sati, Skt smṛti) plays an important role in Buddhist practice and philosophy. Many contemporary Buddhist teachers, especially those following the Theravāda tradition, are advocates of mindfulness. Mindfulness is a function or quality of mind, but it is often described as something to be practiced or cultivated. Right mindfulness is one component of the Noble Eightfold Path that leads to the final religious goal. One text even states that those who have undertaken the four establishments of mindfulness have undertaken the noble path. Therefore mindfulness (sati) can be considered to be a practice.

Etymologically the Pali term sati, which derives from smṛti in Sanskrit, means memory, but it was given new connotations in early Buddhism, and thus the rendering of sati as memory is inadequate in most contexts. As pointed out by T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1910: 323–324), sati has been translated by different people in different ways, such as “conscience,” “attention,” “meditation,” “contemplation,” “insight.” Gyatso (1992: 4) also holds that smṛ- derivatives can have two basic meanings: “recollective memory (or more generally, memory of the past), and what is most often rendered as “mindfulness”. I will translate sati as “mindfulness” in this book, following many other people, but in many cases, I will leave it untranslated. The meaning of sati will be discussed in Chapter 1. The practice of anussati (anusmṛti), an idea interchangeable with sati as Harrison (1992: 228) suggests, will also be dealt with in this book.

As Jaini (1992: 47) points out, in the Theravādin Abhidhamma the word sati (smṛti) appears as a conditioning factor that occurs only in good consciousness and hence is invariably called “right mindfulness” (samma-sati), whereas in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma literature smṛti is enumerated in the list of the factors invariably found in every mental event. Even though “wrong mindfulness” (micchā-sati) is found in the earliest Buddhist texts, it only occurs in contexts (almost exclusively in a description of what is the opposite of the Noble Eightfold Path) where no further explanation is given; on the other hand, sati widely appears in the texts as a positive mental state that should
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be developed. Therefore this book will deal with sati only in the sense of right mindfulness.

Buddhism underwent a long history of doctrinal development. The doctrine of sati is no exception. This study aims to trace the original concepts concerning sati, to elucidate implicit but important notions about sati in early Buddhism, and to find out its soteriological functions and its position in the early Buddhist teaching. I will also attempt to identify some later opinions that are probably mistaken and that have crept into the early texts. I will try to suggest emendations to them.

The focus of this book is on the doctrine of sati in early Buddhism. Griffiths (1983: 56) defines early Buddhism as “pre-Añokan Indian Buddhism.” Similarly, Collins (1990: 89) divides Theravāda Buddhist history into three periods: the “early” period lasts from the time of the Buddha to that of Aśoka. It is largely agreed that King Aśoka reigned around 270–230 BC. Scholars have not reached an agreement with regard to the dating of the Buddha. The Buddha’s death has been dated from the fifth century to early fourth century BC. Therefore, according to the above definition, “early Buddhism” covers roughly the first one or two centuries of Buddhist history. What I mean by early Buddhism may coincide with this definition. By “early Buddhism,” I refer to what is described by Schmithausen (1987: 1): “the canonical period prior to the development of different schools with their different positions.” This is possibly the earliest period of Buddhist teaching that we can discern in the texts available to us. However, the dating of the schisms is problematic.

Hirakawa (1991: 278) indicates that the development of the various Buddhist sects as related in the Singhalese histories and the *Samayabheda-paracanacakra* of the Sarvāstivādin tradition agree that the original schism occurred between the Theravāda (or Sthavira) and the Mahāsaṃghika, and that this schism occurred about one hundred years after the Buddha’s death. On the other hand, there is an important disagreement as follows: The *Samayabheda-paracanacakra* says that this original schism occurred in Aśoka’s reign, whereas the Singhalese histories claim that Aśoka ascended the throne 218 years after the Buddha’s death, and thus date the original schism about one hundred years before Aśoka. In his research into such divergences, Hirakawa (1991: 282) concludes that the Sarvāstivāda version in the *Samayabheda-paracanacakra* rather than the Theravāda version in the Singhalese histories is probably closer to the actual historical development of the Saṅgha. Lamotte (1988: 518) also holds that the scission of the original Saṅgha into the Sthaviras and the Mahāsaṃghikas took place in Aśoka’s reign. Accordingly, I accept the Sarvāstivāda’s account that the schism began at the time of Aśoka.

The materials found in the scriptures of the early schools—which are preserved in Pali, Chinese, and some fragmentary texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan—that agree with each other can be regarded as going back to the
INTRODUCTION

time before the schisms, which first started during the time of Aśoka. Wynne (2005: 65) says,

The corresponding pieces of textual material found in the canons of the different sects . . . probably go back to pre-sectarian times. It is unlikely that these correspondences could have been produced by the joint endeavour of different Buddhist sects, for such an undertaking would have required organisation on a scale which was simply inconceivable in the ancient world.

It is such materials that are the main concern of my study. In other words, what I shall deal with is the earliest stratum of the Canons (which will be explained later) of various schools, which mostly agree with each other on doctrinal issues.10 As Cousins (1983: 5) indicates, divergences in different versions of the four Nikāyas are very rarely founded on doctrinal or sectarian differences. In this book, divergences in doctrines will be scrutinized and, whenever possible, attempts will be made to decide which versions could be the earlier or original ones.

2 Primary sources

2.1 The earliest stratum of the Canon

For most Buddhist schools, the Buddhist Canon is composed of “the three baskets” (Pali ti-piṭaka, Skt tri-piṭaka): (1) The Vinaya-piṭaka, which is concerned with monastic discipline, (2) the Sutta-piṭaka (Śūtra), which provides the doctrinal teachings ascribed to the Buddha or very rarely to his disciples, and (3) the Abhidhamma-piṭaka (Abhidharma), which is composed of later works of further exposition to systematize early teachings. The Theravāda Canon in the language of Pali will be taken as the basic source of this research in that it is the only complete Buddhist Canon preserved by one of the early schools in an Indian language probably very close to the languages used by the Buddha and his disciples. Since my research is mainly concerned with the doctrines of early Buddhism, investigation will be focused on the earliest scriptures in the Sutta-piṭaka, including the four main Nikāyas and some texts in the Khuddaka Nikāya. This is what I mean by “the earliest stratum of the Canon,” or “the earliest (Buddhist) texts.” C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1937: 653) counted the following nine texts as the earliest compilations in the Khuddaka Nikāya: Khuddakapāṭha, Dhammapada, Udāna, Itivuttaka, Sutta-nipāta, Peta-vatthu, Vimāna-vatthu, Therā-gāthā and Therī-gāthā. Most texts in her list will be referred to in this study, except for the Peta- and Vimāna-vatthu, which have little to do with the subject of this study. The four main Nikāyas and those texts in the Khuddaka Nikāya are mostly attributed by the tradition to the Buddha
himself or his immediate disciples with some degree of certainty. I agree with the following statement by Hamilton (1995: 46): “I share the view of most scholars of early Buddhism that the earliest stratum of this material [Pāli Canon] contains the nearest we can get to the teachings of the Buddha himself.”

The four Agamas translated from Sanskrit or some Middle Indic languages (or Prakrits) into Chinese in the fourth and fifth centuries correspond to the four main Nikāyas and also represent the earliest stratum of the Canon. The Agamas preserved in Chinese translation are just as important as the Pali Nikāyas in understanding early Buddhism. Prasad (1993: 55) says, “[T]he Āgamas were rendered into Chinese and the translations were checked and rechecked in all seriousness. Even in their present form, they present the teachings of the Buddha as authentically as the Nikāyas do.” Through comparison between the Pali and Chinese versions I will demonstrate that some Āgama passages could be even earlier or doctrinally more plausible than their Pali counterparts where divergences occur. In some cases, comparison with canonical counterparts preserved in the later Sanskrit literature is also useful to my attempt to solve the problems in the earliest texts.

The Āgamas preserved in Chinese translation belong to different schools. Widespread agreement has been reached in attributing the Madhyama Āgama to the Sarvāstivāda school. The Sāmyukta Āgama is also widely ascribed to the Sarvāstivāda or Mūla-sarvāstivāda tradition. The Dīrgha Āgama belongs to the Dharmaguptakas according to many scholars. The sectarian affiliation of the Ekottara Āgama or Ekottarika Āgama is very controversial. It is ascribed to the Mahāsāṃghikas by Lü (1963: 242), Kumoi (1963: 248), Ui (1965: 137–138), and Bronkhorst (1985: 312–314), but to the Dharmaguptakas by Matsumoto (1914: 349). On the other hand, both Hirakawa (1960: 48–49) and Nakamura (1980a: 39) maintain that the sectarian affiliation of the Ekottara Āgama is not clear. This Āgama is distinct from the other three in that it contains numerous Mahāyāna elements.

2.2 Later Buddhist literature

The Abhidharma-piṭaka provides systematization of early teachings as well as detailed interpretation and clarification of doctrinal points. Although it is included in the Canon by many schools, some schools such as the Sautrāntikas do not recognize this piṭaka, as pointed out by Lamotte (1988: 181). Cox (1995: 8) indicates that there are two explanations for the formation of Abhidharma:

First, most Western scholars contend that Abhidharma treatises evolved from the practice of formulating matrices, or categorizing lists, (mārkā) of all topics of the teaching arranged according to both numeric and qualitative criteria. As the second option, most Japanese scholars suggest that the origin of Abhidharma is to be
INTRODUCTION

found in dialogues concerning the doctrine (abhidharmakathā), or monastic discussions in catechetical style characterized by an exchange of questions and interpretative answers intended to clarify complex or obscure points of doctrine.

Both explanations are supported by accounts in the later Buddhist literature and the traces of the incipient form of the Abhidharma found in the Sūtra-piṭaka. In any case, the Abhidharma-piṭaka represents a later development in Buddhism, and was composed between 200 BC and AD 200 according to Frauwallner (1971: 106). Different schools have different Abhidhamma works which contain sectarian developments. My study will take these facts into account and recognize the divergences in doctrines between the earliest texts and the Abhidhamma.

Commentaries on the Pali Canon, called Aṭṭhakathā, will also be used for understanding the earliest scriptures. The commentaries on the first four Nikāyas were composed or rather edited by Buddhaghosa, who is thought to have lived between approximately AD 370 and 450 (von Hinüber, 1997: 103). The commentaries on the Khuddaka Nikāya were written by different people. The commentaries are the result of a long development based on sources which date back several centuries earlier. Apart from the commentaries, this book will also refer to the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa, which is closely connected to the Nikāya commentaries, and “seems to quote from the old Aṭṭhakathā more extensively than the extant commentaries do” as Von Hinüber (1997: 125) notes. The values of the commentaries are pointed out by Norman (2004: 69):

One of the best aids available for anyone trying to understand and translate a Pali canonical text is the commentarial tradition. The commentaries which are available to us represent the accumulated wisdom of the commentarial tradition at the time of their composition, as well as containing in the lemmata the forms of the canonical texts which were current at the time the commentaries were compiled.

On the other hand, in the same article he also suggests that the commentarial tradition sometimes does not agree with philology, and is not always correct in interpreting the Nikāyas. T.W. Rhys Davids and William Stede (PED 620, s.v. vitakka) also caution us: “The explanations of Commentators are mostly of an edifying nature and based more on popular etymology than on natural psychological grounds.”

3. Approaches

In this book I approach my subject from philological, historical and psychological perspectives. My basic approach is to elucidate the earliest texts
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through those texts themselves, trying to uncover what may have been the earliest Buddhist teaching on the practice of sati and the theoretical underpinnings on which it is based. The commentaries and the Abhidhamma will be utilized as aids in understanding the earliest texts, but wherever there is a contradiction between what can be attested by the earliest texts and the interpretation in the later literature, I will take up the former and abandon the latter. Sometimes Mahāyāna texts are also consulted in order to elucidate some difficult passages in the earliest texts. Although Mahāyāna Buddhism is a relatively late and innovative development, some Mahāyāna texts nevertheless contain very early teachings as well as possibly intact citations from the earliest texts, and may shed light on some problems in early Buddhism.

The Buddha is well-known for his skill in means in his teachings. He often explained the same thing in different ways. Some of the doctrines were standardized probably by himself in his later years, while others may have been standardized by the later tradition. Standard statements or formulae can be compared with some difficult passages in order to make sense of those passages. On the other hand, the same discourses given by the Buddha may have been memorized by different disciples in different ways, and then recorded in different words or arrangements by the compilers. During this process deviations and errors could have occurred. Therefore, comparing passages of different versions with standard statements or formulae may sometimes help to clarify the meanings of these passages, or can help to identify possible mistakes and rectify them.

Before the Buddhist texts were committed to writing in the first or second century BC, they had been transmitted orally for several centuries. During the period of oral tradition the Canon was not fixed. The accounts of several Buddhist councils (saṅghīti) to rehearse the scriptures reflect the fact that the Canon underwent several editorial revisions. Pande (1957: 24) says, “To explain this ‘identity-in-difference’ we must resort to the hypothesis that the Nikāyas are frequently ‘edited’ texts embodying doctrines deriving from a common source.” Scholars have put forward several possible reasons for the modifications of the texts, especially considering the divergences between parallel versions of the same texts. Both Cousins (1983: 9–10) and Gethin (1992: 157–158) attribute such divergences mainly to the possibility that early texts were preached in an improvisatory way, with the help of mnemonic lists. Gombrich (1990b: 26) suggests that changes to the Canon may have occurred due to lapses of memory and to the contamination of texts as someone’s memory slipped from one text to another. Compilers’ new ideas may also affect the redaction of the texts. Schmithausen (1981: 201) states:

[D]ivergencies are caused . . . also by the intentions of the instructor. There must have been, certainly, not only chanters simply choosing and combining elements from a given stock of tradition,
but also preachers personally engaged in practice and theory, and it is hardly conceivable that such persons did not develop new ideas—even though they themselves need not have taken these ideas to be new in substance—and that they did not try to incorporate them into tradition by means of modification, supplementation, etc., of the already existing material.

On the other hand, Lamotte (1988: 156) suggests that such modifications may not have occurred only during the period of oral tradition: “[T]he question remains as to whether the divergences which contrast the Pāli tradition with that of the Sanskrit can be explained solely through variations in the oral transmission of the texts, or through intentional modifications based on the written compilations.” These views will be taken into account in my study. In Chapter 1 (Section 4) a case even suggests an intentional modification of one passage (in Sutta 29 of the Vedānā Samyutta) influenced by another mistaken passage (in the Upatīpātika Sutta), which may have been caused by a lapse of memory.

Owing to contamination between early Buddhist texts in the long period of oral transmission, it is very difficult to distinguish between earlier and later texts, and which texts have influenced others. In this book, however, attempts will be made to stratify some texts in chronological order. Although these arguments may not be decisive, they do seem to help to clarify some doctrinal issues. One significant feature in contamination of texts is the frequent use in the Canon of what scholars have dubbed “pericopes,” an idea in New Testament criticism applied to the early period of transmission of the Buddhist traditions. As Gombrich (1987: 77) explains, they are “passages of scripture which were standardized and used as units to compose longer texts.” Pericopes can be put in different contexts, sometimes in wrong contexts. My study involves discerning heterogeneous components in the texts and identifying the original or right contexts in which certain pericopes occur in order to find out which texts may have influenced others.

Gombrich (1996: 12) has indicated that “the earliest Buddhism” has some features which the later Buddhist tradition had forgotten about but which we can uncover through our knowledge of the religious milieu at the Buddha’s time. In a number of cases, I will try to provide a more plausible interpretation of some difficult passages in “the earliest Buddhism” by showing their allusions to Brahmanism and asceticism of which the later tradition apparently was unaware. This book will consult the two earliest Upaniṣads, the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, which are pre-Buddhist and which date from the seventh to sixth centuries BC.

The trend to explore the interface between psychology and Buddhism is growing over the last half-century. I will also attempt to conduct research between the two disciplines. Padmal de Silva (2001: 70) points out that some modern psychological concepts and techniques can be found in Buddhism,
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which is due to the fact that Buddhism is essentially empiricist/experientialist in its basic stance. This book will compare some Buddhist concepts with notions and recent findings in the field of psychology. This is by no means to reduce a profound religion and philosophy to a discipline of modern science, but rather it helps us understand the Buddha’s insights into the nature of the mind that are still true and significant from the perspective of a modern discipline, and it helps us understand how Buddhist doctrine transcends the knowledge of psychology and uses it as a base for the spiritual quest.

As Dudley-Grant et al (2003: 1) say, Buddhism and psychology “are ultimately profoundly optimistic about the universal human capacity to move beyond suffering.” In contemporary psychology mindfulness has been adopted as an approach to enhance mental health through preventing or reducing emotional distress and cognitive vulnerability to such distress. Segal et al (2002) have developed a treatment program called “mindfulness-based cognitive therapy” (MBCT). As Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 9) indicates, within the context of modern psychology the word “therapy” often refers to techniques for treating mental illness. With more profound concern, Buddhism is meant to cure the ills of the world. Gombrich (1988: 2, 59) says that the medical metaphor is central to Buddhism. The Buddha describes himself as the supreme surgeon (sallakatto anuttaro, Sn 560). Being an outline of the whole Buddhist doctrine, the Four Noble Truths are associated by scholars24 with a medical model: the physician diagnoses the symptoms (First Noble Truth, dukkha), finds the cause of the illness (Second Noble Truth, dukkhasamudaya), sees clearly that it can be cured (Third Noble Truth, dukkhanirodha), and administers a course of treatment (Fourth Noble Truth, dukkhanirodha). This book will examine the role of mindfulness in Buddhist soteriology, which is based on the medical metaphor, in comparison with principles of psychology, which is concerned with therapy.

4. Main issues

As mentioned above, sati is a function of mind. What kind of function is it? How does it function? I will try to answer such questions. The Buddha often explains human experiences by way of five aggregates (khandha): material form (rupa), feeling (vedana), apperception (saññā), volitional formations (sankhāra) and consciousness (viññāna). It would be helpful to find out how sati works in relation to the five aggregates. The Dhammasaṅgani, the first book of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, classifies sati under the sankhārakkhandha (Dhs § 62), but this finds little support in the earliest texts. As Gethin (1998: 204) says, the Abhidhamma texts “attempt to give a systematic and exhaustive account of the world by breaking it down into its constituent physical and mental events (dhamma/dhamma).” Therefore, it is inevitable for the Abhidhamma to take the five khandhas as including everything pertaining to
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a being, and thus it has to use saṅkhārakkhandha as an umbrella category for classifying all the incorporeal (arūpin) factors, including sati, that cannot fall into the aggregates of vedanā, saññā and viññāna.25

Hamilton (1996: XXIX) points out that an analysis of the human being into five khandhas “is given not in terms of what he or she consists of but in terms of how he or she operates.” This analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. An individual is not composed of just the five khandhas. There is probably no need to classify sati as any khandha, and perhaps it does not belong to any khandha according to early Buddhism. On the other hand, my study will demonstrate that sati is closely linked to the aggregate of saññā. On the basis of this discussion, I shall further explore how sati effects the realization of the soteriological goal and investigate various functions of sati in different states of mind as found in the earliest texts.

A special concern of this study is the relationship between sati and the two main categories of Buddhist meditation: serenity (samatha) and insight (vipassanā). It seems to be a widely held opinion in Theravāda Buddhism that serenity meditation is not essential for the realization of Nirvana, but the sine qua non of liberation is insight meditation, for which sati is a paradigm practice. Ven. Rahula (1980: 271) says,

This is called vipassanā-bhāvanā “insight-meditation”. This is the true Buddhist meditation. It is taught by the Buddha in many discourses, but the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta, “Discourse on the Presence of Mindfulness”, is undoubtedly the most complete and most important of them all.26

Sati is thus regarded as vipassanā meditation, the authentic Buddhist meditative practice, and is even interpreted as the “only way” to liberation.27 I will try to answer the question: Does sati represent the only path to liberation, a path of vipassanā without the need of samatha?

The scheme of the four satipaṭṭhānas, establishments of mindfulness, is often used as the paradigm for the practice of sati. It consists of contemplations of four subjects: the body, feelings, mind, and dhammas. This book will devote a whole chapter to it. Kāyaṭagāti sati is traditionally understood as mindfulness of the body, and is considered to be the first satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of the body. My study will examine the validity of this understanding, and will clarify the original meaning of kāyaṭagāti sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas, and thereby give a new perspective on the relationship between the four satipaṭṭhānas and kāyaṭagāti sati as well as their connection with Buddhist philosophy. Since comparison between the Pali and Chinese versions of the Kāyaṭagāti Sutta and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is indispensable for understanding the original meanings of kāyaṭagāti sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas and how these two texts have evolved, this book will provide English translations of the Chinese versions of these two texts. As for
Chapter 1 discusses the role of mindfulness (Pali sati) in Buddhist soteriology from a psychological perspective. This chapter demonstrates that the practice of mindfulness consists in conducting the wholesome functioning of sañña (apperception/conception), one of the five components of personality according to Buddhism. It also shows that sañña is linked with cognition and also emotion, which includes the secondary feeling (vedana) as a subjective reaction to the mere reception and registration of sensation. Avoiding cognitive problems, mindfulness prevents sañña from going astray to conceptual proliferation (papāna), which is obstructive to the insight that leads one to liberation. On the other hand, mindfulness prevents feelings from developing into emotional disturbances; through transformation of sañña it conduces to the surmounting of emotional agitation and hence the attainment of the best emotional state, equanimity (upekkhā). This practice helps to achieve an optimal cognitive capability and emotional state, and thereby enables one to attain the ultimate religious goal. This point is illustrated by a research on the path to liberation centered on the four jhānas (meditative attainments) frequently found in the Buddhist texts.

Chapter 2 includes my effort to formulate a classification of mindfulness on the basis of the discussion in Chapter 1, although this classification is not meant to be exhaustive. Chapter 1 shows the general principle underlying the practice of mindfulness, that is, to direct sañña in a proper way. This involves interaction between the mind and its objects. Chapter 2 discusses the various types and functions of mindfulness in terms of such interaction in different states of mind ranging from normal consciousness to several kinds of meditation. These different functions of mindfulness are not always distinctively separate or incompatible. They sometimes work together. On the other hand, the same function of mindfulness can be found in different states of consciousness. The different types and functions of mindfulness fall into the following categories:

1. Simple awareness
2. Protective awareness
3. Introspective awareness
4. Deliberately forming conceptions

Chapter 3: Serenity (samatha) meditation and insight (vipassanā) meditation are usually regarded as the two main categories of Buddhist meditation. The practice of mindfulness is widely considered to be the core of insight meditation by practitioners and scholars alike. However, there seems to have been
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no work that explains how mindfulness relates to insight meditation according to the earliest Buddhist texts. In this chapter I will explore this issue by resorting to the earliest texts. While mindfulness is often seen as a method of insight meditation, little attention has been drawn to the relationship between mindfulness and serenity meditation. A large part of this chapter is devoted to probing the role of mindfulness in serenity meditation, and demonstrates how mindfulness contributes to the creation of signs (nimitta) or conceptual images in serenity meditation, and how it functions in relation to other mental factors in different jhānas. I show that mindfulness of breathing in the form of the sixteen exercises exemplifies how the four establishments of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) conjoin serenity and insight meditation, and that the sixteen exercises represent four groups of exercises, part of which are simultaneous, rather than one sequence of sixteen stages as some scholars suggest.

Chapter 4 clarifies what is referred to by the term kāyagatā sati or kāyasati (念身 in Chinese), which is usually rendered as mindfulness of the body and is equated to the first of the four satipaṭṭhānas in the Theravāda tradition. Taking into account the oral tradition of Buddhist texts, an investigation into the Pali and Chinese versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and other early texts leads to the suggestion about how the Kāyagatāsati Sutta may have evolved from three other texts which are internally much more coherent, and proposes a partial reconstruction of an antecedent version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta from which the Pali and Chinese versions derived. According to this antecedent version, kāyagatā sati did not refer to mindfulness of the physical body only, as the Pali version of this text and the later tradition suggest, but rather, a further examination of the canonical contexts in which kāyagatā sati and kāyasati occur shows that kāya here refers to an individual that can experience through his senses. Kāyagatā sati or kāyasati is mindfulness directed to kāya, the locus of our subjective experience based on the senses. It can transform our subjective experience, and thereby enable us to achieve liberation. It is a general guideline or fundamental principle applied to the path to liberation, and is not restricted to those specific exercises given in different versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.

Chapter 5: The (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, a discourse on the four establishments of mindfulness, is highly venerated in the Theravāda tradition. Through a comparative analysis of various versions of this text and other canonical passages in Pali, Chinese and Sanskrit, this chapter suggests that the different versions of this text are later amalgams of material from different sources, especially the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, which in turn drew a large amount of its material from three other sets of teachings. As the authenticity of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is questionable, this chapter adopts a new approach based on examining passages on the four satipaṭṭhānas that are common to different Nikāyas in order to identify the essential teachings on this subject. From a comparison between a passage in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad and passages on kāyagatā sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas, it can...
be inferred that the term *ekāyano maggo*, which has been translated in different ways, refers to a comprehensive path, whereby the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are characterized as a general instruction applicable to various Buddhist practices, just like *kāyagatā sati*. All the above discussions lead to the conclusion that *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* are two different ways of formulating the teaching on mindfulness according to different schemes of classification of phenomena, which cover the individual and the external world perceived. Both *kāyagatā sati* and the four *satipaṭṭhānas* concern subject-object interaction, where lies the crux of *samsāra* as well as nirvana.
Chapter 1

MINDFULNESS IN SOTERIOLOGY: TRANSFORMATION OF COGNITION AND EMOTION

This chapter discusses the role of sati in Buddhist soteriology from a psychological perspective. As Griffiths (1983: 55) says, for both Western Buddhologists and Buddhist apologists it has become a truism that methods of transforming the cognitive, perceptual and affective experience of the practitioner are of central importance to Buddhist soteriology. I shall start with an investigation of the relationship between sati and saññā, one of the five aggregates (khandha). Then I will explore how sati conduces to liberation through the transformation of cognition and emotion, which are both linked with saññā.

1. Mindfulness and saññā

This chapter proposes that the development of sati is to direct saññā in a proper way. Before dealing with this topic, let us examine what saññā and sati refer to.

The earliest texts do not seem to have given a very clear explanation of what saññā means. As Hamilton (1996: 53ff.) demonstrates, according to many passages in the Nikāyas, saññā has a function of recognition or identification. She suggests (57–58):

[Perhaps the most satisfactory translation of saññā would be ‘apperception’, which implies both that its function is discriminatory, and also that it incorporates a function of assimilation or comprehension of what has been perceived so that identification can take place.]

Gómez (1976: 141ff.) and Ruegg (1998: 138) also opt for the rendering of saññā (Skt saṁjñā) as apperception. On the other hand, Hamilton (1996: 58–59) points out that saññā can also be thought of as the faculty of conception. When its functioning is dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data, it is apperception; otherwise, it is conception. Wayman (1976: 326–332) also demonstrates that in many cases saññā (Skt saṁjñā) has to be translated as “conception”, “notion,” or “idea.”
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Now let us look at how the Abhidhamma literature interprets it. The Atthasālinī says that saññā has noting as its characteristic and recognition as its property.3 This explanation conforms to the modern interpretation of saññā in the Sutta-pitaka as “apperception.” From another angle, the Atthasālinī describes the property of saññā as “making a sign as a condition for noting again.”4 According to this description, as Nyanaponika Thera (1998: 121) has pointed out, “remembering” is a function of saññā. Gethin (2001: 41), commenting on the “formal Abhidhamma definition of saññā,” also says,

[I]n its capacity of labelling or marking (which seems to be intended here) saññā must be understood as playing a major role in the psychology of memory, at least as far as this is conceived of as a simple matter of recognition and recall.

Following up the above Abhidhammic explanation of saññā, Gethin (2001: 41–42) says,

From the point of view of Abhidhamma analysis it is apparent that many of one’s so called ‘memories’ are simply conceptions or ideas based on a particular perspective of what occurred in the past. In short, they are misconceptions, the product of saññā associated with unskilful consciousness. The point is that as far as Abhidhamma is concerned our ‘remembering’ fails to reflect properly the way things truly are.

I would like to add one more point. While saññā associated with unskillful/unwholesome (akusala) consciousness produces “memories” as misconceptions, the misconceptions will in turn bring about “recognition” or “apperception” of incoming sensory data in a misleading way. This is a vicious cycle. A similar point is made by Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 32–33):

For instance, the normal visual perception if it is of any interest to the observer will rarely present the visual object pure and simple, but the object will appear in the light of added subjective judgements. . . . [T]he perception will sink into the store house of memory. When recalled, by associative thinking, it will exert its distorting influence also on future perceptions of similar objects.

In contrast, as Gethin (2001: 42) indicates, sati is seen as a “particular kind of ‘remembering’—when developed it ‘remembers’, as it were, properly.” The Sanskrit root of the word sati, smṛ, can mean “to remember” and “be mindful of” (MW 1271). C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1936: 255) suggests that sati is a Pali equivalent for smara (derived also from smṛ) in Sanskrit as found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Neither word is wholly covered by “memory.” This
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Upaniṣad states (tr. Olivelle, 1996: 163): “When they do remember (smareyuḥ), then they would be able to hear, consider, and recognize. Clearly, it is through memory (smara) that one recognizes one’s children and cattle.” Here we find that smara is related to recognition.6 Similarly, the Indriya Saṃyutta gives the following definition of the faculty of sati:

And monks, what is the faculty of sati? Here, monks, a noble disciple is possessed of sati, endowed with supreme “mindfulness and discrimination” (satinepakka), is one who remembers, who recollects what was done and said long ago. He dwells contemplating the body as a body...feelings...mind...He dwells contemplating dharmas as dharmas, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world.7

It is noteworthy that in this definition the passage “He dwells contemplating the body as a body...concerning the world” is a standard description of the four establishments of mindfulness (cattō satipaṭṭhānā), or “the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula” as will be discussed in Chapter 5. This definition involves not only memory or recollection, but also discrimination or identification. Here the term “mindfulness and discrimination” (sati-nepakka) denotes recognition rather than just remembering. This can be inferred from a sutta in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, which says, “Monks, five knowledges arise separately in those who, being discriminating (nipaka) and mindful (patissata), develop immeasurable concentration.” The two words nipaka and patissata may correspond respectively to nepakka, which is derived from nipaka (PED s.v. nepakka), and to sati in the above compound satinepakka in the definition of the faculty of sati. In support of this, the commentary glosses nipaka and patissata as “possessing nepakka (discrimination) and sati (mindfulness).” Therefore it is reasonable to associate satinepakka in the definition of sati with the two words in the foregoing sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya. According to this sutta, those who are discriminating (nipaka) and mindful (patissata) are able to obtain the five knowledges, which refer to identification of the characteristics of immeasurable concentration, such as being pleasant, being unworldly, etc. (AN III 24) From this it can be inferred that in the definition of sati faculty satinepakka is related to the function of identification or recognition. It is also conceivable that proper remembering requires properly identifying or recognizing incoming sensory data or experiences. This must be implied in the definition of the faculty of sati.

Included in this definition, the four satipaṭṭhānas also involve both recognition and memory. The basic satipaṭṭhāna formula8 says “contemplating the body as a body,” “contemplating feelings as feelings,” etc. (e.g. SN V 141: kāye kāyānupassī, the same applies to vedanā, citta and dhammas). A formula which recurs in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the Satipaṭṭhāna
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Samyutta runs as follows: “He dwells contemplating the nature of arising (samudaya-dhamma) in the body; he dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing (vaya-dhamma) in the body; he dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body.” (The same is said of vedanā, citta and dhammas). This is to form conceptions in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching on impermanence. The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta describes many practices as: “he understands” (pajānati) the experiences or objects in the way they are. These statements imply that the satipaṭṭhāna practice is to develop accurate identification of the true nature of experiences or objects observed. On the other hand, this practice can counteract unwholesome memories. In the Dantabhāmi Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the four satipaṭṭhānas are said to be the bindings for the mind of the noble disciple in order to subdue his memories (sara) and thoughts (samkappa) based on household life. Accordingly the faculty of sati and the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas involve both proper recollection and proper identification. The two functions support each other reciprocally, and provide the cure for the foregoing vicious cycle caused by saṅhāra associated with unskillful consciousness.

From the above discussion we can conclude that sati plays a role similar to saññā in cognition, including memory (or recollection) and recognition (or conception). In the following cases, saṅhāra and sati seem to refer to the same thing. A sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (V 108–112) gives an exposition of ten saṅhāras, among which asubhasaññā is the same as one of the practices in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, namely seeing the body as full of many kinds of impurity. Following the description of asubhasaññā is the sentence: iti imasmiṃ kāye asubhānpassā viharati (AN V 109, “Thus one dwells contemplating this body as ugly”), which is very similar in form to kāye kāyānpassā viharati (“One dwells contemplating the body as a body”) in the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula. In this formula the word anupassin is used to describe how to practice the four satipaṭṭhānas, while in several instances anupassin is virtually synonymous with saññin, the adjective form of saññā; for example, ekacco puggalo sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccānapassā viharati aniccasaññā aniccapatiṇḍasanvedi at AN IV 13. The practice of ānāpānasati is one of the foregoing ten saṅhāras. Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1914, note 119) says that the maranasaṅhāra at SN V 132 is usually called “mindfulness of death” (maranasaṅhāra) as found at AN III 304–308.

In these cases, the notions of sati and saṅhāra seem to be interchangeable. The implication is that sati is a decisive factor in the proper functioning of saṅhāra, and the practice of sati consists in developing correct and wholesome cognition, a perfect and undistorted form of saṅhāra. I will elucidate this point according to the earliest texts, and show that overcoming cognitive problems is crucial to liberation and sati plays a major role in this respect.

Before we return to this point, it would be helpful to look at the relationship between sati and saṅhāra according to later Buddhist literature. Gethin (2001: 40) says,
According to the system of Abhidhamma embodied in the Pali Abhidhamma-piṭaka and commentaries, sati is only ever present as a mental factor (cetasika) in skilful states of mind (kusala-citta): if there is sati, there is skilful consciousness; and since sati is in fact always present in skilful states of mind, if there is skilful consciousness, there is sati.23

Saññā, however, exists in wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate states of mind.24 The Atthasālāṁī says that sati has firm saññā as its immediate cause.25 Accordingly, only when saññā exists can sati function. Sati has to work together with saññā. As long as sati is present, saññā must be associated with a wholesome mental state, and the manner in which saññā recognizes or memorizes must be wholesome.26 I will show that such a relationship between sati and saññā is explained in different ways in the earliest texts.

2. Mindfulness and cognition

2.1 Saññā and conceptual proliferation (papañca)

The penultimate chapter of the Sutta-nipāta, the Āṭṭhakavagga, emphatically advocates the practice of sati27 and dissociation from saññā.28 I will argue that saññā here refers to unwholesome saññā rather than saññā in general. The Āṭṭhakavagga is closely related to the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya in respect of wording and topics. This sutta starts with Dāṇḍapāṇi’s question about what the Buddha preaches and proclaims. The Buddha answers as follows:

Friend, I preach and proclaim such [a doctrine] that one does not dispute with anyone in the world with its gods, māras and brahmās, anyone in this generation with its ascetics, Brahmins, gods and human beings, and so that saññās do not lie latent in that Brahmin who dwells detached from sensual desires, without doubt, with worry cut off, free from craving for existence and non-existence.29

Similarly, a great deal of the Āṭṭhakavagga consists of exhortations not to engage in disputes. The Duṭṭhaṭṭhaka Sutta, Paśūra Sutta and Kalahavīvāda Sutta are good examples. Even the very wording used in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, i.e. viggayha (dispute), also occurs in verses 844, 878 and 883 of the Āṭṭhakavagga. The term bhavabhave vītatāghañi (“free from craving for existence and non-existence”) in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta is strikingly similar to avītatāghāse bhavabhavesu (“not free from craving for existence and non-existence”) found in verses 776 and 901.30 The most significant is the statement “Saññās do not lie latent in that Brahmin who dwells detached from sensual desires, . . . .” This agrees with the purport of the
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Atthakavagga that the problem of saññā should be overcome. For example, verse 847 contrasts a liberated person with ordinary people by comparing their connections with saññā:

One who is detached from saññā has no ties. One who is liberated through wisdom has no illusions. Those who have grasped saññā and view wander clashing in the world. 31

It should be noted that saññā in these two texts does not refer to the aggregate of saññā in general, but rather to some particular type of saññā. In the sentence “Saññās do not lie latent (saññā nānusesenti) in that Brahmin . . .” the verb amuseti often goes with underlying tendencies (anusaya) in the Nikāyas. 32 This sutta also mentions several underlying tendencies in the passage that I cite below. Therefore amuseti may indicate that saññās here refer to those connected with underlying tendencies, probably underlying tendencies to views (ditthanusaya) mentioned in this sutta (see the quotation below).

In the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, after the Buddha answered Daṇḍapāṇi’s question, a certain monk requested the Buddha to explain his answer. The Buddha replied:

Monk, if there is nothing to be delighted in, to be welcomed, [or] to be clung to in that source from which apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation assail a person, then this is the end of the underlying tendencies to passion, this is the end of the underlying tendencies to aversion, this is the end of the underlying tendencies to views, . . . this is the end of taking up cudgels, of taking up swords, of quarrels, disputes, argument, strife, slander and false speech. 33

Here again we find that many words are the same as or similar to those in the Atthakavagga: “taking up cudgels” (daṇḍāḍāna = attaṇḍa in verse 935, where atta is the past passive participle of ā-dā), “quarrel” (kalaha, verses 862, 863), “argument” (vivāda, verses 862, 863), and “slander” (pesuñña = pesuṇa in verse 863). Unfortunately, the Buddha’s answer was too brief to be intelligible, so after he left, the monks went to Mahā Kaccāṇa and asked him to expound in detail. Then he elaborated:

Friends, depending on the eye 34 and visible forms, eye-consciousness arises. The combination of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling [arises]. What one feels, one apperceives. What one apperceives, one thinks about. What one thinks about, one conceptually proliferates. With what one conceptually proliferates as the source, apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation assail a person with regard to past, future and present...
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visible forms cognized by the eye. [The same is said of the other five
senses, namely ear, nose, tongue, body, mind-organ.]

This passage represents a formula of the cognitive process in unskillful con-
sciousness. Here the term “apperception and naming [associated with] con-
ceptual proliferation” (papañca-saññA-saṅkhā) is similar to papañca-saññA-
saṅkhā in verses 874 and 916 of the Āṭṭhakavagga. Both terms denote a harmful
factor that causes suffering in saṃsāra. In the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, the origin
of papañca-saññA-saṅkhā can be traced back to saṅkhā. Likewise, verse
874 of the Āṭṭhakavagga says that papañca-saññA has its source (nidāna) in
saṅkhā. This is why both texts say that one should stay away from saṅkhā in
order to achieve liberation.

2.2 Problems of saṅkhā in terms of the senses

Now I shall discuss the Āṭṭhakavagga and other parts of the Canon in relation
to the formula of cognition in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta mentioned
above. Verse 790 of the Āṭṭhakavagga says, “The Brahmin does not say that
purity is from something else, or is in what is seen (diṭṭhe), in what is heard
(sute), in rules and observances, or in what is thought of (mute).” The same
idea is found in many other verses. This is the Buddha’s criticism of the soter-
iology of contemporary religions. “Purity” (suddhi) here refers to the reli-
gious goal, or liberation. The meaning of suddhi is implied in the first sutta
of the Māra Saṅyutta (SN I 103), which records that when the Buddha just
attained enlightenment, he thought: “I am freed from that severe asceticism!”
then Māra said to him: “You have missed the path to purity (suddhi).”
Therefore, “purity” (suddhi) here refers to the religious goal, or liberation.
“Rules and observances” (sīlavata) could refer to the practices of such
ascetics as ox-observance ascetics (govatika) and dog-observance ascetics
(kukkuravatika) as stated in the Kukkuravatika Sutta, where the Buddha criti-
cizes a dog-observance ascetic thus: “If he has such a view: ‘By this rule
(silena) or observance (vatena) or asceticism or holy life I will become a god
or some god’, this is his wrong view.”

Here is a clue to the Buddha’s refutation of ātman, the “Self,” in the
Upaniṣads. As Olivelle (1996: lv–lvi) explains, ātman has many usages in the
Upaniṣadic vocabulary; one such usage refers to the “Self,” the ultimate essence
of a human being, which is equated to Brahma, the ultimate real.
Jayatilleke (1963: 60–61) points out that seeing, hearing, thinking, etc. are
already regarded as ways of knowing the ātman in the early Upaniṣads, and
the same terminology is employed by Buddhist texts in contexts which criti-
cize the Upaniṣadic doctrines of the ātman. He refers to as examples MN I
135 and verses 793, 798, 802, 813, 901 in the Sutta-nipāta. Gombrich (1990a:
15) also says that diṭṭham, sutam, mutam, viññātam in the Alagaddāpama Sutta
(MN I 135f.) is alluding to a passage in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 4.5.6,
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which reads: “When the Self (ātman) is seen, heard, thought of and cognized, the whole is known.” (ātmani khalv āre drṣṭe śrute mate viññāta idaṃ sarvam viditam). In our verse (Sn 790) “what is seen, heard, or thought of” (diṭṭhe, sute, mue vā) may also be an allusion to the same passage, although viññāta is missing, which could be due to the restriction of meter.

As Gombrich (2002: 22) points out, the closest verbal parallel of all is in verse 797: “Grasping the benefit which he sees in the Self that is seen, heard, and thought of, or in rules and observances, he sees anything else as inferior.” (yat attanā passati ānisāṃsatā diṭṭhe sute śilavate mue vā tad eva so tattha samuggahāya, niḥnato passati sabbam aṭṭhaṃ.) Here attanā (“the Self,” with the final lengthening for metrical reason) agrees with the three past passive participles, diṭṭhe sute mue, and apparently refers to the ātman in the Upaniṣads. Therefore this verse also expresses the same criticism of Brahmanism.

As discussed above, saññā criticized in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta refers to some particular type of saññā. This is also the case with verse 802 in the Aṭṭhakavagga, which describes a liberated person thus: “By him, not even a minute saññā is conceptualized here with regard to what is seen, heard, or thought of.”39 This means that he does not conceptualize the “Self” rather than that he has no saññā at all. Likewise, na saññasaññā na visaññasaññā na pi asaññā na vibhūtasaññā in verse 874, which has been translated in different ways by the commentary40 and different scholars,41 may mean that one should avoid any erroneous way of apperceiving/conceiving (saññin) and still keep the proper function of saññā.

According to sutta 95 of the Saṅyatana Saṅyutta, “What is seen, heard, or thought of” (diṭṭha suta mue vā) refers to what is experienced through any of the six senses. In this sutta the Buddha exhorts Māluṅkyaputta (or Māluṅkaputta) to practice thus:

Regarding things seen, heard, thought of, and cognized (diṭṭha-suta-mue-viññātabhesu dhammesu) by you: in the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard; in what is thought of there will be merely what is thought of; in the cognized there will be merely the cognized (viññāta).42

Then Māluṅkyaputta says,

I understand in detail, venerable sir, the meaning of what the Blessed One said in brief:

(Verse 1) Mindfulness is neglected by one who pays attention to the agreeable sign on seeing a visible form. One feels it with infatuated mind and clings to it. Many feelings arising from the visible form grow in one. One’s mind is impaired by covetousness and annoyance. For one who accumulates suffering thus, Nibbāna is said to

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be far away... [The same is said of the other five senses in the next five verses respectively.]

(Verse 7) On seeing a visible form, being mindful, one is not attached to visible forms. One feels it with a detached mind and does not cling to it. One lives mindfully in such a way that when one sees a visible form and even experiences a feeling, [suffering] is exhausted, not accumulated. For one who diminishes suffering thus, Nibbāna is said to be near... [The same is said of the other five senses in the next five verses respectively.]

The above verses are repeated by the Buddha in this sutta. According to the foregoing passage, it is evident that “things seen, heard, thought of, and cognized” (diṭṭha-sutta-muta-viññātabba dhammā) refer to what is perceived through the six senses. Kamalēswar Bhattacharya (1980: 11) says that this is the starting point of the traditional interpretation. According to the Visuddhimagga, diṭṭha refers to the sphere of visible form that is seen, suta the sphere of sound that is heard, viññātabba or viññāta the sphere of consciousness (viññāṇa), and surprisingly, muta (thought of) refers to the spheres of smell, taste and tangible data. I am not sure if the Buddha intended these terms to be understood in this way, but he may have changed the original meaning of the expression in the Upaniṣads to fit his teaching. This may apply to the verses cited above in the Atīthakavagga. A pun is probably implied in “what is seen, heard, or thought of.” On the one hand, this phrase refers to what is perceived through the six senses. On the other hand, it alludes to the “Self.” The Atīthakavagga may intend to say that one should not form the saññā of the “Self” with regard to anything perceived through the six senses.

Likewise, “paying attention to (manasikaroto) the agreeable sign (nimitta)” in the first six verses in sutta 95 of the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta is probably meant to criticize saññā operating in an unwholesome way when one perceives through the six senses. In contrast, the last six verses recommend being mindful with regard to incoming sensory data. This is parallel to some verses in the Vaṅgisāthera Saṃyutta: “Your mind is on fire due to the perversion of saññā. You should avoid the beautiful sign (subhaṇa nimittaṃ) which is provocative of lust... You should have kāyagata sati⁴⁷...”⁴⁸ Skilling (1997: 480) points out that saṃjña (saññā in Pali) is connected with nimitta in most definitions. Here subhaṇa nimittaṃ is related to the perversion of saññā, and kāyagata sati is apparently prescribed as a remedy for the perversion of saññā.

2.3 Sati prevents saññā from developing into conceptual proliferation

The above-mentioned cognitive process in the Madhupiṇḍika formula can be summarized as Figure 1.1.
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The sequence of the formula remains ethically neutral until the link of feeling (vedanā). The sequence from sañjānāti (saññā) onwards is liable to criticism. Here arise two questions. Firstly, what kind of saññā should be avoided? Secondly, what is the relationship between sati and saññā? For the first question, it may refer to the saññā that brings about various views and can cause disputes among ascetics and Brahmins, which is a matter repeatedly criticized in the Aththakavagga and the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta. Saññā regarding the Self as implied in the foregoing verse 802 is an example. In other words, what should be avoided is the type of saññā that leads to papañcasaññāsaṅkhā and leads people astray from the ultimate truth.

As for the second question, we may say that sati is a factor that plays a crucial role in proper cognition, and it prevents saññā from going astray to conceptual proliferation (papañca). In his research on the philosophy of the Aththakavagga, Premasiri (1972: 12) has a comment on the nature of saññā in relation to incoming sensory data:

The word saññā occurs in the Aththakavagga mostly in the sense of ideas of sensory origin... Saññā stands for the purely subjective, and subjective experiences can easily be erroneously described, when they are verbally formulated, as views and elevated to the position of objective truths.

All the views and speculations that cause disputes in the world result from such subjective experiences based on sensory contacts, including the contact between mind and mental objects. These experiences bring about various ways of conceptualization among different beings, which leads to naming associated with conceptual proliferation (papañca-saṅkhā, or papañcasaññāsaṅkhā), and hence diverse views and arguments among people.

Such conceptual proliferation based on subjective experiences stems from a deep-rooted sense of ego, as stated in verse 916 of the Aththakavagga: The Blessed One said, “The sage should completely stop [the thought] ‘I am,’ which is the root of naming associated with conceptual proliferation.” As Ven. Nānananda (1971: 5–6) has pointed out, the Madhupiṇḍika formula of cognition begins on an impersonal note, which is sustained only up to the point of vedanā. Then the mode of description changes to a personal tone presented by the third-person verbs, which imply deliberate activity: yam vedeti tam sañjānāti, yam sañjānāti tam vitakketi, yam vitakketi tam papañceti. Kalupahana (1975: 122) further argues:
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Immediately after feeling (vedanā), the process of perception becomes one between subject and object. . . . This marks the intrusion of the ego-consciousness, which thereafter shapes the entire process of perception.

This seems plausible. In the case of an ordinary person, saññā (or its nominal form, saññā) involves the duality of subject and object, and therefore ego-consciousness, or the thought “I am” in the Aṭṭhakavagga’s terminology. How can one stop the thought “I am,” which is the root of conceptual proliferation? The second half of the foregoing verse 916 might be the answer: “He should train himself to dispel whatever craving is in himself, always being mindful.” Here conceptual proliferation is associated with craving (taṇhā).

This is reflected in a sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, where the unexplained questions are described as “connected with craving” (taṇhāgata) as well as conceptually proliferated (papañcita). Sati is to rectify such problems concerning cognition. I will further elucidate this point by invoking other texts.

The Pāsādana Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya also teaches something similar to what we have seen in the Aṭṭhakavagga, and by comparing these two texts we can identify sati in the Aṭṭhakavagga with the four satipatthānas in the Pāsādana Sutta, and saññā in the former text with saññā in the latter. In the Pāsādana Sutta the Buddha criticizes various views concerning ontology or metaphysics. They are classified into two groups: (1) the bases of view connected with the past, such as “The self and the world are eternal/not eternal”; (2) the bases of view connected with the future, such as “The self is material and healthy after death,” “The self does not exist after death.”

The ascetics and Brahmins who hold these different views say, “Only this is true and any other [view] is foolish.” The Buddha says that he does not accept them. The reason is that some beings conceive/apperceive (saññā) in different ways (aññathā) in this respect. Similarly, the Aṭṭhakavagga has the following verses (indicated by verse numbers):

786: The purified one does not form a view anywhere in the world in regard to existence and non-existence.
832: Those who, having taken up a view, dispute and say, “Only this is truth.” . . .
832: . . . They take their own view to be true. Therefore they regard their opponent as foolish.
835: Why do they proclaim various truths? . . .
886: Without saññā there are not many and various truths that are eternal in the world . . .
887: One shows contempt depending on these, namely what is seen, what is heard, rules and observances, or what is thought of. Having stood firm in one’s decision, being complacent, one says, “My opponent is foolish, unskilled.”
There are several parallels between the *Pāsādika Sutta* and the *Atthakavagga*. They both criticize the views involving ontological speculation which have nothing to do with liberation. In these two texts people hold different views and consider their own to be the only truth and others' to be foolish. Both texts point out that the reason for such divergence in views is *saññā* (or *saññin*, the adjective form of *saññā*). It should be noted that in the passage quoted above from the *Pāsādika Sutta*, “in this respect” (*ettha*) is qualifying the objects or contents one conceives/apperceives (*saññin*), which probably refer to the metaphysical matters that cause disputes among ascetics and Brahmans as described in the *Pāsādika Sutta* and the *Atthakavagga*. It is this type of *saññā* that should be overcome, but not *saññā* in general. A connection between *saññā* and “what is seen, heard, or thought of” can be found in verses 886 and 887, as we have seen in 802 discussed above. As mentioned above a theme in the *Atthakavagga* repeated several times is to overcome the problem of *saññā* and to practice *sati*. A clearer connection between the two can be found in the *Pāsādika Sutta*, where the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (establishments of mindfulness) are recommended for the abandoning of all such views. Although this text does not mention overcoming problem of *saññā*, this must be implied since it confirms that people hold different views because they have different *saññās*. In other words, *saññā* is the origin of forming such views. Therefore, when the *sutta* says that the four *satipaṭṭhānas* can conduce to the abandoning of all such views, it implies that this practice also solves the problem of *saññā*.

To sum up, the unwholesome functioning of *saññā* can lead to conceptual proliferation (*papañca*), which is obstructive to the insight that effects liberation. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* are practiced to rectify this faulty functioning of *saññā* by focusing on empirical objects without any conceptual proliferation—contemplating the body, etc., as they are. In other words, “in the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard . . .” as stated in *sutta* 95 of the *Saḷāyatana Saṇṭipitaka* mentioned above. As Goleman (1975: 219) puts it, the practice of mindfulness is to break through the natural tendency “to substitute abstract cognitive patterns or perceptual preconceptions for the raw sensory experience.” In the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* a refrain appended to each of the practices includes the following words: “His mindfulness that ‘there is a body (or feeling, etc.)’ is established to an extent sufficient for knowledge and recollection.” This could imply that mindfulness is established to such an extent that one apprehends the bare objects of sensory experience without stimulating the mind into cognitive chains of reaction.

### 3. Mindfulness and emotion

#### 3.1 Emotions: Secondary feelings conditioned by *saññā*

The *Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* appears to refer to *satipaṭṭhāna* as a practice that deals with emotion by overcoming cognitive
problems. Near the end of the *sutta* is an explanation of the three *satipāṭhānas*, which is preceded by an exposition of the thirty-six states of beings (*sattapada*). The thirty-six states of beings refer to six types of joy (*somanassa*), of dejection (*domanassa*) and of equanimity (*upekkhā*) based on the household life and the same number based on absence of desire, each experienced according to the six sense-bases (*āyatana*). These thirty-six states of beings also occur in *sutta* 22 of the *Vedanā Sāṇyutta*, where they are called “the thirty-six feelings.” In this *sutta*, *somanassa*, *domanassa* and *upekkhā* are also included in the set of five feelings (SN IV 232). These three terms appear to be emotions in the context of the *Sāḷāyatanavibhanga Sutta*. As Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 40) indicates: “While feeling (*vedanā*) comes under the standard psychological categories of Buddhism, there is no generic term for emotion.” I shall elucidate that what modern psychology calls emotions fall into the categories of feeling (*vedanā*) and volitional formations (*saṅkhāra*) in Buddhism. Let us first examine the thirty-six states of beings. Here is a summary of these feelings:

1. Six kinds of joy based on the household life: Joy arises when one regards as acquisition the acquisition of visible forms cognized by the eye that are wished for, desired, agreeable, gratifying, and associated with worldliness, or when one recalls what was formerly acquired that has passed, ceased, and changed. [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]

2. Six kinds of joy based on absence of desire (*nekkhama*): Joy arises when, by knowing the impermanence, change, fading away, and cessation of visible forms, one sees as it actually is with proper wisdom that visible forms both formerly and now are all impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change. [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]

3. Six kinds of dejection based on the household life: Dejection arises when one regards as non-acquisition the non-acquisition of visible forms cognized by the eye that are wished for, desired, agreeable, gratifying, and associated with worldliness, or when one recalls what was formerly not acquired that has passed, ceased, and changed. [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]

4. Six kinds of dejection based on absence of desire: Having seen . . . that visible forms both formerly and now are all impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change, one generates a longing for the supreme liberations thus: “When shall I enter upon and dwell in that sphere which the noble ones now enter upon and dwell in?” In one who generates thus a longing for the supreme liberations, dejection arises with that longing as condition. [The same is said of the other five sense-bases.]

5. Six kinds of equanimity based on the household life: Equanimity arises in a foolish muddled ordinary person, in an uninstructed ordinary
person who, on seeing a visible form with the eye, does not know the limits or know the results and who is blind to danger. The same is said of the other five sense-bases.

6. Six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire: Equanimity arises when one sees as it actually is with proper wisdom that visible forms both formerly and now are all impermanent, unsatisfactory, and subject to change. The same is said of the other five sense-bases.

A scrutiny of the description of these feelings can show that their arising is actually a result of cognition, i.e. sañña. Take the six kinds of joy based on the household life as an example. The statement that “one regards as acquisition the acquisition of visible forms cognized by the eye that are wished for . . .” denotes labeling or identification, while the statement that “one recalls what was formerly acquired” refers to recollection. Both functions belong to sañña as discussed earlier in this chapter. After the exposition of the six types of feeling, the Buddha exhorts the monks

1. to abandon the six kinds of joy based on the household life by depending on the six kinds of joy based on absence of desire,
2. to abandon the six kinds of dejection based on the household life by depending on the six kinds of dejection based on absence of desire,
3. to abandon the six kinds of equanimity based on the household life by depending on the six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire,
4. to abandon the six kinds of dejection based on absence of desire by depending on the six kinds of joy based on absence of desire,
5. to abandon the six kinds of joy based on absence of desire by depending on the six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire.

Accordingly, the feelings that are most highly recommended are the six kinds of equanimity based on absence of desire.

I will argue that all these feelings can be considered to be emotions. With regard to vedanā, Johansson (1979: 88) notes that a distinction between the mere reception and registration of sensation and the subjective reaction to it was made in Buddhism. In my view, this point is illustrated very well in sutta 6 of the Vedanā Samyutta, in which the Buddha says: “Monks, when an uninstructed ordinary person comes into contact with a painful feeling, he sorrows, distresses himself, laments, weeps beating his chest, and becomes bewildered. He feels two feelings: a bodily one and a mental one.” The bodily feeling is compared to a stab by a dart, while the mental feeling is compared to a further stab by a second dart. In this sutta the bodily feeling refers to the original painful feeling he experiences, which is the mere reception of sensory data, while the mental feeling refers to the subsequent subjective reaction to the original feeling, which may be expressed in this sutta by the words “he sorrows, distresses himself.”
Johansson (1979: 89) points out that from many formulations one gets the impression that the pleasant and unpleasant qualities are inherent in the objects. This may apply to the first dart in this case. This Sutta says that the instructed noble disciple only feels the bodily feeling, not the mental one. This is meant to teach the overcoming of the subsequent “secondary feeling,” the mental one, which is a subjective reaction to the original feeling, the bodily one. The original feeling may be intrinsic, as it were, in the sensory data, just like the pain felt when a man is struck by a dart. If he sorrows, distresses himself, then he feels a secondary painful feeling. In this case, while the original feeling is inevitable, the secondary feeling can be avoided. The three types of feeling, namely somanassa, domanassa and upakkhā, in the Sālayatanavibhaṅga Sutta should be regarded as such secondary feelings since they do not necessarily arise as a result of sensory contact according to this Sutta. This can be supported by the commentary on the foregoing Sutta of the Vedanā Sanyutta, which refers to the secondary feeling as a feeling of domanassa. In the Nikāyas the terms somanassa and domanassa refer to mental pleasant feeling and mental painful feeling respectively. This also suggests that somanassa and domanassa belong to the secondary feelings, which are mental, according to the foregoing Sutta of the Vedanā Sanyutta.

In my opinion, the secondary feelings such as somanassa, domanassa and upakkhā can be counted as emotions for the following reasons. In the field of psychology, Gross (2001: 133) notes: “Wundt (1897) . . . believed that emotional experience can be described in terms of combinations of three dimensions—pleasantness/unpleasantness, calm/excitement, and relaxation/tension.” Somanassa and domanassa belong to the dimension of pleasantness/unpleasantness, while upakkhā seems equivalent to calm as it is translated as “equanimity” by many scholars.

Although psychologists have disagreed in their definitions of emotion as indicated by Paul Ekman, W.V. Friesen and P. Ellsworth (Ekman, 1982: 9), emotion as defined by many psychologists seems to cover part of vedanā (feeling) and part of saṅkhārā (volitional formations) in Buddhism. Gross (2001: 133) states: “Ekman et al. (1972) and Ekman & Friesen (1975) identified six primary emotions: surprise, fear, disgust, anger, happiness and sadness.” The last two emotions correspond to the feelings of somanassa and domanassa in our case, while anger might belong to saṅkhāra. Vetter (2000: 38) argues that rāga (“lust”), dosa (“anger” or “hatred”) and moha (“delusion”) should be counted as saṅkhāra according to Sutta 11 of the Vedanā Sanyutta. The Dhammasaṅgīti, the first book of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, classes lobha (similar to rāga), dosa and moha in the saṅkhārakkhandha. Hamilton (1996: 46) says that the saṅkhārakkhandha is where the emotions Westerners associate with feelings come from. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the secondary feelings discussed above can be regarded as emotions. In my view, emotion can be the transition from the original feeling to saṅkhāra (volitional formation), as is implied in the foregoing Sutta 6 of
the *Vedanā Sanyutta*, where the secondary feeling is said to lead to underlying tendencies (*anusaya*), which fall into the category of the *saṅkhāra-akkhandha* as indicated by Hamilton (1996: 76). The relationship between emotion, *vedanā* and *saṅkhāra* can be represented in Figure 1.2.

There are various theories of emotion, among which the "cognitive labeling theory" that Schachter and Singer (1962) propose to explain emotion seems to be in line with the texts discussed above. They say (p. 380):

[It] is suggested that one labels, interprets, and identifies this stirred-up state in terms of the characteristics of the precipitating situation and one’s *apperceptive* mass. This suggests, then, that an emotional state may be considered a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a *cognition* appropriate to this state of arousal. . . . Cognitions arising from the immediate situation as interpreted by *past experience* provide the framework within which one understands and *labels his feelings*. It is the *cognition* which determines whether the state of physiological arousal will be labeled as "anger," “joy,” “fear,” or whatever.

This statement is analogous to the foregoing *sutta 6*, where the arising of the secondary feeling, or emotion, depends on the subjective reaction of the person who experiences the original feeling. This subjective reaction comes from one’s cognitive labeling associated with memory, or *apperception* (*saññā*). Likewise, the feelings discussed in the *Salāyatana-nibbaṇa Sutta* can arise due to one’s recognition or labeling of certain characteristics, or can be surmounted by spiritually superior emotions through transforming the ways of cognition.

Spiro (1982: 48) considers *upekkhā* to be “the only emotional state ultimately valued by nibbanic Buddhism.” Griffiths (1983: 61) describes *upekkhā* as “a psychological condition opposed to any kind of extreme emotional reaction, either pleasant or unpleasant.” Likewise, C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1931: 166) translates *upekkhā* as “emotional indifference” or “emotional neutrality” (1931: 35) in the context of the *jhānas*. She indicates that the *indriyappabheda-upakkhā*, or *upekkhā* dividing the (ethically) regulative forces of *somanassa*
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and domanassa, is emotional (Aung, 1910: 230). Equanimity based on absence of desire is a state in which one remains emotionally undisturbed and detached from any objects experienced through the six senses. This is achieved by contemplating the nature of objects such as impermanence and unsatisfactoriness, and dissociating oneself from labeling objects as agreeable or disagreeable and counting anything as gain or loss. Equanimity based on absence of desire is not apathy or insensitivity due to ignorance, but is brought about by penetration of the true nature of the things experienced.

3.2 The three satipaṭṭhānas and the supreme state of emotion, equanimity

Near the end of the Salāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta are the “three satipaṭṭhānas, practicing which the Noble Teacher is fit to instruct a group.” These three can be summarized in brief as follows:

1. The first satipaṭṭhāna: When the Teacher teaches the Dhamma out of compassion [thinking]: “This is for your welfare . . .,” the disciples do not wish to hear. With that the Tathāgata is not satisfied, and does not feel satisfaction; he dwells free from defilement, mindful and fully aware.

2. The second satipaṭṭhāna: When the Teacher teaches the Dhamma out of compassion [thinking]: “This is for your welfare . . .,” some disciples wish to hear, while others do not. With that the Tathāgata is not satisfied, and does not feel satisfaction; he is not dissatisfied, and does not feel dissatisfaction; having avoided both satisfaction and dissatisfaction, he dwells equanimously, mindful and fully aware.

3. The third satipaṭṭhāna: When the Teacher teaches the Dhamma out of compassion [thinking]: “This is for your welfare . . .,” the disciples wish to hear. With that the Tathāgata is satisfied, and feels satisfaction; he dwells free from defilement, mindful and fully aware.

These three “satipaṭṭhānas” refer to how the Buddha practices the establishment of mindfulness in three different circumstances. This section should be consistent with the topic expounded earlier in the same sutta, that is, cultivating upekkhā and abandoning other emotions. But according to this section the first and the third satipaṭṭhānas include certain kinds of emotion other than upekkhā. Only in the second situation does the Buddha achieve upekkhā and abandon other emotions. This seems rather incoherent. This paragraph might be corrupt as the CSCD has a different version of the first satipaṭṭhāna, which reads: “The Tathāgata is not dissatisfied, and does not feel dissatisfaction” (for Pali see the above note). This section also disagrees with a verse in a sutta of the Sānāyutta Nikāya, which reads: “Compassionate for their welfare, the Perfectly Enlightened One teaches realization. The Tathāgata is released from satisfaction and repulsion.” The
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counterpart of this section in the Chinese translation of the Madhyama Āgama is quite different from the Pali version, and could provide a solution to this problem. The three satipaṭṭhānas can be summed up as follows:

1. The first satipaṭṭhāna: When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to the disciples out of compassion, they do not accept the true Dharma and go against the Blessed One’s teaching. The Blessed One is not sad with this, but he is equanimous without doing anything, constantly mindful and constantly aware.

2. The second satipaṭṭhāna: When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to the disciples out of compassion, they accept the true Dharma and do not go against the Blessed One’s teaching. The Blessed One is not delighted at this, but he is equanimous without doing anything, constantly mindful and constantly aware.

3. The third satipaṭṭhāna: When the Tathāgata preaches the Dharma to the disciples out of compassion, some of them do not accept the true Dharma and go against the Blessed One’s teaching, while others accept the true Dharma and do not go against the Blessed One’s teaching. The Blessed One is not sad at this, nor is he delighted, but he is equanimous without doing anything, constantly mindful and constantly aware.

A Sanskrit version of these three satipaṭṭhānas (Skt smṛtyupasthāna) said to be quoted from an unspecified sūtra by Yaśomitra in his Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavākyāḥ agrees largely with the Chinese version, although the first two smṛtyupasthānas are inverted and some words are apparently missing in the third smṛtyupasthāna. Much earlier than Yaśomitra, virtually the same version of the three items in the same order is also quoted in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-sūtra* (or *Mahāvibhāṣā, [阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論], a Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma work). Similar statements are also found in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (大智度論), a commentary on the Mahāyāna text called *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, and the *Tattvasiddhi* (or *Satyasiddhi*, 成實論) composed by Harivarman, who belonged to the Dārṣṭāntikas according to Lü (1982: 172) or to the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntikas according to Ven. Yinshun (1968: 574), but to the Bāhūsrutiyas according to Buswell and Jaini (1996: 94).

The account of the three satipaṭṭhānas preserved in different traditions in Chinese translation as well as in Sanskrit appears more consistent with the preceding topic on the various types of emotion in the Saṁyutta-nāṇa Sutta, and the whole context looks more coherent than that in the Pali version. In this context the establishments of mindfulness refer to establishing a stable mental state in which one constantly remains equanimous and free from various disturbing emotional elements which ordinary people are subject to in reaction to what they experience through their senses. In the context of this sutta, mindfulness (sati/smṛti) is established in order to
overcome such commotion of emotion and achieve the supreme state of emotion, equanimity, through transformation of the cognitive process based on the six senses. Ven. Bodhi says, “Satipaṭṭhāna here obviously has a different meaning than usual.” (Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1343, note 1246).

In my opinion, however, the three satipaṭṭhānas and the usual four satipaṭṭhānas are not really different in the sense that both are based on the same principle, namely developing sati for conducting the wholesome functioning of saññas. This point will be further illustrated in the following discussion of another text.

3.3 The four satipaṭṭhānas and the supreme state of emotion, equanimity

Another exposition of the four satipaṭṭhānas shows how saññas can be directed to counteract unwholesome cognition, and thereby help to achieve the optimal emotional state, equanimity. The Indriyabhāvanā Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya states:

(A) And how, Ānanda, does one become a noble one with developed faculties? Here, Ānanda, when a monk sees a visible form with the eye, in him there arises what is pleasant, there arises what is unpleasant, there arises what is both pleasant and unpleasant.

(B) (1) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the agreeable in the repulsive,” he dwells conceiving the agreeable therein. (2) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the repulsive in the agreeable,” he dwells conceiving the repulsive therein. (3) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the agreeable in the repulsive and in the agreeable,” he dwells conceiving the agreeable therein. (4) If he wishes: “May I dwell conceiving the repulsive in the agreeable and in the repulsive,” he dwells conceiving the repulsive therein. (5) If he wishes: “Avoiding both the agreeable and repulsive, may I dwell equanimously, mindful and fully aware,” he dwells therein equanimously, mindful and fully aware. [The same is said of the other five senses].

Here we have a process of cognition similar to that stated in the Madhupiṇḍika Sutta. In passage A “What is pleasant,” “what is unpleasant,” and “what is both pleasant and unpleasant” refer to feelings, especially emotions. This can be inferred from an earlier paragraph in this sutta, which runs as follows in brief:

When a monk sees a visible form with the eye, in him there arises what is pleasant, there arises what is unpleasant, there arises what is both pleasant and unpleasant. He understands thus: “There has
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arisen in me what is pleasant, what is unpleasant [or] what is both pleasant and unpleasant. And that is conditioned, gross and dependently originated, [whereas] this is peaceful, this is sublime, namely equanimity.” Thus what is pleasant, etc. ceases in him, and equanimity is established.90

It is very clear that “what is pleasant,” etc. refers to emotions. They can be surmounted by the wholesome functioning of saññī—proper identification of their true nature and of the state opposite to them, and thereby equanimity can be attained.

Passage B moves on to the operation of saññā, and it is noteworthy that this passage is quoted in the first sutta of the Anuruddha Samyutta as a practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas.91 “Repulsive” (paṭikkula) and “agreeable” (appaṭikkula) are descriptions of the object, and result from how one apperceives/conceives the object. Subsequent to the arising of feelings (passage A), one with developed faculties is said to deliberately conceptualize with regard to what he apperceives in four ways (passage B). Take the first one as an example: When he dwells conceiving (saññī) the agreeable in the repulsive, “the repulsive” must refer to what he apperceives or conceives originally, while “the agreeable” should be a conception deliberately formed.92 The deliberately formed saññā is probably intended to counteract the habitual saññā for the sake of overcoming the emotion caused by the habitual saññā. But the deliberately formed saññā may cause another type of emotion. Therefore, following the stage of deliberate use of saññā, one has to avoid both saññās, the agreeable and the repulsive. Then “he dwells equanimously (upekahako), mindful and fully aware.” This suggests that saññās of the agreeable and the repulsive can arouse such emotions as “what is pleasant,” etc. stated in passage A, and have to be abandoned in order to surmount those emotions and achieve upekkhā. Hecker describes this practice as “perfect control of emotive reactions” (Nyanaponika and Hecker, 1997: 193).

To sum up, the transformation of saññā conduces to the overcoming of disturbing emotional elements and the attainment of the best emotional state, upekkhā. As the foregoing sutta in the Anuruddha Samyutta concludes, it is to this extent that the four satipaṭṭhānas are undertaken by a monk.93 This shows that the four satipaṭṭhānas were considered to be a practice concerning the exercise of saññā and conducive to the establishing of the supreme emotional state.

3.4 Sati breaks the link between feelings and underlying tendencies

Why is it so important to eliminate those emotions and achieve upekkhā? Because it is integral to the Buddhist theory of liberation. According to sutta 6 of the Vedanā Samyutta mentioned above, when an instructed noble disciple comes into contact with a painful feeling, he does not feel the
secondary mental feeling, i.e. emotion. Therefore, the underlying tendencies (anusaya) to aversion, lust, and ignorance do not lie latent in him. Then he is detached from birth, ageing, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, dejection and distress. In other words, he has achieved liberation (SN IV 209). Accordingly, surmounting the disturbing emotions paves the way to liberation. The following sutta 7 of the Vedanā Samyutta echoes sutta 6, and prescribes sati as a preventive against disturbing emotions and the ensuing underlying tendencies. Here the Buddha starts his instruction with how to be mindful (sata) and fully aware (sampajāna). The former is explained by the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1), and the latter by the sati-sampajāñña formula (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2) found in the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta and other places. Then he says, 94

Monks, while a monk dwells thus, mindful and fully aware, vigilant, ardent, and resolute, if there arises in him a pleasant feeling, he understands thus: “There has arisen in me a pleasant feeling. Now that is dependent, not independent. Dependent on what? Dependent on this very body. But this body is impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated. So when the pleasant feeling has arisen in dependence on a body that is impermanent, conditioned, dependently originated, how could it be permanent?” He dwells contemplating impermanence, vanishing, fading away, cessation and relinquishment in the body and in pleasant feeling. As he dwells thus, the underlying tendency to lust in regard to the body and in regard to pleasant feeling is abandoned by him. [The same is said of painful feeling and neither-painful-nor-pleasant-feeling, with the corresponding underlying tendencies to aversion and ignorance.]95

The feeling here is said to be dependent on the body. This apparently refers to the original bodily feeling in the previous sutta. The secondary mental feeling, i.e. emotion, is not mentioned here presumably because it is prevented by the practice of mindfulness and full awareness, which involves contemplating the true nature of the body and feeling, namely impermanence and dependent origination. The Buddha goes on to teach that such contemplation leads to the abandoning of underlying tendencies, which implies liberation. Here again the practice of sati involves proper identification of reality, which consists in the wholesome functioning of saññā.

4. Mindfulness and the Path to Liberation

As discussed above, according to the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta and the first sutta of the Anuruddha Samyutta, the satipaṭṭhānas enable one to surmount emotional agitation and achieve equanimity (upekkhā) through transforming saññā. Conversely, the problems of saññā are said in another text to be
overcome by the development of wholesome emotions. In the Sakkapañña Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, when Sakka, lord of the gods, asked the Buddha about the path leading to the cessation of “apperception and naming [associated with] conceptual proliferation” (papañca-saññā-saṅkhā), his reply can be summed up as follows: There are two kinds of joy (somanassa), the kind to be developed and the kind not to be developed. The kind not to be developed causes the unwholesome states to increase and the wholesome states to decrease. The kind to be developed causes the unwholesome states to decrease and the wholesome states to increase. The same is said of dejection (domanassa) and equanimity (upekkhā). This reply does not seem to give a clear answer to Sakka’s question, but it apparently suggests that cultivating the joy to be developed, the dejection to be developed, and the equanimity to be developed will lead to the cessation of papañca-saññā-saṅkhā. It is very likely that these three emotions to be developed are equivalent to the emotions based on absence of desire expounded in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta, while the three emotions not to be developed are equivalent to the emotions based on the household life. In any case, this is a training for improving emotions, and this training is prescribed as a solution to the problems related to cognition. Similarly, some psychologists argue that emotions can affect cognitions, including memories, as Balota and Marsh (2004: 206) and Hayes (2000: 90) point out.

Therefore we find an interesting reciprocal relationship between cognition and emotion. They affect each other, and solving the problems on one side will be conducive to solving the problems on the other side. According to Buddhism emotion and cognition seem to be actually entangled with each other. The following remark by Gombrich (1988: 65–66) may support this point:

[T]wo rival analyses of life’s problems were already on offer. I have dubbed them the intellectualist—which locates the nub of the problem in our lack of true understanding—and the emotionalist—which blames our lack of self-control. The Buddha wonderfully combined the two. You cannot see things straight because you are blinded by passion, and you allow your emotions to run you because you do not see things as they are.

Thus we can see why sati is so vital to enlightenment. It enables one to overcome both cognitive and emotional problems, providing the basic principles underlying the whole edifice of Buddhist soteriology so as to satisfy both the intellectualist and the emotionalist.

There are various schemes of the path to liberation found in the Canon. The most prominent scheme is probably the one that is centered on the four jhānas, a series of meditative attainments, and culminates in the liberating insight. The relationship between sati and the jhānas will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Here we may gain an understanding of how sati effects
the jhānas by viewing this issue from a particular perspective. The sequence of the four jhānas shows a reduction in emotional and even sensory agitation as well as in cognitive disturbance. According to the usual jhāna formula, rapture (pīti) and pleasure (sukha) are present in the first and the second jhāna; rapture fades away in the third jhāna; in the fourth jhāna even pleasure and pain (dukkha) are abandoned, together with the disappearance of joy (somanassa) and dejection (domanassa) in the past (pubbe va). 97 It is not clear when somanassa and domanassa disappear. The discussion below of the Uppaṭṭiputta Sutta in the Indriya Samyutta could provide an answer. 98

This text says that the arisen pain faculty (dukkhindriya) ceases without remainder in the first jhāna; the arisen dejection faculty (domanassindriya) ceases without remainder in the second jhāna; the arisen pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) ceases without remainder in the third jhāna; the arisen joy faculty (somanassindriya) ceases without remainder in the fourth jhāna; the arisen equanimity faculty (upekkhindriya) ceases without remainder in the sāṇāvedayitanirōdha. 99 All the above mental factors belong to the aggregate of feeling. In the later literature a distinction is made between upakkhā as a feeling (vedamupekkhā) and upakkhā as specific neutrality (tatramajjhattupekkhā). 100 Specific neutrality includes upakkhā of the third and fourth jhānas 101 and is placed under the aggregate of volitional formations, saṅkhārakkhandha. 102 It is nevertheless clear that according to this text upakkhā in the jhānas is among the five indriyas, which are unequivocally referred to as feelings (vedanā) in the Nikāyas. 103

Unfortunately, many sūtras of the Indriya Samyukta, including the counterpart of the Uppaṭṭiputta Sutta, are missing in the Chinese translation of the Samyukta Āgama, but the foregoing account in this sūtra is quoted in several later texts of various traditions in Chinese translation. For example, the *Abhidharmānīrika (rasa)-sāstra (阿毘達摩甘露味論), which is attributed to the Sarvāstivāda by Takakusu (1905: 139), states: “The dejection faculty ceases without remainder in the first jhāna. The pain faculty ceases without remainder in the second jhāna. The joy faculty ceases without remainder in the third jhāna. The pleasure faculty ceases without remainder in the fourth jhāna.” 104 The same account is found in the *Tattvasiddhi (or *Satyasiddhi-sāstra, 成實論) 105 of the Dārṣṭāntikas or the Bāhūsrutiyas, and also in the Yogācārabhūmi of the Yogācāra school. 106 The *Tattvasiddhi indicates that it is said in the “Sūtra,” and the Yogācārabhūmi quotes it from the Avipārika Sutta (無倒經). 107 Part of the passage in question in the Avipārika Sutta is also cited in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: “uktan hi bhagavatā Avipārikaśāstraṃ saṃsthaṃ dhyānām uktavā ‘atrāśiyotpamān saumanasayendrīyam apariseṣanā niruddhā iti; catatthe ca dhīyāne suk-hendriyāṃ niruddhāya iti uktam.” (Ak-P 440) The order in which various feelings cease according to these texts does not agree with the order found in the Uppaṭṭiputta Sutta.
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As I have demonstrated in an article, the foregoing passage of the *Aviparītaka Sūtra* preserved in the Sanskrit and Chinese literature provides a plausible account of the order in which specific feelings cease in different jhānas, which fits in quite well with the usual jhāna formula. Its Pali counterpart in the *Uppatiṭṭhika Sutta*, however, contradicts the usual jhāna formula in three respects and has caused difficulties to Theravāda exegesis.

In *sutta* 29 of the *Vedanā Samyutta*, pīti, sukha and upekkhā that arise in dependence on sensual pleasure are called worldly (sāmāsa) pīti, worldly sukha, and worldly upekkhā, which must refer to those in the ordinary state. According to this *sutta*, pīti in the first and second jhānas is unworldly (nirāmisa) pīti, and sukha in the first, second and third jhānas is unworldly (nirāmisa) sukha (SN IV 235–236).

Pīti, along with sukha and upekkhā, is apparently regarded as a feeling since these three are discussed in the same manner in this text included in the *Vedanā Samyutta*, a chapter of the *Samyutta Nikāya* devoted to the exposition of feeling. When the sixteen exercises of the ānāpānasati are correlated to the four satipaṭṭhānas, the exercise “He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in perceiving pīti’; he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out perceiving pīti’ ” is assigned to contemplation of feelings (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). The Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharmavibhāgā-sāstra* explicitly states that pīti (Pali pīti) belongs to the aggregate of feeling (*vedanā-skandha*).

However, pīti is classified under the aggregate of volitional formations (sāṅkhārakkhandha) in the Theravāda Ābhidhamma, e.g. Dhs §§62, 148, etc. The fact that pīti is seen as a feeling in the *Sutta-piṭaka*, but classed under the aggregate of volitional formations by the Theravadins could support my argument that the secondary feelings, or emotions, can be the transition from the original feelings to sāṅkhāras. Commenting on pīti, C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1974: 9, note 6) also says, “It connotes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling.” Similarly, Guenther (1974: 124) translates pīti as “ecstatic emotivity.”

In the *Dhammasaṅgani* §§160, 161 and 163, upekkhā is not included in the mental factors of the first, second, and even third jhānas, presumably because in these sections somanassā is said to be present in the first three jhānas, while upekkhā is incompatible with somanassā. The inclusion of somanassā in the first three jhānas could be influenced by the *Uppatiṭṭhika Sutta*, which says that somanassā ceases in the fourth jhāna and therefore implies that it exists in the first three jhānas. The *Dhammasaṅgani*’s omission of upekkhā in the third jhāna contradicts the usual jhāna formula, which states that one dwells equanimous (upekhako) in the third jhāna. Similar omission of upekkhā is found in *sutta* 29 of the *Vedanā Samyutta* (S IV 237), which explains unworldly upekkhā as the upekkhā in the fourth jhāna without mention of the third jhāna. But according to the *Samyukta Agama* preserved in Chinese translation, “unworldly (無食, literally “non-food,” “nirāmisa) upekkhā” refers to the upekkhā in the third jhāna, while that in the fourth jhāna is called “unworldly unworldly” upekkhā.” The omission of
unworldly upakkhā in the third jhāna in the Pali version is perhaps also influenced by the Upatipātika Sutta, according to which the third jhāna still has somanassa, which is incompatible with upakkhā.

Let us now return to the topic of sati and refer back to the five points given in the Sāliyātanavibhaṅga Sutta (see Section 3.1):

1. to abandon somanassa based on the household life by depending on somanassa based on absence of desire,
2. to abandon domanassa based on the household life by depending on domanassa based on absence of desire,
3. to abandon upakkhā based on the household life by depending on upakkhā based on absence of desire,
4. to abandon domanassa based on absence of desire by depending on somanassa based on absence of desire,
5. to abandon somanassa based on absence of desire by depending on upakkhā based on absence of desire.

This passage can provide an explanation for the purpose of jhāna meditation with regard to feelings. When one attains the first jhāna, one has developed unworldly somanassa based on absence of desire, which counteracts worldly somanassa based on the household life in an ordinary state of mind (point 1). This unworldly somanassa of the first jhāna also counteracts unworldly domanassa (point 4), which has counteracted worldly domanassa (point 2). In the third jhāna, unworldly somanassa is abandoned due to unworldly upakkhā (point 5).

The above discussions, especially those concerned with the usual jhāna formula and the Aviparītaka Sūtra account, can be summed up in Table 1 (factors in bold type are to be surmounted in the next jhāna).

In the course of jhāna meditation, one first develops unworldly pleasant feelings and abandons worldly pleasant feelings as well as unpleasant feelings. As one proceeds to higher levels of jhāna, even unworldly pleasant feelings, from emotions to bodily feelings, are gradually abandoned. When the emotional elements, unworldly pīti and somanassa, are abandoned in the third jhāna, the practitioner achieves the supreme affective state, upakkhā. In the

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<td>ordinary state</td>
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<td>first jhāna</td>
<td>dukkha, unworldly somanassa, unworldly pīti, unworldly sukha</td>
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<td>second jhāna</td>
<td>unworldly somanassa, unworldly pīti, unworldly sukha</td>
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<tr>
<td>third jhāna</td>
<td>unworldly sukha, unworldly upakkhā (mental)</td>
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<td>fourth jhāna</td>
<td>unworldly unworldly upakkhā (both mental and bodily)</td>
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usual Ḗṭāna formula, the fourth Ḗṭāna is described as upakkhaśatipārisuddhi, “purity of equanimity and of mindfulness,” presumably because even unworldly sukha is eliminated, and therefore upakkha is even “purer,” as it is free not only from emotional disturbance, but also from the disturbance of bodily feelings. Thus proceeding through the four Ḗṭānas involves a reduction in emotional and sensory experiences to a state of equanimity, upakkha. Heiler (1922: 26) has indicated that the Ḗṭānas have a certain emotional quality about them and are concerned with the reduction of feelings to a state of indifference (i.e. upakkha), or a state of religious equanimity before the world. As discussed in Section 3, it is sati that enables one to overcome emotional disturbances and attain equanimity. This also applies to the reduction of feelings to upakkha in the Ḗṭānas. Chapter 3 (Section 2.2.2) will elucidate how sati functions in each of the four Ḗṭānas.

As for the cognitive aspect, the first Ḗṭāna is described as accompanied by vitakka and vicāra. In the second Ḗṭāna, vitakka and vicāra are eliminated. These two terms are virtually synonymous (PED s.v. vitakka). As Stuart-Fox (1989: 86) notes, “the term vicāra was used only to reinforce the meaning of vitakka.” However, as Cousins (1992: 138–147) shows, the Abhidhamma and the later Buddhist literature make a clear distinction between vitakka and vicāra, but different traditions have given different interpretations of these two terms. Such a distinction between the two terms is implied on some occasions in the Nikāyas, but they are apparently later additions. In the Mahāvedalla Sutta (MN I 294), vitakka and vicāra are among the five factors of the first Ḗṭāna. This seems to imply that they are different things. But this passage is not found in the Chinese counterpart of the Mahāvedalla Sutta (T 1, 790b–792b), and hence it could be an interpolation under the influence of early Abhidhammic analysis as Stuart-Fox (1989: 89–90) contends. He (p. 92) also points out that although there are five references in the Nikāyas to the three kinds of samādhi: (1) with vitakka and vicāra, (2) without vitakka but with vicāra, and (3) without vitakka and vicāra, they are either not found in the Chinese counterparts or replaced in the Chinese counterparts by a reference to three kinds of samādhi characterized by emptiness, signlessness and desirelessness.

The Madhupindika formula discussed above contains the following sequence:

\[
\text{saññānāti (saññā)} \rightarrow \text{vitakketi} \rightarrow \text{papañceti} \rightarrow \text{papañcasaññaṃsaṅkhā}
\]

The link of vitakketi in this sequence may apply to vitakka and vicāra in the first Ḗṭāna, and the elimination of vitakka and vicāra must denote the abandoning of the ensuing papañcasaññaṃsaṅkhā, but sañña is still functioning.

According to the Pujapāda Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, sañña is gradually refined through the progress of the Ḗṭānas. In this sutta the Buddha says that some sañnośćas arise through training while others cease through training in the following way (DN I 182–183): When a monk enters and dwells in the
first jhāna, his previous conception of sensual pleasures (kāma-saṅghāti) ceases, and at that time there arises a subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion (vivekajñā-saṅgha-sukham-sacca-saṅghāti). Afterwards, when he enters and dwells in the second jhāna, his previous subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion ceases, and there arises a subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of concentration (samādhiñā-saṅgha-sukham-sacca-saṅghāti). In the third jhāna, his previous subtle and true conception of rapture and pleasure born of concentration ceases, and there arises a subtle and true conception of equanimity and pleasure (upekkhā-saṅgha-sukham-sacca-saṅghāti). In the fourth jhāna, his previous subtle and true conception of equanimity and pleasure ceases, and there arises a subtle and true conception of neither-pain-nor-pleasure (adukkhā-saṁgha-sukham-sacca-saṅghāti).

These saṅghās are linked with different levels of feelings or emotions. As grosser, or lower, levels of sensations or emotions are gradually abandoned when one proceeds to higher levels of jhāna, the saṅghās of corresponding sensations or emotions cease accordingly. This also demonstrates a strong connection between emotion and cognition.

As will be discussed in Chapter 3, jhāna meditation involves the cultivation of sati, which steers and regulates cognition (saṅghā) as well as sensations and emotions (vedanā) in a proper way so that one can achieve different levels of jhāna. This practice culminates in the fourth jhāna, which is characterized as upekkhā-sati-pārisuddhi, a state of pure equanimity and mindfulness. The fourth jhāna provides an optimal emotional state and cognitive capability, which prepare the mind for the ultimate spiritual goal, and thereby enable one to attain liberation through developing the three gnoses (vijjā) or knowledges (ñātā), as stated in many texts. The Poṭṭhapāda Sutta also states: “As far as the attainment with sati [extends], there is penetration to perfect knowledge (aññā)”. The word aññā, like vijjā and ānā, represents the final knowledge obtained on reaching liberation. The improvement and perfection of saṅghā resulting from the enhancement of sati during jhāna meditation are conducive to the realization of perfect knowledge which effects liberation.

This path to liberation, from the attainment of the jhānas to the development of the perfect knowledge, involves both cognitive/intellectual and emotional transformations. The ultimate religious goal is often described as the “taintless liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom” (anāsavānti cetovimuttiṃ paññāvīmuttiṃ, all accusatives). Although “liberation of mind” and “liberation by wisdom” can refer to the same thing, they have different emphases according to some early texts. A passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya reads thus:

O monks, these two things are conducive to gnosis (vijjā). What two? Serenity (samatha) and insight (vipassanā). When serenity is developed, what benefit does it bring? The mind is developed. When
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the mind is developed, what benefit does it bring? Lust (rāga) is abandoned. When insight is developed, what benefit does it bring? Wisdom is developed. When wisdom is developed, what benefit does it bring? Ignorance (avijjā) is abandoned. . . . Thus, monks, through the fading away of lust there is liberation of mind; through the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom.122

This passage shows that serenity (samatha) and insight (vipassanā) are equally important. Serenity aims to calm the mind and eradicate lust (rāga). The Vibhaṅga (p. 145) uses the word rāga to explain craving (tanha) in the dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) formula, which says that tanha is conditioned by feeling (vedanā). Therefore serenity has to deal with feeling in order to eradicate rāga, i.e. tanha, which leads to renewed existence according to the Four Noble Truths.123 This is the emotionalist approach to the problem, and brings about “liberation of mind.” Insight aims to develop wisdom and hence eradicate ignorance (avijjā), which is the first link in the chain of dependent origination explaining the round of rebirths.124 This is the intellectualist approach to the problem, and leads to “liberation by wisdom.” Serenity concerns emotion/feeling (vedanā) and corresponds to the practice of the jhānas, while insight concerns cognition (sati) and corresponds to the development of perfect knowledge.125 How sati operates in serenity and insight will be elaborated in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2

TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF MINDFULNESS

Sati has been explained or described in very diverse ways and contexts in the Buddhist Canon. It seems that sati has different functions on different occasions for different purposes. In this chapter I will attempt to formulate a classification of sati on the basis of our discussion in the last chapter, although this classification is not meant to be exhaustive. In that chapter we looked at the general principle underlying the practice of sati, that is, to direct saññā in a proper way. This involves interaction between the mind and its objects. In this chapter I shall discuss the various functions of sati in terms of such interaction in different states of mind ranging from normal consciousness to several kinds of meditation. As will be shown below, these different functions of sati are not always distinctively separate or incompatible. They sometimes work together. On the other hand, the same function of sati can be found in different states of consciousness.

1. Simple awareness

In the practice of simple awareness, sati is the conscious registering of the presence of objects, which can be any incoming sensory data or experiences, whether in normal daily activities or during meditation. The Satipatthāna Sutta contains the following examples, to each of which is appended a refrain indicating one of the four satipatthānas:

(i) A monk, when taking a long in-breath, knows: “I am taking a long in-breath”; or, when taking a long out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a long out-breath.” When taking a short in-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short in-breath”; or, when taking a short out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short out-breath.” . . . Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body.1

(ii) When walking (standing, sitting or lying down, or however one’s body is disposed), one knows: “I am walking (standing, etc.).” . . . Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body.2
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(iii) When feeling a pleasant feeling, a monk knows: “I feel a pleasant feeling”; when feeling a painful feeling, he knows: “I feel a painful feeling”; when feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he knows: “I feel a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling.” . . . Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating feelings as feelings. 3

These practices consist of non-judgmental observation and recognition. The mind is simply aware of an object objectively without evaluating the object, the subject (i.e. the observer or the mind) or the interaction between the two. Mindfulness is often understood or employed in this sense by psychologists. For example, Kabat-Zinn (1994: 4) defines mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally.” Following this definition, Teasdale (2004: 277) says, “the non-judgmental characteristic of mindfulness means that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are treated simply as that, as experiences.”

2. Protective awareness

While one is perceiving incoming sensory data, one is further aware of how the mind reacts to the objects. In this instance, sati is related to the restraint of the senses and requires moral judgment. This function is impossible unless preceded by simple awareness (RFG).

2. Kāyasati/kāyagātā sati and satipaṭṭhāna

In the Dukkhadhamma Sutta of the Saṅyāsāṅkha Saṅyutta, the Buddha gives instruction on how to behave in daily life (translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 1249):

And how, monks, has a monk comprehended a mode of conduct and way of living in such a way that as he conducts himself thus and as he lives thus, evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection do not flow into him? Suppose a man should enter a thorny forest. There would be thorns in front of him, thorns behind him, thorns to his left, thorns to his right, thorns below him, thorns above him. He would go forward, being mindful (sati),4 he would go back, being mindful, thinking: “May no thorn [prick] me!” So too, monks, whatever in the world has an agreeable and pleasing nature is called a thorn in the Noble One’s Discipline.5

This simile implies that a monk should constantly practice mindfulness in every movement so as to protect himself from evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection, which result from contact with attractive objects. Then the Buddha says that having understood the above discourse,
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one should understand restraint and non-restraint. Below is his explanation of restraint (saṃvara) (non-restraint (asamvara) is explained in the converse way):

On seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is not intent on it in the case of an agreeable visible form, and is not upset at it in the case of a disagreeable visible form. He dwells with kāyasati established (upatīthe kāyasati) . . . [and so on through all the six senses].

It is evident that what the Buddha means by “restraint” is the restraint of the senses. Therefore this passage links sati with the “restraint of the senses,” which is often expressed by the following formula (hereafter passage D):

On seeing a form with the eye, he does not grasp at its signs or details (na nimittaggāhī hoti nāmabhyañjanaggāhī). Since evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection might flow into him if he dwelt leaving the eye faculty unguarded, so he works for its restraint, guards the eye faculty, and achieves the restraint of the eye faculty . . . [and so on through all the six sense faculties].

We can find a striking analogy between this formula and the above two passages in the Dukkhadhamma Sutta. Both are aimed at preventing evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection from “flowing into” the practitioner. In the formula, the method used is to guard or restrain the senses, while in the Dukkhadhamma Sutta, the method used is sati, which is connected to the restraint of the senses and is apparently rephrased as kāyasati. Kāyasati and kāyagatā sati are usually rendered as “mindfulness of the body” and “mindfulness concerning the body” respectively. Chapter 4 will show that kāya here refers to the “individual” rather than the “body.” I will leave the two terms untranslated. This function of sati is elucidated in the Kiṃsuka Sutta, which follows the Dukkhadhamma Sutta. Here the Buddha makes a simile as follows: A king has a frontier city with six gates. The gatekeeper keeps out strangers and admits acquaintances. The Buddha explains that, in this simile, “the city” is a designation for kāya; “the six gates” stand for the six internal sense bases; “the gatekeeper” represents sati (SN IV 194).

From these texts we can infer that this function of sati is to guard or restrain the six senses when one perceives any incoming sensory data so that, to put it figuratively as the texts do, evil unwholesome states will not flow into one’s mind through the sense-doors. This function of sati is recognized by Buddhaghosa in his Atthasālinī: “[Sati] should be seen as like a gatekeeper in the sense of guarding the eye-door, etc.”

It is noteworthy that kāyasati, or kāyagatā sati, is often associated with restraining the senses. The Chapāṇa Sutta in the Saḷāyatana Saṃyutta has the same exposition of restraint and non-restraint as that in the
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Dukkhadhamma Sutta cited above: “On seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is not intent on it... He dwells with kāyasati established.” After this exposition this text gives a further explanation with a simile that we can summarize as follows:

Six animals with different domains are tied to a firm post or pillar. Each animal would pull in the direction of its own domain, but in the end they would be tired and stay near the post or pillar. So too, for a monk whose kāyagata sati is developed, the eye does not pull in the direction of agreeable forms, nor are disagreeable forms repulsive. The same applies to the other five senses. Thus there is restraint. A firm post or pillar is a designation for kāyagata sati.10

This passage appears to be a supplementary explanation for restraint and non-restraint as expounded earlier, and kāyasati in the earlier exposition of restraint and non-restraint is rephrased as kāyagata sati in this supplementary explanation. According to this passage, kāyagata sati functions as a post or pillar that restrains the six senses. It stops the senses from their habitual unwholesome reactions to their corresponding objects. The same passage as that found in the exposition of restraint and non-restraint in the Dukkhadhamma Sutta and Chapāṇa Sutta is also found in other suttas in the Saṅghaṭa Saṅyutta.11 There are other instances in the Nikāyas where kāyasati or kāyagata sati occurs in the context of guarding the senses. This is important to our understanding of kāyasati as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

This type of sati is particularly emphasized with reference to coming into contact with enticing or distracting objects. In sutta 20 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṅyutta, the Buddha makes the following simile: Suppose a great crowd were to assemble to see the most beautiful girl of the land singing and dancing. A man would be ordered to carry around a bowl of oil full to the brim between the crowd and the girl, and he would be killed if he spilled even a little oil. The Buddha explains that “the bowl of oil full to the brim” represents kāyagata sati (SN V 170). This simile is very similar to that of the thorny forest in the Dukkhadhamma Sutta. In both cases one has to be mindful of every movement he makes at every moment in order either to avoid death (the result of being distracted by the girl) or to avoid being hurt by thorns (which refers to agreeable objects). Both are related to the restraint of the senses. It is clear that kāyagata sati in sutta 20 also refers to mindfulness that guards the senses.

In sutta 6 and sutta 7 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṅyutta (SN V 146–149) the four satipaṭṭhānas, explained by the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula, are said to be a monk’s resort, his own paternal domain, while the five cords of sensual pleasure (pañca kāmagudā) are said to be the domain of others. Māra will get a hold on those who stray outside their own resort into the domain of
others; he will not get a hold on those who move in their own resort, in their own paternal domain. Thus the four satipaṭṭhānas serve the purpose of protection. The five cords of sensual pleasure refer to the agreeable objects cognized by the first five senses.12 The sixth sense, manas, is not included perhaps because, as Hamilton (1996: 32) suggests, “though manodhātu would be involved in the process of the arising of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile pleasure it would not in itself be the basis for a specific type of pleasure in its own right.” A monk’s own paternal domain, namely the four satipaṭṭhānas, serves as the restraint of the senses. The basic satipaṭṭhāna formula may imply that one should contemplate the body “as a body” (or feelings “as feelings,” etc.) without further grasping at its signs or details such as attractive or repulsive features.13 According to the formula on the restraint of the senses, not grasping at the signs or details is to protect one from evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection.

How does sati relate to the restraint of the senses? The answer lies in its function of steering saññā in the cognitive process. Our daily activities involve contact between the six senses and their corresponding objects. To put it in a figurative way, sati as the gatekeeper prevents unwholesome cognition of objects and any ensuing troubles from entering the individual through the sense-doors, and only admits proper cognition of the objects. Such unwholesome cognition of objects is implied in the formula on the restraint of the senses quoted above: “grasping at its signs and details” (nimittaggāhaḥ hori anubyahājanaggāhaḥ), which is the function of saññā, and sati can rectify the unwholesome functioning of saññā. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the Vāṇīsathēra Sānyutta, the beautiful sign (subha nimittaḥ) is related to perversion of saññā, and kāyagataḥ sati is apparently prescribed here as a remedy for the perversion of saññā. This function of sati is to avoid forming any saññā that may lead to evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection. This is how the senses are restrained.

### 2.2 The sati-sampajañña formula

The term sampajañña (“being fully aware”) is included in the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1), and is sometimes explained by the following formula:

He acts in full awareness when going forward and going back; he acts in full awareness when looking ahead and looking behind; he acts in full awareness when bending back and stretching out [his limbs]; he acts in full awareness when wearing his upper robe (saṅghāti) [and other] robes [and carrying his] bowl;14 he acts in full awareness when eating, drinking, chewing and tasting; he acts in full awareness when defecating and urinating; he acts in full awareness when walking, standing, sitting, falling asleep, waking up, speaking and keeping silent.15
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Since this passage is referred to as “mindfulness and full awareness” (sati-sampajañña) in the Nikāyas, I will call it the “sati-sampajañña formula.” This formula is given in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya under the first satipaṭṭhāna, i.e. contemplation of the body. Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta interprets full awareness (sampajañña) in this formula as fourfold: full awareness of purpose, full awareness of suitability, full awareness of the domain [of meditation], and full awareness of non-delusion (Ps I 253–270). But his interpretation finds little canonical support.

On the other hand, Rahula (2000: 71) takes this practice to mean being aware of the act one is performing at the moment. Even the Chinese translation of this formula in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta seems to mean that (See Appendix 1). If this is the case, this practice would be almost identical with the preceding practice under contemplations of the body in the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta: “When walking (standing, sitting and lying down, or however one’s body is disposed), one knows: ‘I am walking (standing, etc.).’” Therefore, Schmithausen (1976: 251) regards this practice as just a repetition of what precedes it. Similarly, Ven. Anālayo (2003: 136) also takes these two practices as being “both concerned with directing mindfulness to the body in activity.” A similar view is also found in the Saundarananda by Aśvaghoṣa in a section on mindfulness and full awareness: “Then being fully aware of all your acts, you should fix your mindfulness on sitting, walking, standing, looking, speaking, and so on.” It may be right that the practice represented by the sati-sampajañña formula involves mindfulness of physical activities. But I will show that, according to the earliest stratum of the Canon, this practice is more importantly concerned with mental states, and is also meant to protect the mind.

This formula is very similar to the last one of the six subjects of mindfulness (anussatiṭṭhāna) expounded in the Udāyī Sutta of the Anguttara Nikāya: Here, Ānanda, being mindful (sato), a monk goes forward; being mindful, he goes back; being mindful, he stands; being mindful, he sits; being mindful, he lies down; being mindful, he undertakes walking up and down. This subject of mindfulness, Ānanda, thus developed, thus cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness.

It is noteworthy that this practice is said to lead to “mindfulness and full awareness” (sati-sampajañña). The parallel of wording in this passage to the sati-sampajañña formula is obvious and shows the close relationship of these two. Almost all the actions in this passage are included in the sati-sampajañña formula. It is very likely that this passage describes the same practice as the sati-sampajañña formula, and that “mindful” (sato) in this passage means the same thing as “acting in full awareness” (sampajāna-kāroti) in the formula. This probably reflects that the Buddha’s skill in means makes it possible to
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express the same teaching in different ways, or that the same teaching may have been memorized by different disciples in different ways. Moreover, virtually identical words in this passage are also found in the aforementioned Dukkhadhamma Sutta: “He would go forward, being mindful; he would go back, being mindful.” “Mindful” (sato) in these two texts must refer to the same thing. As discussed above, the passage in the Dukkhadhamma Sutta implies that one should practice mindfulness in every movement so as to protect oneself from evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection. By analogy such may also be the case in the Aṅguttara Nikāya passage and the sati-sampajañña formula, where sampajāna-kāri means the same as sato.

Even more solid evidence can be found elsewhere. A passage in the Mahāsūthotana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya runs thus (hereafter passage A):

When a monk dwells in this way, if his mind inclines to walk, he walks, thinking: “While I am walking thus, no evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection will flow into me.” Thus he is fully aware (sampajāna) of that. [The same applies to standing, sitting, and lying down.]²³

Similarly, the Nanda Sutta in the Aṅguttara Nikāya reads (hereafter passage B):

If, monks, Nanda has to look to the eastern direction, focusing his mind thoroughly he looks to the eastern direction, thinking: “While I am thus looking to the eastern direction, no evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection will flow into [me].” Thus he is fully aware (sampajāna) of that. . . . [The same applies to the other three directions.]²⁴

These two passages are very similar to the sati-sampajañña formula. Just like this formula, both passages contain the word sampajāna following an activity. The word describing the activity in passage B, looking (āloketi), also occurs in the formula in the form of a past participle, ālokite. The activities in passage A, walking, standing and sitting, also occur in the formula, although the wording for “walking” is different. The expression “no evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection will flow into [me]” is reminiscent of the passage on mindfulness quoted above from the Dukkhadhamma Sutta and the phrase “in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world” in the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula (see Chapter 5, Section 2.1). Passage B in the Nanda Sutta is given as an explanation of how Nanda guards the doors of his sense-faculties, whereas the Chinese counterpart of passage B in the Saṃyuktâgama (T 2, 73b) belongs to the practice called “mindfulness and full awareness.” I will further illustrate that the Chinese version is more plausible. It is necessary here to compare the structure of the Nanda Sutta and its Chinese counterpart. Both texts deal with the four virtues Nanda has:
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1. Guarding (or “closing” [sic] in Chinese) the doors of the sense-faculties
2. Being moderate in eating
3. Being devoted to vigilance (“diligent in practice in the first and last watches of the night” in Chinese)
4. Mindfulness and full awareness (sati-sampajāñña)

In the Nanda Sutta “guarding the doors of the sense-faculties” is explained by passage B, and “mindfulness and full awareness” is explained as (hereafter passage C):

Feelings (vedanā) are understood by Nanda as they arise, understood as they remain present, understood as they vanish. Apperceptions/conceptions (saññā) are understood. . . Thoughts (vitakkā) are understood as they arise, understood as they remain present, understood as they vanish.25

This is a definition of sampajāña given in sutta 35 of the Satīpāṭhāna Sutta (SN V 180–181). In the Chinese version of the Nanda Sutta, however, the explanation of “mindfulness and full awareness” is composed of both passage B and passage C,26 while “closing the doors of the sense-faculties” is explained thus:

If the eye sees a visible form, it does not grasp at the visible form’s sign (*nimitta), nor does it grasp at its details (*anuvyāñjana) . . . Evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection do not flow into his mind, and the restraints arise. [He] guards the sense-faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, and the restraints arise.27

I shall show that the Chinese version, rather than the Pali, agrees with the standard accounts in the Canon. “Guarding the doors of the sense-faculties” (which is also called “the restraint of the sense-faculties”) and “mindfulness and full awareness” are among the preliminaries to the jhānas at many places in the Nikāyas.28 In the Mahā-Assapura Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (I 273–274) all the four virtues of Nanda are given prior to the four jhānas. In these texts the description of “guarding the doors of the sense-faculties”29 is identical to passage D on the restraint of the senses quoted earlier (p. 43), which is virtually the same as the description of “closing the doors of the sense-faculties” in the Chinese version quoted above, whereas it is replaced by passage B in the Pali version. In the standard formulation “mindfulness and full awareness” is explained by the sati-sampajāñña formula,30 which is similar to passage B as discussed above. Passage B and passage C are both given as the explanation for “mindfulness and full awareness” in the Chinese version. These can be shown in Table 2.
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Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pali version of the Nanda Sutta</th>
<th>Chinese version of the Nanda Sutta</th>
<th>standard account of the preliminaries to the jhānas</th>
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<tr>
<td>guarding the doors of the sense-faculties</td>
<td>passage B</td>
<td>passage D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mindfulness and full awareness</td>
<td>passage C</td>
<td>passage B + passage C</td>
</tr>
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It is clear that the Chinese version of the Nanda Sutta is very close to the standard account, and could be the more authentic one. Although passage C is not found in the standard account, it is the definition of sampajañña in the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta as mentioned above. The Pali version takes passage B to mean guarding the doors of the sense-faculties perhaps because “looking” in the passage involves the eye-faculty. However, if we compare this passage with passage A, we will find that both passages have the same pattern, and that this pattern applies to different activities in the sati-sampajañña formula rather than to the sense-faculties. Even Buddhaghosa cited passage B to interpret “looking ahead and looking behind” in the sati-sampajañña formula in his commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (Ps I 261). Passages A and B are in effect paraphrasing part of the sati-sampajañña formula, and they make clear that one’s mental state is what one should be fully aware of while acting (sampajānakārin).

The facts that (1) passage C is in the place of “mindfulness and full awareness” (sati-sampajañña) in both versions of the Nanda Sutta, and that (2) passage C and the sati-sampajañña formula are both given as an explanation of the term sampajañña in the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta suggest a close relationship between the sati-sampajañña formula and passage C, which denotes full awareness of the cognitive process. This process of cognition is included in the Madhupiṇḍika formula discussed in Chapter 1 (see Figure 2).

Passage C represents observation of the decisive point in the process of cognition. As discussed in Chapter 1, saññā (saññāni) can be either wholesome or unwholesome, or indeterminate. When it is unwholesome, vitakka (vitakketi) will also be unwholesome and lead to papañceti and

![Figure 2](image-url)

Figure 2
papañcasāsankhā, which bring about the “evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection.” It is possible that the sati-sampajañña formula implies that while performing daily activities, which inevitably involve perceiving through the senses, one should be fully aware of the cognitive process and thereby prevent the evil unwholesome states.

To conclude, in the light of passages A and B, the sati-sampajañña formula indicates that one is not just “fully aware” of what one is doing at the moment, but more importantly one is fully aware with the purpose of avoiding unwholesome mental states. In other words, while undertaking any activities, one reminds oneself to keep the evil unwholesome states away from one’s mind. This is what is meant by “acting in full awareness” (sampajānakārin) in the sati-sampajañña formula. The sati-sampajañña formula is not just contemplation of the body, the first satipaṭṭhāna, but rather it serves as a general guideline for practice in daily life, probably including meditation as well.

Frauwallner (1973: 206) associates the five-fold wariness (samiti) in Jainism with “mindfulness and full awareness” (smṛti-samprajanya) in Buddhism, by which he probably refers to the sati-sampajañña formula. Schmithausen (1976: 254) points out that the Prakrit term samii, which later theorists would have us believe to be samiti in Sanskrit, is actually equivalent to smṛti. He says that the practice of the sati-sampajañña formula could be an exercise of pre-Buddhist origin. This is possible since there are similarities between samii and sati-sampajañña as will be shown below, and Jainism was founded earlier than Buddhism, probably centuries before Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, the Buddha’s contemporary often too simply called the founder of Jainism.

Both samii and sati-sampajañña are to be practiced in daily life. The fivefold samii concerns five major activities of a monk in daily life, that is (1) walking, (2) speaking, (3) accepting alms, (4) picking up things and putting them down, (5) answering the call of nature. Among them (1), (2) and (5) are included in the sati-sampajañña formula. In Jainism, samii involves detailed and strict rules with regard to these daily activities for the sake of stopping the influx of karma, especially the karma of harming life. In Buddhism, however, sati-sampajañña is mainly a mental exercise, which aims at preventing the influx of unwholesome states into the mind. For Jains samii means to be mindful of one’s behavior, whereas for Buddhists sati is much more than that. They put emphasis on mindfulness of mental states. If sati-sampajañña derived from the Jain idea of samii, Buddhism shifted the focus from physical activities to mental ones. This divergence in their concerns of mindfulness reflects their different opinions about karma. The Buddha says, “It is intention that I call karma,” while for Jainism, as Dundas (2002: 97) notes, karma is regarded as being a physical substance. A striking contrast in their notions of karma is also found in the Upāli Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, where Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (called Nigaṇṭho Nātaputto by Buddhists) is said to regard bodily karma as the most
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reprehensible in the performance of evil action (karma), but the Buddha regards mental karma as the most reprehensible.38

3. Introspective awareness

While one is in contact with incoming sensory data, one’s mindfulness can have an introspective function with regard to one’s own mind. This function serves as a remedial measure when “protective awareness” fails to act. In case evil unwholesome states arise in one’s mind, one should be able to activate the faculty of mindfulness so as to notice and recognize them and get rid of them in time.

The Sunakkhatta Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya provides a simile which describes this function of sati:

Suppose, Sunakkhatta, a man were wounded by an arrow thickly smeared with poison. . . . A surgeon would cut around the opening of the wound with a knife, then he would probe for the arrow with a probe, then he would pull out the arrow and would expel the poisonous humour without leaving a trace of it behind.39

Here, “wound” is a designation for the six internal bases, i.e. the six senses. “Poisonous humour” and “arrow” stand for ignorance and craving respectively. “Probe” is a designation for sati.40 Again we find that sati functions in the context of the six senses, but here it acts as an antidote to the unwholesome states that have invaded an individual rather than a preventive or a guard against them.

The effective functioning of both protective awareness and introspective awareness requires the practitioner to remind himself to examine his own mental states, whether wholesome or unwholesome. This is elaborated in the Milindapañha, a paracanonical text:

(1) When sati arises, sire, it reminds one of the states together with their counterparts that are wholesome and unwholesome, blamable and blameless, inferior and lofty, dark and bright, thus: “These are the four establishments of mindfulness; these are the four right strivings; these are the four bases of supernatural powers; these are the five faculties; these are the five powers; these are the seven enlightenment factors; these are the noble eightfold path; this is serenity; this is insight; this is gnosis; this is liberation.” Then the one who practices yoga resorts to the states that should be resorted to and does not resort to the states that should not be resorted to; he follows the states that should be followed and does not follow the states that should not be followed. Thus, sire, sati has reminding (apilāpana)41 as its characteristic. . . . (2) When sati arises, sire, it
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examines the courses of the beneficial and unbeneﬁcial states thus: “These states are beneﬁcial; these states are unbeneﬁcial; these states are helpful; these states are unhelpful.” Then the one who practices yoga removes the unbeneﬁcial states and takes hold of the beneﬁcial states; he removes the unhelpful states and takes hold of the helpful states. Thus, sire, sati has taking hold as its characteristic.42

According to this passage, sati reminds a practitioner of various mental states and enables one to recognize them, and in a more active sense, it helps one take hold of the beneﬁcial and helpful states and remove the opposite states. This involves the proper function of recollection, recognition and discrimination, which belong to the ﬁeld of sammā. Such proper functioning of sammā forms the basis for freeing the mind from unwholesome states.

4. Deliberately forming conceptions

This function of sati is not contemporaneous with sense perceptions. It consists in the wholesome functioning of sammā in the sense of conception rather than apperception. It is based on constructive memories.

4.1 Anussati—Forming inspiring conceptions

In the Nikāyas there are threefold, sixfold and tenfold series of anussati.43 The sixfold series is probably the most commonly found.44 It consists of buddhānussati, dhammānussati, saṅghānussati, sīlānussati, cāgānussati, devatānussati (“recollection or mindfulness of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha, morality, generosity and deities”). The ﬁrst three form the threefold series. The tenfold classiﬁcation could be a later accretion in that it is rarely found in the Nikāyas,45 and it seems heterogeneous as the last four kinds of anussati, namely mindfulness of breathing, mindfulness of death, mindfulness concerning kāya and recollection of peace (ānāpānasati, maraṇasati, kāyagatā sati, upasamānussati), are apparently different in nature to the former six.46 Therefore my discussion will be conﬁned to the sixfold anussati, especially the ﬁrst three anussatis. These three are also referred to as buddhagatā sati, dhammagatā sati and saṅghagatā sati in the Dhammapada (296–298), and as bhagavantam ārabbha sati, dhammam ārabbha sati and saṅgham ārabbha sati (mindfulness regarding the Blessed One, mindfulness regarding the Dhamma and mindfulness regarding the Saṅgha) at SN V 369. Accordingly it is reasonable to deal with at least the ﬁrst three kinds of anussati as part of our discussion of sati.

The term anussati (Skt anumṛtā) derives from the verb anussarati (anu-√smṛt), which means “to remember,” “to recollect” or “to call to mind” (DOP s.v. anuṣārati and anussati). As Shaw (2006: 109) explains, the ﬁrst six anussatis are “things to be thought about or brought to mind again and again.”
Harrison (1992: 228) says: “[I]f we look at the traditional subjects of anuṣmṛti, we can see quite clearly that personal recollection of past experience is not involved.” He further contends: “The general interchangeability of smṛti and anuṣmṛti also suggests that we are dealing with a ‘calling to mind’ rather than recollection in the strict sense.” (Harrison, 1992: 228) When one practices anussati for some time, however, one may recollect one’s previous experience of the practice, such as a strong religious sentiment that arose in one’s mind before (LSC). Such inspiring memories can provide a support for the practice of anussati. Anussati may be regarded as a practice of reminding oneself of the subjects by deliberately forming conceptions. It is similar to a function of saṅkhāra called “constructive imagination” by Hamilton (1996: 61), which refers to a process of good/positive or constructive conditioning of one’s saṅkhāra by means of deliberate conceptualizing. In our case, anussati is to deliberately conceptualize what is accounted spiritually wholesome and beneficial according to a set of credal statements or formulae. The Dhammapada says that the Buddha’s disciples day and night constantly practice buddhagatā sati, dhammagatā sati and saṅghagatā sati, i.e. the first three kinds of anussati, as well as kāyaṅgatā sati. This means that the subjects of anussati are to be remembered by Buddhists in their daily life.

An important benefit of this practice is overcoming an emotion, that is fear. For example, sutta 3 of the Sakka Samyutta relates how the Buddha prescribes the practice of the first three anussatis to his disciples as a remedy against fear when staying in wild and solitary places. As the Buddha points out himself, the reason why this practice can have such an effect is “Because the Tathāgata, the Arahat, the Perfectly Enlightened one is devoid of lust, devoid of hatred, devoid of delusion; he is brave, courageous, bold, ready to stand his ground.”

This practice is to identify with the positive qualities of the Buddha so as to alter one’s consciousness by using constructive conceptualization. This is another example, apart from those discussed in the previous chapter, of overcoming emotional disturbance by transforming saṅkhāra. Devatānussati (literally “recollection of deities”) also has a similar function. The practitioner reminds himself that the faith, morality, learning, generosity, and wisdom that bring about rebirth as a deity are also found in himself. Such identification with the good qualities of deities makes one feel secure and positive about one’s afterlife, and thus may appease anxiety in regard to death.

The practice of anussati can also be related to serenity (samatha) meditation, or concentration (samādhi). This will be discussed in the next chapter.

4.2 Forming conceptions of objects of a negative nature

4.2.1 Conception of ugliness

Two practices stated in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta belong to this kind of sati, that is, seeing the body as full of impure bodily parts, and contemplating
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a corpse in different stages of putrefaction and disintegration. The first practice is called “conception of ugliness” (asubhasaññā) at AN V 109. The second one is also called “absorption through ugliness” (asubhajhāna) in the Dhammasaṅgani (§§ 263–264), and “ugliness as meditation subject” (asubhakammajjhāna) in the Visuddhimagga (p. 178). Both practices are taken to explain “meditation on ugliness” (asubhabhāvanā) at SN V 320 by the commentary and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1773 and 1951, note 300). They both require deliberately forming saññā of the repulsive or transient nature of the body in order to develop a sense of detachment from the body. As Andō (1981: 146–147) points out, the Vijaya Sutta in the Sutta-nippāta is closely analogous with the section on contemplation of the body in the Satipatthāna Sutta. It teaches contemplation on eighteen bodily parts (Sn 194–196), which are all included in the thirty-one impure bodily parts stated in the foregoing first practice, and it also describes the decomposition of a corpse (Sn 200–201) in basically the same way as the first two stages stated in the foregoing second practice. The purpose of such a practice is given in verse 203 thus: “One would discard desire for the body, both of oneself and of others.”

Examples of discarding desire for someone else’s body by this type of sati recur in the Nikāyas. In the Mahādudakkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (I 88–89), the above practice of contemplating a corpse is prescribed by the Buddha as a means of removing desire and lust for material form (rūpa), which in the context refers to a body of the opposite sex. Similarly, at SN IV 110–111 the Buddha explains to King Udāna the methods by which young monks overcome lust for women. One of the methods is seeing the body as full of impure bodily parts as stated above. As to discarding desire for one’s own body, an extreme example is found in the Vesālī Sutta of the Ānāpāna Samyutta, where dozens of monks, after practicing meditation on ugliness (asubhabhāvanā), became so disgusted with their own bodies that they committed suicide. As mentioned above, asubhabhāvanā refers to the foregoing two practices according to the commentary. They did not realize that such practices are intended to remove desire for the body, not the body itself.

This function of sati is based on, in Hamilton’s (1996: 177) words, a “healthily negative” attitude towards the body. As she (pp. 177–178) indicates, we tend to identify with our bodies. Even the Buddha says that it would be better to take this body as the Self because of its apparently greater permanence (SN II 94–95). To deliberately think of the repulsive or transitory nature of the body is a countermeasure against the habitual tendency to identify with the body, and can probably further disillusion one with the concept of the “Self.” In this sense, it is related to insight (vipassanā) meditation, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Perhaps it can serve as a preliminary to insight meditation. On the other hand, it can also be applied to serenity (samatha) meditation. This will also be discussed later. Therefore this type of sati can operate in different states of consciousness.
4.2.2 Mindfulness of death

Mindfulness of death (maraṇasaṭṭha) also falls into the class of sati as forming a conception of objects of a negative nature. It is the last one of the ten anussatis, and is also called conception of death (maraṇasaṁññā). Below is a summary of an exposition of this practice found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya:

When day has passed and night has commenced, a monk reflects thus: “Many things can cause my death. A snake or a scorpion or a centipede may bite me. I may die from it. That would be a hindrance to me. I may stumble and fall; the food I have eaten may harm me; ... I may die from it. That would be a hindrance to me.”

The monk should reflect thus: “Are there any evil unwholesome states in me that have not been abandoned and would be a hindrance to me if I die tonight?” If the monk on reflection realizes that there are these states, he should arouse extraordinary desire ... and exercise mindfulness and full awareness in order to abandon these states.

This practice is to remind oneself that there are many chances of death and that one may die at any time, so that one has to prepare right now for one’s afterlife or liberation, which is dependent on one’s mental state. Therefore one should examine if there are any evil unwholesome states in one’s mind and exercise mindfulness and full awareness in order to abandon those states. Accordingly, mindfulness of death serves as a means to motivate introspective awareness and protective awareness. This is another example of different functions of sati working together.

4.3 Developing loving-kindness (mettā) towards all beings

The well-known Metta Sutta in the Khuddakapāṭha and Sutta-nipāta describes the development of loving-kindness (mettā) as sati that should be practiced virtually all the time:

Just as a mother would protect her own son, her only son, with her life, so one should develop the immeasurable mind towards all beings and loving-kindness towards the whole world. One should develop the immeasurable mind, upwards, downwards and across, without obstruction, without hatred and hostility. Standing, walking, sitting, or lying down, as long as one is free from drowsiness, one should practise this mindfulness. They say, “This is a divine dwelling in this world.”

To cultivate loving-kindness towards all sentient beings and conceive of them as being one’s own son involves “constructive imagination.” This is a
process of morally constructive transformation of one’s saññā by means of deliberate conceptualizing. In this *sutta* the scope of such deliberate conceptualizing is extended to the maximum, covering creatures that are seen and unseen, and those who have already come to be and those about to come to be. Loving-kindness is among the four immeasurable states (*appamaññā*) or divine dwellings (*brahmavihāra*): loving-kindness (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), altruistic joy (*muditā*) and equanimity (*upekkhā*). Just like *upekkhā* discussed in Chapter 1, loving-kindness may also be counted as a type of emotion produced by deliberately transforming *saññā*, which is the job of *sati*. While the *Metta Sutta* mentions “this mindfulness” (*etam satiṃ*), it probably does not mean that loving-kindness itself is a kind of *sati*, but it implies that the process of developing loving-kindness involves *sati*. The development of loving-kindness is unique for its altruistic aspect which seems to be lacking in other types of *sati* discussed above.

*Sutta 19* of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* also implies that *sati* can have a dimension of social ethics. In this *sutta* the Buddha gives a parable of an acrobat and his apprentice Medakathālikā. The Buddha says,

> Just as the apprentice Medakathālikā said to the teacher: “I shall protect myself,” monks, thus should *satipaṭṭhāna* (establishment of mindfulness) be practised. “I shall protect others,” thus should *satipaṭṭhāna* be practised. One who protects oneself protects others. One who protects others protects oneself. And, monks, how does one who protects oneself protect others? By practicing, developing and cultivation. Thus one who protects oneself protects others. And, monks, how does one who protects others protect oneself? By forbearance, harmlessness, loving-kindness and compassion.

It should be noted that *satipaṭṭhāna* (establishment of mindfulness) here is singular, different from the plural form in the context of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. This passage apparently connects *satipaṭṭhāna* with forbearance, harmlessness, loving-kindness and compassion, and therefore applies *sati* to some ethical attitudes in regard to interpersonal relations. In similar fashion, Chappell (2003: 264) introduces the concept of “social mindfulness” as a dimension of Buddhist mindfulness practice. He (p. 264) holds that mindfulness training is a way to find sympathy and compassion with others, and that balanced meditation must involve “recognizing the interconnectedness and impermanence of experience that naturally leads to . . . an increased awareness of the common ground shared with others.”
Chapter 3

MINDFULNESS IN METHODOICAL MEDITATION

In the simile in the *Kimsuka Sutta* mentioned in the previous chapter, a swift pair of messengers would ask the gatekeeper: “Where is the lord of this city?” and deliver a message of truth to the lord of the city. As mentioned before, “gatekeeper” stands for mindfulness and the “city” stands for the individual (*kāya*) according to the Buddha. He also explains that “the swift pair of messengers” is a designation for serenity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipassanā*); “the lord of the city” is a designation for consciousness; “a message of truth” is a designation for Nibbāna.1 Similarly, the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* and a *sutta* in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* say, “Whoever has developed and cultivated *kāyagatā sati*, for him whatever wholesome states are conducive to gnosis (*vijjābhāgīya*) are included.”2 And at AN I 61 *samatha* and *vipassanā* are said to be two wholesome states conducive to gnosis (*vijjābhāgīya*).3 *Samatha* and *vipassanā* are regarded as the two main categories of Buddhist meditation. According to the foregoing *suttas*, these two can bring about Nibbāna or gnosis (i.e. liberating insight) in one’s consciousness and are regulated or developed by *sati*, the gatekeeper in the simile. I will discuss the role of *sati* in these two types of meditation. Let us first investigate what these two terms refer to.

There seems to be no clear explanation of *samatha* or *vipassanā* in the earliest stratum of the Canon although they occur quite frequently.4 At DN III 54 *samatha* is used to rephrase *santa*, calm or serene, which has the same root *sam* as *samatha*.5 Cousins (1984: 59) indicates that the identification of *samatha* and *vipassanā* with *samādhi* (concentration) and *paññā* (wisdom) is standard in the *Abhidhamma* texts. This can be traced back to earlier texts in the *Nikāyas*. For example, as Cousins (1984: 59) points out, at AN III 373 the five faculties (*indriya*) are given as: *saddhā* (faith), *sati*, *viriya* (energy), *samatha* and *vipassanā*, whereas the usual list is: *saddhā*, *viriya*, *sati*, *samādhi* and *paññā*. Another example is at AN I 61, where development of *samatha* is said to result in development of states of mind (*citta*), while development of *vipassanā* is said to result in development of wisdom. Here development of states of mind and of wisdom comprise the last two of the three principal divisions of Buddhist practice: morality (*sīla*), concentration
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(samādhi) and wisdom (paññā), as concentration is also referred to as the achievement in states of mind (cittasampadā) or training in higher states of mind (adhicittasikkhā). A list of four qualities at AN IV 360 also suggests that samatha and vipassanā occupy the position of concentration and wisdom: having faith (saddho), endowed with morality (sīlavā), possessing serenity of mental states within (lābhā ajjhattāṃ ceto-samathassa), and possessing insight into things by higher wisdom (lābhī adhipaññā-dhamma-vipassanāya). Although samatha and vipassanā may not have quite the same meaning as concentration and wisdom, there is hardly any doubt that they refer to concentration and wisdom respectively.

1. Mindfulness and insight (vipassanā) meditation

The practice of mindfulness, especially satipaṭṭhāna, is widely considered to be the core of insight (vipassanā) meditation by practitioners and scholars alike. For example, Ven. Gunaratana (2002: 31) says, “Vipassana is the oldest of Buddhist meditation practices. The method comes directly from the Satipatthana Sutta, . . .” and (p. 145) “Mindfulness is the center of vipassana meditation and the key to the whole process.” Griffiths (1981: 611 and 614) says, “We may take vipassanā (insight) and paññā (wisdom) as equivalent terms . . . Perhaps the simplest and most effective way of developing paññā described in the Pāli canon is that of satipaṭṭhāna.” Harvey (1990: 254) also says, “The basic framework for developing Insight practice is known as ‘the four foundations of mindfulness’, the sati-paṭṭhāna’s.” Curiously, there seems to have been no work that explains how sati relates to vipassanā in the earliest stratum of the Canon. I shall explore this issue by resorting to the Nikāyas.

As mentioned above, development of vipassanā is said to result in development of wisdom (paññā). Anālayo (2006a: 244–245) has illustrated that, according to several similes in the Nikāyas, mindfulness plays a preparatory role for the development of wisdom. Looking from another angle, I will show that mindfulness serves as the method for the development of wisdom according to canonical passages that explain wisdom or vipassanā. In sutta 10 of the Indriya Samyutta (SN V 199), the faculty of wisdom is explained as “wisdom directed to rise and fall” (udayatthagāmini pāññāya). Similarly, part of the refrain in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, which also occurs in sutta 40 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta, is about contemplation of rise and fall:

He dwells contemplating the nature of arising in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body. [The same applies to feelings, mind and dhammas.]

This passage matches the explanation of pāññā quite well. The mechanism may be that sati directs saññā in a way conformable to Buddhist doctrine
so that one can recognize the rise and fall in the four aspects, and thus paññā is developed.

As interpreted in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (II 93ff.), a rather late text included in the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, vipassanā is contemplation of things as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and not-self, which are the three aspects of the nature of phenomena in Buddhist metaphysics. In the chapter on vipassanā, as a basis for interpretation it quotes three *suttas* from the *Anguttara Nikāya* (III 441ff.), which say that it is impossible to realize the fruits of arahantship, etc. without seeing all conditioned things (*saṅkhāra*) as impermanent, unsatisfactory, and all things (*dhamma*) as not-self. This is in accord with a discourse in the *Nikāyas* and the *Vinaya* concerning seeing the five aggregates by wisdom (*paññā*), which apparently denotes vipassanā: reviewing the five aggregates as impermanent, and therefore unsatisfactory, and consequently not-self, one sees with proper wisdom the reality of not-self with regard to the five aggregates, whether past, future, or present, internally (*ajjhatta*) or externally (*bahiddhā*), etc. This is parallel to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the four subjects of satipaṭṭhāna and the five aggregates both represent classifications of human experience. Therefore contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and *dhammas* amounts to contemplating the aggregates. Just like the foregoing discourse on seeing the five aggregates by wisdom, contemplation of these four objects of satipaṭṭhāna is also often said to be carried out internally (*ajjhatta*) and externally (*bahiddhā*) in the *Nikāyas*. This is parallel to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, the four subjects of satipaṭṭhāna and the five aggregates both represent classifications of human experience. Therefore contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and *dhammas* amounts to contemplating the aggregates. Just like the foregoing discourse on seeing the five aggregates by wisdom, contemplation of these four objects of satipaṭṭhāna is also often said to be carried out internally (*ajjhatta*) and externally (*bahiddhā*) in the *Nikāyas*. Contemplation of rise and fall in these four objects as stated in *sutta* 40 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* corresponds to seeing the aggregates as impermanent, and hence their being unsatisfactory and not-self is also implied. Therefore it is plausible to regard the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas as vipassanā.

Another definition of the faculty of wisdom is understanding the four noble truths (SN V 199). In the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, understanding the four noble truths is also included in the section dealing with contemplation of *dhammas*. However, it is not found in the two Chinese versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*.

2. Mindfulness and serenity (samatha) meditation

While *sati* or satipaṭṭhāna is often referred to as vipassanā, little attention has been drawn to the relationship between *sati* and *samatha*, serenity meditation. I shall examine this issue. As mentioned above, *samatha* refers to the same thing as concentration (*samādhi*). An interesting statement about the relationship between *sati* and concentration recurs in the *Nikāyas*: One who develops right concentration or immeasurable concentration has the knowledge: “Being mindful, I attain this concentration; being mindful, I emerge from it.”

Right concentration (*samanāsāmādhi*) is defined as the four *jhanas* in the *Nikāyas* (MN III 252, SN V 10). The faculty of concentration (*samādhindriya*)
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is also defined in terms of the four jhānas (SN V 198). Although I have not found in the Nikāyas that the four formless (āruppā) attainments and the “cessation of apperception and feeling” (saññāvedayitanirodha) are classified under samādhi or samatha, this is implied in sutta 8 of the Anāpāna Sānyutta (SN V 318–319), which says that if a monk wishes to enter and dwell in these five meditative attainments along with the four jhānas, he should attend to “concentration by mindfulness of breathing” (ānāpāna-sati-samādhi). These nine are often listed in a series of meditative attainments which are sometimes called the “nine successive stages” (nava anupubbavivārā). As Griffiths (1981: 610) states, this nine-fold structure “describes a series of states of consciousness of increasing abstraction.” All these meditative states will be involved in my discussion below.

Aggregate of concentration

In the Cūḷavedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, a nun called Dhammadinnā explains to a lay follower named Visākha the relationship between the Noble Eightfold Path and the three aggregates of morality, concentration and wisdom. She says that right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration are subsumed in the aggregate of concentration (samādhi). Moreover, in reply to his question, she says: “The four satipaṭṭhānas are the nimittas of concentration (samādhi).” Nimitta can mean cause or sign (PED, s.v. nimitta). I will show that as causes the four satipaṭṭhānas can lead to various meditative attainments, and as signs the four satipaṭṭhānas provide meditation subjects and other essential aspects involved in the meditative attainments.

What does the aggregate of concentration refer to? The answer can be found in the Dīgha Nikāya, where a three-part scheme of the path to liberation recurs. The three parts are called “the aggregate of morality, the aggregate of concentration, and the aggregate of wisdom” (sīlakkhandha, samādhiikkhandha, paññakkhandha) in the Subha Sutta (DN I 206–208). According to some passages in the Dīgha Nikāya, the aggregate of concentration is composed of the four jhānas and a set of preliminaries to them. The preliminaries are as follows in brief (hereafter set A):

1. guarding the doors of the sense-faculties
2. mindfulness and full awareness
3. being contented
4. starting meditation in a sitting posture
5. abandoning the five hindrances

Two other sets of preliminaries to the jhānas, with a few differences, are found in the Majjhima Nikāya.

Set B:
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1. restraint of the senses
2. mindfulness and full awareness
3. starting meditation in a sitting posture
4. abandoning the five hindrances

Set C:

1. guarding the doors of the sense-faculties
2. being moderate in eating
3. being devoted to vigilance
4. mindfulness and full awareness
5. starting meditation in a sitting posture
6. abandoning the five hindrances

Among these three sets, the description of “guarding the doors of the sense-faculties” is virtually the same as that of “restraint of the senses.” Set B has the four items common to all the three sets. All these four items and “being devoted to vigilance” in set C are related to sati. This will be elucidated below. It should be noted that some of these preliminaries are to be practised in daily activities, and the first two of these four items have been discussed in Chapter 2.

2.1 Sati and the preliminaries to the jhānas

(1) Restraint of the senses
This practice is quoted as passage D and discussed in Section 2 on “protective awareness” in Chapter 2, where sati is shown to have the function of restraining the senses.

(2) Mindfulness and full awareness
This has also been discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2. There is no doubt that it is a practice of sati.

(3) Being devoted to vigilance
This practice is to remind oneself to purify one’s mind of obstructive states during the day and in the first and third watches of the night when one is still awake; in the middle watch of the night one lies down, mindful (sata) and fully aware (sampajāna), having attended to (manasikaritvā) the conception (saññā) of rising.21 This practice agrees with a function of sati discussed in Chapter 2, that is, to remind oneself to keep unwholesome states away from one’s own mind. The phrase “mindful and fully aware” is also an evident indication of sati.

(4) Starting meditation in a sitting posture
At this stage a monk resorts to a solitary place, and “on returning from his almsround, after his meal he sits down, folding his legs crosswise, setting
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his body erect, and establishing mindfulness (satiṃ upaṭṭhapetvā) before him” (tr. Nāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995: 274–275). Therefore mindfulness is also involved in this phase.

(5) Abandoning the five hindrances
The five hindrances refer to covetousness (abhijjhā), ill will (byāpāda), sloth and drowsiness (thīnamīddha), restlessness and remorse (uddhaccakukkucca) and doubt (vicikicchā). As Ven. Anālayo (2006b) points out, a sutta in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (IV 458) briefly states that the four satipaṭṭhānas should be developed in order to abandon the five hindrances. Below is an elucidation of how mindfulness helps to overcome the five hindrances.

(i) conception of light (ālokasaññā)
In the account of samādhiḥkhandha (aggregate of concentration) the description of abandoning one of the five hindrances reads: “Having abandoned sloth and drowsiness (thīnamīddha), he dwells free from sloth and drowsiness, conceiving light (ālokasaññin), mindful and fully aware.” Walshe (1995: 545, note 120) points out: “Cultivation of the perception of light is given as a standard way of overcoming the hindrance of sloth-and-torpor.” Similarly, at AN IV 85–87 the Buddha gave Mahāmoggallāna several pieces of advice on how to abandon drowsiness (mīḍḍha), one of which is “Attend to the conception of light (ālokasaññā), concentrate on the conception of day: as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day. Thus, with your mind uncovered and unenveloped, develop a bright mind.” This practice is referred to as one of the five or six subjects of mindfulness (anussati) at AN III 323, and is also included in the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta in the Madhyama Āgama.

(ii) anussati
In two suttas of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, an exposition concerning the sixfold anussati (see Chapter 2, Section 4.1) implies the removing of the hindrances as a preliminary to the jhānas. Here, the standard description of each anussati is followed by a passage like this:

(P1) At the time when the noble disciple reminds himself of the Tathāgata, his mind is not possessed by lust, his mind is not possessed by anger, his mind is not possessed by delusion. At that time his mind becomes upright with the Tathāgata as object. With upright mind a noble disciple obtains inspiration in the meaning, obtains inspiration in the Dhamma, obtains gladness connected with the Dhamma.

(P2) When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body is
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trancelike feel pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.27

This passage is about anussati of the Tathāgata, i.e. the Buddha. The same is said of the other five subjects of anussati. Similarly, the paragraph on abandoning the five hindrances is sometimes followed by the following passage in the account of samādhi khandha:

(L2) When he sees these five hindrances being abandoned in himself, gladness is born. When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body is tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.

(L3) Being secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, he enters and dwells in the first jhāna, which is accompanied by vitakka and vicāra, with rapture and pleasure born of seclusion . . . the second jhāna . . . the third jhāna . . . the fourth jhāna. . . .28

Paragraph P2 is very similar to paragraph L2, while P1 may correspond to the stage of abandoning the hindrances. This is suggested by Buddhaghosa. In the Visuddhimagga he explains P1 thus: “When he has thus suppressed the hindrances through the absence of being possessed by lust, etc. . . .”29, and explains P2 as the arising of the jhāna factors.30 Therefore the practice of anussati can clear the mind of the hindrances, and prepare for the jhāna meditation. Buddhaghosa holds that in this case the jhāna does not reach absorption (appanā), but only access [concentration] (upacāra).31 In other words, anussati cannot lead to the jhāna proper, but can be practiced as a transition from normal consciousness to absorption. Anussati is very much like conceiving light (ālokasaññin) in the sense that it is only a means of abandoning the hindrance rather than a meditation subject for the jhānas.

The practice of anussati as a method of abandoning the hindrances is probably implied in a difficult passage in sutta 10 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta:

(K1) When he dwells contemplating the body as a body, there arises in him either a fever in the body based on the body or sluggishness (linatta) of mind, or his mind is distracted outwardly. That monk should then direct his mind towards some inspiring sign (pasādaniya nimitta).

(K2) When he directs his mind towards some inspiring sign, gladness is born. When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body
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is tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.

(K3) He reviews thus: “The purpose for which I directed my mind has been accomplished. Now let me withdraw [my mind].” He withdraws [his mind] and does not think (vitakketi) or ponder (vicāreti). He understands: “Without vitakka and vicāra, internally mindful, I am pleased.” [This passage is about contemplating the body, the first of the four satipaṭṭhānas. The same is said of feelings, mind and dhammas.]32

In his commentary on paragraph K1, Buddhaghosa glosses “some inspiring (pasādaniya) sign” as “a certain object that inspires confidence (pasāda), such as the Buddha, etc.”33 “The Buddha, etc.” probably refers to at least the first four subjects of anussati, viz the Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha and morality (sīla), in that they are often said to be the objects of confirmed confidence (aveccappasāda), and the exposition of confirmed confidence in these four objects is almost identical with the standard description of the first four anussatis.34 In the Vatthūpama Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya the exposition of confirmed confidence in the Buddha, Dhamma and Saṅgha even includes part of paragraph P1, and the whole of P2.35 Therefore, “some inspiring sign” in sutta 10 could be the subjects of anussati. We should note that nimitta, “sign,” is often connected with saññā, as discussed in Chapter 1. Therefore “directing his mind towards some inspiring nimitta” can mean directing saññā in a wholesome way, which is a function of sati.

Comparing passage K and passage L, we find that K2 is very similar to L2. As Bodhi (2000: 1922, note 147) suggests, “without vitakka and vicāra” in K3 seems to imply the second jhāna, while L3 contains the usual jhāna formula. This indicates a rough correspondence between K3 and L3. In K1 “sluggishness of mind” (cetaso līnattā) is related to the hindrance of sloth and drowsiness, as suggested in a passage of the Aṅguttara Nikāya: “Monks, in one whose mind is sluggish (līnatta), unarisen sloth and drowsiness arise, and arisen sloth and drowsiness is liable to increase and expansion.”36 Similarly, sloth and drowsiness is attributed to sluggishness of mind in the Samyutta Nikāya.37 Likewise, “a fever in the body based on the body” and “his mind being distracted outwardly” in K1 could refer to other hindrances. In this paragraph “directing the mind towards some inspiring sign” is meant to abandon such hindrances and prepare for jhāna. Therefore, K1 corresponds to the process of abandoning the hindrances preceding L2 in the account of samādhikkhandha.

K3 implies that when the purpose of abandoning the hindrances has been achieved, the method of directing the mind towards some inspiring sign should also be set aside. Since “without vitakka and vicāra” refers to the second jhāna, this method is to be discarded before one reaches the second
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jhāna, probably even prior to the first jhāna, for Buddhaghosa says that amassati can only lead to access concentration.

2.2 Satī and the jhānas

2.2.1 Satī and nimitta of the jhānas

As mentioned above, the four satipaṭṭhānas are called “the nimittas of concentration (samādhi)” in the Cūḷavedalla Sutta. In the Saṅgīti Sutta (DN III 226), samādhi-nimitta is illustrated by a list of terms: aṭṭhika-saṁñā (contemplation of a skeleton), puḷavaka-saṁñā (contemplation of a worm-infested corpse), vinīlaka-saṁñā (contemplation of a livid corpse), vicchiddaka-saṁñā (contemplation of a corpse full of holes), and uddhumātaka-saṁñā (contemplation of a bloated corpse). Contemplation of a corpse in different stages of decomposition is included in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, a text devoted to mindfulness. Even some of the above terms, namely aṭṭhika, vinīlaka and uddhumātaka, occur in this text. As discussed in Chapter 2, such contemplation belongs to a function of mindfulness, that is, deliberately forming conceptions (saññā). Therefore the foregoing saññās refer to the practice of sati, and thus this passage in the Saṅgīti Sutta implies that mindfulness is the nimitta of concentration.

Here nimitta can be interpreted as “sign” or “object” since the object of mindfulness is also the object of concentration. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as “cause.” As the commentary glosses, through these saṁñās one can achieve samādhi. This means that these contemplations serve as the causes or basis of concentration. A verse in the Visuddhimagga says that the ten asubhas, which refer to contemplations on a corpse in different stages of decomposition, are called “causes of this and that jhāna” by the Buddha. It should be noted that the Visuddhimagga holds that this practice can only lead to the attainment of the first jhāna, not the second and the rest. This idea might be based on the Abhidhamma as the Dhammasaṅgani (§§ 263–264) only mentions the first jhāna in its exposition of asubhajhāna, which refers to the ten asubhas.

Sutta 8 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta states that while a foolish monk is contemplating the body as a body (feelings, mind, dhammas), his mind does not become concentrated, his defilements (upakkilesa) are not abandoned, he does not grasp that sign (nimitta), and thus he gains neither pleasant dwellings in this very life nor mindfulness and full awareness because he does not grasp the sign of his own mind. A wise monk is the opposite and gains pleasant dwellings in this very life and mindfulness and full awareness because he grasps the sign of his own mind. Since “pleasant dwellings in this very life” refer to the four jhānas, the foregoing implies that the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas may lead to the attainment of the jhānas. Thus “mindfulness and full awareness” here must also refer to the mindful state.
present in the jhānas rather than mindfulness and full awareness as a preliminary to the jhānas. The key to the attainment of the jhānas is to grasp the sign of one’s own mind. What does “grasping the sign of one’s own mind” mean? This seems to be puzzling, and the sutta itself gives no explanation. An account in the Upakkilesa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya may shed some light on this problem.

In this text the Buddha asks Anuruddha whether he and his fellow monks have attained a comfortable dwelling which is a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones and beyond human states. In the Cūḷaṅgoina Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, also in the context of a dialogue between the Buddha and Anuruddha, the term “comfortable dwelling which is a distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones and beyond human states” (uttarim manussadhammā alamariyaṅnakassaranaviseso phāsuvihāro) refers to any of the nine meditative attainments from the first jhāna to the cessation of apperception and feeling. In the Upakkilesa Sutta, however, the comfortable dwelling characterized by conceiving the radiance and the vision of forms (rūpa) can only apply to the four jhānas since the meditative attainments higher than the jhānas surmount conceptions of forms (rūpa-saṅkhāra) according to the Nikāyas.

In reply to the Buddha’s foregoing question, Anuruddha says, “We conceive (sañjāna) radiance and a vision of forms. But soon afterwards the light and the vision of forms disappear, and we do not master that nimitta.”45 The word nimitta can mean either cause or sign. Choosing the former meaning, Ven. Nānamoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 1012) translate: “Soon afterwards the light and the vision of forms disappear, but we have not discovered the cause for that (tañ ca nimittaṃ na paṭivijjhatā).” However, the Chinese translation of this text in the Madhyama Āgama renders nimitta as “sign.” No words equivalent to tañ ca nimittaṃ na paṭivijjhatā are found in the Chinese counterpart, but a similar expression is attributed to the Buddha: “You (plural) do not master this sign.”46 Moreover, in the later part of this text recur these two terms: rūpa-nimitta (“the sign of forms”) and obhāsa-nimitta (“the sign of radiance”).47 Accordingly, nimitta here must mean the “sign,” which refers to the radiance and the vision of forms as objects of concentration.

Following Anuruddha’s reply, the Buddha says that before he was enlightened, he also had the same experience. He realized that when mental defilements (cittassa upakkilesa) such as doubt, etc. arose in him, his concentration fell away, and when concentration fell away, the radiance and the vision of forms disappeared.48 This description is strikingly analogous to the foregoing statement in sutta 8 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta: His mind does not become concentrated, his defilements (upakkilesa) are not abandoned, he does not grasp that sign. Both cases imply that concentration, the abandoning of defilements, and grasping the sign (or conceiving the radiance and the vision of forms) are synchronic or interdependent in some way.
Mastering the sign, or the radiance and the vision of forms, is crucial to attaining a “comfortable dwelling,” which refers to the four jhānas in the Upakkilesa Sutta. This amounts to the foregoing that grasping the sign of one’s own mind is essential for gaining “pleasant dwellings in this very life,” i.e. the four jhānas.

In sutta 8 the method employed to achieve the four jhānas is the four satipaṭṭhānas. As Takei (1983: 162) indicates, in the four Nikāyas and the four Āgamas, as far as the prose is concerned, there are more than forty suttas in which Anuruddha preaches or carries on a dialogue; in over eighty per cent of them he either practices the four satipaṭṭhānas himself or encourages others to practice them. Since Anuruddha is so devoted to the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas, it can be inferred that in the Upakkilesa Sutta it is also by means of the four satipaṭṭhānas that he reaches the meditative attainments called “comfortable dwellings.” In addition, in sutta 12, 13, 14, 22, 23 and 24 of the Anuruddha Samyutta (SN V 303–306), Anuruddha claims that it is through the cultivation of the four satipaṭṭhānas that he acquires the three gnoses (vijjā) and three other achievements, which constitute the well-known six supernormal knowledges (abhīdāna) as found in the Nikāyas. Since the acquisition of these special faculties is based on the attainment of the fourth jhāna according to the Nikāyas, it is very likely that Anuruddha’s cultivation of the four satipaṭṭhānas conduces to the jhānas.

The “sign” (nimitta) in the above two texts could be what later Buddhist literature calls “counterpart sign.” According to the Visuddhimagga, in the course of meditation leading to jhāna, two “signs” successively arise as the object of meditation: the “acquired sign” (uggaha-nimitta) and the “counterpart sign” (paṭibhāga-nimitta). They are described with reference to the earth kasiṇa, meditation on a disc made of earth, in the Visuddhimagga (pp. 125–126). Gethin (1998: 183) interprets the text: “Whereas the acquired sign is a mental visualization of the physical object exactly as it appears—an eidetic image—the counterpart sign is a purified conceptual image free of any marks or blemishes.”

Although the term “counterpart sign” is not found in early Buddhist texts, the concept might have existed in very early times and seems to fit in quite well with the contexts of the Upakkilesa Sutta and of sutta 8 in the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta discussed above. Cousins (1973: 119) says that the most striking evidence for the antiquity of this concept is to be found in the Upakkilesa Sutta. I shall elucidate this point. In this text the “sign,” which refers to the radiance and the vision of forms, could be a precursor of the counterpart sign. We can find some analogy between the passage in sutta 8 and the following passage in the Visuddhimagga:

When he is doing so, gradually the hindrances withdraw, the defilements subside, the mind becomes concentrated with access concentration, and the counterpart sign arises.
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In this passage, “the defilements subside, the mind becomes concentrated with access concentration, and the counterpart sign arises” corresponds to “his mind becomes concentrated, his defilements are abandoned, he grasps that sign” in the case of a wise monk stated in sutta 8. Therefore “grasping that sign” may mean grasping the counterpart sign. The arising of the counterpart sign is crucial to the attainment of the jhānas because it characterizes access concentration and also absorption (appanā), i.e. the jhāna proper. According to the Visuddhimagga the counterpart sign is born of saññā, and is not to be cognized by the eye. Anuruddha’s reply that “We conceive (sañjānāma) radiance and a vision of forms” cited above also implies that this sign is born of saññā (derived from saṃ-vyāhā sañjānāma). This suggests that such an object is purely created in one’s own mind without being connected to the external object that was originally taken as a meditation subject. In other words, it cannot be an “acquired sign.” This state of consciousness is freed from its normal preoccupation with the objects of the five senses. Accordingly we may interpret the passage in question thus: When a wise monk is contemplating the body as a body (or feelings, etc.), if he grasps a meditation object that is formed by conception (saññā) in his own mind and transcending the original object outside his mind, he breaks the bondage to the objects of the five senses, and thereby escapes from “the sphere of sensual desire” (kāmadhātu) to “the sphere of form” (rūpadhātu), i.e. the jhānas.

2.2.2 Sati in different jhānas

The Dantabhūmi Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya integrates the four satipaṭṭhānas into the first two jhānas thus:

(A) Having abandoned these five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, he dwells contemplating the body as a body, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. . . feelings . . . mind . . . He dwells contemplating dhammas as dhammas, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world.

(B) Just as, Aggivessana, the elephant tamer plants a large post in the earth and binds the forest elephant to it by the neck in order to subdue his forest habits, to subdue his forest memories and thoughts, to subdue his forest distress, fatigue and fever, to make him delight in the village, and to inculcate in him habits congenial to human beings, so these four satipaṭṭhānas are the bindings for the mind of the noble disciple in order to subdue his habits based on the household life, to subdue his memories and thoughts based on the household life, to subdue his distress, fatigue and fever based
on the household life, and in order that he may attain the method and realize Nibbāna.

(C) Then the Tathāgata disciplines him further: “Come, monk, dwell contemplating the body as a body, but do not think thoughts connected with the body; dwell contemplating feelings as feelings, but do not think thoughts connected with feelings; dwell contemplating mind as mind, but do not think thoughts connected with mind; dwell contemplating dhammas as dhammas, but do not think thoughts connected with dhammas.

(D) With the stilling of vitakka and vicāra, he enters and dwells in the second jhāna, which has internal tranquility and singleness of mind, without vitakka and vicāra, with rapture and pleasure born of concentration . . . the third jhāna . . . the fourth jhāna.57

Ven. Bodhi points out that the above passage on the four satiPaṭṭhānas prior to the exposition of the second jhāna must have implicitly covered the first jhāna (Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1333, note 1177). In my opinion, paragraphs A and B belong to the first jhāna, while paragraph C is a description of the second jhāna. The expression “having abandoned these five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom” in paragraph A is a standard account preceding the usual jhāna formula,58 and marks the moment of entering the first jhāna. Paragraph B shows that just as the post binding the elephant tames him and makes him delight in the village, away from the forest, so the four satiPaṭṭhānas make one enjoy being away from the household life. This is related to one of the first jhāna’s characteristics: rapture and pleasure born of seclusion—being secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states (see paragraph L3 in Section 2.1). In paragraph C “not thinking (vitakketi) thoughts (vitakka) connected with the body, etc.” seems to indicate one of the second jhāna’s characteristics, “without vitakka and vicāra,” since the two terms are virtually synonymous as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 4). This paragraph represents a function of sati discussed in Chapter 1, that is, to stop the mind proceeding from saññā (saññā) to vitakketi, papañceti, and papañcasaññāsankhā. In other words, when a practitioner contemplates (anupassin) the body (or feelings, etc.), he only forms saññā of the body without further generating vitakka and the ensuing cognitive proliferation. This cognitive transformation is to be credited to sati.

This sutta explains how the four satiPaṭṭhānas can be employed for the attainment of the first two jhānas. On the other hand, the fact that sato sampajāno occurs in the third jhāna formula60 also suggests that sati is integral to the third jhāna. Likewise, the occurrence of sati in the fourth jhāna formula61 shows that sati characterizes the fourth jhāna. What type of sati is it? Commenting on the mention of mindfulness in the third and the fourth jhānas, Griffiths (1983: 61) says that sato ca sampajāno refers to “a kind of
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non-judgemental awareness,” and that such awareness is “a simple noting of things as they occur.” Thus it belongs to the category of simple awareness as discussed in Chapter 2. The four satipaṭṭhānas in conjunction with the first two jhānas also belong to simple awareness in the light of the description of the practice: contemplating the body (feelings, etc.) as a body (feelings, etc.).

2.2.3 Sati and singleness of mind

In Chapter 1 we examined the relationship between sati and vitakka-vicāra as well as emotions like domanassa, somanassa, pīti and upekkhā in various jhānas. How does mindfulness relate to singleness of mind (cetaso ekodibhāva), probably the essence of concentration (samādhi)? What is one mindful of in the jhānas? A Theravāda monk, Ven. Gunaratana (2002: 149), holds that ideally mindfulness and concentration work together as a team, and says, “Mindfulness picks the objects of attention, and notices when the attention has gone astray. Concentration does the actual work of holding the attention steady on that chosen object.” A Mahāyāna text, the Mahāyānasūtraālaya Skṛa, answers the above questions in a similar way: “Mindfulness and full awareness are [the means (upāya) of] tying (upanibandha), for through one [of the two] the mind is not separated from the object (ālambana) and through the other separation [of the mind from the object] is perceived.” Accordingly, one is mindful of the meditation object that one tries to focus on. In other words, the object of concentration is also the object of mindfulness as mentioned above. On the other hand, it is mindfulness and full awareness that tie the mind to the meditation object and prevent the mind from being distracted from the object. A similar idea is found in Mahānāma’s commentary on the Patissambhidāmagga: “It ties the mind to this [meditation] object (āramma). Thus mindfulness is indeed tying (upanibandhana).” Here “this object” refers to the tip of the nose or the upper lip that has become the sign (nimitta) and the cause (kāṇa) for concentration by mindfulness of breathing, which will be discussed in the next section.

This mechanism is well illustrated by the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing, according to which one is not only mindful of the meditation objects but also aware of what one experiences in four aspects, both physical and mental, during the course of meditation. The exposition of mindfulness of breathing also exemplifies how sati yokes samatha and vipassanā together. Below is a detailed discussion of this practice.

3. Mindfulness of breathing—an example of samatha and vipassanā yoked together

Mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasati) is often elaborated in terms of sixteen exercises, which are sometimes divided into four tetrads and are
correlated with the four satipatthānas. Matsuda (1983: 56–60) contends that the original form of ānāpānasati may have consisted of the first two exercises only and had nothing to do with the four satipatthānas. He suggests that it was expanded to comprise the first four exercises, so that it came to be one of the practices under the first satipatthāna; later on the list of sixteen exercises was completed in the form of the four satipatthānas. Such a long list must be a synthesis of previous, simpler teachings (RFG). Nevertheless, the development of this practice could have been done by the Buddha himself during his teaching career of forty-five years as held by the tradition. This practice in the form of the sixteen exercises must have become an essential Buddhist teaching in very early days since it is the main subject of the Anāpāna Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikāya and the Anāpānasati Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and also occurs in other parts of the Nikāyas and even the Vinaya. Mindfulness of breathing in the form of the sixteen exercises exemplifies how the four satipatthānas conjoin samatha and vipassanā, and the relationship between sati and various meditative attainments, including all the nine successive stages (anupubbavihāra) mentioned above.

3.1 Contemplation of the body

The first tetrad, which is connected with contemplation of the body, is among the practices of the first satipatthāna in different versions of the Satipatthāna Sutta and the Kāyagatāsati Sutta. This tetrad consists of the following four practices:

1. A monk, when taking a long in-breath, knows: “I am taking a long in-breath”; or, when taking a long out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a long out-breath.”
2. When taking a short in-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short in-breath”; or, when taking a short out-breath, he knows: “I am taking a short out-breath.”
3. He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving the whole body”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving the whole body.”
4. He trains thus: “I will breathe in calming the bodily formation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out calming the bodily formation.”

The first two exercises belong to simple awareness, as discussed in Chapter 2. For the third exercise, the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda traditions give different explanations. The *Mahāvibhāṣā of the Sarvāstivāda states: “Question: As one observes the wind of breath as entering by the nose and getting out by the nose, why is it said that ‘I breathe in and out perceiving the whole body’? Answer: When mindfulness of breathing is not yet accomplished, one observes in-and-out-breath as entering and getting out by the
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nose. When mindfulness of breathing is accomplished, one observes breath as entering and going out through all the pores of the body, which is like a lotus root.” (T 27, 136a–b) Therefore, taking the word “body” literally, the Sarvāstivādins interpret “the whole body” as the entire physical body, which has pores everywhere, so the whole body can be involved in breathing. As to the Theravādins, the Visuddhimagga explains as follows (tr. Nāṇamoli, 1975: 294–295): “He trains thus: ‘I shall breathe in making known, making plain, the beginning, middle and end of the entire in-breath body. I shall breathe out making known, making plain, the beginning, middle and end of the entire out-breath body’, thus he trains.” (Vism 273) According to the Theravādins, who understand the word “body” in a figurative sense, “the whole body” refers to the entire process of breathing, perhaps just through the nose as people normally do. As Ven. Anālayo (2003: 131) points out, this interpretation can claim support from the Anāpānasati Sutta since the Buddha here identifies in-breathing and out-breathing as a certain body among bodies (MN III 83).

In the fourth exercise the bodily formation (kāyasatkhāra) refers to breathing in and breathing out, according to the Nikāyas and the Sūmyukta Āgama. The Chinese counterpart of the fourth exercise in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is “He learns to breathe in stopping the bodily formation; he learns to breathe out stopping the verbal formation.” Here “verbal” must be a wrong reading for “bodily” because the Pali has kāya (bodily) instead of “verbal” (MN I 56), and the statement “He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in calming bodily formation;’ he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out calming bodily formation.’” is a stock phrase found at many places in both the Pali canon and the canon in Chinese translation. It is notable that the Chinese version has “stopping” (ţ), whereas the Pali has “calming” (pamahāya). I will show that these two expressions refer to the same idea and this sentence implies the achievement of the fourth jhāna.

Sutta 11 of the Vedaṭa Sūmyutta states: “For one who has attained the fourth jhāna, breathing in and breathing out have ceased (niruddha),” and this is rephrased in the same sutta as “For one who has attained the fourth jhāna, breathing in and breathing out have been calmed (patipassadha),” which is among the six kinds of calming (passadhi). The three words pasambhayam, patipassadha and passadhi are all composed of (or contain) the same verbal root sambh and prefix pra. Since the bodily formation refers to breathing in and breathing out as mentioned above, “calming (passambhayam, or ‘stopping’ in the Chinese) the bodily formation” in the fourth exercise refers to the foregoing state where breathing in and breathing out have ceased (niruddha) or been calmed (patipassadha), a state which is attained in the fourth jhāna. This is explicitly pointed out by the *Mahāvibhāṣa of the Sarvāstivādins, where a passage expounding mindfulness of breathing as found in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna...
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Sutta reads: “Stopping the bodily formation refers to the fourth jhāna.”79 Therefore, mindfulness of breathing can lead to the attainment of the jhānas.

It seems that “calming/stopping the bodily formation” in both versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta means stopping breathing. This is confirmed in the *Mahāvibhāṣā, which says, “Stopping the bodily formation refers to making the wind of breath gradually become subtle and arrive at cessation.”80 Similarly, Buddhaghosa in his Visuddhimagga indicates that the Dīgha and Samyutta reciters (bhānaka) held that “in the fourth jhāna [the bodily formation] is extremely subtle and even reaches cessation.”81 Therefore both traditions hold that “calming/stopping the bodily formation” means gradually stilling breath, up to and including its ceasing.82 If so, there would arise an absurd contradiction—How can one practice mindfulness of breathing when one stops breathing? This problem has been noticed in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, which has a passage discussing this issue as follows:

[Objection:] As they say (iti kira), “He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in calming (passambhayaḥ) the bodily formation’; he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out calming the bodily formation’.”; that being so, there is no arising of perception (upaladdhi) of wind, and there is no arising of in-breaths and out-breaths, and there is no arising of mindfulness of breathing . . .83

[Clarification:] . . . at first gross in-breaths and out-breaths occur. Because the sign of the gross in-breaths and out-breaths is well grasped, well attended to, well reflected on, even when the gross in-breaths and out-breaths have ceased, subtle in-breaths and out-breaths occur afterwards. Because the sign of the subtle in-breaths and out-breaths is well grasped, well attended to, well reflected on, even when the subtle in-breaths and out-breaths have ceased, afterwards his mind does not become distracted since [it takes as its] object the sign of the subtle in-breaths and out-breaths. That being so, there is arising of perception of wind . . .84

This statement asserts that “calming the bodily formation” means “stopping in-breaths and out-breaths,” and that one can still practice mindfulness of breathing even when breathing has stopped since one can still contemplate the sign of breathing taken from one’s past experience. In the paragraph of clarification, the expression “the sign . . . is well attended to” ( . . . nimittanumanasikatatta) is reminiscent of saññā as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 2.2). In this context, the functioning of sati consists in forming saññā of breathing, which is an accurate and subtle identification of the experience. At first saññā functions in the sense of apperception, which is dependent on the co-temporal input of sensory data of tangible objects, the in-breaths and out-breaths. Afterwards, even when breathing has ceased in the fourth jhāna, this saññā of breathing can be recalled and serves as a meditation object. This is
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recollection, which is also a definition of sati as discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1). Put differently, in this case the practitioner forms saññā of breathing, which is in the sense of conception as it has nothing to do with co-temporal sensory data.

3.2 Contemplation of feelings

The second tetrad in the sixteen exercises of ānāpānasati is as follows:

(5) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving rapture (pītī)”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving rapture.”
(6) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving pleasure (sukha)”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving pleasure.”
(7) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving the mental formation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving the mental formation.”
(8) He trains thus: “I will breathe in calming the mental formation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out calming the mental formation.”

This tetrad belongs to contemplation of feelings in the four satipaṭṭhānas. The first two exercises may be related to the jhānas, since rapture (pītī) is a factor in the first two jhānas and pleasure (sukha) is a factor in the first three jhānas. This is how the Visuddhimagga interprets it. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Section 4), sutta 29 of the Vedanā Samyutta says that there are worldly pīti and sukha that arise in dependence on sensual pleasure as opposed to unworldly pīti and sukha in the jhānas. Therefore it is also possible that the first two exercises can be practiced in an ordinary state of mind.

In the latter two exercises, the mental formation (cittasaṅkhāra) refers to apperception/conception (saññā) and feeling (vedanā) according to the Nikāyas. Just as “calming the bodily formation” in the first tetrad means gradually stopping the bodily formation, “calming the mental formation” in Exercise 8 of this tetrad must mean gradually stopping the mental formation. In other words, this exercise includes the cessation of apperception and feeling, which is the highest meditative attainment, transcending the four jhānas and the four formless attainments. This is in accordance with a statement in sutta 11 of the Vedanā Samyutta: “For one who has attained the cessation of apperception and feeling, apperception and feeling have been calmed.” Similarly, the commentary on the Arthavinīcayya Sūtra glosses “calming the mental formations” (cittasaṅkhārān, plural) in the section on the sixteen exercises as “leading to subtlety step by step by progressing through formless attainments, abandoning all [the mental formations] in the attainment of cessation.” The attainment of cessation (niruddha-samāpatti) is a synonym for the cessation of apperception and feeling. Mindfulness of breathing as a method
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of achieving the attainment of cessation is clearly stated in *sutta* 8 of the Ānāpānasanyutta: If a monk wishes to enter and dwell in the cessation of apperception and feeling, he should attend to concentration by mindfulness of breathing.91

Here arises a paradox: Exercise 8 probably does not mean that one can practice ānāpānasati in the attainment of cessation, since this attainment is without saññā, upon which the function of sati is dependent as discussed in Chapter 1. The *Amapada Sutta* of the Majjhima Nikāya seems to imply that sati is not present in the attainment of cessation in that it gives a list of mental states, including sati, in the description of each of the four jhānas and the first three formless attainments, but not in the fourth formless attainment and the attainment of cessation. As illustrated by Griffiths (1986: 5ff, 58ff.), both the Theravāda and the Vaibhāṣika traditions held that neither mind nor any mental events endure in this meditative attainment, while some later Buddhist theoreticians like Vasumitra and the Yogācārins proposed certain types of consciousness. According to those earlier traditions, sati must cease to exist in this attainment. Exercise 8 probably only means that the practice of ānāpānasati can effect the attainment of cessation, rather than meaning that one still practices mindfulness in the state of cessation. This is just like the case when the Buddha says that he falls asleep mindful and fully aware,92 and the case of the sati-sampajāñāna formula, which states that one acts in full awareness (sampajānakārin) when falling asleep. These cases do not mean that one can be mindful and fully aware even in sleep, but only describe the mental state just before the moment when one falls asleep. And such a mindful state can have effects on the quality of sleep as indicated in the Aṅguttara Nikāya and the Vinaya, where one who has established mindfulness and is fully aware is said to enjoy the benefits of being free from evil dreams, etc.93 Likewise, Exercise 8 may imply that this practice provides a mindful state that leads to the attainment of cessation.

3.3 Contemplation of mind

The third tetrad of the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing reads:

(9) He trains thus: “I will breathe in perceiving the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out perceiving the mind.”

(10) He trains thus: “I will breathe in gladdening the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out gladdening the mind.”

(11) He trains thus: “I will breathe in concentrating the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out concentrating the mind.”

(12) He trains thus: “I will breathe in liberating the mind”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out liberating the mind.”94
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This tetrad is about the third satipatthāna, contemplation of mind. The first exercise is quite straightforward. The others will be elucidated below. A statement preceding the jhāna formula that recurs in the Dīgha Nikāya runs thus:

When he sees these five hindrances being abandoned in himself, gladness is born. When he is gladdened, rapture is born. When the mind is uplifted by rapture, the body becomes tranquil. One whose body is tranquil feels pleasure. The mind of one who feels pleasure becomes concentrated.95

Although this passage precedes the jhāna formula, it may not refer to a stage prior to the first jhāna; rather it seems to be outlining the jhānas in that it contains three important factors of the jhānas, i.e. rapture (pīti), pleasure (sukha), and “becomes concentrated” (samādhīyati = samādhī). Thus this passage is closely related to the jhānas.96 Two expressions in this passage, “gladdened” (pamudita < pra-√mud) and “concentrated” (samādhīyati < sam-ā-√dhā), are semantically and etymologically the same as “gladdening” (abhippamodaya S < abhi-pra-√mud) and “concentrating” (samādaha S < sam-ā-√dha) in Exercise 10 and Exercise 11 of this tetrad. Therefore it is most likely that “gladdening the mind” and “concentrating the mind” in mindfulness of breathing refer to the experiences of the jhānas in the respect of mental states.

As Gombrich (1998: 21) indicates, there are two grades of “liberation of mind” (ceto-vimutti): one is permanent, definitive liberation, and the other is temporary and can be a meditative state. As he argues, the second one is a secondary development, just like the sixteen forms of ānāpānasati. A good example is found in the Mahāvedalla Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, where the fourth jhāna and one of the four formless attainments, the sphere of nothingness, are respectively referred to as “neither-painful-nor-pleasant liberation of mind” (adukkhamasukhā cetovimutti) and “liberation of mind associated with nothingness” (ākiñcanā cetovimutti).97 Moreover, the formless attainments in general are called liberations (vimokkha) in the Nikāyas.98 The Mahāsūññata Sutta (MN III 110) mentions temporary liberation of mind (samāyika cetovimutti). The Paṭissambhidāmagga defines temporary liberation (samāyiko vimokkho) as “the four jhānas and the four formless attainments.”99 From the foregoing it is plausible to infer that “liberating the mind” in Exercise 12 of the third tetrad denotes such a temporary mental state of liberation by means of meditative attainments.

According to the second and third tetrads, while absorbed in various levels of meditative attainment, the practitioner is not only aware of the meditation subject, but also of his feelings and mental states. This is implied in the Paṭṭhapāda Sutta discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 4). It talks about different kinds of saṅkhā at different levels of meditative attainment, where the
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The contents of saññā include feelings like pīti, sukha and upokkha, and mental states like viveka and samādhi.

3.4 Contemplation of dhammas

Below is the fourth tetrad, which is correlated to the fourth satipaṭṭhāna, i.e. contemplation of dhammas:

(13) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating impermanence”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating impermanence.”
(14) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating dispassion”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating dispassion.”
(15) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating cessation”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating cessation.”
(16) He trains thus: “I will breathe in contemplating relinquishment”; he trains thus: “I will breathe out contemplating relinquishment.”

These four exercises represent the way in which a Buddhist practitioner contemplates the nature of phenomena or mental objects. The first three tetrads concern the meditative attainments. I will show that the contemplations given in the fourth tetrad are to be understood in relation to these meditative attainments. Such a relation is parallel to what is stated in the Mahāmāravīkyaputta Sutta (MN I 432–437), which expounds a certain scheme of contemplation based on various meditative attainments. Following the description of each of the four jhānas, this text says that a monk sees the five aggregates in each attainment as impermanent (anicca), as unsatisfactory, as not-self, etc. Then he focuses his mind on the deathless element thus: “This is peaceful, this is excellent, that is, the tranquilization of all formations, the relinquishment (patimissagga) of all clinging, the destruction of craving, dispassion (vīrāga), cessation (niruddha), Nibbāna.” Similarly, following each of the first three formless attainments, he sees the four aggregates (excluding rūpa, material form) in each attainment as impermanent, as unsatisfactory, as not-self, etc. Then he contemplates the deathless element in the same way as he does after each of the four jhānas. We can find that the contents of contemplation following each of the foregoing meditative attainments cover all the objects of contemplation in the fourth tetrad. This is not a mere coincidence, but gives a significant indication of the practice this tetrad represents.

The close connection between the fourth tetrad and the Mahāmāravīkyaputta Sutta can also be inferred from the following comparison between the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions. In the Chinese Sāṃyuktāgama, which is attributed to the Sarvāstivādins, the objects of contemplation in the fourth tetrad are impermanence (無常), abandonment (斷), dispassion (無欲) and
cessation (尼) (T 2, 206). In other words, relinquishment (paṭinissagga) in the Pali version is replaced by abandonment in the Chinese version.

In its exposition of the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing, the "Srāvakābhūmi", which is influenced by the Sarvāstivādins, also has the same four objects of contemplation as those in the "Samyukta Āgama": impermanence (anītya), abandonment (prahāṇa), dispassion (virūga) and cessation (nīrodha). The Chinese version of the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta Sutta" in the Madhyama Āgama, which is also attributed to the Sarvāstivādins, states: "He contemplates this feeling as impermanent, contemplates rise and decline, contemplates dispassion, contemplates cessation, contemplates abandonment, and contemplates relinquishment." It is noteworthy that "abandonment" (prahāṇa) occurs in the Sarvāstivāda version of the fourth tetrad but not in the Theravāda version, and this word is likewise found in the Sarvāstivāda version of the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta Sutta" but not in the Theravāda version. This suggests that the fourth tetrad is closely associated with the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta Sutta".

The whole practice of ānāpānasati embodied by the sixteen exercises can be understood by way of the practice expounded in the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta Sutta". In order to compare these two contexts, let us first investigate the practice in the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta Sutta". As discussed in Chapter 2, contemplation on impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and not-self belongs to the development of wisdom, i.e. vipassanā meditation. Similarly, a statement almost identical to the above description of the deathless element is given as the content of wisdom (paññā) at SN V 226. In his end note on the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta" passage about contemplating impermanence, etc. and the deathless element following the first jhāna, Ven. Bodhi says, "This passage shows the development of insight (vipassanā) upon a basis of serenity (samatha), using the jhāna on which the practice of insight is based as the object of insight contemplation." (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1266, note 655) Actually this applies also to the other jhānas and the first three formless attainments. According to the "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta Sutta", in the three formless attainments only the four immaterial aggregates of the five are made the objects of insight meditation, presumably because conceptions of material form (rūpasaññā) are already surmounted on entering the first formless attainments, the sphere of infinite space.

The text does not mention the attainment of cessation, nor does it mention the fourth formless attainment, base of neither-conception-nor-nonconception (nevasaññānaññāññāyaññata). The reason is found in a sutta of the Aṅguttara Nikāya, which contains an exposition almost identical to the foregoing "Mahāmāluṇikya-putta" account of developing insight on the basis of the seven meditative attainments. Following this exposition, this sutta says, "As far as the attainment with saññā [extends], there is penetration to perfect knowledge (aññā)". The "Poṭṭhāpāda Sutta" also says that the arising of knowledge (ñāna) comes from the arising of saññā. This implies that
knowledge, including perfect knowledge, presupposes saññā, which functions in the seven lower meditative attainments but not in the higher two. The attainment of cessation has no saññā to be the basis for developing insight. In the nevasaññānasaññāyatanā, apparently saññā is too tenuous to be the base for developing insight.

As discussed above, the first three tetrads deal with the meditative attainments, i.e. samatha. Just like the foregoing in the Mahāmānḍākyaputta Sutta, the fourth tetrad represents the development of wisdom (paññā) or insight (vipassanā) on the basis of the meditative attainments stated in the first three tetrads. This may be implied in a statement following the fourth tetrad in the Ānāpānasati Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya: “Having seen with wisdom (paññā) the abandoning of covetousness and dejection, he views closely with equanimity.” The Visuddhimagga also says that the fourth tetrad is stated by way of pure insight (vipassanā) only.

In conclusion, the sixteen exercises of ānāpānasati cover different factors involved in the progress of samatha meditative attainments, and are classified into four tetrads according to the four subjects of satipaṭṭhāna. The last subject, contemplation of dhammas, is vipassanā meditation on the basis of samatha meditation. In the context of these sixteen exercises, the four satipaṭṭhānas refer to being mindful of or recognizing what one experiences in four aspects, i.e. the body, feelings, mind, and dhammas, while practicing mindfulness of breathing. The above discussions can be summarized diagrammatically in Figure 3.

Exercise 4 (calming the bodily formation) can lead to the attainment of the fourth jhāna. Exercise 5 (perceiving rapture) and Exercise 6 (perceiving pleasure) denote the first three jhānas, which include these mental factors. Exercise 8 (calming the mental formation) progresses through formless attainments up to the attainment of cessation, which is devoid of mindfulness. Exercise 12 (liberating the mind) implies the four jhānas and four formless attainments, which are temporary liberations of mind. Exercises 13–16

Figure 3
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represent insight meditation based on the previous meditative attainments up to the third formless attainment. Accordingly, contemplations of all the four aspects can be practiced in the four jhānas. In the first three formless attainments there are only contemplations of feelings, mind and dhammas, for conceptions of material form (rupasañña), to which the body (the first satipaṭṭhāna) belongs, are surpassed. In the fourth formless attainment even contemplation of dhammas is no longer possible as sañña is too tenuous there.

It is clear that the sixteen exercises are not a series of stages or steps that a practitioner passes through one by one as some scholars suggest.117 This diagram shows the relationship between the sixteen exercises and various meditative attainments. This, however, does not mean that mindfulness of breathing can only be practiced in the context of samatha. The first three exercises of the first tetrad, Exercises 5, 6, 7 of the second tetrad and Exercises 9, 10 of the third tetrad are not necessarily practiced in samatha meditative states. Moreover, Buddhaghosa interprets the first three tetrads not only in terms of samatha, but also in terms of vipassanā (Vism 275–289).118

The sixteen exercises could be seen as exemplifying the four satipaṭṭhānas in general. The four aspects are integral parts of the whole practice. Apart from mindfulness of breathing, meditation using other techniques may also involve contemplations on these four aspects. Therefore the four satipaṭṭhānas may form the general guidelines for various practices. The first three satipaṭṭhānas are concerned with the subjective experiences themselves, while the last one involves the objective reflection on those experiences and contemplation of the ultimate truth on the basis of them. In other words, the first three satipaṭṭhānas focus on one’s personal physical and psychological conditions, while the last one is contemplating phenomena (dhammā), including those personal conditions, in accordance with the Buddha’s teachings (Dhamma).
Chapter 4

KĀYAGATĀ SATI: MINDFULNESS DIRECTED TO THE EXPERIENCER

Of the various categories of teaching on mindfulness, the four satipaṭṭhānas, ānāpānasati and kāyagatā sati gain particular attention in the Canon. Suttas 10, 118 and 119 in the Majjhima Nikāya are devoted to them respectively. There are also Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta and Ānāpāna Samyutta in the Saṁyutta Nikāya. A division’ in the Aṅguttara Nikāya is devoted to kāyagatā sati (AN I 43–46). Chapter 3 has discussed ānāpānasati in terms of the sixteen exercises, which are the major subjects in the Ānāpānasati Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya and the Ānāpāna Samyutta of the Saṁyutta Nikāya. This and the next chapters will deal with the other two categories of teaching on mindfulness.

1. The origins of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta

Kāyagatā sati, or kāyasati, has been discussed in the section on protective awareness in Chapter 2, especially in the contexts of restraining the senses, but its meaning remains obscure. That chapter shows that these two terms are virtually synonyms. Kāyagatā sati is commonly understood as “mindfulness concerning the body,” or “mindfulness of the body”, and is usually considered to be the first satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of the body, for the practices given in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta are identical to those outlined in the first satipaṭṭhāna of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. For example, Nyanaponika Thera and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 279, note 24) say, “‘Mindfulness directed to the body” (kāyagatā-sati) comprises all fourteen exercises described under contemplation of the body in the Kāyagatā-sati Sutta (MN 119) and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (DN 22, MN 10).” Karunaratne (1999: 168) says, “’[M]indfulness in regard to the body’ is a name for fourteen kinds of meditation having various aspects of the body as its topics. . . . This group of fourteen meditations is identical with the first of the fourfold application of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) called contemplation of the body.” This view can be traced back to Buddhaghosa. In his commentary on the Kāyagatāsati Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, he very briefly summarizes all the practices listed in this text by saying that they refer to contemplation of the body in the
fourteen ways in satipaṭṭhāna. "Satipaṭṭhāna" here apparently refers to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, where contemplation of the body is explained by the following six ways (which can be expanded into fourteen by counting the nine states in the sixth way):

1. mindfulness of breathing
2. understanding the four postures
3. acting in full awareness in daily life (the sati-sampajaṇāna formula)
4. reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity
5. reviewing the body by way of the four elements
6. contemplating a corpse in nine different states of decomposition

In his exposition of kāyagatā sati in the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa also quotes a passage from the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and the above fourteen practices (or six ways). The formulae on the four jhānas are not mentioned here, although they are also included in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta along with the foregoing fourteen practices, and are treated in the same way, each of the four jhānas being followed by the same refrain as that following those fourteen. The four jhānas are excluded by Buddhaghosa perhaps because they do not look so much like contemplation of the body as those fourteen practices, even though the simile-accompanied glosses following the jhāna formulae do contain the word kāya. In his exposition of the ten anussatis in his Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa explicitly glosses kāyagatā sati as mindfulness directed to the "material body" that is analyzed into hair of the head, etc.

As far as I know, the Pali version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta is the only text in the earliest stratum of the Canon that can support the interpretation of kāyagatā sati as mindfulness directed to the physical body: all the practices it gives are related to the body. This text, however, differs significantly from its Chinese counterpart, the Sūtra on Mindfulness of the Body (念身經) in the Madhyama Agama, which is attributed to the Sarvāstivāda school. For apart from the foregoing six kinds of practice and the four jhānas, it also includes several practices which do not look like mindfulness of the body. The whole list of practices is in brief as follows:

1. understanding the four postures and the states of being asleep (and/or) awake
2. full awareness of daily activities
3. extinguishing evil unwholesome thoughts with wholesome dharma thoughts
4. with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate, restraining one mental state with [another] mental state
5. mindfulness of breathing
6. the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion pervading the body (the first jhāna)
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7. the rapture and pleasure born of concentration pervading the body (the second jhāna)
8. the pleasure born of the absence of rapture pervading the body (the third jhāna)
9. pervading the body with the pure state of mind (the fourth jhāna)
10. attending to the conception of light, and developing a bright mind
11. grasping the reviewing-sign and recollecting what he attends to
12. reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity
13. reviewing the body by way of the six elements
14. contemplating a corpse in different states of decomposition

Among these fourteen practices, numbers 3, 4, 10 and 11 cannot be counted as mindfulness of the body. Numbers 6, 7, 8 and 9 are the simile-accompanied glosses on the jhānas, which are not regarded as kāyagatā sati by Buddhaghosa as mentioned above. Although these glosses contain the term kāya, the whole expression is likely to be figurative, and kāya here probably refers to the experiencer of sensation and feeling both physically and mentally as some scholars suggest. Since so many practices which are not mindfulness of the physical body are included in the Chinese version, it is impossible that kāyagatā sati was regarded as mindfulness of the physical body when this Sarvāstivāda text, which is preserved in Chinese translation, was compiled. One may argue that those practices which cannot be counted as mindfulness of the body in the Chinese version are later interpolations, and even the four jhānas in the Pali version are later insertions because they are not kāyagatā sati as Buddhaghosa suggests. But I will show that, as far as the list of practices are concerned, the Sarvāstivāda version could be closer to the antecedent or even original version, which drew a large amount of material from three other sets of teachings, and the Theravāda version removed those practices that do not look like mindfulness of the body.

Here I shall explain what I mean by “the antecedent version” of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta. According to the *Samayabhedorasacanakara* (異部宗輪論; T 49, 15a–b) by Vasumitra of the Sarvāstivādins, at the time of King Aśoka (ca. 270–230 BC) the original Buddhist Order first split into two sects, the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthavira (or Sthaviravāda in Sanskrit, Theravāda in Pali); later on the Sarvāstivāda school split off from the Mahāsāṃghikas. As to the Pali source, the commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* (Kv-a 2–3), a Theravāda Abhidhamma work, states that after the first schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Theravādins, the Mahāmāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas further seceded from the Theravādins; then the Sarvāstivāda (Pali Sabbatthivāda) school split off from the Mahāmāsakas. According to Lamotte (1988: 529–536), several other sources from different schools agree with the Sarvāstivāda account. In any case, there was a close tie between the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins. In his comparative study...
of the Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pali Majjhima Nikāya, Ven. Thich Minh Chau (1991: 14) makes the following comment:

The high percentage of similarities between the Chinese and the Pali versions and the presence of many literally identical passages show that there existed a basic stock, not only of doctrines, but also of texts, agreeing in all essentials with both the Chinese and the Pali versions. ... All this proves the existence of an ancient Canon, probably the lost Magadhi Canon referred to by WINTERNITZ in his HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.11

We can therefore assume that before these two schools split there was an antecedent Canon from which the Canons of both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda schools originated, and that the Pali and Chinese versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta which have come down to us derived from an earlier version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta in that antecedent Canon. It is this earlier version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta that I refer to as “the antecedent version” in this chapter.

The oral tradition of Buddhist texts should be taken into account. During the period of oral transmission the Canon was not fixed. Norman (1983: 31) suggests:

[T]here was in early times a large collection of suttas which were remembered by heart, and the task of allocating them to the various nikāyasāgas had not been finished, or the allocation completely agreed, by the time the schools began to separate. The reference in the Vinaya-piṭaka to an upāsaka inviting the bhikkhus to come and learn a sutta from him before it is lost would seem to indicate that the collection of suttas had not yet been completed.

We cannot be sure about whether the Kāyagatāsati Sutta had already been composed and included in the collection of suttas when the sutta-piṭaka was first compiled, but it is almost certain that this sutta already existed before the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins had drifted apart, for both schools have this sutta. It will be demonstrated that some components of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta are borrowed from other texts and do not fit the contexts in this sutta, but instead fit the contexts in those other texts. I will suggest that three other texts provide the materials that make up most part of this sutta. Part of the discussion below is summarized in Table 4.

1.1 The Udāyī Sutta

In the Udāyī Sutta2 of the Anguttara Nikāya (III 322–325), the Buddha asks Udāyī a question three times: “How many subjects (ṭhāna)3 of anussati are
there?” but Udāyī remains silent. When pressed by Ānanda, he finally answers: “A monk recollects many of his former abodes [i.e. former lives], . . .” (bhikkhu anekavihita pubbenivāsaṃ anussarati . . .), which is quoted from the standard account of the first of the three gnoses (vijjā). But he was reproached by the Buddha for this answer. Then Ānanda answers the question, giving five items. They are as follows in brief:

1. The first three jhānas, which lead to pleasant dwelling in this very life
2. “A monk attends to the conception of light (ālokasaññā) and concentrates on the conception of day: as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day. Thus, with his mind uncovered and unenveloped, he develops a bright mind,” which leads to the acquisition of knowledge and vision
3. Reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity (identical to the fourth practice in the Pali Kāyatānasati Sutta), which leads to the abandoning of desire for sensual pleasures
4. Contemplating a corpse in nine different states of decomposition (identical to the sixth practice in the Pali Kāyatānasati Sutta), which leads to the uprooting of the conceit “I am”
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5. The fourth jhāna, which leads to the penetration of the various elements

To these five the Buddha adds a sixth:

6. “Being mindful, a monk goes forward; being mindful, he goes back; being mindful, he stands; being mindful, he sits; being mindful, he lies down; being mindful, he undertakes walking up and down. This subject of anussati, Ānanda, thus developed, thus cultivated, leads to mindfulness and full awareness.” 14

The foregoing account implies that it is wrong to take anussati in the compound anussatiṭṭhāna to mean recollection as in the case of recollecting one’s past lives, but rather it means mindfulness. 15 Among the above six subjects of mindfulness, the third and fourth are included in both the Pali and Chinese versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.16 Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) has shown that the sixth is similar to the sati-sampajañña formula, which is also included in the two versions of the text. It is noteworthy that the second subject of mindfulness about the conception of light closely resembles the tenth practice in the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta (see Appendix 2).

Apart from the six subjects of mindfulness, the passage on the conception of light is only found at DN III 223 = AN II 45, where this passage is in the context of developing concentration (samādhi) rather than mindfulness. Therefore the passage on the conception of light in the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta is probably related to the six subjects of mindfulness rather than to the other context. It is possible that, among the six subjects of mindfulness, the conception of light (2) and three other items (3, 4, 6) were originally included in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, and the Sarvāstivādins preserved all the four items while the Theravādins left out the conception of light presumably because it cannot be counted as mindfulness of the physical body. (see Table 4) This possibility will be reinforced by the following discussions concerning other practices and statements in the two versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.

1.2 The Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sutta

The Vitakkasanthāna Sutta in the Majjhima Nikāya has three passages in common with the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, and one of the three is also found in the Pali version. This text expounds the five methods that a monk pursuing the higher states of mind (adhicitta) should practice in order to abandon evil unwholesome thoughts, and thereby concentrate the mind. The refrain following each of the five methods is as follows (tr. Nāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995: 211):
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With the abandoning of them his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated. 17

The refrain following each of the practices in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta is as follows (tr. Nāṇamoli & Bodhi, 1995: 950):

As he abides thus diligent, ardent, and resolute, his memories and intentions based on the household life are abandoned; with their abandoning his mind becomes steadied internally, quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated. That is how a bhikkhu develops mindfulness of the body. 18

This refrain contains exactly the same words as the refrain in the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta (although the wording in the translation of tesaṁ pahānā is slightly different). These words fit the context of the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta quite well as each of the five methods is about abandoning evil unwholesome thoughts. Besides, these words are concerned with concentration (samādhi) and thus conform to the topic of the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta, the higher states of mind (adhicitta), which refers to concentration as mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 3. In the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, however, the sentence “As he abides thus diligent, ardent, and resolute, his memories and thoughts based on the household life are abandoned” needs to be inserted after each of the practices in order to fit the Vitakkasanthāna refrain into the context. The Vitakkasanthāna Sutta refrain is the passage closest to the Kāyagatāsati Sutta refrain I can find in the earliest stratum of the Canon. 19

The only other similar passage is found in the Mahāsūññata Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya:

If a monk should wish: “Let me enter and dwell in emptiness internally,” Ānanda, that monk should steady his mind internally, quiet it, bring it to singleness and concentrate it. And, Ānanda, how does a monk steady his mind internally, quiet it, bring it to singleness and concentrate it? 20

But this passage makes no mention of abandoning something, and the verbs are future past participles in their first occurrence in this passage and then mostly causatives in their second occurrence, whereas the verbs in the refrains of both the Vitakkasanthāna and Kāyagatāsati Suttas are all present indicatives. Therefore, the Mahāsūññata passage is more distant from the refrains in the Vitakkasanthāna and Kāyagatāsati Suttas. From the foregoing we can deduce that the Kāyagatāsati Sutta refrain either comes from the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta refrain, or these two come from a common source in the earlier Canon.
The refrain in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta preserved in Chinese translation is:

Thus, however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements (梵行) in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Although this is somewhat different from the Pali version, the purport is very similar. In addition to the refrain, even the third and fourth practices in the Sarvāstivāda Kāyagatāsati Sutta are parallel to the first and the fifth methods in the Chinese *Adhicitta Sūtra (增上心經), equivalent to the Pali Vitakkasanthāna Sutta. The first method is as follows:

A monk attends to a sign connected with the wholesome. If unwholesome thoughts arise, on the basis of this sign he further attends to a different sign connected with the wholesome, causing the evil unwholesome thoughts to stop arising. On the basis of this sign he further attends to that different sign connected with the wholesome, and thus the arisen unwholesome thoughts disappear. When the unwholesome thoughts have disappeared, his mind becomes constantly steadied, still internally, and he becomes single-minded and attains concentration. Just as a carpenter or a carpenter’s apprentice holds an inked string and applies it to the wood, and then chops the wood with a sharp axe to straighten it, so on the basis of this sign a monk further attends to a different sign connected with the wholesome, causing the evil unwholesome thoughts to stop arising...

Although the description of this method is much longer than that of the third practice in the Sarvāstivāda Kāyagatāsati Sutta (see Appendix 2), it means basically the same, that is, counteracting unwholesome thoughts with the wholesome. The simile for the first method in the *Adhicitta Sūtra is even identical to that for the third practice in the Sarvāstivāda Kāyagatāsati Sutta. Here is the Pali version of this method:

When a monk, owing to a sign, attends to that sign, and there arise evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion, then he should attend to another sign connected with the wholesome. When he attends to another sign connected with the wholesome, those evil unwholesome thoughts connected with desire, with hate, and with delusion are abandoned and disappear. With the abandoning of them his mind becomes steadied internally,
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quieted, brought to singleness, and concentrated. Monks, just as a skilled mason or a mason’s apprentice might remove, take out, and get rid of a coarse peg with a fine peg, so when a monk, owing to a sign, attends to that sign . . .27

The description of this method is largely the same as the Chinese version although the simile is different.

The description of the fourth practice with a simile in the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta (see Appendix 2) is almost identical to part of the fifth method in the *Adhicitta Sūtra as follows:

With his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, that monk rectifies one mental state with [another] mental state, grasps and subdues [that mental state] . . . Just as two strong men seize a feeble man, grasp and subdue [him] . . .28

Its Pali counterpart in the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta is also very similar:

Monks, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, the monk should restrain, crush and torment one mental state with [another] mental state . . . Monks, just as a strong man, having grasped a weaker man by the head or a shoulder, might restrain, crush and torment [him] . . .29

The passage on the fifth method in the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra is also found in the Mahāsaccaka Sutta (MN I 242), Bodhirājakumāra Sutta (MN II 93) and Saniṅgārava Sutta (MN II 212). In these three texts, however, the same passage is given as one of the practices which the Buddha tried out before his enlightenment. The only context in which both the foregoing two practices (the third and fourth) in the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta are found is the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra.30 This suggests a close connection between these two practices and the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra. Padmal de Silva (2001) has examined the five methods in the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta and found that four of them (including the two practices in the Chinese Kāyagatāsati Sutta) have striking parallels in contemporary clinical psychology and psychiatry. This shows the homogeneity and coherence of the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra, which seem to be lacking in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta. If we consider this point together with the fact that the same refrain fits in the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta far better than in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, we can infer that those two practices peculiar to the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta probably come from the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra, rather than the other way round. Likewise, the refrain in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta probably also comes from the Vitakkasanthāna Sutta/*Adhicitta Sūtra, rather than the other way round.
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According to the above discussion, it may be concluded that the refrain in the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* and the third and fourth practices in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* come from the *Vitakkasanthāna Sutta*/*Adhicitta Sutta*. This strongly suggests that those two practices in the Sarvāstivāda version along with the refrain were originally included in the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*. It is very unlikely that those two practices were interpolated by the Sarvāstivāda, and that these “interpolations” and the refrain of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* come from the same source simply by accident. There are over five thousand suttas in the extant four main Nikāyas. Considering the large number of different texts or contexts in the Canon, the probability of these “interpolations” and the refrain coming from the same text or context by chance is extremely slim. The most plausible explanation for this coincidence is perhaps that they were all parts of the antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, from which the extant Pali and Chinese versions derive, but those two practices which do not look like mindfulness of the body were omitted by the Theravādins. (see Table 4)

1.3 The Pañcaṅgika Sutta

The *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* of the Aṅguttara Nikāya expounds the “noble fivefold right concentration” (*ariya-pañcaṅgika-sammāsāmādhi*), which consists of the four *jhāna* formulae followed by the simile-accompanied glosses on them and a description of the reviewing-sign (*paccavekkhadī-nimittā*) with a simile. The four *jhāna* formulae and the following simile-accompanied glosses in this text are identical to those in the Pali version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, while the Chinese version only has the simile-accompanied glosses on the four *jhānas*. The passage on the reviewing-sign reads thus:

> Again, monks, a monk well grasps the reviewing-sign, well attends to, well reflects on, and well penetrates [it] with wisdom. Monks, just as one might review another, or someone standing might contemplate another sitting, or someone sitting might contemplate another lying down; so monks, a monk well grasps the reviewing-sign, well attends to, well reflects on, and well penetrates [it] with wisdom.

This passage, including the simile, is parallel to the eleventh practice in the Chinese version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* (see Appendix 2). The same set of five practices in the *Pañcaṅgika Sutta* is also found in the Chinese translation of a text called the *Śūtra on the Ten Repeated Dharmas of the Dīgha Āgama* (*長阿含十報法經*, hereafter SRTD), which is equivalent to the Pali *Dasuttara Sutta* in the Dīgha Nikāya. The counterpart of the “noble fivefold right concentration” in this Chinese text is called the “five kinds of concentration” (*五種定*), which comprise the simile-accompanied glosses on the four *jhānas* and a passage similar to the foregoing description of the reviewing-sign:
Again, a disciple on the path grasps the reviewing-truth (sic) of the body, having carefully attended to, carefully discriminated, carefully grasped [it]; just as a person standing contemplates a person sitting, a person sitting contemplates a person lying down.39

This text is considered to belong to the Sarvāstivādins by Chizen Akanuma40 and de Jong (1979: 253). The only references to the reviewing sign (or “reviewing-truth”) in the earliest stratum of the Canon, including both the Pali and Chinese, are in the foregoing Pañcaṅgika Sutta, the “five kinds of concentration” in SRTD, and the Chinese versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.41 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the section on contemplating the body in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta derives from the Kāyagatāsati Sutta. It is most likely that the reviewing-sign in these two Sarvāstivāda texts comes from the “five kinds of concentration” in SRTD, equivalent to the Pañcaṅgika Sutta. The four jhānas with the simile-accompanied glosses in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta may also come from the Pañcaṅgika Sutta. This will be elucidated below.

The foregoing discussion covers most of the practices listed in the two versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and the refrain appended to those practices. Following this main discourse on kāyagatā sati are an exposition with similes and a list of benefits of practising kāyagatā sati. This latter part also has a portion in common with the Pañcaṅgika Sutta. The Kāyagatāsati Sutta has the following words (hereafter passage A):

[The Buddha says,] “Monks, anyone whose kāyagatā sati has been developed and cultivated directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge (abhiphā) whatever (yassa yassa) state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] (tatra tatr’ eva) whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] (āyatana) exists. Monks, suppose a water pot, full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it, were set on a stand. Whenever a strong man tilts it, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, anyone whose kāyagatā sati has been developed and cultivated directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

Suppose a rectangular pond on level ground were surrounded by an embankment and full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it. Whenever a strong man loosens the embankment, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, anyone whose kāyagatā sati has been developed . . . (repeat as above).

Monks, suppose a chariot harnessed to thoroughbreds were standing on level (lit. good) ground at a crossroads, with a goad lying

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ready. Then a skilled groom, a trainer of horses, would mount it, grasp the reins in his left hand and the goad in his right hand, and drive it on or back as he wishes. So too, monks, anyone whose kāyagatā sati has been developed . . . (repeat as above). "42

The Pañcaśīka Sutta has a passage containing almost identical words (hereafter passage X):

[The Buddha says,] “Monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated, he directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge (abhiññā) whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists. Monks, suppose a water pot, set on a stand, were full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it. Whenever a strong man tilts it, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated, he directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

Monks, suppose a rectangular pond on level ground were surrounded by an embankment and full of water to the brim so that a crow could drink from it. Whenever a strong man loosens the embankment, would water come out?” “Yes, venerable sir.” “So too, monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated . . . (repeat as above).

Monks, suppose a chariot harnessed to thoroughbreds were standing on level (lit. good) ground at a crossroads, with a goad lying ready. Then a skilled groom, a trainer of horses, would mount it, grasp the reins in his left hand and the goad in his right hand, and drive it on or back as he wishes. So too, monks, when the noble fivefold right concentration has been thus developed and thus cultivated . . . (repeat as above).”43

According to these two passages, what a monk practices when he has developed kāyagatā sati (passage A) is the same as what he does when he has developed the noble fivefold right concentration (passage X). Even the similes in the two cases are identical44 although the word order in the first two similes is slightly different. Passage X in the Pañcaśīka Sutta is the only passage in the earliest stratum of the Canon that is almost identical with passage A in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta,45 both passages containing the description of realizing supernormal knowledge on the basis of a certain “level”
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illustrated by the three similes. Is one passage modeled on the other? Which represents the original context? I shall demonstrate that the original context is about developing the six kinds of supernormal knowledge on the basis of various meditative attainments.

Following passage X, the Pāñcaṅgika Sutta reads (hereafter passage Y):

(1) If he wishes: “Let me experience many kinds of supernatural power: having been one, let me become many. . . . Let me travel with the body as far as the Brahmā world,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

(2) If he wishes: “With the divine ear element that is purified . . . those far and near . . .,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

(3) If he wishes: “Let me understand the minds of other beings, of other persons, having encompassed them with my own mind. . . . Let me understand a mind with lust as a mind with lust. . . . Let me understand an unliberated mind as an unliberated mind,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

(4) If he wishes: “Let me recollect many of my former abodes, that is, one birth, two births. . . . Thus let me recollect many of my former abodes with their modes and details,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

(5) If he wishes: “With the divine eye that is purified and surpasses mankind . . . Let me understand how beings transmigrate according to their karma,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.

(6) If he wishes: “Through the destruction of the taints, let me understand, realize, enter and dwell in the taintless liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom myself in this very life,” he acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.46

After the description of the four jhānas and the reviewing-sign (fivefold right concentration), passages X and Y prescribe the further practice which one can do on the basis of such meditative attainments. This practice is centered on abhiññā, “supernormal knowledge.” In the Nikāyas the term abhiññā is sometimes used to refer to the six special faculties as given in passage Y.47 Abhiññā, “supernormal knowledge,” in passage X must also refer to the six special faculties in the ensuing passage Y. The expression “he directs his mind towards (cittaṃ abhiññināmeti) realizing by supernormal knowledge (abhiññā) whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge” in passages
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X and A is also reminiscent of the standard formula on developing the six abhiññās, which states that “he applies and directs his mind towards” (cittam abhināharati abhininnāmeti) supernatural power, the divine ear element, etc. 48

In passages A, X and Y the following sentence recurs: “He acquires the ability to witness (sakkhibhavyatam)49 this or that very [state] (tatra tatr’ ev) whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.” Tatra tatr’ eva, the equivalent of a locative, apparently goes with sakkhibhavyatam since sakkhīn (Skt sāksin), “be witness of,” can have an object in the locative case (MW s.v. sāksin). Tatra tatr’ eva must be a correlative referring back to “whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge” (yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikaraṇaṁyassa dhammassa). Therefore this sentence is saying that he acquires the ability to witness, or experience, the states that are to be realized by the six types of supernormal knowledge. In the foregoing sentence, “whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists” (sati sati āyatane) probably can be understood as “on the basis of a suitable meditative attainment” for the following reasons. Firstly, the names of the four formless attainments all contain the word āyatana. Secondly, in the Kāyasakkhi Sutta of the Āṅguttara Nikāya (IV 451f.) each of the nine meditative attainments are referred to as a “level” (āyatana). Similarly, āyatana in our sentence may also refer to a meditative attainment. Therefore, our sentence means that when there is a certain meditative attainment as a base, a practitioner is able to witness, or experience, the states realizable by the six types of supernormal knowledge. 50 This is apparently the purport of passages X and Y in the Pañcâṅgika Sutta.

Both the Pañcâṅgika Sutta (passage X) and the Kāyagatāsati Sutta (passage A) have the statement “He directs his mind towards realizing by supernormal knowledge whatever state is realizable by supernormal knowledge, and acquires the ability to witness this or that very [state] whenever a [suitable] level [of concentration] exists.” This statement, however, makes good sense only in the context of concentration like that in the Pañcâṅgika Sutta, but not in the context of kāyagatā sati. Even though kāyagatā sati may lead to the jhānas, it is not jhāna or any other meditative attainment as such, especially if it is rendered in a very narrow sense as mindfulness of the physical body. The idea about developing supernormal knowledge on the basis of various “levels [of concentration]” in passage A of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta is apparently borrowed from such a context as that in the Pañcâṅgika Sutta and then superimposed on the context in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.

Let us consider the following three points: (1) As mentioned above, passage X in the Pañcâṅgika Sutta is the only passage in the earliest stratum of the Canon that is almost identical with passage A in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, and the latter is apparently modeled on the former. (2) As mentioned above, apart from the Chinese versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and Satipatthāna Sutta, the only reference to the reviewing-sign (or “reviewing-truth”) in
the earliest stratum of the Canon is in the foregoing Pañcañgika Sutta, roughly equivalent to the “five kinds of concentration” in SRTD. (3) The Pañcañgika Sutta appears to have coherent contents and a simple structure. It describes different levels of concentration with similes, and then expounds also with similes what to practice on the basis of different levels of concentration, and lastly gives the fruits brought about by this practice. It could be among the earliest texts which were subject to very little contamination. From these three points, we may conclude that the Pañcañgika Sutta provides the Pali Kāyagatāsati Sutta with passage A, and provides the Chinese version with the passage on the reviewing-sign. The four jhānas with simile-accompanied glosses in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta could also have been borrowed from the Pañcañgika Sutta along with passage A and the passage on the reviewing-sign. Therefore, the antecedent version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta probably drew the following material from the Pañcañgika Sutta: (1) the passages on the four jhānas and the reviewing-sign, which comprise the fivefold right concentration, (2) passage A about developing supernormal knowledge on the basis of concentration. Later on the passage on the reviewing-sign was omitted by the Theravādins, presumably because it cannot be regarded as mindfulness of the body, while passage A was omitted by the Sarvāstivādins for some reason which I still cannot fathom. (see Table 4)

One may argue that the passage on the reviewing-sign, which is not mindfulness of the body, is a Sarvāstivāda interpolation, and that it is a mere coincidence that this “interpolation” and passage A in the Pali Kāyagatāsati Sutta come from the same source. Considering that there are so many different texts or contexts in the Canon, the probability of this Sarvāstivāda “interpolation” and passage A in the Theravāda version coming from the same text or context by chance is extremely slim.

1.4 An earlier version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta

According to the previous sections, we should probably discard the hypothesis that the practices peculiar to the Sarvāstivāda version which do not look like mindfulness of the body are later additions, but rather we should accept that these practices were already included in the antecedent version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta together with those practices directly concerning the physical body found in both the Pali and Chinese recensions we have today. We should consider this issue in the light of textual compilation and transmission. In view of the above discussions, we can assume that the antecedent version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta drew a large amount of material from the three texts discussed above. One significant feature in contamination of texts is the frequent use in the Canon of what scholars have dubbed “pericopes,” an idea in New Testament criticism applied to the early period of transmission of the Buddhist traditions. As Gombrich (1987) shows, pericopes only make perfect sense in the original contexts. Likewise, several
passages do not make good sense in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, but they fit into other suttas very well.

In the course of the textual transmission, both schools omitted or modified some parts of the earlier version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, and the Theravādins particularly excluded those not directly related to the body, probably when kāyagatā sati came to be understood as mindfulness of the physical body. The influence of reciters’ ideas on the redaction of the texts in oral tradition is suggested by Schmithausen (1981: 201):

There must have been . . . preachers personally engaged in practice and theory, and it is hardly conceivable that such persons did not develop new ideas—even though they themselves need not have taken these ideas to be new in substance—and that they did not try to incorporate them into tradition by means of modification, supplementation, etc., of the already existing material.

It is conceivable that such modifications, supplementations, etc. were normally done by addition rather than subtraction, since no one would want to risk losing any of the Buddha’s words (RFG). Our case, however, is a rare, but not the only, example of modification by subtraction. In the Samyukta Āgama preserved in Chinese, the third jhāna is referred to as unworldly upekkhā, but this is omitted in the Pali version (SN IV 237) because the third jhāna still has somanassa according to the Pali Uppaṇipātika Sutta (SN V 215), and somanassa is incompatible with upekkhā. Another example is provided by Ray (1994: 162 and 176, note 32), who shows that the list of eleven saints in the Ānā (p. 3) is more likely to be original than the list of ten in the Majjhima Nikāya (III 78–79), which has removed Devadatta as his positive side was increasingly hidden under a covering of vitriolic condemnation. The practice of modification by subtraction even continued to the re-editing of the Satipatthāna Sutta in the Theravāda school, which further removed the four jhānas from the list of the first satipatthāna, mindfulness of the body, presumably because the Theravāda tradition came to emphasize the Satipatthāna Sutta as a discourse on insight (vipassanā) meditation rather than serenity (samatha) meditation. Being serenity meditation, the four jhānas had to be left out.

Moreover, it is inconceivable that the Sarvāstivāda compilers would have borrowed passages not really about mindfulness of the body and added them to a text if this text had been supposed to be devoted to mindfulness of the body. The only plausible explanation is that those four passages peculiar to the Sarvāstivāda version formed parts of an earlier, probably original, version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, but were later on eliminated by the Theravādins, who may have considered them to be interpolations.

It would be helpful to consider another point here. The fifth practice in the Pali Kāyagatāsati Sutta is reviewing kāya as being divided into four
elements in the way a cow is being divided into pieces, whereas the Chinese version speaks of six elements, with the addition of space and consciousness elements. It is very unlikely that the Sarvāstivādins would have interpolated consciousness into a description of the components of kāya if kāya had been regarded as the physical body at that time.

From the above discussions it follows that when the Kāyagatāsatī Sutta was first composed, kāyagatā satī was not considered to be mindfulness of the physical body alone, and kāya obviously had a much broader sense than the physical body. Since the antecedent, or even the original, version of the Kāyagatāsatī Sutta probably contained all the practices given in the Chinese version and passage A in the Pali version, kāyagatā satī covers different types of mindfulness as discussed in Chapter 2 and is closely connected to the meditative attainments which effect supernormal knowledge, including liberating insight. Therefore kāyagatā satī seems to be a general guideline or a basic principle that applies to a wide range of practices. But what exactly kāyagatā satī and kāya in this context mean is still not clear since the word kāya can have many meanings. Below is an attempt to solve this problem.

2. The meaning of kāyagatā sati

Apart from the Kāyagatāsatī Sutta, the only explanation of kāyagatā satikāyasati in the earliest stratum of the Canon, including both Pali and Chinese, is found in a sūtra in the Ekottara Āgama, which reads:

What is meant by mindfulness of the body [refers to] head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, gall bladder, liver, lungs, heart, spleen, kidneys, large intestines, small intestines, white and sticky (sic) bladder, feces, urine, omasum (sic), dark green bowels, stomach, bladder, urine, tears, spittle, snot, pus, blood, fat, saliva, skull, brain. What is the body? It is the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element. It is made by the father element and the mother element. Where does it come from? By whom is it made? The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the mind. Where will this arise in the end? Thus, monks, is called mindfulness of the body.

This text seems to give the answers before their corresponding questions. Therefore, the list of the bodily parts is the answer to “What is the body?”; the four elements to “Where does it come from?”; “made by the father element and the mother element” to “By whom is it made?” etc. It is self-evident that the body consists of the bodily parts. “Composed of the four great elements, born from father and mother” is a stock description of the body. In contrast, the mention of the six senses in this context appears puzzling and out of place. This occurrence, however, can be a significant indication of what kāyagatā
sati actually refers to. Unfortunately, this passage seems rather corrupt and does not suffice to help us fully understand the issue. I shall resort to another approach as a complement that will shed more light on this problem.

Here is an attempt to find out what kāyagatā sati or kāyasati refers to from the contexts in which it occurs. Below are the references to kāyagatā sati and kāyasati that I have found in the earliest stratum of the Pali Canon (to avoid repetitions, repeated occurrences of kāyagatā sati and kāyasati in one text in a similar context are counted as one reference): 66

kāyagatā sati:
- DN III 272
- MN III 88–99
- SN I 188; II 220; IV 199–200, 359, 373; V 170
- AN I 30, 42, 43–46; IV 374–377
- Sn 340
- Dhp 293, 299
- Ud 28, 77
- Th 6, 468, 636, 1035, 1225

kāyasati:
- MN I 266–270
- SN IV 119–120, 184–186, 189, 198–199

In this list, eight (shown in bold type) of the twenty-seven (nearly 30 percent) references to kāyagatā satikāyasati occur in the context of restraining the senses. This is a significant indication of how it is employed in Buddhist practice and what it may refer to. Five of these eight references are found in the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta, which are devoted to the six senses. I will examine several important passages in this part of the Saṁyutta Nikāya.

2.1 Kāyagatā sati/kāyasati as found in the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta

As discussed in Chapter 2, in the Chapāṇa Sutta of the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta, kāyagatā sati functions as a post or pillar that restrains the six senses. In the Kīṃsuka Sutta of the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta (SN IV 194–195) the Buddha makes a simile about a frontier city with six gates. In this simile, as he explains, “the city” represents kāya; “the six gates” represents the six internal sense bases; “the gatekeeper” represents mindfulness. It is very clear that what mindfulness is concerned with is what is going on at the six gates. This is perhaps the import of kāyagatā sati or kāyasati in the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta, and kāya in kāyagatā satikāyasati probably refers to the same as kāya in the above simile, where the city with six gates implies that kāya has six senses. In his discussion of this simile, Harvey (1995: 116–117) says, “[T]he ‘town’ of the body has ‘six gates’, which thus means that it includes the mind-organ . . . ‘Body’, then, can include mental processes.” 66

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In the simile “the lord of the city” stands for consciousness. Commenting on this, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1429, note 209) says, “I see the point to be simply that consciousness is the functional centre of personal experience.” Thus he seems to regard kāya represented by the “city” as personal experience. The six senses form the basis of our personal experience, whether physical or mental. According to the simile, kāya has the six senses. Thus kāya probably refers to a living organism that can experience through his senses. There are other cases in the early texts in which kāya refers to the individual, or the experiencer of both physical and mental aspects. In our case, kāyasati or kāyagatā sati may refer to mindfulness applying to an individual that is able to perceive through his senses and is endowed with consciousness as the functional center of his experience. This could be why the six senses are mentioned in the sūtra of the Ekottara Āgama cited above.

In the Avassuta Sutta of the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta, the Buddha asks Mahāmoggallāna to preach on his behalf. Then Mahāmoggallāna says,

How, friends, is one avassuta? Here, friends, on seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is intent on it in the case of an agreeable visible form, and is upset at it in the case of a disagreeable visible form. He dwells with mindfulness of kāya unestablished (anupaṭṭhitakāyasati), with a limited mind, and does not understand as it really is that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, where those evil unwholesome states that have arisen in him cease without remainder. [The same is said of the other five senses.]

He then explains anavassuta in the converse way. One who dwells with kāyasati unestablished is called avassuta, while one who dwells with kāyasati established is called anavassuta. What do these two terms mean and how are they related to kāyasati, mindfulness of kāya? The theme of this discourse involves imagery shared by some other suttas in the Nikāyas. The Dukkhadhamma Sutta explains how a monk should live so that “evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection do not flow into (anusavanti) him,” and the answer is to practice mindfulness (SN IV 189). The Cūlahatthipadopama Sutta reads: “Evil unwholesome states of covetousness and dejection might flow into (anvassaveyyum) him if he dwelt leaving the eye faculty unguarded” (MN I 180). The words anusavati and anvassavati can mean “flow in” or “flow upon.”

Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1426, note 194) points out that these two words and avassuta in Mahāmoggallāna’s sermon are all based on the same root su, “to flow.” What Mahāmoggallāna means by avassuta is apparently the same as these two words. Avassuta refers to the flowing in of evil unwholesome states, and anavassuta refers to cessation of the flowing in of evil unwholesome states. Waldschmidt (1978: 25) interprets the purport of Mahāmoggallāna’s sermon as “letting in and not letting in of sensitive influences through the eye and the other organs of sense.” The six senses are seen as the inlets through
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which evil unwholesome states enter an individual. To achieve liberation where no evil unwholesome states exist, one has to stop letting them in through the six sense-doors, and kāyasati is mentioned here presumably as the method to guard the sense-doors. This is very similar to the imagery in the Kīṃsukha Sutta, where the senses are likened to the gates and mindfulness (sati) is likened to the gatekeeper. Kāya in kāyasati here probably also refers to the same as kāya in the Kīṃsukha Sutta, that is an individual who experiences through the six senses.

2.2 Kāyagatā sati/kāyasati and the individual possessed of consciousness

Kāya used in the sense of an individual is also found in the Bālapanḍita Sutta of the Nidāna Saṃyutta (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 549):

Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body (kāya) and external name-and-form (bahiddhā nāmarūpa); thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the fool experiences pleasure and pain.

The commentary explains “this body (kāya)” as his own body possessed of consciousness, and “external name-and-form” (bahiddhā nāmarūpa) as others’ body possessed of consciousness, and says that the meaning should be elucidated in terms of the five aggregates and the six sense bases of oneself and another.74 According to the commentary, kāya here includes both physical and mental aspects of an individual, and involves the six senses. Ven. Bodhi (2000: 740, note 48) does not agree with the commentary’s interpretation of external name-and-form, and suggests: “We may have here, rather, a rare example of the term nāmarūpa being employed to represent the entire field of experience available to consciousness, ‘external name’ being the concepts used to designate the objects cognized.” He also disagrees with the commentary’s interpretation of “the dyad” (not “this dyad,” etam dvayaṃ, but the dvayaṃ preceding paticcā) as the internal and external sense bases,75 and suggests: “It seems that here the text intends the term dyad to denote one’s own conscious body and ‘external name-and-form.’” In other words, the dyad refers back to kāya and external name-and-form.

His suggestions are plausible. Accordingly, in this passage “Dependent on the dyad there is contact” means that contact (phassa) depends on kāya and external name-and-form. The statement “There are just six sense bases, contacted through which . . .” is apparently a paraphrase of the previous sentence. This is perhaps why the commentary regards the dyad as the internal and external sense bases. Kāya and external name-and-form (bahiddhā
nāmarūpa) appear to correspond to the internal and external sense bases respectively, and thus constitute the conditions for contact. Suggesting that nāmarūpa (name-and-form) here represents the entire field of experience available to consciousness, Ven. Bodhi seems to regard external name-and-form as the external sense bases since all the experience available to consciousness refers to the six sense objects. Then how does kāya, the other member of the dyad, relate to the six internal sense bases, i.e. the six senses?

Let us first examine what kāya means in this text. The passage “hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this kāya has thereby originated” is an explanation of how a sentient being is reborn, or how the round of rebirths (sāsāra) is going on. Thus rather than a physical body, kāya here must refer to a sentient being of a certain existence in the round of rebirth. The commentarial glosses kāya as kāya possessed of consciousness (saviññānakāya), or “conscious body” as translated by Ven. Bodhi (2000: 740, note 48). Likewise, in the Chinese translation of this text in the Saṅyāsakāya Ágama, the equivalent to kāya is “consciousness-body (*kāya)” (識身 T 2, 83c). In these two cases kāya is likely to mean something covering consciousness (viññāṇa). Just as the expression sadevake loke samārake sabrahmake (“in the world with its gods, māras and brahmās”) implies that the world includes gods (deva), etc., so too saviññānakāya kāya implies that kāya includes consciousness. Since the physical body cannot include consciousness as the two things belong to different aggregates (rūpa “material form” and viññāṇa “consciousness”), kāya here cannot be the physical body, and saviññānakāya kāya probably refers to a sentient being that includes or possesses consciousness. The commentary’s gloss of kāya as saviññānakāya kāya and the Chinese translation of “consciousness-body” may imply equation between kāya and sentient being. This interpretation of kāya squares quite well with the meaning of kāya in the context of the Bālapañcita Sutta.

In his discussion of the dyad, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 740, note 48) draws our attention to the common expression “in regard to this kāya possessed of consciousness and all external nimittas” (imasmiñ ca saviññānake kāye bhīddhā ca sabbanimitesu), which recurs in the Nikāyas.77 He probably implies that kāya possessed of consciousness and all external nimittas correspond respectively to kāya and external name-and-form in our text. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2.1), in meditation nimitta refers to an object of concentration. It can also refer to the six sense objects.78 These two dyads both represent the subject and the six sense objects in the field of experience. As Kalupahana (1992: 37) indicates, consciousness often implies a relationship between subject and object. Kāya in the former dyad and “kāya possessed of consciousness” in the latter dyad both refer to the subject that perceives objects, while “external name-and-form” and “all external nimittas” refer to the sense objects perceived by the subject.

C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1937: 407, 409, 410) contends that in some texts of the Khandha Saṅyuttā the older dual division of kāya and viññāṇa, i.e.
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saviññāna 

kāyo in these texts, is cluttered up with the newer division of the five khandhas. Disagreeing with my understanding of saviññānaka kāya, she regards it as a duality of mind, viññāna, and body, kāya. There are several contexts in the Nikāyas where viññāna is described in opposition to body, kāya.80 Such descriptions of duality, however, are not found in any of the contexts in the Nikāyas where saviññānaka kāya is referred to.81 No matter whether kāya in this expression refers to the body as opposed to mind, viññāna, there is no doubt that saviññānaka kāya represents the human being as a whole, and it is most likely that kāya in kāyagatā sati is derived from this concept. Moreover, the category expressed by “this kāya possessed of consciousness and all external nimittas” (imasmīn ca saviññānake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbamimittesu) probably furnishes the basis of kāyagatā sati, which concerns the way an individual acts while being conscious of (saviññānaka) whatever objects (nimitta) are perceived by his senses. Similarly, another more elaborate category parallel in some way to the aggregates (khandha)—kāya, vedanā, citta, and dhammas—forms the four objects of satipaṭṭhāna. These two different formulations of sati are based on alternative schemes of phenomenological classification, which cover the individual and the external world perceived. This will be further discussed in the next chapter.

To sum up, the explanation of kāyasati in the Ekottara Āgama supplies a clue to the connection between kāyagatā satikāyasati and the six senses. This practice may be associated with the idea of kāya in the classification of our experienced world into the individual possessed of consciousness and all the objects external to him (imasmīn ca saviññānake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbamimittesu). This classification accords with the dyad in the Bālapaṇḍita Sutta, “kāya and external name-and-form,” where kāya clearly refers to a sentient being as a certain existence in samsāra that provides the internal sense bases, and bahiddhā nāmarūpa corresponds to the external sense bases, i.e. sense objects. In other words, kāya is able to experience through its six senses, and so is said to possess consciousness. These points are embodied by the simile in the Kimsuka Sutta, where the city, i.e. kāya, has six gates, i.e. the senses, and just as the city has its lord, kāya has consciousness (viññāna) as “the functional centre of personal experience.”82 Kāyagatā sati is mindfulness directed to the individual (kāya) being conscious of sense objects, and such mindfulness protects the individual by guarding his cognitive process based on the six senses, just as the gatekeeper protects the city by guarding the gates.

Kāyagatā sati or kāyasati concerns adjusting one’s cognitive apparatus in order to achieve the soteriological goal. Kāyasati is often found in the following formula:

On seeing a visible form with the eye, a monk is not intent on it in the case of an agreeable visible form, and is not upset at it in the
case of a disagreeable visible form. He dwells with mindfulness of kāya established (upaṭṭhitakāyasati), with an immeasurable mind, and understands as it really is that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, where those evil unwholesome states that have arisen in him cease without remainder. [The same is said of the other five senses.]

The implication is that liberating insight results from proper recognition and even reorientation of one’s experience conditioned by the six senses. In the Sabba Sutta (SN IV 15) the Buddha says that the six senses and their objects are “the all.” This implies that our subjective experience is our “world.” Liberation consists in transformation of our “world” into a soteriological experience. Hamilton (2000: 107) says,

What really matters is understanding one’s experience: it is this, no more and no less, that brings liberating insight. And in focussing his teachings solely on the means to achieving that insight, the Buddha metaphorically relates the different aspects of what we think of as the world around us to one’s subjective experience.

Similarly, kāyagatā sati or kāyasati is mindfulness directed to kāya, the locus of our subjective experience through the senses. Such mindfulness can transform our subjective experience, i.e. our “world,” and thereby enable us to achieve liberation by properly steering the cognitive process so that evil unwholesome states can be prevented from entering our “world.” Kāyagatā sati or kāyasati is a general guideline or fundamental principle applied to the path to liberation, and is not restricted to those specific exercises, including those related to the physical body, given in different versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.
Chapter 5
THE FOUR SATIYATAHANAS: MINDFULNESS AS A COMPREHENSIVE PATH

The four satiyyatas are widely mentioned or expounded in the Canon. Especially, the Satiyatahana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, the Mahasatiyatahana Sutta of the Digha Nikaya and the Satiyatahana Samyutta of the Samyutta Nikaya are devoted to them. The basic satiyatahana formula, which will be discussed in Section 2.1, can be seen as a definition of the four satiyyatas. According to this formula, the four satiyyatas refer to contemplations of the body, feelings, mind and dhammas. The etymology and meanings of the term satiyatahana have been discussed very thoroughly by Gethin (2001: 30–36). C.A.F. Rhys Davids (Woodward, 1930: xv.) says that the verb for sati is always upahitasati in the Pitakas, but “the Commentaries agree in treating the word, never as satyupahithana, as in the reading in Buddhist Sanskrit texts, but always as sati plus ‘pahithana’, a word which has no independent existence, save in that very late appendix to the Abhidhamma Pitaka: the seventh Book.” I would like to suggest that a good way of understanding the etymology of satiyatahana is found in a passage at AN II 218: attan ca upahitasati hoti, para ca satiyatahane samadapeti, “He is himself one whose mindfulness is present/established, and he rouses another to establishment of mindfulness.” Here satiyatahana is evidently rephrasing upahitasati, and so there is no doubt that satiyatahana is composed of sati and a word derived from upa-vsthā.

As for the meaning of satiyatahana, there are two possibilities. In the Vanapaththa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (I 104–107), sati is associated with the verb upahiti (< upa-vsthā), which means “stands near,” “is present,” “appears,” etc. (DOP, s.v. upathithati, p. 448). If we take satiyatahana to represent a combination of sati and a noun deriving from upa-vsthā, satiyatahana can mean “the standing near of sati” or “the presence of sati.” However, the Vanapaththa Sutta seems to be the only place where sati is found to be associated with upaththiti, whereas sati is very frequently associated with derivatives from the causative of upaththiti (upaththapeti or upaththapeti), which means “brings near,” “causes to appear,” “brings about,” etc. (DOP, s.v. upaththiti, p. 450) Therefore, satiyatahana can mean “bringing about of mindfulness” or “establishment of mindfulness.”
THE FOUR SATIпаTHANAS

1. Investigating the (Mahā)satiпаṭṭhāna Sutta and its authenticity

The Satipatṭhāna Sutta (MN I 55–63) and the Mahāsatipatṭhāna Sutta (DN II 290–315) appear identical except for the addition in the latter of a more detailed exposition of the four noble truths. Ishikawa (1939: 28) suggests that this addition was probably borrowed from the Dhammacakkappavattana Vagga in the Sanyutta Nikāya (V 420–424) and the Saccavibhaṅga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (III 248–252). On the other hand, T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1910: 337) say, “The Dīgha addition is interesting as containing a fragment of Old Commentary (as old as the texts) of which other fragments are found in the Nikāyas, and also in the Vinaya.” Norman (1983: 40) states: “The addition uses a style of definition which is similar to that found in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka, and its unusually detailed character has led to the suggestion that it is perhaps a fragment from an early commentary which has crept into the canon” (referring to Rhys Davids’ statement cited above). I take the Satipatṭhāna Sutta and the Mahāsatipatṭhāna Sutta as two versions of the very same text.

The (Mahā)satiпаṭṭhāna Sutta is highly venerated in the Theravāda tradition, and seems to have attracted more attention of scholars than the Satipatṭhāna Sanyutta and other relevant discourses do. The preamble of the (Mahā)sati паṭṭhāna Sutta comprises the setting of the scene, the ekāyana formula, and the basic satipatṭhāna formula. The main discourse can be summed up as follows:

I. Contemplation of the body
   1. Mindfulness of breathing
   2. Understanding the four postures
   3. Acting in full awareness in daily life (the sati-sampajañña formula)
   4. Reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity
   5. Reviewing the body by way of the four elements
   6. Contemplating a corpse in nine different states of decomposition

II. Contemplation of feelings

III. Contemplation of mind

IV. Contemplation of dhammas
   1. The five hindrances
   2. The five aggregates
   3. The six internal and six external sense bases
   4. The seven enlightenment factors
   5. The four noble truths

It is notable that the practices grouped under contemplation of the body are the same as those given in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta. Shimoda (1985: 545–546) shows that several passages in the Satipatṭhāna Sutta are found in other
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suttas in the Nikāyas and argues that the accounts in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta are not necessarily related to the four satipaṭṭhānas. He also indicates that they are common in early Buddhist texts. Similarly, Gethin (2001: 45) says,

These fourteen practices\(^7\) that can form the basis of kāyānupassanā draw on themes and stock passages that are found scattered throughout the Nikāyas. In effect, then, the various Nikāya elements that might constitute kāyānupassanā are brought together to give something of a summary account.

Things appear even more complicated if we take into account the other two versions of this text with considerable variations: the Niānchu Jing (念處經, which is equivalent to the Pali title “Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta” and will be referred to as the “Sarvāstivāda version") in the Madhyama Āgama\(^8\), widely attributed to the Sarvāstivādins,\(^9\) and the first sūtra in the twelfth chapter (*Ekāyana-mārga Varga*) of the Ekkottara Āgama,*\(^10\) whose sectarian affiliation is controversial.\(^11\) For a comparison between the Pali and the two Chinese versions, see Appendix 3. Attempts have been made by scholars to find out the original form of this text and thereby the original meaning of the four satipaṭṭhānas.

The first important work on this was by Schmithausen (1976). He takes the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula, which he calls “the short definition of the four satipaṭṭhānas,” as a standard for judging the authenticity of other parts of these two texts. He assumes that the detailed description of contemplation of feelings and of contemplation of mind have been passed down relatively unaltered in the Pali and other versions\(^12\) because they agree best with the short definition of the four satipaṭṭhānas and because in these two cases the divergences among different versions are limited to inessential details. Then he proposes two criteria for deciding to what extent the components of the detailed description of contemplation of the body and of contemplation of dhammas are authentic: one is the extent to which individual components have parallel versions in the teaching passed down through other schools; the other is the extent to which individual components fit in with the short definition and the detailed description of contemplation of feelings and of contemplation of mind. Accordingly he argues that [I. 2]\(^13\) understanding the four postures in the detailed description of contemplation of the body, and [IV. 1] the five hindrances, [IV. 3] the six internal and external sense bases and [IV. 4] the seven enlightenment factors in the detailed description of contemplation of dhammas are authentic. He (1976: 251–252) points out that the remaining five sections under contemplation of the body are either found elsewhere in the Canon as an independent exercise or as a component of another particular set of teachings [I. 1, 3, 6], or can be reworkings of older materials [I. 4, 5].

These arguments are not beyond question. The short definition, which he uses as a criterion for judging the authenticity of the detailed descriptions
of the four types of contemplation, is not found in either of the Chinese versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. Moreover, the authenticity of the detailed description of contemplation of mind is doubtful. This will be discussed later.

Taking a different approach, Bronkhorst (1985: 309–312) reaches a different conclusion on this issue. He contends that the earliest recognizable description of the four satipaṭṭhānas only contains [I. 4] observation of the impure bodily parts under satipaṭṭhāna on the body, and [IV. 4] observation of the seven enlightenment factors under satipaṭṭhāna on dhammas. His arguments are briefly summed up as follows:

(A) The Vibhaṅga, which preserves very old mārkas (older than those of the Dhammakāndha) and “cited parts of Sūtras that introduced or explained items occurring in the Mārkas,” only gives [I. 4] observation of the impure bodily parts under satipaṭṭhāna on the body, and gives [IV. 1] observation of the five hindrances and [IV. 4] observation of the seven enlightenment factors under satipaṭṭhāna on dhammas.

(B) The Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta in the Ekottara Āgama specifies satipaṭṭhāna on dhammas as only containing [IV. 4] the seven enlightenment factors, and the four jhānas. Since the Ekottara Āgama is assumed to belong to the Mahāsāṅghikas, which emerged as a separate sect around 116 or 137 years after the Buddha’s death, the sūtras of this sect “should preserve some early features where the texts of other sects show in common a further development.” This passage “may also be an independent development from a description of the four smṛtyupasthāna even older than the one surviving in the Vibhaṅga.” Observation of the five hindrances, which is not found in the Ekottara Āgama, was added under satipaṭṭhāna on dhammas in the Vibhaṅga.

Regarding the first point, even if the mārkaṇḍs of the Vibhaṅga are very old and the parts of the suttas cited by the Vibhaṅga are also as old, the composers of the Vibhaṅga may not necessarily have cited the whole passages or suttas available to them to explain the mārkaṇḍ items. They may have selected only some parts as illustrations. As to the second point, he does not explain why the practice of the four jhānas under satipaṭṭhāna on dhammas and the other two practices under satipaṭṭhāna on the body specified in the Ekottara Āgama are not as old as the seven enlightenment factors in the same text.

Ven. Sujato (2006: 264–273) postulates a reconstruction of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta on the basis of the three extant versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (one Pali and two Chinese) and similar expositions found in three Abhidhamma works (Vibh, SA, Dhammakāndha) and a Mahāyāna text (Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra). The basic principle in reconstructing the text is “Generally, then, the *Satipaṭṭhāna Mūla will include only material found in all texts, but will occasionally allow phrases found only in four or five.” (p. 267) Therefore, the result is a much shorter version than the three extant versions of the sutta, which includes only [I. 4] reviewing the bodily parts in contemplation of the body,
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and only [IV. 1] the five hindrances and [IV. 4] the seven enlightenment factors in contemplation of dhammas.

It is beyond my ability to restore the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta to its original form, but below is my attempt to explore how this text came into being. As mentioned above, Shimoda, Gethin, and Schmithausen all agree that the practices under contemplation of the body are found in other parts of the Nikāyas; Shimoda and Schmithausen even suggest that some of the practices can belong to teachings other than the first satipaṭṭhāna. It is noteworthy that the practices under the first satipaṭṭhāna in the Pali (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta are identical to those in the Pali Kāyagatāsati Sutta except for the addition of the four jhānas in the latter, while the Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta has exactly the same practices as those given in the section on the body in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (See Appendix 1). As discussed in Chapter 4, the earlier version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta from which both the Pali and Chinese versions derived was composed when kāyagatā sati was still not understood as mindfulness of the physical body. It is likely that later on when kāyagatā sati came to be regarded as mindfulness of the physical body, it was taken to be equivalent to the first satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of the body. Therefore the Kāyagatāsati Sutta was employed as a basis for composing the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. Lin (1949: 127) has suggested that the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is an expansion of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.15 In my opinion, this explains why the first satipaṭṭhāna in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta contains so many practices irrelevant to the body, which have been considered later additions by some scholars.16

Several signs indicate that the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is a rather late composite of extracts from other contexts, sometimes arranged in an incoherent way. Let us first examine the section on contemplation of mind. Shimoda (1985: 545) indicates that the passage in this section is found in other suttas,17 and that in these suttas it is a description of how an enlightened person understands the minds of other beings, while only the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta takes it as contemplation of one’s own mind. I would like to point out that this passage itself does not specify whose mind is being contemplated; it runs as follows: “A monk understands a mind with lust as a mind with lust. He understands a mind without lust as a mind without lust... with hatred... without hatred...”18 (The same is said of other mental states.) In the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, this passage is meant to describe a method of practice, whereas in many other suttas the same passage refers to a special power as an achievement, and it is always among a list of achievements.20 As far as I am aware, in all contexts except for the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, this passage is preceded by the sentence “He understands (or ‘May I understand’ or ‘I understand’ or ‘You understand’) the minds of other beings, of other persons, having encompassed them with [his (my, your) own] mind,”21 which makes it clear that this passage denotes the ability to understand
others’ minds. Without this sentence the meaning of this passage would be very vague in that we cannot tell whose mind it refers to.

The frequent occurrence of this passage preceded by the above sentence suggests that the complete stock passage must include this sentence. Since different Nikāyas were handed down orally, and probably redacted, by different bhānakas (“reciters” or “preachers”) who were independent of each other, the fact that this “complete stock passage” is found at so many places in all the four primary Nikāyas suggests that this “complete stock passage” could belong to a very early stratum, or at least that it was accepted as essential by the bhānakas of all these four Nikāyas. Therefore, the passage in the section on contemplation of the mind must originally refer to a special power as found at many other places, where it is always preceded by the sentence “He understands (or ‘I understand,’ etc.) the minds of other beings, of other persons, having encompassed them with [his (my, your) own] mind.” The compilers of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta must have borrowed this passage from the “complete stock passage” in older texts, using it as an exposition of contemplation of mind.

Another indication that the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is relatively late can be found in the fact that the following refrain is appended to each of the practices:

In this way he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally. He dwells contemplating the nature of arising in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing in the body, or he dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body. Or his mindfulness that “there is a body” is established to an extent sufficient for knowledge and recollection. And he dwells independent, and does not grasp anything in the world. Thus, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body. [The same is said of feelings, mind and dhammas.]

Ven. Bodhi refers to this as “the refrain on insight” and contrasts it with the refrain emphasizing concentration in the Kāyatāsati Sutta. As discussed in Chapter 3, the expression “contemplating the body (feelings, etc.) as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally” in the refrain appears to be parallel to the stock formula on seeing with wisdom the five aggregates internally or externally as not-self, which is related to insight meditation. Chapter 3 shows that the passage on contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body is also connected with insight meditation. It raises no problem when such expressions of insight meditation in the refrain occur alone in the Nikāyas, but they inevitably cause difficulties when applied to some practices in the Kāyatāsati Sutta that are not
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in the same line. This is also probably why the four jhānas, which belong to concentration rather than insight meditation, are removed from contemplation of the body in the Pali (Mahā)satiṣṭhāna Sutta—in order to avoid an obvious inconsistency, while the Kāyagatāsati Sutta still preserves the four jhānas along with all the practices under contemplation of the body in the Pali (Mahā)satiṣṭhāna Sutta.

As will be discussed later, “internally” and “externally” refer to “of oneself” and “of another” respectively. Gethin (2001: 53–54) points out the difficulties in making sense of the refrain when applied to many of the practices in the (Mahā)satiṣṭhāna Sutta: “The idea of watching another’s body is no doubt clear enough if we are talking of the parts of a body or a corpse, but when we are talking of the breath the idea is perhaps a little harder to grasp. . . . The idea of watching another’s feelings, mind and dhammas is perhaps even more curious.” By inferring from some passages in the Nikāyas, Ven. Anālayo (2003: 96) contends that it is not impossible to develop awareness of another’s feelings and states of mind. Part of the problem suggested by Gethin is reflected in the exposition of smṛtyupasthāna in two Prajñāpāramitā texts. “Contemplating the body as a body internally” (adhyātma kāye kāyānupāsyān)27 in the Pañcāvatīsāsāsrikā-prajñāpāramitā or “contemplating the internal body as a body” (adhyāmakāye kāyānudarṣ)28 in the Satasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā refers to understanding the four postures, acting in full awareness in daily life, mindfulness of breathing, reviewing the body in terms of elements, and reviewing the bodily parts. On the other hand, each of the nine charnel ground contemplations29 is referred to as “contemplating the body as a body externally” (bahirdhā kāye kāyānupāsyān)30 or “contemplating the external body as a body” (bahirdhākāye kāyānudarṣ)31. The authors of these texts seem to suggest that contemplating another’s body is only practicable in the case of contemplating a corpse in the charnel ground, while other practices can only apply to oneself. Most of this suggestion is quite understandable although reviewing the body in terms of elements and reviewing the bodily parts seem to me to be equally applicable to another’s body as well.

Gethin (2001: 54) comments: “[T]he way the sutta formulation includes the progression ajjhattamabhiddhājaññatta-bahiddhā for all four satipaṭṭhānas is simply mechanical.” This comment holds true for at least the long lists of practices in the section on the body in different versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. The facts that the Kāyagatāsati Sutta has a different refrain following the same practices concerning the body as those in the (Mahā)satiṣṭhāna Sutta and that the refrain in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta32 is to a great extent different from the Theravāda version suggest that application of the refrains to those practices in various versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the Kāyagatāsati Sutta can be quite arbitrary and that these texts are later amalgams of material from different sources.
THE FOUR SATIPAṬṬHĀNAS

From the above discussion, it is unlikely that the extant versions of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta can represent the authentic or original Buddha’s teaching on the four satipaṭṭhānas. The possibility cannot be excluded that the Buddha may have illustrated the four satipaṭṭhānas by using various concrete methods of practice and detailed instructions like those found in the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. It is however almost impossible to restore such a discourse, if it did exist, to its “original,” considering the complexity and obscurity of the way in which early Buddhist literature was formed and transmitted. Cousins (1983: 9–10) suggests that consideration of the oral nature of the Nikāyas affords the possibility of a strong improvisatory element, which can be confirmed by comparison between the surviving versions derived from different sects. Commenting on divergence found between the Pali Dasuttara Sutta and the corresponding versions of the Daśottara Sūtra that survive in Buddhist Sanskrit and Chinese translation, Gethin (1992: 157–158) says,

This seems to me a very good illustration of why we should not think in terms of an “original” or “correct” version of such a text. Rather, what we have here is a mnemonic technique and system of arrangement...; this technique and system...; yielding a structure within which, provided one knows what one is doing, it is perfectly legitimate to improvise as one feels appropriate.

A similar principle may be applied to the case of different versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. As will be shown below, the four satipaṭṭhānas occupy an important position in the Buddhist teaching, and so compilers of the Canon may have thought it necessary to compose a sutta (sūtra) devoted to this teaching. Therefore, it is possible that the compilers of the Canon, within the basic framework of the four satipaṭṭhānas, improvised as they felt appropriate the detailed descriptions for each of the four satipaṭṭhānas, drawing materials from other contexts, and thereby formed an independent sutta. Consequently, even descriptions that are originally irrelevant to the four satipaṭṭhānas could have been included in such a sutta.

However, Allon (1997: 367) says,

[A]ccounts of what the Buddha is supposed to have said and discourses on his teaching would have been given by the monks and nuns after the Buddha’s death in an improvisatory manner... But these accounts and discourses were fundamentally different from the essentially fixed, memorised texts transmitted by the community.

He contends: “[T]he early Buddhist sutta texts were, in the words of R. Gombrich, ‘deliberate compositions which were then committed to memory’. ”

I agree with his argument, and consider it possible that the Buddhist discourses went through a period of improvisation before they were formally...
“composed” or rather compiled, committed to memory, and transmitted orally by the community. As discussed in the Introduction, texts during the period of oral tradition were liable to modification. Since during this period schisms occurred, different schools may have modified the texts, including the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, in different ways. Therefore, considerable divergences exist between the Pali and Chinese versions of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta that have come down to us. The two versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta may have also undergone the same process. It is probably before the Sarvāstivādins split from the Theravādins that many parts of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta had already been taken to form the detailed instructions on contemplation of the body in the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, and part of the passage on the special power mentioned above was borrowed to form the detailed instructions on contemplation of mind, for these two cases are found in the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta of both schools.

2. Essential teachings on the four satipaṭṭhānas

As the authenticity of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is questionable, how can we know what the four satipaṭṭhānas really refer to according to the Buddha? Since different Nikāyas were transmitted, and probably redacted, by different bhānakas who were not influenced by the traditions of the bhānakas of other Nikāyas, ideas concerning the four satipaṭṭhānas that occur in different Nikāyas are most likely to be early, if not original, teachings on the four satipaṭṭhānas, which were regarded as essential by the bhānakas of different Nikāyas. We will find that most of them appear to be what can be called “pericopes,” i.e. passages containing the basic doctrinal elements which are often used to build up larger discourses.

2.1 The basic satipaṭṭhāna formula

A passage on the four satipaṭṭhānas, aptly called “the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula” by Gethin (2001: 45ff.), is widely found in all the four Nikāyas:

The four establishments of mindfulness. What four? Here, monks, a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body (kāye kāyānupassī), ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. He dwells contemplating feelings as feelings, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. He dwells contemplating mind as mind, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. He dwells contemplating dhammas as dhammas, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world.
There are difficulties with the terms kāye kāyānupassā, vedanāsu vedanānupassā, citte cittānupassā, and dhammesu dhammānupassā. Take kāye kāyānupassā as an example; the word “body” occurs twice: one is locative (kāye), and the other (kāya) is coupled with anupassin (“contemplating”) to form a compound. This phrase has been translated in different ways. Bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassā viharati is translated by Gethin (2001: 29) as “a bhikkhu with regard to the body dwells watching body.” Similarly, Ven. Anālayo (2003: 31) translates it as “in regard to the body a monk abides contemplating the body,” and interprets the formula by drawing on components of the Pali Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta: “in regard to your own body or the bodies of others, direct awareness to its (or their) impermanent nature evident in different aspects of the body, such as the process of breathing, or its postures and activities, or its anatomical constitution, or its elementary qualities, or its decay at death” (pp. 33–34). Hamilton (1996: 173) interprets the formula thus: “With regard to the body, the bhikkhu is first of all to centre his attention on the body qua body, and not on the feelings or anything else he might associate with the body . . . .” This interpretation is in accordance with the commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta:

It should be understood that after saying “with regard to the body,” mention (gahaṇa) of body is made (katan) for the second time [by saying] again “contemplating the body” for the sake of showing analysis (vavatthāna) without mixing up (asammiśata) and discrimination of the mass (ghanaviniṇṇhoga), etc. Therefore with regard to the body one does not contemplate feelings, nor does one contemplate mind or dhammas, but only contemplates the body. Thus (ii) analysis without mixing up is shown by pointing out the very attribute of contemplation of the body with regard to the thing called “body.”

Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1627 ff.) translates kāye kāyānupassā as “contemplating the body in the body” in his translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. Similarly, the Chinese translation of the Dhammasamkhāya by Xuanzang has “to dwell contemplating the body in this internal (or ‘that external’, ‘internal and external’) body,” and the Chinese translation of the *Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-sūtra by Kumārajīva has “contemplating the body inside the internal (or ‘external’, ‘internal and external’) body.” This is a literal translation, taking the locative kāye as meaning “in the body.” Another way of translating kāye kāyānupassā is “contemplating the body as a body”; e.g. in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta translated into Chinese by Gautama Saṃghadeva, and in the translation of the Majjhima Nikāya by Nāṇamoli & Bodhi (1995: 145 ff.). These two ways of translation seem to be able to render a good sense in conformity with some similar expressions in the Canon.
For example, ekacco puggalo sabbasankhāresu aniccānupassī viharati aniccaśaṅnī at AN IV 13 can be translated as “A certain person dwells contemplating impermanence in all conditioned things, apperceiving/conceiving impermanence [in them]” or “A certain person dwells contemplating all conditioned things as impermanent,” apperceiving/conceiving [them] as impermanent.” Likewise, bhikkhu asubhānupassī kāye viharati, āhāre paṭikkūlasaṅnī, sabbaloke anabhīrataasaṅnī, sabbasankhāresu aniccānupassī at AN II 150 can be translated as “A monk dwells contemplating ugliness in the body, apperceiving/conceiving repulsiveness in food, apperceiving/conceiving the whole world as discontent, apperceiving/conceiving all conditioned things as impermanent.” In these cases, words in the locative such as all conditioned things and body (sabbasaṅkhāresu, kāye) define the sphere of the objects where one’s contemplation is located, and words coupled with anupassin such as impermanence and ugliness (anicca, asubha) indicate the nature of the objects to be contemplated. This is also the case with kāye kāyānupassī, etc., in the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula. The sphere of the objects one is contemplating is the body (kāye, locative), feelings, etc., while the nature of the objects to be contemplated is also the body (kāya coupled with anupassin), feelings, etc. Such expressions in the formula can be paraphrased as “contemplating ‘bodyness’ in the body,” etc. This means to view things in the way they actually are. Similarly, Goenka (1998: 22) translates: “witnessing the reality of the body in the body,” etc.

This is also reminiscent of a passage concerning cognition cited from the Sallāyatanasamyutta in our discussion of sati and saññā in Chapter 1: “In the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard; in what is thought of there will be merely what is thought of; in the cognized there will be merely the cognized (viññāta).” Likewise, in the above two passages quoted from the Aṅguttara Nikāya, the word saññā, conceiving or apperceiving, is used in a similar sense as anupassī, contemplating. The same semantic analogy may apply to the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula, where anupassī also virtually functions as saññā. Thus such expressions as kāye kāyānupassī, etc. in the formula represent sati as a faculty that steers saññā in a proper way, so that one’s cognition is wholesome and conducive to insight that leads to liberation. Just as the above passage in the Sallāyatanasamyutta alludes to refutation of the Self as discussed in Chapter 1, such expressions may also imply that one should contemplate the body in the way the body is, but not view the body as a “self” or anything substantial, and so conforms to the important Buddhist doctrine of “not-self” (anattā). This interpretation is supported by the commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.
He sees the body in this body, but does not see other natures [in this body]. Why is that said? He does not see the natures of permanence, pleasure, self and beauty in this body which is by nature impermanent, unsatisfactory, not-self and ugly, in the way that people see water in a mirage that is without water by nature.47

In the basic satipatthāna formula I use “in order to remove” to translate vineyya, which is an absolutive (or gerund)48 and would normally be translated as “having removed,”49 for the absolutive is normally used to express an action preceding the action of the main verb of a sentence.50 Such a translation, however, will cause problems. If we translate: “having removed covetousness and dejection concerning the world,” the formula will mean that contemplation of the body, feelings, mind and dhammas should be practiced after removing covetousness and dejection. Thus removing covetousness and dejection becomes a prerequisite for the four satipatthānas. This evidently contradicts the “ekāyana formula” (discussed below in Section 2.6) found in the (Mahā)satipatthāna Sutta and the Satipatthāna Sānyutta, which describes the four satipatthānas as a path for the disappearance of suffering and dejection (domanassa), etc.,51 and therefore implies that removing dejection is a purpose of, rather than a prerequisite for, the four satipatthānas.

Ven. Nyānuttara (1979: 280) argues that vineyya in this context means “overcoming,” not “having overcome,” and the phrase has to mean that the practice of satipatthāna and overcoming covetousness and dejection take place at the same time. He (p. 283) also invokes a gloss in the commentary on the Mahāsatipatthāna Sutta: “By overcoming covetousness and grief is meant the fruit of contemplation” (tr. Nyānuttara).52 This shows that the commentator considers overcoming covetousness and dejection to be a result of the satipatthāna practice. In other words, overcoming covetousness and dejection is a goal, not a prerequisite, for satipatthāna. In the light of the context, it seems to make better sense to render vineyya as “in order to remove” rather than as “having removed.”

This translation can find support in Gombrich’s (1998: 15) discussion of an absolutive, abhisamecca, in the Metta Sutta of the Sutta-nipāta. Norman (1992: 16) translates the first verse: “This is what is to be done by one who is skilful in respect of the good, having attained (abhisamecca) the peaceful state.”53 Gombrich (1998: 15) follows the commentary and takes “the peaceful state” (santam padam) to mean Nibbāna, the Buddhist’s religious goal, and raises the question: “But if that is so, why is the person who has attained nibbāna being told what he has to do? Surely he has no more duties?” He proposes a solution to this puzzle: “[I]n Pāli the infinitive, which is most commonly used to express purpose, can be used as an absolutive. So here that same semantic assimilation would be operating in reverse, and the introductory verse is saying what one has to do in order to attain nirvana.” (p. 15)
Disagreeing with this point, Norman (2004: 76) says,

My explanation of the problem is to say that the commentary is wrong in saying that santāṃ padaṃ means nibbānam . . . I take santa literally as ‘peaceful’. It is used often enough as an epithet of a bhikkhu (where it certainly does not imply ‘gained Nibbāna’) and I see no reason why santipadaṃ (which is what I understand santāṃ padaṃ to mean) should not literally mean ‘state of being peaceful, calm, at rest’.

In a passage of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, however, santāṃ padaṃ is indeed used as a synonym of Nibbāna: “This is the peaceful state (santāṃ padaṃ), this is the sublime state, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, Nibbāna.”54 (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 1694). Even santipadaṃ appears to refer to Nibbāna in the Muni Sutta of the Sutta-nipāta (tr. Norman, 1992: 22):

208. Who(ever) having cut down what has grown, would not plant (any new) growing thing, (and) would not bestow (moisture) upon it, him they call a solitary wandering sage. That great seer has seen the state of peace.
209. Having considered the fields (of activity), having crushed the seed, he would not bestow the moisture (of affection) upon it. That sage indeed, seeing the end of birth and death, leaving speculation behind, is not counted (in any category).55

Collins (1982: 220) says, “We can then understand the symbolic dichotomy further by seeing that samsāra is a life of constant agriculture, planting seeds and reaping their fruit, while nīrṇāṇa is the abandonment of such a life.” The above two verses are no doubt depicting such abandonment of life in samsāra, and the statement “That great seer has seen the state of peace” apparently means that he has witnessed or experienced Nibbāna. Similarly, in a short text in the Pārīyanavagga of the Sutta-nipāta, Jatakanṇī asks the Buddha to preach “the state of peace” (santipadaṃ), and the Buddha’s answer in the ensuing verses (Sn 1098–1100) is about destruction of greed and taints (āsava), which implies Nibbāna as it is described as taintless (anāsava) liberation (MN I 73–74).

The above canonical passages all support the commentary’s explanation of santāṃ padaṃ in the Metta Sutta as Nibbāna. Here one could add another point. In this sutta the taṃ preceding santāṃ padaṃ implies that the audience knows what is being referred to, i.e. “that santāṃ padaṃ” is being used to refer to a specific state of peace which has already been explained (RFG).
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Norman (2004: 75) concedes: “If santāṃ padāṃ is indeed a synonym of Nibbāṇa, then it is inappropriate to say that the subject of the sutta has already obtained it.” Accordingly, it is inappropriate to translate santāṃ padāṃ abhisamecca as “having attained the peaceful state.” The best solution is perhaps what has been proposed by Gombrich, that is to take abhisamecca, which is an absolutive as confirmed by Norman (2004: 76), as being used as an infinitive to express purpose, and translate it as “in order to attain.”

In our basic satipaṭṭhāna formula, vineyya can be reckoned as another example of an absolutive being used to express purpose, since “practicing the four satipaṭṭhānas in order to remove covetousness and dejection” renders much better sense than “practicing the four satipaṭṭhānas after having removed covetousness and dejection,” and also accords well with the ekāyana formula. On the other hand, as Perniola (1997: 375) points out, some absolutives can indicate actions that follow the action of the main verb. This can probably be applied to our case. In other words, one removes (vineyya) covetousness and dejection after one has dwelt (viharati) contemplating the body, etc.

The following two sections will deal with some stock passages formed by converting this basic formula into teachings for different purposes.

2.2 The “internal-external” formula

The basic satipaṭṭhāna formula is sometimes combined with the words “internally” (ajjhattaṃ), “externally” (bahiddhā) and “[both] internally and externally” (ajjhattabahiddhā), and thereby forms the “threefold way of developing the four satipaṭṭhānas”⁵-six:

He dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world; he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world; he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. [The same is said of feelings, mind and dhammas.]⁵-seven

An abridged form of this formula is also found in the Nikāyas, including the refrain of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta: “He dwells contemplating the body as a body internally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body externally, or he dwells contemplating the body as a body internally and externally.” [The same is said of feelings, mind and dhammas.]⁵-eight

While its Sanskrit counterpart adhyātma means “own, belonging to self; concerning self or individual personality” (MW p. 23, s.v. adhyātma), the
Pali word *ajjhatta* can also mean “concerning oneself” (DOP p. 34, s.v. *ajjhatta*). This meaning, as I will show, fits our case very well, but it has been translated as “internal” or “internally” in the context of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* by many people since ancient times. They probably try to preserve some philosophical nuances implied in the context, especially in contrast with *bahiddhā* (externally). Therefore I will follow my predecessors.

The *Vibhaṅga* (193–201) and the commentary on the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (Ps I 252) explain that “internally” refers to oneself, while “externally” refers to another being. This explanation is supported by a passage in the *Janavasabha Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*:

Here a monk dwells contemplating the body as a body *internally*, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. As he dwells contemplating the body as a body *internally*, he becomes rightly concentrated on it and rightly pure. Rightly concentrated on it and rightly pure, he produces knowledge and vision *externally* of another’s body.60

Here “externally” explicitly indicates “another’s body,” and in contrast, “internally” strongly suggests “his own body” in the context. This passage seems to say that producing knowledge and vision of another’s body is a natural outcome of the internal contemplation. The crux of the practice obviously lies in the internal contemplation. This is reflected by the fact that “internally” precedes “externally” in the formula. As discussed above, as far as many practices listed in the different versions of the *Satipaṭṭhāna sutta* are concerned, it is difficult to take another’s body, etc., as objects of contemplation, so the external contemplation may be an inferential activity on the basis of the internal contemplation. In regard to this issue, Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 59–60) says,

> [In the systematic meditative development of Insight only *internal* objects are taken up and brought into the focus of Bare Attention. This is so because only one’s own bodily and mental processes are accessible to direct experience. . . . Mindfulness on *external* objects, however, may, and should, be cultivated outside the strict meditative practice. Those *external* objects, i.e. bodily and mental activities of others, will present themselves to us either by direct sense-perception or by inference.

Ven. Mahasi Sayadaw (1994: 41) also says that contemplating the body, etc., externally refers to “contemplation to the life processes of others, by way of inference (anumāna).” Walshe (1995: 592, note 660) also holds a similar opinion.

As for “contemplating internally and externally,” the last part of the threefold way of developing the four *satipaṭṭhānas*, there seems to be no
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explanation in the Nikāyas. The Vibhaṅga’s explanation does not associate the objects with any specific individual, for example: “How does a monk dwell contemplating feelings as feelings internally and externally? Here a monk understands a pleasant feeling thus: “[It is] a pleasant feeling.” This seems to suggest a purely objective understanding of the contemplated objects with the blurring of distinctions between self and others. The commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta explains in a different way: contemplating his own body as a body at one time and contemplating another’s body as a body at another time. I agree with Ven. Anālayo (2003: 98), who says that the Vibhaṅga offers a more convincing perspective, while the commentarial presentation does not really add anything new to the previous two stages, “contemplating internally” and “contemplating externally.”

2.3 The “arising-vanishing” formula

In sutta 40 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta, the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula is expanded through combination with the phrases “the nature of arising,” “the nature of vanishing” and “the nature of arising and vanishing”:

A monk dwells contemplating the nature of arising in the body, dwells contemplating the nature of vanishing in the body, and dwells contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the body, ardent, fully aware, possessed of mindfulness, in order to remove covetousness and dejection concerning the world. [The same is said of feelings, mind and dhammas.] An abridged form of this passage is included in the refrain of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. It implies contemplation of impermanence, and is connected with development of insight (vipassanā) as discussed in Chapter 3. In the first sutta of the Amaruṭṭha Saṃyutta, the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula is even expanded through combination with these three phrases and also with the three aspects discussed above: internally, externally, and both internally and externally.

2.4 The four satipaṭṭhānas and concentration

While the foregoing two formulae are related to insight meditation, in sutta 4 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta there is a passage which is also similar to the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula but which suggests concentration or serenity meditation. Here the Buddha says that monks who are newly ordained, monks who are trainees (sekha), and those who are arahants should all practice the four satipaṭṭhānas in this way: “They dwell contemplating the body (feelings, etc.) as a body, ardent, fully aware, fixed (ekodibhāta), pure-minded, concentrated, with one-pointed mind.” This appears to be a
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modified basic satipatthana formula that contains expressions which denote concentration. Here ekodibha is etymologically and semantically identical with ekodibhavam in the second jhana formula. The expression “concentrated, with one-pointed mind” is used to indicate the attainment of concentration (samadhisampada) in the Majjhima Nikaya, and also occurs in a formula preceding the standard jhana formula that probably serves as a prologue to the four jhanas.

This “modified basic satipatthana formula” is very similar to a passage recurring in the Nikayas: “established in mindfulness, fully aware, concentrated, with one-pointed mind,”69 as opposed to “with mindfulness neglected, not fully aware, not concentrated, with wandering mind.”70 It is possible that the “modified basic satipatthana formula” is modeled on this much more commonly found formula. Later in this chapter I will show that the four satipatthanas were possibly formulated relatively late as compared with other teachings of the Buddha.

In Chapter 3 we have also discussed several other instances in the Nikayas where the four satipatthanas are applied to, or serve as the causes of, concentration, including the jhanas. Such widely found correlation between the four satipatthanas and concentration can be seen as an essential teaching on the four satipatthanas.

2.5 The four objects of contemplation

There are four objects of contemplation in the basic satipatthana formula: body, feelings, mind and dhammas. This is why this teaching is called “the four satipatthanas.” Unfortunately, there seems to be no explanation of these four objects in the Nikayas except for the (Mah) satipatthana Sutta, which derives its exposition of contemplation of the body from the Kaya sati Sutta and its exposition of contemplation of mind from a passage describing a supernatural power as discussed above. Despite its long exposition, the (Mah) satipatthana Sutta does not give any clear explanation of what these four objects refer to and why these four are chosen. Presumably at the Buddha’s time these matters were self-evident. The later Buddhist literature of different schools has attempted to understand the four objects of satipatthana in terms of the five aggregates (khandha), an analysis of the human being very commonly found in the Nikayas.

The Petakopadesa, a paracanonical text in the Theravada tradition, associates the five khandhas with the four satipatthanas in its sixth chapter:

Here the five aggregates are the four grounds for individual existence. The aggregate of form is the body as a ground for individual existence. The aggregate of feeling is feelings as a ground for individual existence. The aggregate of apperception and the aggregate of volitional activities are dhammas as a ground for individual
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existence. The aggregate of consciousness is mind as a ground for individual existence.\textsuperscript{71}

The same passage also occurs in the Yin chi ru jìng (陰持入經, *Sūtra\textsuperscript{72} on Skandha, Dhātu and Āyatana),\textsuperscript{73} which was translated into Chinese by the Parthian An Shigao in the second century AD. Zacchetti (2002: 76) has identified this text as the sixth chapter of the Peṭakopadesa. The “original” sectarian affiliations of these two texts are still unclear. Bechert (1955–56–57: 352ff.) has concluded that the Peṭakopadesa intruded into the Theravāda tradition from outside.\textsuperscript{74} Zacchetti (2002: 94) demonstrates that the Yin chi ru jìng/Peṭakopadesa (Chapter 6) is not a Sarvāstivādin text.

The same relationship between the four satipaṭṭhānas and the five khandhas was also indicated by Buddhaghosa in his commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (Ps I 280–281). Similarly, the Dharmaskandha, a Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text, identifies “dharmas” in contemplation of dharmas with “the aggregates of apperception and volitional activities” (T 26, 478b ff.), but it makes no mention of three other aggregates in the passages dealing with contemplation of the body, feelings and mind. The *Mahāvibhāgā, a later Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma work, states that the establishments of mindfulness in the body, feelings, and mind are preached respectively to cure the form aggregate, feeling aggregate and consciousness aggregate; the establishment of mindfulness in dharmas is preached to cure the aggregates of apperception and volitional activities.\textsuperscript{75} The relationship between the four satipaṭṭhānas and the five aggregates suggested in the above texts can be illustrated as follows:

1. contemplation of the body——form
2. contemplation of feelings——feeling
3. contemplation of mind——consciousness
4. contemplation of dharmas——apperception and volitional activities

This correspondence between the two sets of teaching was apparently widely accepted by different traditions as the above texts present it. None of these texts, however, gives any reference to the earliest texts. Below is a discussion of such a correspondence between the satipaṭṭhānas and the khandhas according to the earliest stratum of the Canon, and an attempt to find out what exactly the four objects refer to.

Sutta 42 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta may cast some light on our problems. It reads:

a1) By the arising of food comes the arising of the body. By the ceasing of food comes the ending of the body.

a2) By the arising of contact comes the arising of feelings. By the ceasing of contact comes the ending of feelings.
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a3) By the arising of name-and-form comes the arising of mind (citta). By the ceasing of name-and-form comes the ending of mind.

a4) By the arising of attention (manasikāra) comes the arising of dhammas. By the ceasing of attention comes the ending of dhammas.76

Here is an analysis into causal facts by the dependent origination (patīcca-samuppāda) principle, a typical way the Buddha explained the saṁsāric experience and escape from it. Words similar to the above passage are found scattered in both Sutta 56 and Sutta 57 of the Khandha Samyutta77 as follows:

b1) By the arising of food comes the arising of form. By the ceasing of food comes the ceasing of form . . .

b2) By the arising of contact comes the arising of feelings. By the ceasing of contact comes the ceasing of feelings . . . By the arising of contact comes the arising of apperception. By the ceasing of contact comes the ceasing of apperception . . . By the arising of contact comes the arising of volitional activities. By the ceasing of contact comes the ceasing of volitional activities . . .

b3) By the arising of name-and-form comes the arising of consciousness. By the ceasing of name-and-form comes the ceasing of consciousness.78

The conditions for the arising and ceasing of the body, feelings and mind as stated in sutta 42 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta are exactly the same as the conditions for the arising and ceasing of the five aggregates (khandha) found in the Khandha Samyutta. This suggests a connection between the five khandhas and the first three of the four satipaṭṭhānas. Below is a discussion of this connection.

2.5.1 Body (kāya)

As discussed before, kāya has different meanings. So does rūpa, “form.” Hamilton (1996: 3ff.) indicates two main kinds of description of the rūpakkhandha in the Sutta Piṭaka: the simple and general description, and the detailed and specific description. The simple and general descriptions are two, the first of which obviously refers to rūpa as the body:

And why, monks, do you call it form? It “suffers” (ruppati), monks, so it is called “form” (rūpa). Suffers from what? Suffers from cold, suffers from heat, suffers from hunger, suffers from thirst, suffers from contact with flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun-heat and serpents.79
The second of the simple descriptions analyzes rūpa into the four great elements and the form derived from them. The detailed and specific description gives a comprehensive explanation of the four great elements; here the term rūpa explicitly refers to both “internal elements,” i.e. things belonging to one’s own body such as hair of the head, bile, etc., and “external elements,” i.e. inanimate things that do not belong to the body (e.g. MN I 185–189). As Hamilton (1996: 4) says, “both types of analysis of rūpa indicate that the term primarily refers to the body, in accord with the Buddha’s central concern with the human being.” Moreover, according to passage b1 in sutta 56 and sutta 57 of the Khandha Saṅyutta, form (rūpa) is dependent on food, which implies that food maintains the body, so in this case form refers only to the body, not to the external elements. Corresponding to b1, a1 confirms that kāya in the first satipaṭṭhāna also refers to the body, just like rūpa in b1.

2.5.2 Feelings (vedanā)

The meaning of a2 exactly conforms to that of the first part in b2; even the wording is almost identical. There is no doubt that contemplation of feelings is related to the aggregate of feeling. The aggregates of apperception and volitional activities, which are also conditioned by contact, appear irrelevant to contemplation of feelings. These two aggregates are connected with contemplation of dhammas according to later Buddhist literature mentioned above. It is noteworthy that feeling being conditioned by contact is also found in various types of the dependent origination formula in the Nikāyas.

2.5.3 Mind (citta)

Since a3 apparently corresponds to b3, mind (citta) in a3 and consciousness (viññāna) in b3 are likely to refer to the same thing. Citta and viññāna are referred to as synonyms in the Nikāyas. In a3 and b3 they are both described as being conditioned by name-and-form (nāmarūpa). This denotes a link in the dependent origination formula, i.e. nāmarūpa and viññāna condition each other, although in many cases the standard twelve-fold formula only mentions that viññāna conditions nāmarūpa. In the cases where nāmarūpa and viññāna condition each other, these two mark the beginning of the chain of dependent origination, and seem to imply that these two together constitute the rebirth of a new life, and form the basis for the subsequent development of the individual. For example, sutta 65 of the Nidāna Saṅyutta states (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 602):

It is to this extent that one may be born and age and die, pass away and be reborn, that is, when there is consciousness with name-and-
form as its condition, and name-and-form with consciousness as its condition. With name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact... 85

Some passages on dependent origination even imply that viññāna is related to the cause of rebirth and is understood as something that connects the previous life to this life. For example, in the Mahānidāna Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya, the Buddha asks: "If viññāna did not enter a mother's womb, would name-and-form be reborn for existence in this form?" The answer is "no." This apparently means that when conception takes place, viññāna serves as a transmigrating factor and enables the development of the new personality.87 This meaning of viññāna is also found in other passages.88 Similarly, as Johansson (1979: 157) indicates, citta is sometimes used in a way that suggests a personal identity from existence to existence. For example, in sutta 21 of the Sotāpatti Sanyutta, the Buddha tells Mahānāma not to be afraid of death because even if his body is eaten by crows, vultures, etc., his mind (citta) which has been trained in faith, morality, learning, generosity, and wisdom, goes upwards and to distinction.89 A verse in the Devatā Sanyutta reads: "Craving generates a person; his mind (citta) runs about; a being has entered saSsāra; karma [determines] his destiny." As Collins (1982: 214) says, this verse means that a person's mind transmigrates.

Therefore citta is similar to viññāna in functioning as a transmigrating factor that survives physical death. Both citta and viññāna are responsible for the continuity of beings in the round of rebirth. In both cases, however, there exists a paradox: while citta or viññāna maintain a personal identity from existence to existence, they are also both said to be dependent on nāmarūpa and therefore subject to change. As mentioned above, the "arising-vanishing formula" teaches contemplating the nature of arising and vanishing in the four objects, including citta. The Buddha also emphasizes that what is called "citta" and "viññāna" arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night, and so should not be grasped thus: "This is mine, this I am, this is my self." Therefore, just like viññāna, citta as it were has an eschatological sense, and at the same time stress is laid on its impermanent nature in order to avoid being identified with an eternal transmigrating entity, or the "Self" (attan).92

In the Mahāsāṃghikha Sutta, the Buddha refutes the opinion that the same viññāna wanders in the round of rebirth and experiences the result of karma by pointing to its conditionality, that is, it is conditioned by the six sense faculties and sense objects (MN I 258–259). Thus the seemingly eschatological implication of viññāna is diluted by its temporary psychological aspect, but the point here, as Collins (1982: 104) says, is not to deny that consciousness is in any way the vehicle of rebirth. The same explanation of viññāna is also applied to citta in the Abhidhamma. In its exposition of "contemplating mind as mind" in the four satipaṭṭhānas, the Sāriputrābhidharma, which
Bareau (1950) and Frauwallner (1995: 97) attribute to the Dharmaguptakas, explains citta as the six classes of consciousness (六識身 = cha viññā-ṇakāyā),97 which are classified in terms of the six senses.94 Such explanations of viññā and citta highlight the changeable nature of viññācitta in terms of its contents, which change all the time dependent on the objects. On the other hand, the nature or quality of viññācitta is relatively stable, and it is the nature of mind or consciousness that determines the nature of a renewed existence or otherwise liberation. This can be seen in sutta 51 of the Nidāna Sutta:

Monks, if a person immersed in ignorance generates a meritorious volitional activity, consciousness fares on to the meritorious; if he generates a demeritorious volitional activity, consciousness fares on to the demeritorious; if he generates an imperturbable volitional activity, consciousness fares on to the imperturbable.95

Ven. Bodhi (1998: 160–161) interprets this passage as: “A meritorious volition infuses consciousness with a meritorious quality and thereby steers consciousness towards rebirth in a realm resulting from merit. . . .” Similarly, in the foregoing sutta 21 of the Sotāpatti Sutta, the nature of mind (citta) is shaped by faith, morality, etc., and it is in this sense that mind goes upwards and to distinction. The nature of mind will be elucidated below. Although most of the section on mindfulness of mind in the (Mahā)satipāṭhāna Sutta is likely to have been borrowed from a different and older context of “reading” other people’s minds as discussed above, this passage provides us with a good source for understanding the term citta. What citta refers to can be deduced from the words qualifying citta. This passage gives a list: mind with lust, mind without lust, mind with hatred, mind without hatred, mind with delusion, mind without delusion, contracted mind, distracted mind, exalted mind, unexalted mind, surpassed mind, unsurpassed mind, concentrated mind, unconcentrated mind, liberated mind, unliberated mind. As Ven. Anālayo (2003: 177) notes, in the light of these terms, citta “usually refers in the discourses to ‘mind’ in the conative and emotional sense, in the sense of one’s mood or state of mind.” Hamilton (1996: 110) also suggests that the central meaning of citta is one’s “state of mind.” The foregoing list of different states of mind appears to be a spectrum of spiritual levels that reflect one’s progress on the path to liberation. Citta as indication of spiritual levels is also suggested by the expressions “gladdening the mind,” “concentrating the mind,” and “liberating the mind” in the third tetrad of the sixteen exercises of mindfulness of breathing, which is related to the third satipatthāna as discussed in Chapter 3.

We can see from the foregoing list of states of mind that citta can be characterized by volitions. Hamilton (1996: 112) says that citta is the source of volitions, and draws our attention to the fact that citta comes from the same
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verbal root as such active terms as cetanā, “intention” or “volition.” The close association of citta with volitions suggests that the aggregate of volitional activities (saṅkhārā) would probably be better ascribed to citta of the third satipaṭṭhāna than to dhammas of the fourth satipaṭṭhāna as suggested in later Buddhist literature. If we consider this together with the identification of citta with viññā, citta has a broader sense than viññā as the fifth khandha, and is probably closer to viññā in some passages implying the analysis of the individual into kāya and viññā; or into kāya and citta. The case may be that the four objects of the satipaṭṭhānas represent an alternative analysis of a being or phenomena to that of the five khandhas. On the other hand, the correspondence between the passage cited from sutta 42 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and that from sutta 56 and sutta 57 of the Khandha Sutta suggests that the compilers of the Satipaṭṭhāna Nikāya or probably even the Buddha himself regarded the first three objects of the satipaṭṭhānas as corresponding to the three khandhas, namely, rūpa, vedanā and viññā. Nevertheless, such correspondence may not represent a rigid equation between them. The Buddha’s skill in means allows for different ways of viewing human experiences and phenomena, and different schemes may correspond to each other in one way or another without being incompatible.

2.5.4 Dhammas

As to attention (manasikāra) being the condition for dhammas as stated in passage a4, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1928, note 182) associates it with a passage in the Anguttara Nikāya: “All dhammas come into being through attention; all dhammas arise from contact.” This passage apparently concerns cognition, and dhammas seem to refer to the objects of one’s cognition. In his interpretation of the fourth satipaṭṭhāna, Karunaratna (1989: 485) says, “All dhammas constitute objects of the mind; it is by the arising of attention (manasikāra) that they present themselves to the mind as objects.” Nyanaponika Thera and Ven. Bodhi (2000: 313, note 40) also say, “The world of objects becomes present to consciousness only through attention (manasikāra).” In the Nikāyas the term manasikāra and its verbal form manasikaroti are sometimes used in conjunction with nimitta, which refers to the six sense objects or objects in other senses. The Abhidhamma literature such as the Atthasālinī explains manasikāra in terms of yoking the associated states to the object or turning towards the object. As a complement to the Atthasālinī’s explanation, Ven. Bodhi (1993: 81) says that manasikāra is “the mental factor responsible for the mind’s advertence to the object, by virtue of which the object is made present to consciousness.” Chapter 4 discussed the classification of our experienced world into the individual possessed of consciousness (saviññāṇako kāya), and all external objects (nimittā). It is very likely that this classification evolves into the four subjects of satipaṭṭhāna. That is to say, saviññāṇako kāya was first divided

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into kāya (here meaning “body”) and viññāna (“mind” as opposed to body), and then developed into kāya, vedanā and citta, while all external nimittas were replaced by dhammas.

On the other hand, dhammas in the fourth satipaṭṭhāna may convey another meaning. In the earliest texts the Buddha often says, “Pay attention!” (manasikaro or manasikaroθa) before he starts a discourse. Thus a4 might mean that the understanding of teachings (dhamma) is conditioned by attention (manasikāra). The fourth satipaṭṭhāna in the Pali version of the *Mahā/satipaṭṭhāna Sutta has five sections regarding:

1. the five hindrances (nīvarana)
2. the five aggregates (khandha)
3. the six internal and six external sense bases (āyatana)
4. the seven enlightenment factors (bojjhaṅga)
5. the four noble truths (ariyasacca)

The Sarvāstivāda version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta has only three of them: the five hindrances, the sense bases and the seven enlightenment factors. The last four in the above list are all among the items of the mātrkās (comprehensive lists of the fundamental doctrinal items) of the Vibhāṅga and the Dharmaskandha, and the first can be found in the contents of the Khuddakavatthu in the Vibhāṅga’s mātrkā (Vibh 378) and the *Kṣudravastukā (雜事) in the Dharmaskandha’s mātrkā (Ṭ 26, 497a–b).

Quite different from the above two versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, the other Chinese version in the Ekottara Gama includes only two sets of teaching in the fourth satipaṭṭhāna: the seven enlightenment factors and the four jhānas, which too are both among the items of the mātrkās of the above two Abhidharma works. As Frauwallner (1995: 3) points out, mātrkās existed in the oldest Buddhist tradition and later on developed into the Abhidharma, and they preserve the doctrinal concepts of the Buddha’s sermons in the form of comprehensive lists. Therefore contemplation of dharmas probably means reflecting on objects (dharmas) available to consciousness in accordance with the Buddha’s teaching of actuality, represented by the categories of the Dharma such as the mātrkās. Gombrich (1996: 35–36) says that the commonest use of dhammā (plural) refers to the contents of thought, but in the *Mahā/satipaṭṭhāna Sutta “the dhammā that the text spells out are in fact the teachings of the Buddha . . . The Buddha’s teachings come to be the same as (any) objects of thought, because anything else is (for Buddhists) unthinkable.” Ven. Bodhi (2000: 44) has a similar view:

Of course, any existent can become an object of mind, and thus all dhammas in the fourth satipaṭṭhāna are necessarily mind-object; but the latter term puts the focus in the wrong place. I now understand dhammas to be phenomena in general, but phenomena arranged in
accordance with the categories of the Dhamma, the teaching, in such a way as to lead to a realization of the essential Dhamma embodied in the Four Noble Truths.

Therefore dhammas in the fourth satipatthāna can cover virtually whatever phenomena become the objects of consciousness, which are contemplated through the Buddhist point of view. Thus the objects of the first three satipatthānas can also be made the objects of the fourth, dhamma.108 This has been illustrated in Chapter 3 on the sixteen aspects of mindfulness of breathing as correlated with the four satipatthānas. The first three satipatthānas are concerned with the subjective experiences themselves, while the last one involves the objective reflection on those experiences and contemplation of the ultimate truth on the basis of them.109 In other words, the first three satipatthānas focus on one’s personal physical and psychological conditions, while the last one is contemplating phenomena (dhamma), including those personal conditions, in accordance with the Buddha’s teachings (Dhamma). The first three are centered on direct experiences, while the last one involves abstract systematization or formulation of the first three. The four objects of satipatthāna and the five aggregates may just be alternative classifications of human experience that should be understood and transformed. Although the Sāmyutta Nikāya suggests some kind of correspondence between the first three satipatthānas and the aggregates of rūpa, vedanā and viññāna, it seems too far-fetched to squeeze the aggregates of saññā and sañkhārā into the four satipatthānas by equating them to the objects of the fourth satipatthāna as later literature does, but rather sañkhārā is better assigned to citta of the third satipatthāna as mentioned above. As discussed in Chapter 4, kāyagatā sati may have derived from a certain scheme of phenomenological classification: the individual (kāya) and name-and-form (nāmarūpa) external to him, or the individual (kāya) possessed of consciousness and all the objects (nimitta) external to him. In the same way, the four satipatthānas are based on a different scheme of phenomenological classification, which is probably intended to be more comprehensive. The correspondence is illustrated in Figure 5:

2.6 The ekāyana formula

A passage which is called “the ekāyana formula” by Gethin (2001: 44ff.) is found in the Satipatthāna Sutta, Mahāsatipatthāna Sutta and the first, eighteenth and forty-third sutta of the Satipatthāna Sāmyutta:

Ekāyana, monks, is this path (magga) for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of suffering and dejection, for the attainment of the method, for the realization of Nibbāna—that is, the four satipatthānas.110
Etymologically ekāyana is composed of eka, “one,” and ayana, “going.” As Gethin (2001: 59) points out, in the four primary Nikāyas the formula describing the ekāyano maggo is only applied to the satipaṭṭhānas. In the Chinese Saṃyuktāgama, however, passages similar to this formula containing the term ekāyano maggo are found to refer also to other sets of practice such as the four bases for supernatural power (iddhipāda) and mindfulness of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṃgha, morality, generosity and deities. A parallel passage on mindfulness of these six objects is found in a newly published Sanskrit manuscript in the Schøyen Collection (reconstructed by Harrison, 2007: 203–204), which also includes this formula: Vāpi ime āyusmantaḥ tena bhagavatā jānatā paśyatā tathāgatenaṁrhotā satyaksamīrdhenā sanbhādhe avakāśe viṣeṣādhamgātā ākhyātā ekāyano mārgaḥ sat(r2tvāṇam visūdhrave āk)kapardrvāṇām samatikkramāva dukkhadaurmanasyāvāma nyāyasya dharmasādhigamāya | katame sat | āyusmanta āryaśrevakah tathāgatāṁ ākārataḥ samanuṣmara(r3t) | . . . punar aparame (ā)yuṣmaṁta āryaśrēvako dharmam ākārataḥ samanuṣmaraṁ | . . . 114

These occurrences of the ekāyana formula could be interpolations since it is not found in the Pali counterparts of the above texts. This can also be deduced from the *Mahāvibbhotā, which states: “Are the right abandonings, the bases for supernatural power, the faculties, the powers, the enlightenment factors, and the path factors “the one-going path” (*ekāyana-mārga)? If yes, why does that sūtra only refer to the satipaṭṭhānas as the one-going path, not to the others?” In what follows the *Mahāvibbhotā does not cite any other sūtras to support its argument that the foregoing sets of teaching are also *ekāyana-mārga, but rather it gives five explanations attributed to “someone says.” This suggests that the authors, who were the most learned Sarvāstivādins claimed to be “the five hundred arhants,” did not know of any canonical passages like the ones I quoted above which refer to supernatural powers, etc. as ekāyana-mārga. Therefore it is most likely that
originally the term ekāyano maggo (ekāyana-mārga) was assigned exclusively to the four satipaṭṭhānas.

Gethin (2001: 64) discusses the possible meanings of ekāyana in this formula, and is in favor of interpreting it as “going alone” and “going to one.” Both Gethin (2001: 62) and Ven. Anālayo (2003: 28) agree in regarding ekāyano maggo in this context as resembling ekāyanena maggena in a simile in the Mahāsihanāda Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (174), but they seem to disagree in their interpretations of this simile. Gethin (p. 63) interprets the term as “a particular path that leads to a particular place—and that place only,” while Ven. Anālayo interprets the term as “the direct path.” I would like to propose an alternative interpretation which may highlight the fact that the four satipaṭṭhānas are singled out for the designation ekāyano maggo.

Gethin (2001: 61) has already considered a passage in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BU 2.4.11; 4.5.12) in his discussion of this term. On the basis of this passage and others, Ven. Sujato (2006: 177–186) argues that ekāyana means “leading to unification (of mind)” and that “the primary purpose of satipatthana is to lead to jhana.” I would like to suggest a different interpretation of ekāyano maggo based on the above Upaniṣadic passage. In this passage ekāyana means the “point of convergence” (Olivelle, 1998: 68–69). Likewise, the ekāyano maggo in our formula could imply that the four satipaṭṭhānas constitute the path where various strands of practice converge. Our discussions in this chapter and Chapter 3 show that the four satipaṭṭhānas cover the two main categories of meditation, serenity and insight meditation, and that the early teachings on this practice are mainly general guidelines. As guidelines, the four satipaṭṭhānas are to be applied to or cover different practices. Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 7) says,

The teachings of the Buddha offer a great variety of methods of mental training and subjects of meditation, suited to the various individual needs, temperaments and capacities. Yet all these methods ultimately converge in the “Way of Mindfulness” called by the Master himself “the Only Way” (or: the Sole Way; ekāyano maggo).

My interpretation is also in accord with Gethin’s (2001: 65–66) following remark:

As for the Nikāyas, there is a sense in which, of the seven sets, the four satipaṭṭhānas are the most versatile and universally applicable . . . with the four satipaṭṭhānas we have the nearest thing in the four Nikāyas to basic general instruction in Buddhist [meditation] practice’ or yoga.

The term ekāyano maggo can be rendered as a comprehensive or “all-inclusive” path, which appropriately characterizes the four satipaṭṭhānas as basic general instruction applicable to various Buddhist practices. This
THE FOUR SATIPAṬṬHĀNAS

interpretation can be reinforced by examining a passage on kāyagatā sati recurring in the Nikāyas:

Monks, just as whoever has pervaded the great ocean with his mind, for him whatever streams flow into the ocean are included, so whoever has developed and cultivated kāyagatā sati, for him whatever wholesome states are conducive to gnosis are included.\textsuperscript{118}

Here is a simile analogous to the one in the \textit{Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad}: “The ocean is the converging point of all the waters.”\textsuperscript{119} Kāyagatā sati is compared to the ocean, which implies that kāyagatā sati covers all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis. Likewise, describing the four satipaṭṭhānas as a path of ekāyana, or the converging point, is tantamount to the comparison of the four satipaṭṭhānas to the ocean, which also implies that they cover all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis. It is possible that both the simile for kāyagatā sati and ekāyana for the four satipaṭṭhānas are inspired by the same passage in the \textit{Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad} and that these two sets of teaching refer to the same thing.

3. The four satipaṭṭhānas and kāyagatā sati

Apart from the foregoing imagery shared by the four satipaṭṭhānas and kāyagatā sati, the two bear many other similarities, and some canonical passages even imply that they are the same thing. As discussed in Chapter 4, kāyagatā sati refers to mindfulness applied to an individual who experiences through the six senses, which cover both physical and mental phenomena. Similarly, the objects of the four satipaṭṭhānas are parallel to the aggregates (khandhas), and also cover both physical and mental aspects. Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1122) notes: “[T]he six internal and external sense bases offer an alternative to the five aggregates as a scheme of phenomenological classification.” Viewed from this angle together with our earlier discussions, kāyagatā sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas are just different expressions of the same practice based on different schemes of classification of the same phenomena. Furthermore, kāyagatā sati involves a very wide range of Buddhist teaching just like the four satipaṭṭhānas. A simile mentioned above denotes that kāyagatā sati covers all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis, while at AN I 61 samatha and vipassanā are said to be two wholesome states conducive to gnosis. As discussed above, these two great categories of Buddhist meditation are covered by the four satipaṭṭhānas. Moreover, in \textit{sutta} 20 of the \textit{Satipaṭṭhāna Sān̄yutta} there is no mention of the four satipaṭṭhānas but only kāyagatā sati (SN V 169–170). Since the \textit{Satipaṭṭhāna Sān̄yutta} of the Sān̄yutta Nikāya is devoted to the four satipaṭṭhānas, kāyagatā sati is probably regarded as identical with the four satipaṭṭhānas by the compiler of the Sān̄yutta Nikāya.
MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

In *sutta* 13 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, when Ānanda was grieving over the death of Sāriputta, the Buddha exhorted him to dwell with himself and the Dhamma as his island and his refuge by resorting to the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. In *sutta* 9 of this *Sutta*, just before passing away, the Buddha gave the same instruction as his last teaching for his disciples to follow either before or after he passed away. These two *suttas* probably provide the background to the following two verses attributed to Ānanda in the *Theragāthā*:

(1034) All the directions are obscure; the teachings are not clear to me; as [my] good friend has died, it seems like darkness.

(1035) For one whose companion has passed away, for one whose master is dead and gone, there is no friend like kāyagatā sati.

In the foregoing *sutta* 13 of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, Ānanda says something very similar to verse 1034: “Having heard that the Venerable Sāriputta has attained final Nibbāna, all the directions are obscure and the teachings are not clear to me.” According to the commentary, verse 1034 was said by Ānanda after he heard about the death of Sāriputta. Thus it is beyond doubt that the “good friend” in this verse refers to Sāriputta. “For one whose companion has passed away” in verse 1035 is glossed by the commentary as “for one who is deprived of his good friend.” In other words, “companion” in this verse refers back to Sāriputta in verse 1034. The word “master” (satthar) in the Canon usually refers to the Buddha. According to these two verses, since Ānanda lost his reliable friend (Sāriputta) and master (the Buddha), he had to count on kāyagatā sati as his spiritual guide. This is strikingly analogous to the purport of the foregoing two *suttas* in the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*, and therefore kāyagatā sati in the *Theragāthā* apparently refers to the same teaching as the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* was employed as a basis for composing the *(Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. It is likely that kāyagatā sati is an earlier teaching than the four *satipaṭṭhānas*. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* could have been formulated at a later period to express the same teaching as kāyagatā sati, and could have even been particularly emphasized by the Buddha and/or his disciples in order to replace kāyagatā sati, since the four *satipaṭṭhānas* seem to be more comprehensive and cause less confusion than kāyagatā sati, which some people may take to mean mindfulness of the physical body.

4. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* emphasized as the Buddha’s final teaching

While the Chinese parallel to the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* in the *Ekottara Āgama* has its setting in Sāvatthi (舍衛國, T 2, 568a), the setting given in the
THE FOUR SATIPAṬṬHĀNAS

Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions of this text is Kammāsadhamma (MN I 55; 前部毘婆娑, T 1, 582b) of the Kuru country, which may imply that these two versions were supposed by their compilers to have been composed at a rather late time. The Kuru country, whose capital was near the modern Delhi, was located very far to the west of where the Buddha carried out most of his ministry (see the map near the front of the book). It is even more remote than Saṅkassa (or Saṅkissa, Skt Sāmkāśya), a place which according to the tradition was visited by the Buddha, and the visit has been doubted by some scholars because of its long distance from the heartland of Buddhism at that time. Hirakawa (1991: 259) even argues: “Kosambī was the furthest west to which the Buddha himself visited and preached the Dharma during his ministry,” while Saṅkassa was located even further west than Kosambī (Kausāmbī).

Several suttas are said to have been delivered in Kammāsadhamma. Ven. Thich Minh Chau (1991: 55) points out that more texts in the Chinese Madhyama Āgama than in the Pali Majjhima Nikāya have their settings in Kammāsadhamma, and he suggests that this is because the Sarvāstivādins preferred places related to their stronghold or their own native places. In other words, the compilers’ regional sense might have affected the selection of settings for the suttas. Thus it is possible that the compilers started to include Kammāsadhamma as a setting in the Canon when Buddhism had spread to the northwest, which could have happened after the Buddha’s death. On the other hand, Mayeda (1964: 69) argues that the Buddha’s visit to the Kuru country must be a fact since this is recorded in many early texts and they cannot be denied altogether.

In any case, the location of Kuru has led some scholars to speculate about the lateness of the (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. Lily de Silva (n.d.: 3–4) holds that the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta was not preached “until the Dhamma spread from its original seat of Magadha to the outskirts of the Kuru country.” Ven. Anālayo (2003: 16) says, “[T]he detailed instructions found in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta apparently belong to a later period, when the Buddha’s teaching had spread from the Ganges valley to the distant Kammāsadhamma in the Kuru country, where both discourses were spoken.” The narrative framework, however, could have been arbitrarily set up in the compilation of the Canon, as Gombrich (1990b: 22) points out: “In its account of how the Canon came to be compiled, at the First Council, the introduction to the Sumanigalavilāsini frankly says that words of the narrative portions were inserted on that occasion, and thus clearly distinguishes between the words attributed to the Buddha and their settings.” Therefore the setting of a sutta may not tell us the exact place and time at which it was delivered. Nevertheless, the setting of the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta at least suggests that the compilers of these two schools may have considered or believed this discourse to have been delivered at a rather late time. Likewise, the following
INVESTIGATION OF THE SETTINGS OF THE SUTTAS IN THE SATIPAṬHĀNA SAMYUTTA demonstrates that, apart from the suttas with unidentified settings, all of those discourses were supposed to have been given at a later or the last stage of the Buddha’s lifetime or even after his death.

The second half of the Satipaṭhāna Samyutta is comprised of fifty-four suttas which give no settings and are modeled on the same stock formulae as those in several other Samyuttas of the Mahāvagga in the Samyutta Nikāya. The settings of the first fifty suttas in the Satipaṭhāna Samyutta can be listed as follows (figures refer to sutta numbers):

Sāvatthi: 3, 5, 10, 11, (13), 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 43, 44, 48, 49

Ambapālī’s Grove in Vesālī: 1, 2
Beluvagamaka in Vesālī: 9
Pāvārika’s Mango Grove in Nālandā: 12
Ukkacelā: 14
Sāvatthi134: 13
(The above are delivered shortly before the Buddha’s death.)

Pātaliputta: 21, 22, 23 (delivered shortly before or after the Buddha’s death)

Uruvelā: 18 (not proclaimed until much later after the Buddha’s enlightenment)

Sālā: 4
Sedaka: 19, 20
Sāketa: 26, 27, 28
Rājagaha: 29, 30
(Time is unidentified in the above suttas.)

Setting not given: 6, 7, 8, 33, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 46, 47, 50

The occurrence of Sāvatthi as the setting is remarkably frequent, in 21 out of the 50 suttas. According to the later tradition, during his forty-five year-long ministry the Buddha was traveling without a regular dwelling for the first twenty years, but from then on he settled in Sāvatthi.135 This may explain why so many suttas were set in Sāvatthi. On the other hand, Schopen’s (1997) research may cast some light on this issue. He cited the following passage from the Kṣudrakavastu of the Mālasarvastivāda-vinaya (tr. Schopen, 1997: 575):

The Blessed One said: “Upāli, those who forget the name of the place, etc., must declare it was one or another of the six great cities, or somewhere where the Tathāgata stayed many times. If he forgets
THE FOUR *SATIPAÑÑHĀNAS*

the name of the king, he must declare it was Prasenajit; if the name of the householder, that it was Anāthapiññāda; of the lay-sister, that it was Mṛgāramātā."

Schopen (1997: 575–576) says that the two categories, “places where the Buddha stayed many times” and “the six great cities,” are almost coterminal. He (p. 576) points out that the range of options among the six cities is severely restricted by the additional provisions. If the name of a king or householder or female lay follower is lost, it must be replaced with the names Prasenajit, Anāthapiññada or Mṛgāramātā, while all these three were from Śrāvasti (Pali Sāvatthi). Therefore the rules set in the passage cited above from the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya* clearly favor Śrāvasti. Schopen (1997: 578) says, “[A]ssuming even a moderate operation of such rules, we should find a *sutta* literature dominated by Śrāvasti, and that is exactly what we find in the Pāli collection.” He gives several examples, such as (1) Gokhale (1982: 10) finds that 593 out of 1009 texts in his sample are set in Sāvatthi; (2) in Ven. Thich Minh Chau’s (1991: 52–56) analysis of the Chinese *Madhyama-AGama*, 44 out of 98 sūtras are set in Śrāvasti. Schopen (1997: 579) concludes: “The shape of all our collections would, moreover, seem to suggest that redactional rules very similar to those in the Kṣudrakavastu operated in all traditions or monastic groups, even if the Mūlasarvāstivādin version is the only one so far discovered.” The extraordinarily frequent occurrence of Sāvatthi as the setting in the *Satipaññhāna Samyutta* probably results from the application of such rules, and so the suttas with this setting will not be taken into account in our discussion of the dating of the suttas.

Of the remaining suttas, three are found in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 72–168), traditionally the account of the Buddha’s last days: *sutta* 2 is found at DN II 94–95; *sutta* 9 is found at DN II 98–101; *sutta* 12 without the last paragraph is found at DN II 81–83. *Sutta* 14 is set on the occasion of Sāriputta’s and Moggallāna’s deaths. Since the above *sutta* 12, an account of Sāriputta’s lion’s roar, is included in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, the account in *sutta* 14 must be regarded as even later during the Buddha’s last days. In this connection it would be interesting to discuss *sutta* 13. According to this text, the Buddha was staying in Sāvatthi when Ānanda brought him the news of Sāriputta’s death and the Buddha gave instruction on how to dwell with oneself and the Dhamma as one’s island and refuge, which is explained by the four *satipaññhānas*. The same instruction is also found in *sutta* 14 and in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN II 100). Sāriputta’s death and the occurrence of this instruction suggest that the account in *sutta* 13 is intended to be set during the Buddha’s final journey, but the setting of the *sutta* in Sāvatthi causes problems with regard to chronology. This is noticed by Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1924, note 157):
In the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, Sāriputta’s lion’s roar (just above) takes place during what appears to be the Buddha’s final journey along the route from Rājagaha to Vesālī. From Vesālī the Buddha heads towards Kusinārā without ever returning to Sāvatthī, some 200 km to the west. Yet the present sutta shows the Buddha residing at Sāvatthī when he receives the news of Sāriputta’s death. To preserve the traditional chronology, the commentaries (Spk here, and Sv II 550) have the Buddha make an additional side trip to Sāvatthī following his rains retreat at Beluvaṃaka (see DN II 98–99), an excursion not mentioned in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta.

The explanation in the commentaries seems farfetched. The setting of this sutta in Sāvatthī may well be an outcome of applying rules like those in the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya. The counterpart of this sutta in the Chinese Sunyukta Āgama (sūtra 638) gives a different setting, stating that the Buddha was staying in Rājagaha (王舍城 T 2, 176b). In any case, it is beyond doubt that if the Buddha gave such instruction after Sāriputta’s death, this must have taken place not long before the Buddha passed away.

Just like sutta 2, which is included in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, sutta 1 is set at Ambapālī’s Grove in Vesālī. These two suttas were put together by the compilers presumably because they were considered to have been taught during the same period when the Buddha was staying there. There is no specific indication in the Nikāyas that he visited Ambapālī’s Grove at another time. According to the accounts given in the Vinaya (I 231–233) and the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN II 94–98), Ambapālī was converted by the Buddha and gave her grove to the Buddhist order shortly before his death. It is very unlikely that the Buddha stayed in this grove and gave sutta 1 there before she gave her grove to the Buddhist order.

Three suttas (21, 22, 23) are set in Pātaliputta, where Ānanda and Bhadda carry on dialogues. According to the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (DN II 84ff.) and the Vinaya (I 226ff.), during the Buddha’s final journey this city was a mere village called Pātaligāma, and he prophesizes its prosperity and perils by calling it Pātaliputta. In all of the other suttas in the Nikāyas mentioning the city Pātaliputta, only the Buddha’s disciples appear on the scene but not the Buddha himself. One of these suttas even records that a monk Udena told a Brahmin about the Buddha’s death. In the light of these facts, the three suttas in question must be meant to be events that occurred after the Buddha had passed away or when he visited Pātaligāma during his final journey. The contents of two of the three suttas also reflect this historical background. In sutta 22 whether or not the true Dhamma can endure after a Tathāgata has passed away is said to depend on whether the four sati-patthānas are cultivated or not. Sutta 23 talks about the decline of the true Dhamma in a similar way. These suttas imply the awareness of crisis among the Buddha’s disciples who had already lost or were about to lose their master.
THE FOUR SATI-PATTHĀNAS

To sum up, a total of nine suttas are set at the time shortly before or even after the Buddha’s death.

In sutta 18, when the Buddha had just become enlightened in Uruvelā, he reflected on the four satipaṭṭhānas, which were expressed by the ekāyana formula and the basic satipaṭṭhāna formula. Then Brahmā Sahampati appeared before the Buddha, repeated the contents of the Buddha’s reflection, and uttered a verse in conclusion. The whole sutta makes no mention of the Buddha’s preaching. This sutta is almost identical with sutta 43, except that sutta 43 is set in Sāvatthi, where the content of sutta 18 becomes the Buddha’s preaching in the form of retrospection. These two suttas imply that the Buddha did not preach the four satipaṭṭhānas immediately after his enlightenment although he was awake to them. He revealed this experience of his some time later, according to sutta 43 in Sāvatthi, which probably also denotes a forgotten setting. These two texts seem to imply that the four satipaṭṭhānas represent a rather late teaching.

Lastly, sutta 4 is set in Sālā and suttas 19, 20 are set in Sedaka. There seems to be no information about when the Buddha visited these two places. In the three suttas set in Sāketa (26, 27, 28) and two in Rājagaha (29, 30), the Buddha does not appear but only his disciples carry on dialogues or give sermons. There is no other information on when the events in these suttas may have taken place.

In conclusion, among the settings of the suttas in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sānyutta, all those which appear to be valid or identifiable point to a rather late period in the Buddha’s lifetime or even after his death. Although this does not mean that these discourses were actually delivered at the exact places or time given in these suttas, it may suggest that the compilers of these texts “remembered” or believed that these discourses on the four satipaṭṭhānas were delivered rather late. This probably reflects the possibility that the four satipaṭṭhānas were particularly emphasized by the Buddha at a later stage in his teaching career. Besides, the arrangement of the four satipaṭṭhānas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya also gives a similar sign. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (1936: 257–258) states:

Yet, if we turn to the Fours lists in the Fourth Collection . . . we see that these four sati-practices are missing from the Fours! They first occur in the Fives, of course, not as titular, but incidentally only, and subsequently. The only occurrence of the term satipaṭṭhāna in the Fours is almost an anticipation of a formula not yet drafted: “By himself he makes mindfulness present, and causes another to practice in making it present.” Is not this, taken together, suggesting to us that, when the Fours were (orally) collected in the gradual compiling of the Fourth Collection, the formula known as the Four Presences of Mindfulness was not yet drafted?
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She seems to suggest that the four satipaṭṭhānas might not have been taught by the Buddha, and not even been formulated when the section on the “Fours” in the Aṅguttara Nikāya was compiled. It is possible, however, that the Buddha taught this practice at a relatively late time, perhaps not long before he passed away, so that many disciples were not familiar with it. The early compilers of the Aṅguttara Nikāya were probably among these people, and therefore the four satipaṭṭhānas did not assume a prominent role in their compilation of texts. Another possible reason for the omission of the four satipaṭṭhānas from the “Fours” is, as suggested by C.A.F. Rhys Davids herself earlier, 147 that the Aṅguttara and Saṁyutta Nikāyas were not independently compiled, so that the four satipaṭṭhānas and some other important tenets that are fully dealt with in the Saṁyutta Nikāya are not included in the Aṅguttara Nikāya under their own number.

The instructions on dwelling with oneself and the Dhamma as one’s island and refuge found in suttas 9, 13 and 14 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṁyutta and the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta show that the four satipaṭṭhānas were especially emphasized as his final teaching in his old age. This teaching, which is characterized by the term ekāyana, may represent the Buddha’s attempt to summarize or conclude his entire teaching on how to practice for the realization of the ultimate religious goal.
Conclusion

The place of mindfulness within the system of Buddhist doctrine

Hamilton (2000: 5) notes: “All systems of practice are based on theoretical underpinnings whether the latter are explicit or not... there are reasons why the systems of practice are thought to be efficacious in achieving their aim.” On the basis of textual analysis of Pali, Chinese, and Sanskrit sources, Buddhist philosophy aided by modern psychology offers a valuable perspective on why the practice of mindfulness (sati) is efficacious in achieving the soteriological aim. The essence of sati consists in the proper functioning of sañño, the critical point in the cognitive process. Sati prevents sañño from going astray to conceptual proliferation (papāñca) and thereby develops a wholesome process of cognition conducive to the gnosis (vījñā) that brings about liberation. The transformation of sañño by sati also prevents feelings from developing into emotional agitation, which causes the underlying tendencies (anusaya) to lie latent in a person and bind him to the round of rebirths. Sati conducts the wholesome functioning of sañño so that one can properly identify reality, abandon wrong views and maintain emotional equanimity, upākkhā. The path to liberation through the four jhānas represents a systematic process of refining the cognitive apparatus and reducing emotional disturbance in order to prepare the mind for the ultimate goal, and sati is essential to this process.

In the light of the relationship between sati and sañño, we can classify sati according to the different ways in which it functions in practice. It can be simple awareness, protective awareness, introspective awareness, or it can deliberately form conceptions. Sati was taught in diverse forms in early Buddhism. It can be concluded that sati serves as a general guideline or a fundamental principle that is to be applied to various practices, including samatha and vipassanā meditation as well as daily activities. Mindfulness of breathing in the form of sixteen exercises correlated with the four satipaṭṭhānas illustrates how samatha and vipassanā can be brought together to achieve the religious aim. The practice of mindfulness is not only concerned with oneself, but it can also be altruistic. The process of developing loving kindness (mettā) is a type of mindfulness that should be practiced to form one’s ethical attitude towards all beings.
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Examination of the settings of suttas in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta suggests that the Buddha probably started to preach the four satipaṭṭhānas (establishments of mindfulness) at a late stage in his teaching career, and particularly emphasized it as his final teaching. The scheme of the four satipaṭṭhānas was promoted as the paradigm for the practice of mindfulness in early Buddhism. In the Canon it is given as the explanation for the faculty of mindfulness (satindriya) and for right mindfulness (sammāsati). Mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasati) is also often expounded by way of the four satipaṭṭhānas. The four satipaṭṭhānas are prescribed as the method for developing all the seven enlightenment factors in the Ānāpānasati Sutta (MN III 85–87). The doctrines of dependent origination (paticcasamuppāda) and the aggregates (khandha) are linked to the causal analysis of the four subjects of satipaṭṭhāna.

In this book I put forward the theoretical underpinnings on which the practice of kāyagatā sati and of the four satipaṭṭhānas are based. An investigation into the Pali and Chinese versions of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta demonstrates that the antecedent version of this text from which these two versions derived was a composite of extracts from different texts. The way in which that antecedent version was composed indicates that kāyagatā sati did not refer only to mindfulness concerning the physical body, as the Pali version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta and the later tradition suggest. At a later point when kāyagatā sati came to be understood as mindfulness concerning the physical body, the Kāyagatāsati Sutta further provided essential material for the composition of the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. In fact, kāyagatā sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas are two different ways of formulating the teaching on sati according to different schemes of classification of phenomena, which cover the individual and the external world perceived. Kāyagatā sati is based on the analysis of our experienced world into the individual possessed of consciousness and all the objects external to him. The four satipaṭṭhānas provide an alternative classification of the empirical world which consists of personal physical and psychological conditions on the one hand (body, feelings, mind), and whatever objects are perceived through the Buddhist point of view on the other (dhammas). Both kāyagatā sati and the four satipaṭṭhānas concern subject-object interaction, where lies the crux of saṁsāra as well as Nirvana.

Can liberation be achieved through sati alone without samatha?

It is important to note that while many canonical passages show or imply that mindfulness or satipaṭṭhāna is closely related to samatha meditation or the aggregate of concentration, the later Theravāda tradition tends to restrict the scope of mindfulness, especially satipaṭṭhāna, to vipassanā meditation or development of wisdom. This is perhaps because of the tendency in the tradition to redefine “liberation by wisdom” (paññāvimutti) as being
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liberated by insight alone without high meditative attainments, although “liberation by wisdom” originally did not mean so as demonstrated by Gombrich (1996: 96–134). A good example of such redefinition can be seen in the Susīma Sutta (SN II 119–128). In the Pali version of this sutta a number of monks claimed to be “liberated by wisdom” without any experience of the formless attainments or the development of the first five abhiññās. The commentary even takes a step further and glosses it as: “We are jhāna-less, dry-insight practitioners (sukkha-vipassaka), liberated by wisdom alone.” Another example is in the Kīṭāgiri Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, where a person liberated by wisdom does not touch in person and stay in those peaceful liberations that are formless, transcending forms. Apparently those formless liberations refer to the four formless attainments.

As Cousins (1996: 57) points out, the references to arahants “liberated by wisdom” in the earlier texts (including the Susīma Sutta) seem mostly to say that they had not developed the formless attainments or the first five abhiññās; but the later tradition even accepts that there were such arahants who had not developed all or even any of the four jhānas. Gombrich (1996: 126) notes that a lack of the supernormal knowledges (abhiññās) may imply that the meditative attainments (i.e. attainments of the jhānas) which bestow those powers have not been reached. A similar way of redefining “liberation by wisdom” is also found in the Sarvāstivāda tradition preserved in the Chinese Sanyukta and Madhyama Āgamas. In the Chinese version of the Susīma Sutta in the Sanyukta Āgama, a monk who claims to be “liberated by wisdom” admits that he does not attain any of the four jhānas or the peaceful liberations that are formless, transcending forms. The Chinese version of the Kīṭāgiri Sutta in the Madhyama Āgama states that a monk liberated by wisdom does not touch in person (lit. with his body) and stay in the eight liberations. The last five of the eight liberations are the four formless attainments and the attainment of cessation. According to the Dharmasamāgani, the first three liberations are connected to the first jhāna, while the second one even covers all the four jhānas. But I have not found such explanations in either the four main Nikāyas or the Āgamas. In any case, in the Sarvāstivāda Sanyukta and Madhyama Āgamas, “liberation by wisdom” has a broader sense than that in the Theravāda Nikāyas, in that the former covers not only those “liberated” without experiencing the formless attainments, but also those “liberated” without experiencing even lower levels of meditative attainments, the jhānas. As Ven. Sopāka (2004: 174–175, 255) points out, in accordance with the Theravāda version of the Susīma Sutta, this sutta as cited in the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṃghikas (T 22, 362b–363b) also says that those monks claimed to be “liberated by wisdom” without any experience of the formless attainments. This version of the story may go back to pre-sectarian times, that is, before the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras. Then the Theravāda school which is still extant and the Sarvāstivāda school both derived from the Sthaviras, and the
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former preserved the story shared by the Mahāsāṁghikas while the latter modified it. The idea of “liberation by wisdom” without experiencing any meditative attainments (even the jhānas) as presented in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Susīna Sutta and the Theravāda commentaries could be a later development, as Ven. Sopāka (2004: 258) suggests.

This tendency to devalue concentration, whether the formless attainments or even the jhānas, may have affected the tradition’s interpretation of sati or satipāṭṭhāna, and therefore sati is dissociated from samatha or samādhi meditation. Ven. Rahula (1980: 271) maintains that samādhi is pre-Buddhist while vipassāna-bhāvanā is the true Buddhist meditation, and the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is the most complete and important teaching on this true meditation. Similarly, Nyanaponika Thera (1962: 103) translates saṅkhā-vipassanā as “Bare Insight,” by which he means “the exclusive meditative practice of it without a previous attainment of the Absorptions,” and he regards the satipaṭṭhāna as belonging to “Bare Insight.” However, the Vibhaṅga, a Theravāda Abhidhamma text, says that when a monk attains the first jhāna and contemplates the body (feelings, etc.) as a body (feelings, etc.), at that time sati, anussati, etc. are called “satipaṭṭhāna,”12 and that the four satipaṭṭhānas may be connected with viṭakka, vicāra, pūti, sukha, and upekkhā,13 which are characteristic of the jhānas. Similarly, the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāsā-sāstra contains a section on a sophisticated exposition of how to practice the four snṛtyupasthānas in the context of the four dhyānas and the formless liberations.14 The tendency to dissociate satipaṭṭhāna from samatha is apparently a rather late development.

The Pali version of the (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, which is highly venerated in the Theravāda tradition, may have some connection with this tendency. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Section 1, the four jhānas are included in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, but they are missing in the Pali version. The Pali version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, almost identical with the first satipaṭṭhāna on the body in the (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, also contains the four jhānas. The absence of the four jhānas in the Pali (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the refrain characteristic of vipassanā in the text may have led practitioners and scholars to regard satipaṭṭhāna as a purely insight meditation. For example, while discussing the relationship between concentration and insight, Griffiths (1981: 615) says, “In the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, in both its DN and MN forms, we find the clear implication that nibbāna can be attained by the practice of mindfulness alone without the concentration [sic] games involved in samādhi-bhāvanā.” In Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, however, we have seen that the four satipaṭṭhānas are applied to concentration in many cases. Even in the (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself, the last part of the statement of mindfulness of breathing refers to the attainment of the fourth jhāna as demonstrated in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.

Although mindfulness can be practiced outside the context of the samatha meditation, there is probably no explicit indication in the Canon that one
can achieve liberation by the practice of sati alone without the attainment of the jhānas. However, vipassanā is usually regarded by the tradition as the sine qua non of liberation while samatha is seen as only subordinate and not essential for the realization of nirvana. Since satipaṭṭhāna is generally identified by the tradition with vipassanā, a natural corollary is that liberation is to be attained by satipaṭṭhāna alone. A passage in the Nikāyas has been taken as having such an implication. It is the "ekāyana formula" found in the (Mahā)satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and Satipaṭṭhāna Samyutta. Ekāyano maggo is often rendered as "the one and only path" or "the only way." Thus the four satipaṭṭhānas come to be understood as the only way to purify beings and realize nirvana, as Ven. Silānanda (2002: 9) interprets this formula:

The satipaṭṭhāna method helps to purify your minds. This is the only way for the purification of the minds of all beings. When you practice vipassanā meditation, you do not have greed or hatred or delusion or pride or other defilements...

As discussed in Chapter 5, Section 2.6, however, ekāyana in the context of satipaṭṭhāna is most likely to mean a point of convergence as it does in BU 2.4.11, where the simile "the ocean is the converging point of all the waters" is also analogous to the simile describing kāyagatā sati in the Nikāyas. It has also been demonstrated that the four satipaṭṭhānas and kāyagatā sati are just two different formulations of the same teaching with different emphases. The implication is that just as the ocean is the converging point of all the waters, the four satipaṭṭhānas, or kāyagata sati, include all the wholesome states conducive to gnosis (vijjā), which states refer to samatha and vipassanā (see Chapter 5, Section 3). Rather than the "only way," the term ekāyana maggo is meant to describe the four satipaṭṭhānas as a comprehensive or "all-inclusive" path, where various strands of practice converge, including development of both concentration and wisdom. This will not lead to the conclusion that the practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas alone without samatha meditation enables one to attain liberation. On the contrary, the ekāyana formula implies that the four satipaṭṭhānas have to be practiced in a comprehensive way in order to achieve nirvana. It is clearly stated in the Dhammapada that: "There is no jhāna for one who has no wisdom (apaññassa); there is no wisdom (paññā) for one who does not practice jhāna. He in whom there are jhāna and wisdom indeed comes into the presence of nirvana." 17

Sati is a general guideline for Buddhist practice, and is to be applied to different aspects of Buddhist practice. It is indispensable for the path to liberation, yoking samatha and vipassanā together. According to sutta 53 of the Bojjhāṅga Samyutta (SN V 112–115), as one of the seven enlightenment factors, sati is said to be always useful while the other six should be practiced only at appropriate times. In Buddhaghosa’s discussion of the five
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faculties, strong sati is a regulating force which is needed in all instances to protect the mind from unwanted consequences due to an excess of any of the other four faculties, namely faith, energy, concentration and wisdom (Vism 130). A statement by Conze (1962: 51) may serve as a conclusion of this book:

If one were asked what distinguishes Buddhism from all other systems of thought, one would have to answer that it is the Dharma-theory and the stress laid on mindfulness. Mindfulness is not only the seventh of the steps of the holy eightfold path, the third of the five virtues, and the first of the seven limbs of enlightenment. On occasions it is almost equated with Buddhism itself.
Appendix 1

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF
THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION OF
THE SATIpaṭṭhāNA SUTTA

Introduction

Apart from the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta of MN and the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta of DN in Pali, two other versions are preserved in Chinese translation. One of them is found in the Madhyama Āgama (中阿含經) and is entitled Niānchū Jīng (念處經), which is equivalent to the Pali title “Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.” The other is the first discourse of the twelfth chapter (*Ekāyana-mārga Varga 壹入道品) in the Ekottara Āgama (or Ekottarika Āgama 增壹阿含經). The following concerns the former Chinese version, which is more closely related to the Pali version than the latter.

The Madhyama Āgama (中阿含經) was translated into Chinese by Gautama Saṃghadeva in AD 398.1 from Prakrit or some Middle Indic language.2 Widespread agreement has been reached in attributing the Madhyama Āgama to the Sarvāstivāda school.3 Some unique expressions in this text will be shown to be characteristic of this school.

The full text was translated into English by Ven. Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 151–167), which is a groundbreaking contribution, but it does not tackle textual problems in depth. Ven. Thich Minh Chau (1991: 87–95) also made an abridged translation of the text. Here is an attempt to provide a critical translation of this important text, and to make sense of some difficulties in the Chinese text. This involves taking into account the features and styles of medieval Chinese, especially in the context of translating Buddhist scriptures from Indic languages into Chinese. Some words or passages in the text are compared with their Pali or Sanskrit counterparts for the purpose of clarification. Emendations are suggested where possible errors in transcription or printing occur.

The translation is based on the Taishō edition (which is a recension based on the Korean editions collated with the Song, Yuan, and Ming editions4) collated with the Jin and Qisha editions, which are the earliest editions available to me. The Jin and Qisha editions were printed in AD 11735 and 12346 respectively when China was divided into two states. The Jin edition was printed in the Jin Dynasty in the North, and the Qisha was printed in
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the Song Dynasty in the South. The Taishō edition is based on the Korean edition, and the Korean edition originates from the Jin edition. Similarly, several later editions are based on the Qisha edition. In this sense, the Jin and Qisha editions are very valuable in terms of producing a recension close to the original.

English Translation

[T 1, 582b] The Discourse on the Establishments of Mindfulness, the second discourse of the Chapter on Cause (*Nidāna Varga) [in the] Madhyama Āgama chanted [on] the second [day in] the small earthen city.9

(Preamble)

I have heard thus. On one occasion the Buddha dwelt among the Kurus in Kammāsadhamma, a town of the Kurus. At that time the World-honored One (世尊, *bhagavant or lokanātha) told the monks: “There is ‘one path’ (一道, *ekāyana-magga) which purifies beings, surmounts grief and fear, eliminates suffering and distress, abandons crying and weeping, and attains the true Dharma—namely the four establishments of mindfulness. The past Tathāgatas, free from attachment and perfectly enlightened, all destroyed the five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, established [their] minds [and] dwelt properly in the four establishments of mindfulness, cultivated the seven factors of enlightenment, and attained the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. The future Tathāgatas, free from attachment and perfectly enlightened, all will destroy the five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, will establish [their] minds [and] dwell properly in the four establishments of mindfulness, will cultivate the seven factors of enlightenment, and will attain the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. Now I, the present Tathāgata, free from attachment and perfectly enlightened, also have destroyed the five hindrances, defilements of the mind and weakeners of wisdom, have established [my] mind [and] am dwelling properly in the four establishments of mindfulness, have cultivated the seven factors of enlightenment, and have attained the unsurpassed, perfect enlightenment. What are the four? The establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body; likewise the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating feelings... mind... dharmas as dharmas.

(I. Contemplation of the Body)

(I. 1) What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body? A monk, when walking, understands: “[I am] walking”; when standing, he understands: “[I am] standing”; when sitting, he understands: “[I am] sitting”; when lying down, he understands: “[I am] lying down”; when asleep, he understands: “[I am] asleep”; when awake, he understands: “[I am]
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awake”; when asleep [and/or] awake, he understands: “[I am] asleep [and/or] awake.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge (*ñāṇa), vision (*dassana), and gnosis (*vijjā). This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 2) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk is fully aware of going out and in, well observes and analyzes; he is fully aware of bending back and stretching [his limbs], stooping and raising [his head], his serene and solemn deportment, properly wearing his *saṅghāti (僧伽梨)14 and [other] clothes [and carrying his] bowl,15 walking, standing, sitting, lying down, being asleep, being awake, speaking and keeping silent. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 3) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. When evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome dharma thoughts. Just as a carpenter or a carpenter’s apprentice holds an inked string and applies it to the wood, and then chops the wood with a sharp axe to straighten it, so when evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome dharma thoughts. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 4) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state]. Just as two strong men seize a feeble man, grasping him randomly17 by any part [of his body] and beating him at will, so a monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state]. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 5) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, being mindful of breathing in, understands: “[I am] mindful of breathing in”; being mindful of breathing out, he understands: “[I am] mindful of breathing out.” Taking a long in-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a long in-breath”; taking a
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long out-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a long out-breath.” Taking a short in-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a short in-breath”; taking a short out-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a short out-breath.” He learns to breathe in [perceiving] the whole body; he learns to breathe out [perceiving] the whole body. He learns to breathe in stopping bodily activity; he learns to breathe out stopping verbal activity. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 6) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Just as a skilled bath man fills a container with bath powder, and mixes [bath powder and] water into a lump, making water drench, moisten, pervade and fill [the lump] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 7) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration. Just as a spring in the mountain, clean and not muddy, [583a] is full and overflows, and there is no chance for water from the four directions to enter [the spring], and from the bottom of the spring water wells up spontaneously and spills over, drenches, moistens, pervades and fills the mountain with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 8) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture. Just as blue, red and white lotuses are born and grow in water, existing under water, so their roots, stems, flowers and leaves are all
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drenched, moistened, pervaded and filled [with water] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 9) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk resolves upon pervading his body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling therein; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pure state of mind. Just as a person is covered with a garment measuring seven cubits or a garment measuring eight cubits, [so that] no part of his body—from head to foot—is not covered; so too for a monk no part of his body is not pervaded by the pure state of mind. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 10) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, attending to the conception of light, well grasps, well holds and well recollects what he attends to. As before, so after; as after, so before; as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day; as below, so above; as above, so below. Thus being unperverted (*aviparyasta), [his] mind is free from entanglement. [He] develops a bright mind, and in the end [his] mind is not covered by darkness. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 11) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk well grasps the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to. Just as [583b] a person sits contemplating [another] person lying down, or lies down contemplating [another] person sitting; so a monk well grasps the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

(I. 12) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk, however his body is placed as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity: “In this body of mine there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh,
sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root\textsuperscript{28}, tears, sweat, snot, spittle (\textit{bīhā}), pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva (\textit{abhīṣ)), phlegm\textsuperscript{29}, and urine. Just as a container is filled with some seeds, and a person with [unimpaired] eyes can see [them] all clearly, namely: "rice, millet seeds, and the seeds of turnips and mustard"; so too a monk, however his body is placed as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity: "In this body of mine there are head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root, tears, sweat, snot, spittle, pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva, phlegm, and urine. Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosia. This is what is meant by "a monk contemplates the body as a body."

(I. 13) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:] "In this body of mine there are the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element."\textsuperscript{30} Just as a butcher, having killed a cow and peeled its skin, spreads [it] on the ground and divides [it] into six pieces; so too a monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:] "In this body of mine [there are] the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the space element, and the consciousness element." Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosia. This is what is meant by "a monk contemplates the body as a body."

(I. 14) Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. A monk sees that corpse which for one or two days, or even for six or seven days, has been pecked by crows and hawks, eaten by jackals and wolves, burnt by fire, or buried underground, or has totally decomposed and decayed; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: "This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually." Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosia. This is what is meant by "a monk contemplates the body as a body."

Again, a monk [583c] contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground a skeleton that is blue, decomposed, half eaten\textsuperscript{31} with bones [lying] on the ground; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: "This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually." Thus a monk contemplates
the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground [a skeleton] without skin, flesh and blood, connected only by sinews; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground disconnected bones scattered in all directions—foot-bones, shin-bones, thigh-bones, hip-bones, back-bones, shoulder-bones, neck-bones, and the skull at different places; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground bones that are as white as shells, or blue as the color of doves,32 or red as if smeared with blood, decayed and crumbled to dust; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.” Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates the body as a body.” If a monk or a nun thus contemplates the body as a body little by little33, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating the body as a body.”

(II. Contemplation of Feelings)

What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating feelings as feelings? A monk, when feeling a pleasant feeling, understands that he feels a pleasant feeling. When feeling a painful feeling, he understands that he feels a painful feeling. When feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, he understands that he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. When feeling a pleasant [feeling of the] body...a painful [feeling of the] body...a neither-painful-nor-pleasant [feeling of the] body...a pleasant [feeling of the] mind...a painful [feeling of the] mind...a neither-painful-nor-pleasant [feeling of the] mind...a pleasant worldly...
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painful worldly [feeling]...a neither-painful-nor-pleasant worldly [feeling]...a pleasant unworldly[feeling]...a painful unworldly [feeling]...a neither-painful-nor-pleasant unworldly [feeling]...a pleasant [feeling with] desire...a painful [feeling with] desire...a neither-painful-nor-pleasant [feeling with] desire...a pleasant feeling without desire...a painful [584a] feeling without desire...a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling without desire...he understands that he feels a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling without desire. Thus a monk contemplates internal feelings as feelings, contemplates external feelings as feelings, and establishes mindfulness with regard to feelings, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates feelings as feelings.” If a monk or a nun thus contemplates feelings as feelings little by little, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating feelings as feelings.”

(III. Contemplation of Mind)
What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating mind as mind? A monk understands as it actually is mind with desire as mind with desire; he understands as it actually is mind without desire as mind without desire...with hate...without hate...with delusion...without delusion...with defilement...without defilement...contracted...distracted...inferior...superior...little...great...cultivated...uncultivated...concentrated...unconcentrated...having an unliberated mind, he understands unliberated mind as it actually is; having a liberated mind, he understands liberated mind as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal mind as mind, contemplates external mind as mind, and establishes mindfulness with regard to mind, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates mind as mind.” If a monk or a nun thus contemplates mind as mind little by little, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating mind as mind.”

(IV. Contemplation of Dharmas)
(IV. 1) What is the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating dharmas? With the eye and forms as condition, there arise internal fetters. When fetters really exist internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “fetters exist internally”; when fetters really do not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “fetters do not exist internally”; if there arise unarisen internal fetters, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen internal fetters have ceased and no longer arise, he understands this as it actually is. Thus the ear...the nose...the tongue...the body...With the mind and mind-objects as condition, there arise internal fetters. When fetters really exist internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “fetters exist internally”; when fetters really do not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “fetters do not exist internally”; if there arise unarisen internal fetters, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen internal fetters
have ceased and no longer arise, he understands this as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal dharmas as dharmas, contemplates external dharmas as dharmas, and establishes mindfulness with regard to dharmas, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates dharmas as dharmas,” namely the six internal bases.

(IV. 2) Again, a monk contemplates dharmas as dharmas. When desire really exists internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “desire exists”; when desire really does not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “desire does not exist”; if there arises unarisen desire, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen desire has ceased and no longer arises, he understands this as it actually is. Thus anger . . . sleep . . . restlessness and remorse . . . When doubt really exists internally, he understands this as it actually is: “doubt exists”; when doubt really does not exist internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “doubt does not exist”; if there arises unarisen doubt, he understands this as it actually is; if arisen doubt has ceased and no longer arises, he understands this as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal dharmas as dharmas, contemplates external dharmas as dharmas, and establishes mindfulness with regard to dharmas, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates dharmas as dharmas,” namely the six hindrances.

(IV. 3) Again, a monk contemplates dharmas as dharmas. When the mindfulness enlightenment factor really exists internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “the mindfulness enlightenment factor exists”; when the mindfulness enlightenment factor really does not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “the mindfulness enlightenment factor does not exist”; if there arises the unarisen mindfulness enlightenment factor, he understands this as it actually is; if the arisen mindfulness enlightenment factor abides, is not forgotten, does not decline, and is further developed and increased, then he understands this as it actually is. Thus discrimination of dharmas . . . energy . . . rapture . . . tranquility . . . concentration . . . When the equanimity enlightenment factor really exists internally, a monk understands this as it actually is: “the equanimity enlightenment factor exists”; when the equanimity enlightenment factor really does not exist internally, he understands this as it actually is: “the equanimity enlightenment factor does not exist”; if there arises the unarisen equanimity enlightenment factor, he understands this as it actually is; if the arisen equanimity enlightenment factor abides, is not forgotten, does not decline, and is further developed and increased, then he understands this as it actually is. Thus a monk contemplates internal dharmas as dharmas, contemplates external dharmas as dharmas, and establishes mindfulness with regard to dharmas, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by “a monk contemplates dharmas as dharmas,” namely the seven enlightenment factors. If a monk or a nun thus
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contemplates dharmas as dharmas little by little, this is called “the establishment of mindfulness that is contemplating dharmas as dharmas.”

(Coda)

If a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness for seven years, he or she will definitely attain [one of] two fruits: either attaining final wisdom here and now (ditthi dhamme), or if there is a residue [of clinging] (upādīsesa), attaining the state of a non-returner (anāgāmitā). Let alone seven years, . . . six . . . five . . . four . . . three . . . two . . . one year, if a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness for seven months, he or she will definitely attain [one of] two fruits: either attaining final wisdom here and now, or if there is a residue [of clinging], attaining the state of a non-returner. Let alone seven months, . . . six . . . five . . . four . . . three . . . two . . . one month, if a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness for seven days and nights, he or she will definitely attain [one of] two fruits: either attaining final wisdom here and now, or if there is a residue [of clinging], attaining the state of a non-returner. Let alone seven days and nights, . . . six . . . five . . . four . . . three . . . two . . . Let alone one day and night, if a monk or a nun establishes [his or her] mind [and] dwells properly in the four establishments of mindfulness little by little for a brief moment, [after] thus practicing in the morning, he or she will definitely make progress in the evening, [or after] thus practicing in the evening, he or she will definitely make progress in the [following] morning.” The Buddha spoke thus. Those monks, having heard what the Buddha said, were delighted and practiced accordingly.

The Discourse on the Establishments of Mindfulness, the second [discourse], is finished. 38
Appendix 2

AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION
OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION
OF THE KĀYAGATĀSATI SUTTA

Introduction

Below is a translation of a text entitled Nianshen Jing (念身經), which is equivalent to the Pali title “Kāyagatāsati Sutta.” This text is included in the Chinese translation of the Madhyama Āgama (中阿含經), which belongs to the Sarvāstivādins. For a general introduction, see Appendix 1. The Chinese version of the Kāyagatāsati Sutta differs considerably from the Pali version, but it is largely ignored, and probably has not yet been translated into English by others.

English Translation


(Preamble)

I have heard thus. On one occasion the Buddha dwelt in the State of Aṅga, and went to Keniya’s residence at Āpana with a large gathering of monks. Then when night had passed and dawn had broken, the World-honored One (*bhagavant, lokanātha) dressed, took his bowl, entered Āpana to beg for food. After finishing his meal in the afternoon, he put away his robe and bowl, washed his hands and feet, put a sitting mat (nīśādana) on his shoulder, and went to a forest. Having entered that forest and reached the foot of a tree, he laid out the sitting mat and sat cross-legged.

At that time many monks, after lunch, gathered sitting in a preaching hall and discussed this matter: “Virtuous ones! The World-honored One is marvelous and extraordinary. He practices mindfulness of the body, analyzes and widely spreads it, thoroughly knows, thoroughly contemplates, thoroughly practices and thoroughly protects it. He is well possessed of good conduct, dwelling in a state of concentrated mind. The Buddha says that mindfulness of the body is of great fruit, [namely] obtaining the eye, possessing the sight and seeing the supreme truth.”
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At that time the World-honored One, while sitting in meditation, with his pure divine ear surpassing humans he heard the monks, after lunch, gathering and sitting in a preaching hall, and discussing this matter: ‘Virtuous ones! The World-honored One is marvelous and extraordinary. He practices mindfulness of the body, analyzes and widely spreads it, thoroughly knows, thoroughly contemplates, thoroughly practices and thoroughly protects it. He is well possessed of right conduct, dwelling in a state of concentrated mind. The Buddha says that mindfulness of the body is of great fruit, [namely] obtaining the eye, possessing the sight and seeing the supreme truth.’ Having heard thus, the World-honored One got up from sitting meditation in the late afternoon,\(^4\) went to the preaching hall, laid out his seat, and sat in front of the crowd of monks.

Then the World-honored One addressed the monks: ‘What matter were you discussing before? For what matter are you gathering and sitting in the preaching hall?’ Then the monks said, [555a] ‘World-honored One, we monks, after lunch, gathered sitting in the preaching hall, and discussed this matter: ‘Virtuous ones! The World-honored One is marvelous and extraordinary. He practices mindfulness of the body, analyzes and widely spreads it, thoroughly knows, thoroughly contemplates, thoroughly practices and thoroughly protects it. He is well possessed of right conduct, dwelling in a state of concentrated mind. The Buddha says that mindfulness of the body is of great fruit, [namely] obtaining the eye, possessing the sight and seeing the supreme truth.’ World-honored One, we discussed such a matter before. For this matter we are gathering and sitting in the preaching hall.’

The World-honored One addressed the monks again: ‘Why did I say that practicing mindfulness of the body, analyzing and widely spreading it conduces to great fruit?’ Then the monks addressed the World-honored One: ‘The World-honored One is the root of the Dharma; the World-honored One is the lord of the Dharma; the Dharma is from the World-honored One. We wish [him] to preach it. Having heard, we will be able to understand the meaning comprehensively.’ Thus the Buddha said, ‘You listen carefully! Think about it well! I shall analyze its meaning for you.’ Then the monks received the instruction and listened.

(The Main Discourse)


Thus however his body behaves,\(^5\) a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements (*upakkilesa*)\(^6\) in the mind, and obtains a concentrated
mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(2) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk is fully aware of going out and in, well observes and analyzes; he is fully aware of bending back and stretching [his limbs], stooping and raising [his head], his serene and solemn deportment, properly wearing his saṅghāti (僧伽梨) and [other] clothes [and carrying his] bowl, walking, standing, sitting, lying down, being asleep, being awake, speaking and keeping silent.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(3) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. When evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome dharma thoughts. Just as a carpenter or a carpenter’s apprentice holds an inked string and applies it to the wood, and then chops the wood with a sharp axe to straighten it, so when evil unwholesome thoughts arise, a monk severs and extinguishes [them] with wholesome dharma thoughts.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(4) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state]. Just as two strong men seize a feeble man, grasping him randomly by any part [of his body] and beating him at will, so a monk, with his teeth clenched and his tongue pressed against the palate, restrains one mental state with [another] mental state, severs and extinguishes [another mental state].

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

taking a short out-breath, he understands: “[I am] taking a short out-breath.”
He learns to breathe in [perceiving] the whole body; he learns to breathe out [perceiving] the whole body. He learns to breathe in stopping bodily activity; he learns to breathe out stopping verbal activity.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(6) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion. Just as a skilled bath man fills a container with bath powder, and mixes [bath powder and] water into a lump, making water drench, moisten, pervade and fill [the lump] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(7) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration. Just as a spring in the mountain, extremely clean and clear, is full and overflows, [555c] and there is no chance for water from the four directions to enter [the spring], and from the bottom of the spring water wells up spontaneously and spills over, drenches, moistens, pervades and fills the mountain with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the rapture and pleasure born of concentration.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(8) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture. Just as blue, red and white lotuses are born and grow in water, existing under water, so their roots, stems, flowers and leaves are all
drenched, moistened, pervaded and filled [with water] with no part unpervaded; so too a monk makes the pleasure born of the absence of rapture drench, moisten, pervade and fill his body; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pleasure born of the absence of rapture.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(9) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk resolves upon pervading his body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling [therein]; no part of his body is unpervaded by the pure state of mind. Just as a person is covered with a garment [measuring] seven cubits or a garment [measuring] eight cubits, [so that] no part of his body—from head to foot—is not covered; so too a monk resolves upon pervading his body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling [therein];¹² no part of his body is unpervaded by the pure state of mind.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(10) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, attending to¹³ the conception of light, well grasps, well holds and well recollects what he attends to. As before, so after; as after, so before; as by day, so at night; as at night, so by day; as below, so above; as above, so below. Thus being [556a] unperturbed, [his] mind is free from entanglement. [He] develops a bright mind, and in the end [his] mind is not covered by darkness.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(11) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk well grasps, well holds¹⁴ the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to. Just as a person sits contemplating [another] person lying down, or lies down contemplating [another] person sitting; so a monk well grasps, well holds the reviewing-sign and well recollects what he attends to.

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”
(12) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk, however
his body is placed15 as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head to foot
[as] full of various kinds of impurity, namely: “In this body there are head-
hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh,
sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines,
spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root, tears, sweat, snot, spittle
(WebRequest), pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva (WebRequest), phlegm,16 and urine. Just as a
container is filled with some seeds, and a person with [unimpaired] eyes can
see [them] all clearly, namely: “rice, millet seeds, barley, wheat, big and small
sesames and beans,17 and the seeds of turnips and mustard”; so too a monk,
however his body is placed as he likes or dislikes, sees [his body] from head
to foot [as] full of various kinds of impurity, namely: “In this body there are
head-hairs, body-hairs, nails, teeth, rough [or/and] smooth thin skin, skin, flesh,
sinews, bones, heart, kidney, liver, lungs, large intestines, small intestines,
spleen, stomach, lumps of feces, brain, brain root, tears, sweat, snot, spittle,
pus, blood, fat, marrow, saliva, phlegm, and urine.
Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really
is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently,
abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having
obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is
what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(13) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk contem-
plates the elements of the body, [thinking:] “In this body of mine there are
the earth element, the water element, the fire element, the wind element, the
space element, and the consciousness element.” Just as a butcher, having killed
a cow and peeled its skin, spreads [it] on the ground and divides [it] into
six pieces; so too a monk contemplates the elements of the body, [thinking:]
“In this body of mine [there are] the earth element, the water element,
the fire [556b] element, the wind element, the space element, and the con-
sciousness element.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really
is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently,
abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having
obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is
what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

(14) Again, a monk practices mindfulness of the body. A monk sees that
corpse which for one or two days, or even for six or seven days, has been
pecked by crows and hawks, eaten by jackals and dogs,18 burnt by fire, or
buried underground, or has totally decomposed and decayed; having seen
it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like
that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”
Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really
is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently,
abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having

160
obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground a skeleton that is blue, decomposed, half eaten with bones lying on the ground; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground without skin, flesh and blood, connected only by sinews; having seen it, he compares himself with it thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground disconnected bones scattered in all directions—foot-bones, shin-bones, thigh-bones, hip-bones, back-bones, shoulder-bones, neck-bones, and the skull at different places; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”

Again, a monk contemplates the body as a body. As though a monk himself were to see in a charnel ground bones that are as white as shells, or blue as the color of doves, or red as if smeared with blood, decayed and crumbled to dust; having seen them, he compares himself with them thus: “This body of mine will also be like that, and equally has that nature, not exempt from it eventually.”

Thus however his body behaves, a monk knows the supreme as it really is. He thus lives alone in solitude, with a vigilant mind, practices diligently, abandons defilements in the mind, and obtains a concentrated mind. Having obtained a concentrated mind, he knows the supreme as it really is. This is what is meant by “a monk practices mindfulness of the body.”
MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

(Similes)

If anyone thus practices mindfulness of the body and spreads it widely, it will encompass all those wholesome things (*dhamma), namely the things that are components of enlightenment (*bodhi-pakkhiya-dhamma). If he has mind and resolves on pervading [something] like the great ocean, those small rivers are all included in the ocean. [Likewise,] if anyone thus practices mindfulness of the body and spreads it widely, it will encompass all those wholesome things, namely the things that are components of enlightenment.19

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with a limited mind (*paritta-citta), Māro pāpimā20 will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if there were a jug, empty inside and devoid of water, standing firmly on the ground. Suppose a person were to take water and pour it into the jug. What do you think, monks? Would that jug in such a case hold the water?”

The monks replied: “Yes, it would, World-honored One. For what reason? It is empty and devoid of water and standing firmly on the ground, so it would surely hold.” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with an immeasurable mind (*appamāna-citta), Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if there were a jug, full of water, standing firmly on the ground. Suppose a person were to take water and pour it into the jug. What do you think, monks? Would that jug in such a case still hold [more] water?” The monks replied: “No, World-honored One. For what reason? That jug is full of water and standing firmly on the ground, so it would not hold.” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins [557a] dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māro pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a strong man were to throw a big heavy stone at wet mud. What do you think, monks? Would the mud take in [the stone]?” The monks replied: “Yes, it would, World-honored One. For what reason? The mud is wet and the stone is heavy, so [the mud] would surely take in [the stone].” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māro pāpimā will surely be able
to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māra pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a strong man were to throw a light feather ball at a stable door. What do you think, monks? Would that [door] take in [the ball]?” The monks replied: “No, World-honored One. For what reason? The feather ball is light and slow, while the door stands stably, so [the door] would not take in [the ball].” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māra pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māra pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a person seeking fire would take a dry wood as the base and drill it with a dry drill. What do you think, monks? Would that person make a fire in this way?” The monks replied: “Yes, he would, World-honored One. For what reason? He drills a dry wood with a dry drill, so he would surely make it.” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell without having properly established mindfulness of the body, with limited mind, Māra pāpimā will surely be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are devoid of mindfulness of the body.

If any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māra pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body. This is as if a person seeking fire would take a wet wood as the base and drill it with a wet drill. What do you think, monks? Would that person make a fire in this way?” The monks replied: “No, World-honored One. For what reason? He drills a wet wood with a wet drill, so he would not make it.” “Likewise, if any recluses and Brahmins dwell having properly established mindfulness of the body, with immeasurable mind, Māra pāpimā will never be able to find an opportunity in them. For what reason? Because those recluses and Brahmins are not devoid of mindfulness of the body.

(Benefits)

It should be understood that there are eighteen benefits (*ānisānśa) for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely. What eighteen? A monk is able to bear oppression by hunger, thirst, cold, heat, mosquitoes, gadflies, flies, fleas, wind and the sun, and can also bear
MINDFULNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

abusive remarks and thrashing; if his body suffers from diseases and feels extreme pain, and even if his life is about to end, he can endure all those disagreeable [feelings]. This is called the first benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk can endure the disagreeable. If the disagreeable arises, his mind never gets stuck. This is called the second benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk can endure dread. If dread arises, his mind never gets stuck. This is called the third benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, in a monk arise three unwholesome thoughts: thought of desire, thought of anger and thought of malice. If the three unwholesome thoughts arise, his mind never gets stuck. This is called the fourth benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk, secluded from desire, secluded from evil unwholesome states... attains and dwells in the fourth jhāna. These are called the fifth to the eighth benefits for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has eradicated the three fetters, attains to [the fruit of] *sotāpanna (須陀洹, xutuohuan, “stream-enterer”), will not fall into unwholesome states, is destined to enlightenment, will experience at most seven rebirths; having gone and come between the heavens and the human world seven times, he puts an end to suffering. This is called the ninth benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has eradicated the three fetters and attenuated lust, anger and delusion, attains to [the fruit of] "gone-and-come-once" (*sakadāgāmin); having gone and come between the heavens and the human world once, he puts an end to suffering. This is called the tenth benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has eradicated the five lower fetters, has been born in the other world, and then attains the final Nirvana, attains to the non-relapse state without returning to this world. [557c] This is called the eleventh benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk has peaceful liberation (*santa-vimokkha), free from form, obtains the formless, witnesses in person and attains such concentration, and dwells therein; and with insight through wisdom he understands the taints (*āsava) and abandons the taints. This is called the twelfth benefit for one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

Again, a monk [has obtained] the bases for supernatural power (iddhipāda), divine ear, knowledge of others’ minds, knowledge of past lives, knowledge of births and deaths, has eradicated the taints, attains liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom which are without the taints, in this very life attains the self-knowledge, self-awareness, self-witness and dwells therein. He
APPENDIX 2

understands as it really is: “Birth has been destroyed, the holy life has been
established, what should be done has been done, there will be no more experi-
ence of becoming.” This is called the thirteenth to eighteenth\textsuperscript{26} benefits for
one who thus practices mindfulness of the body and thus spreads it widely.

It should be understood that one who thus practices mindfulness of the
body and thus spreads it widely has these eighteen benefits.” The Buddha
spoke thus. Those monks, having listened to what the Buddha said, were
delighted and practiced accordingly.

The Discourse on Mindfulness of the Body, the tenth [discourse], is
finished.\textsuperscript{27}
I. CONTEMPLATION OF THE BODY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pali</th>
<th>Ch.1</th>
<th>Ch.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mindfulness of breathing</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding the four postures</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting in full awareness in daily life</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reviewing the body as full of various kinds of impurity</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reviewing the body by way of elements¹</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contemplating a corpse in different states of decomposition</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>extinguishing evil unwholesome thoughts with wholesome dharma thoughts</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate, restraining one mental state with [another] mental state</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the rapture and pleasure born of seclusion pervading the body</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the rapture and pleasure born of concentration pervading the body</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the pleasure born of the absence of rapture pervading the body</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pervading the body with the pure state of mind</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attending to the conception of light, and developing a bright mind</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
grasping the reviewing-sign and recollecting what he attends to

1 Ch.1 has six elements, while Pali and Ch.2 has four.

## II. CONTEMPLATION OF FEELINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pali</th>
<th>Ch.1</th>
<th>Ch.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>understanding: “I feel a pleasant feeling” when feeling a pleasant feeling</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding: “I feel a worldly pleasant feeling” when feeling a worldly pleasant feeling</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding: “I feel an unworldly pleasant feeling” when feeling an unworldly pleasant feeling</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding: “I feel a pleasant feeling” when feeling a pleasant feeling, not feeling a painful feeling</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding: “I feel a painful feeling” when feeling a painful feeling</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding: “I feel a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling” when feeling a neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, without pain and happiness</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) [feeling of] body</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) [feeling of] mind</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) [feeling with] desire</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling a pleasant (painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant) feeling without desire</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Pali sāmīsa. Both Ch.1 and Ch.2 translate it as “food.”
2 Pali nirāmīsa. Both Ch.1 and Ch.2 translate it as “non-food.”
### III. CONTEMPLATION OF MIND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understanding</th>
<th>Pali</th>
<th>Ch.1</th>
<th>Ch.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mind with (without) lust as mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with (without) lust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind with (without) hate as mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with (without) hate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind with (without) delusion as</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind with (without) delusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind with (without) contracted</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>contracted (distracted) mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding exalted (unexalted)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind as exalted (unexalted) mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind as exalted (unexalted) mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind as surpassed (unsurpassed)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surpassed (unsurpassed) mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind as concentrated (unconcentrated) mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind as concentrated (unconcentrated) mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mind as liberated (unliberated)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liberated (unliberated) mind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding defiled (undefiled)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[mind] as defiled (undefiled) [mind]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding cultivated (uncultivated) [mind] as cultivated (uncultivated) [mind]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding having a (having no) passionate mind as having a (having no) passionate mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding having a (having no) disturbed mind as having a (having no) disturbed mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding having a (having no) pervaded mind as having a (having no) pervaded mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understanding having an (having no) immeasurable mind as having an (having no) immeasurable mind</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3

IV. CONTEMPLATION OF DHAMMAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pali</th>
<th>Ch.1</th>
<th>Ch.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the five hindrances</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the five aggregates</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the six sense bases</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the seven enlightenment factors</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the four noble truths</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the four jhānas</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This is a glossary of selected Pali and Sanskrit terms. Sanskrit equivalents to some of the Pali words are given in parentheses.

**Abhidhamma (Abhidharma)**  “higher teaching,” one of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon recognized by many schools

**abhiññā**  supernormal knowledge or power

**Āgama**  a division of the *Sutta(Sūtra)-piṭaka* in the early Buddhist canon, roughly corresponding to the Pali *Nikāya*

**ānāpānasati**  mindfulness of breathing

**arahant (arhant)**  one who has attained nibbāna

**āsava (āsrava)**  literally “influx”; taint, which binds sentient beings to *saṁsāra*

**Brahmā**  a class of deities; the supreme God in Brahmanism

**citta**  mind; state of mind

**Dhamma (Dharma)**  truth; teaching

**dhammas (dharmas)**  phenomena; things; mental objects; [mental] states

**jhāna (dhyāna)**  a meditative attainment, absorption

**kāya**  body; individual

**kāyagatā sati**  mindfulness directed to the individual

**kāyasati**  synonym for *kāyagatā sati*

**khandha**  aggregate

**Mahāsāṃghika**  “a follower of the great community,” name of an early Buddhist school

**Māra**  “Death,” personification of death and evil

**nāmarūpa**  name-and-form

**nibbāna (nirvāṇa)**  nirvana, the extinction of all āsavas and liberation from *saṁsāra*

**Nikāya**  a division of the *Sutta-piṭaka* in the Pali canon

**nimitta**  sign, object [of meditation]; cause

**Piṭaka**  “basket,” referring to any of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon

**saññā**  apperception, conception

**samādhi**  concentration

**samatha**  serenity [meditation]

**saṁsāra**  the round of rebirths
GLOSSARY

Saṃyutta “connected”, group of connected suttas as a section of SN
Saṅgha/Samgha the Buddhist order
saṅkhāra/samkhāra volitional formation; a conditioned thing
Sarvāstivāda “the doctrine that all exists,” name of an early Buddhist school
satipaṭṭhāna (smṛtyupasthāna) establishment of mindfulness
sati-sampajañña mindfulness and full awareness
sutta (sūtra) a discourse attributed to the Buddha or his disciples
Sutta(Sūtra)-piṭaka “basket of suttas,” one of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon
Tathāgata “Thus come” or “Thus gone,” an epithet of the Buddha
Theravāda “the doctrine of the elders,” name of a Buddhist school
Upaniṣads a class of Brahmanical texts aiming at revealing the secret meaning of the Vedas
vagga (varga) chapter
Vaibhāṣika a Sarvāstivādin following the Vībhāṣa treatises
Vinaya “(monastic) discipline,” one of the three divisions of the Buddhist canon
viññāṇa consciousness
vipaśāṇā insight [meditation]
Yogācāra “Yoga practice,” name of a school of Mahāyāna Buddhism
NOTES

INTRODUCTION
1 e.g. Nyanaponika, 1962; Thich Nhat Hanh, 1990; Goenka, 1998; Gunaratana, 2002; Silananda, 2002.
2 SN V 180.
3 By searching CSCD and CBETA.
6 Mhv V 1–4 (p. 28); Dip V 16ff. (p. 35f).
7 T 49, 15a.
8 T 49, 15a.
9 Mhv V 19–21 (p. 30); Dip VI 1 (p. 41), VI 19–22 (p. 43).
10 cf. also Lamotte, 1988: 156.
11 De Jong (1981: 108) demonstrates that the *Samyukta Ágama* was translated from a Sanskrit original. (I am indebted to Ven. Análayo for this reference.) The other three *Ágamas* are considered to have come from Prakrit originals: For the *Dirgha Ágama*, see Karashima (1994: 51); for the *Madhyama Ágama*, see Waldschmidt (1980: 137); von Hinüber (1982: 246); Ven. Análayo (2006b: 5); for the *Ekottara Ágama*, see Mayeda (1985: 103).
19 According to the Theravāda tradition, the canonical texts were first written down in the first century BC in Sri Lanka (Bechert, 1991: 9). Gombrich (1990b: 29) says, “There has long been a general consensus that the earliest surviving Mahāyāna texts go back to the second or first century BC.” Norman (2006: 121) considers it to be likely that Hinayāna (the early schools’) texts were also being committed to writing, in North India if not in Sri Lanka, at that time.
20 Similarly, Winternitz (1933: 7) says, “It is possible that the canon was not compiled all at once, but at several meetings of the monks.”
22 As illustrated by Gombrich (1987).
NOTES

25 Dhs § 62: katamo tasmiṃ samaye satikārakhandho hoti? phasso... sati... ye vā pana tasmiṃ samaye añāhe ati pi atthi paticcasauppannā arūpinī dhamma ̄ thatpavā vedanākkhandhaṃ thatpavā satihākkhandhaṃ thatpavā vīthīnakkhandhaṃ ayaṃ tasmiṃ samaye satikārakhandho hoti.
27 e.g. Ven. Śīlānananda (2002: 9) says, “The satipaṭṭhāna method helps to purify your minds. This is the only way for the purification of the minds of all beings. When you practice vipassanā meditation. . .”

1 MINDFULNESS IN SOTERIOLOGY: TRANSFORMATION OF COGNITION AND EMOTION

1 A large part of this section is cited from Kuan (2005a) with kind permission of Sāriyābhisaṃaya. A Buddhist Studies Quarterly.
2 cf. The New Oxford Dictionary of English (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) s.v. apperception: “the mental process by which a person makes sense of an idea by assimilating it to the body of ideas he or she already possesses.”
3 As 110: vā sañjīvanarākṣānā paccabhiññānakārāvā.
4 As 110: aparā nayo . . . puna-sañjīva-paccaya-nimitta-karaṇa-rasā. Paccaya is missing in Ee, but occurs in CSCD and is quoted by Nyanaponika (1998: 121).
5 Sanskrit words in parentheses are added by me. CU 7.13.1: yadda vāva te smareyur, atha śnuyur, atha manvīrān, atha vijñātan. smareya vai putrān vijnātān, smareya paśūn.
6 Klaus (1992: 82), who translates smara as “attention,” argues that smara in this case does not mean “memory,” but refers to some disposition on which sensory perception depends, i.e. attention, awareness, or mindfulness.
7 SN V198: katamā ca bhikkhave, satindriyaṃ? idha, bhikkhave, ariyasaccā, satimā hoti paramena satipekkena samannāgato cira katenā pi cira bhāsitaṃ pi saritā anussaratā, so kāye kāyānapassā vīharati, pe. vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhammesu dhammānapassātā vīharati atāpi sampajānā satimā vīneya loke abhijjhā-domanassaṃ. cf. MN I 356.
8 Sammāsati in the context of the Noble Eightfold Path is also defined as the four satipatthānas at MN III 252.
9 AN III 24: samādhiṃ bhikkhave bhāvayaṃ appanāṃ nipakānaṃ patissatinā pálico nāṇāni paccattāna yeva uppajjantī.
10 Mp III 231: nipākā patissatā ti nipakkena ca satiyā ca samannāgatā hutvā.
11 This will be discussed in Chapter 5, Section 2.1.
12 Dhamma here has been interpreted in two different ways. As discussed by Gethin (2001: 55, note 111) and von Rosspatt (1995: 203f., note 433), dhamma here is taken by the commentaries to indicate the conditions for the arising and vanishing of the body, while the subcommentaries allow that it can mean “nature” (jāti-dhamma) here. (I am grateful to Dr R.M.L. Gethin for the above references) Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1927, note 178) holds that it is more consistent with the use of the suffix -dhamma elsewhere to take it as meaning “subject to” or “having the nature of” here. Von Rosspatt also shares the same opinion. I agree with them.
13 e.g. MN I 56, 59, 60; SN V 183: samudaya-adhammānapassā (vā) kāyasminī vīharati, vayadhammānapassā (vā) kāyasminī vīharati; samudaya-vayadhammānapassā (vā) kāyasminī vīharati . . .
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14 e.g. MN I 56: ḍīgham vā assasanto: ḍīgham assasāmi ti pañjayati.
15 Saṇḍha, memory, is missing in Ee, but occurs in both CSCD and BJT. Since many words in this sentence also occur in an earlier paragraph of the same sutta (MN III 132), where we have sarasaṁkappānaṁ rather than just saṁkappānaṁ (thoughts), it is more coherent to also have sarasaṁkappānaṁ in this paragraph. This reading is supported by Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 995), who translate “memories and intentions” (saṁkappa can also mean “intention”).
16 Cousins (1992: 140) points out that saṁkappa arises dependent on saṁñā according to SN II 143ff. and MN II 27ff.
17 MN III 136: ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānā cetassu upanibandhanā hoti gehastūnā ti eva sīlānaṁ abhinimmadāya gehastūnaṁ ti eva sarasaṁkappānaṁ (BJT CSCD; sara is missing in Ee) abhinimmadāya . . .
18 Hayes (2000: 13) states: “‘Cognition’ is the general term which we give to mental activities, such as remembering, forming concepts, using language or attending to things.”
19 AN V 109 = MN I 57: imam eva kāyaṁ uddhām pāddatalā adho kesamattakā tacapariyantam pūram nāṇappakāraśa ascino papecakkhati . . .
20 Norman (2006: 55) points out that the way in which group of synonmys were used to explain or elaborate concepts suggests that texts of this type were composed and then transmitted orally.
21 Similarly at AN IV 145ff., AN II 150. I am grateful to Dr Alexander Wynne for the reference.
22 AN V 111.
23 This argument could agree with the Dhammasaṅgiṇī. Dhs §§1–364 shows that sati exists in various wholesome states of mind (kusala-citta). In the Abhidhammaṭṭhā-saṅgaha, sati is one of the nineteen mental factors (cetasika) common to beauty (sobhanaśādhāraṇa). Ven. Bodhi (1993: 85) explains that these nineteen mental factors are invariably present in all beautiful consciousness.
24 e.g. Dhs §§ 1–364 shows that saṁñā exists in various wholesome states of mind. Dhs §§ 365–427 shows that saṁñā exists in various unwholesome states of mind. Dhs §§ 431ff. shows that saṁñā exists in various indeterminate states of mind. In the Abhidhammaṭṭhā-saṅgaha, saṁñā is among the seven metal factors (cetasika) common to every consciousness (sahbacetasasādhāraṇa) (Bodhi 1993: 77).
25 As I 122: sati . . . thira-saṁñā-padaṭṭhānā.
26 I am grateful to Dr R.M.L. Gethin for his advice on this point. I have assimilated it in my discussion above.
27 Verses 768, 771, 855, 916, 933, 962, 964, 973, 974, 975.
28 Verses 792, 802, 841, 847, 874, 886.
29 MN I 108: yathāvādāti kho āvuso sadevake loke sammārake sabrahmake sas-samanabrāhmaṇāya pañjāya sadevaṃmaṇeṣuṣṭā na kenaci loke viggayha tīthiḥ, yathā ca pana kāmehi visamyoṣṭaṃ viharantaṃ tassu brahmaṇaṁ akathākathāṁ chinnakukkuccaṁ bhavābhava vitattaniyaṁ saṁñā nāmuṣenti, evaṃvādāti kho abhiṁ āvuso evamākkhāyati ti. cf. T 1, 603b.
30 Norman (1992: 133–134, 242) takes bhavābhava as a rhythmical lengthening for bhavabhava and translates it as “various existences.” But this fails to explain why rhythmical lengthening should occur in prose here in the Madhupiṇīdika Sutta. He (p. 242) also indicates that as an alternative the commentary Saddhammapajjotikā takes this compound as bhava+abhava. The counterpart of the Madhupiṇīdika Sutta in the Chinese Madhyama Āgama also translates it as “existence, non-existence,” (T 1, 603b: भवसम्भवः). It seems plausible to understand it as “existence, non-existence,” because craving is often said to be of three kinds (e.g. DN III 216, 275): craving for sensual pleasure (kāmataṁ), craving
X. One might suggest that what is referred to by the terms cakkhu, sota, ghāna and so on is not primarily the sense organs eye, ear, nose, etc., but that the terms are to be interpreted figuratively as the faculties of vision, hearing, smell and so on. The Kathāvāththu also criticizes the view that one sees with the physical organ eye. (Kv 573f.)

31 Sn 847; saññāviratassadu na santi gantā, paññāvimuttassadu na santi mohā. saññāna ca diññhi ca ye aggahasaṁ te ghaṭṭāyaṇāṁ vicarantī loke ti.
32 e.g. SN IV 208: tam evam dukkhāya vedānāya patighāṇasayo so amuteti. MN I 433: amuseti tv ev' assa sakkāyadiññihāmusayo.
33 MN I 109–110: yatidōnaṁ bhikkhu purisaṁ papañca-saññā-saṅkhā samudācaranti, etthā ce n' atthi abhinanditabbaṁ abhivaditabbaṁ ajjhositabbaṁ es' ev' anto rāgāṇusayaṁ or es' ev' anto patighāṇaysayaṁ or es' ev' anto diññhānuṣayaṁ or... es' ev' anto daṃḍāṇā-satthādāṇā-kalala-vigga-vivāda-tuvaṇanur-vasaṁ-nusaṁvādaṇāṁ.
34 Hamilton (1996: 18) says, “One might suggest that what is referred to by the terms cakkhu, sota, ghāna and so on is not primarily the sense organs eye, ear, nose, etc., but that the terms are to be interpreted figuratively as the faculties of vision, hearing, smell and so on.” The Kathāvāththu also criticizes the view that one sees with the physical organ eye. (Kv 573f.)
35 MN I 111–112: cakkhuṁ c' āvuso paṭiccā rūpe ca uppaṭijjata cakkhuvinīṇānaṁ, tiṇṇaṁ santati phasso, phassaṭṭhāṇya vēdanā, yaṁ vedeti tāṁ saṅjānāti, yaṁ saṅjānāti tāṁ vitakketi, yaṁ vitakketi tāṁ pāpaṇceti, yaṁ pāpaṇceti yatidōnaṁ purisaṁ papañca-saṅkhā-saṅkhā samudācaranti aṭṭhāṇagatapaccaśappāhānaṁ cakkhuvīṇēye rūpeṁ.
36 saññāvinīṇānaṁ hi papañcaśaṅkhāṁ.
37 na brāhmaṇo aṇṇato suddhim āhā diṣṭhe sute sīlavate mute vā.
38 MN I 388: sace kho paṁ sāna evaṁ diṣṭhe hoti: iminā 'ham śīlāṁ vā vatena vā tapena vā brhamačāryena vā devo vā bhavissāṁ devānātaro vā tī, sā 'ssa hoti michādiṭṭhi.
39 taṣāṅha diṣṭhe va sute mute vā pakappitā n' atthi aṇṇu pi sānāṁ.
40 The Mahānīdēsa interprets this verse thus: Na saṁhāsaṇīṁ means that he is not abiding in natural saṁhā. Na visāṇasāṇīṁ means that he is not deranged nor is his mind disturbed. No pi asāṇīṁ means that he is not one who has attained nirodha, nor is he a being without saṁhi. Na vibhūsāṇīṁ means that he is not one who achieves the four formless attainments. (Nidd I 279–280: na saṁhāsaṇīṁ na visāṇasāṇīṁ ti. saṁhāsaṇīṁ vuccanti ye pakattisaṁhāyā tiṁ, na pi so pakattisaṁhāyā tiṁ. visāṇasāṇīṁ vuccanti unmathakā ca ca khittacaturīcā, na pi so unmathakā, no pi khittacaitto ti, na saṁhāsaṇīṁ na visāṇasāṇīṁ. no pi asāṇīṁ na vibhūsāṇīṁ ti. asāṇīṁ vuccanti nirodhasaṁmānā ca ca asāṇāsattā, na pi so nirodhasaṁmānno, no pi asāṇāsatto, vibhūsāṇīṁ vuccanti ye catunnaṁ arūpa-saṁmāpattīnaṁ lābhino, na pi so catunnaṁ arūpa-saṁmāpattīnaṁ lābhino ti.)
This phrase kīhyati no paciyati has no subject. The commentary suggests suffering and defilement (Spk II 384: kīhyati ti khayam gacchati, kiṃ taṃ? dikkham pi kilesa-jātaṃ pi.). Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1177) chooses “suffering,” which I think is plausible because the next line has “for one who diminishes suffering” (apa-cinato dikkhaṃ). In addition, the first six verses have “for one who accumulates suffering” (ācinato dikkhaṃ), which appears to be in contrast with this phrase in the last six verses.

SN IV 73–75: imassa khvāḥan, bhante, bhagavatā saṅkhittena bhāsitassa vittihārena atthaṃ ajānāmi:

- rūpaṃ disvā sati maṭṭhā, piyānimittaṃ manaskaroto.
- sārattacitto vedeti, taḥ ca ajjhosa tiṭṭhati.
- tassa vaḍḍhanti vedanā anekā rūpasamihvāvā.
- abhijjāḥ ca vihescā ca cittam ās' īpahāññati (Ee āsu pahaññati; emendation according to Bodhi, 2000: 1411; CSCD assūpahaññati).

The original feeling is neutral as it is the mere reception of sensory data, while the secondary feeling is the subsequent subjective reaction to the original one, and is conditioned by saṅhā.

See Chapter 4.

As will be discussed in Section 3.1, feeling (vedanā) can be divided into the original feeling and the secondary feeling. Feeling in this formula refers only to the former. The original feeling is neutral as it is the mere reception of sensory data, while the secondary feeling is the subsequent subjective reaction to the original one, and is conditioned by saṅhā.

Sn 916: mūlaṃ papaśicasaṅkhāyā ti bhagavā mantā asmi ti sabham uparundhe.

Sn 916: yā kāci taṇhā ajjhattam, tāsaṃ vinayā sadā sato sikkhe.

AN IV 68–69: “hoti tathāgato param maranā” ti kho bhikkhu taṇhāgatam etam saṅhāgatam etam maṇiññanīma etam papaśicitam etam . . .


DN III 138, 139: yaḥ ca kho te evam āhamṣu “idam eva saccaṃ, mogham aṭṭhān ti” taṃ teṣeṣu nāmujāṇāmi. taṃ kissa hetu? aṭṭhāthā-saṅhāno pi h' ettha cunda sant' eke sattā.
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56 Luis O. Gómez (1976: 140) says, “Contrary to the customary insistence on ‘right views’ the *Aṭṭhakavagga* speaks of giving up all views.” But according to Sn 786 it seems that the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, just like other parts of the *Suttaπitaka*, only denounces metaphysical views widely held by the Buddha’s contemporary religions, and does not deny right view in the Noble Eightfold Path.

57 DN III 141: *imesaṁ ca, cunda,* *pubbantasahagatānaṁ diṭṭhīnissayānaṁ imesaṁ ca aparantataḥ sahagatānaṁ diṭṭhīnissayānaṁ paṭīnāyā samatikakāmaṁ evaṁ mayā catāro satipaṭṭhānā desāṁ paṭīnātā. katame catāro? idha, cunda, bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassi viharati āṭṭāī sampājāno satinā vinīyā loke abhiṣijjādhammānaṁ, vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dharmesu dharmānupassi viharati āṭṭāī sampājāno satinā, vinīyā loke abhiṣijjādhammānaṁ.

58 SN IV 232: *katamā ca, bhikkhave, chattīnusa vedanā? cha gehasītānī somanassāni, cha nekkhammasītānī somanassāni, cha gehasītānī domanassāni, cha nekkhammasītānī domanassāni, cha gehasītā upekkhā cha nekkhammasītā uppekkhā.*

59 The following translations are based on those of Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 1067–1070).

60 MN III 217: *tattha katamāni ca gehasītānī somanassāni? cakkhuviññeyyānaṁ rūpānaṁ iṭṭhānaṁ kantānaṁ manāpānaṁ manomānaṁ lokānīsapatiṣamitānāṁ yuttānaṁ paṭīlābhāṁ vā paṭīlābhāto samanupassato pubbe vā paṭīlādhāpubbaṁ atītāṁ niruddhaṁ viparītātāṁ samanussarato uppajjati somanassāṁ . . .

Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 1067ff.) translate nekkhamma as “renunciation.” PED (s.v. nekkhanna) takes this word as a derivation from nikkhamma (gerund of nikkhati), equivalent to Sanskrit *naiṣkramya*, and gives a meaning “renunciation.” On the other hand, PED suggests that nekkhanna may be a bastard derivation from nikkaṁa (= Sanskrit *naiṣkāmya*), which means “desireless,” but the form should be nekkhamma. In his discussion of this term, Gethin (2001: 192) argues: “[T]here appears to be no clear reason for thinking nekkhamma—as well as *nekkamma*—cannot stand for *naiṣkāmya*.” The Chinese translation is “absence of desire” (無欲 T 1, 692c–693b), which supports the latter etymological explanation. I am grateful to Dr Gethin for indicating to me the problems with this term.


63 MN III 218: *tattha katamāni ca gehasītānī domanassāni? cakkhuviññeyyānaṁ rūpānaṁ iṭṭhānaṁ kantānaṁ manāpānaṁ manomānaṁ lokānīsapatiṣamitānāṁ apattālābhāṁ vā apattālābhāto samanupassato pubbe vā apattālādhāpubbaṁ atītāṁ niruddhaṁ viparītātāṁ samanussarato uppajjati domanassāṁ . . .

64 MN III 218: *tattha katamāni ca nekkhammasītānī domanassāni? rūpānaṁ tv eva anticitatānaṁ viditvā viparīṇāmavārāṇagirodhaṁ, ‘pubbe c’ eva rūpā eva uparāhi ca saṁbhe te rūpā anticca dukkha viparīṇāmadhammaṁ⁴ ti evam ētuṣā yathābhūtuṁ saṁmappānaṁ divvā anuttaraṁ viṇīkhesu piham upāthāpeti—‘kudā sānā him ahum tad ayatanāṁ upasampajaṁ viharissiyaṁ yad ariyā eva uparāhi ayatanāṁ upasampajaṁ viharanti ti iti anuttaraṁ viṇīkhesu piham upāthāpayato uppajjati piṭhāpacayā domanassāṁ . . .

65 Nāṇamoli and Bodhi (1995: 1069) translate: “who has not conquered his limitations or conquered the results [of action].” They take -jīna as deriving from the root ji, “to conquer.” Norman (1992: 164), however, indicates that this case is possibly an example of the derivation of -jīna < jīva (“to know”). This makes much better sense of the sentence in question.

177
Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 40) holds a similar (although not the same) opinion:

MN III 221: (full text)

My italics throughout this passage.

P. Ekman, W.V. Friesen and P. Ellsworth identify seven emotions according to five investigators, with “interest” being added to the above six emotions. (Ekman, 1982: 42–43)

76 e.g. § 398 and § 420. Nyanaponika Thera (1983: 7) also says that the specific factors operative in emotion belong to the sankhārakkhandha.

Padmasiri de Silva (2005: 40) holds a similar (although not the same) opinion: “With the emergence of craving and grasping we discern the transition from the state of a feeling into the experience of an emotion.”

My italics throughout this passage.

MN III 221: tayo satipaṭṭhānā yad arīyo sevati yad arīyo sevamāno satthā gaṇam amuśāsītum arahati ti.

MN III 221: (1) (full text) idha, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakānaṁ dharmamāṇaṁ deseti anukampako hītesi anukampam paṭipāda: “idaṁ vo hitāya, idaṁ vo sukhāya” ti. tassa sūvakā na susissanti (BJT CSCD; Ee susissanti), na sotaṁ oddahanti, na anācīcittam upaṭṭhapenti, vokkamma ca satthu sāsanā vattanti. tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato na eva attamano (Ee BJT; CSCD anattamano) hoti, na ca attam-anatamo (Ee BJT; CSCD anattamano) purisamvedeti, anavassuto ca viharati sato sampaṭṭho. idaṁ, bhikkhave, pathamaṁ satipaṭṭhānāṁ yad arīyo sevati, yad arīyo sevamāno satthā gaṇam amuśāsītum arahati.
Notes

(2) Pana c' aparāṁ, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakānaṁ dhāmaṁ deseti anukampako hitiṁ anukampako upādāya: "idaṁ yo hitāya, idaṁ yo sukhāyāya" ti. tassa ekacce sāvakā na sussāsanti (BJT CSCD; Ee sussāyanti), na sotaṁ odahanti, ...; ekacce sāvakā sussāsanti (Ee sussāyanti), sotaṁ odahanti ... tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato c' eva attamano hoti, na ca attamanatam paṭissāmyeveti; na ca attamanatam hoti, na ca anattamanatam paṭissāmyeveti. attamanatā ca anattamanatā ca tad ubhayāṁ abhinivajjāya so upēkkhakko viharati sato sampajāno. idaṁ, bhikkhave, dutiyāṁ satipaṭṭhānāyam yad ... arahati.

(3) Pana c' aparāṁ, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakānaṁ dhāmaṁ deseti ... tassa sāvakā sussāsanti (BJT CSCD; Ee sussāyanti), sotaṁ odahanti ... tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato c' eva attamano hoti, tammanatā ca paṭissāmyeveti. anuvassu sato viharati sato sampajāno. idaṁ, bhikkhave, tatiyāṁ satipaṭṭhānāyam yad ... arahati.

81 However, the commentary of both CSCD and Ee supports the reading in Ee. Ps V 27: na c' eva: attamano ti na sakamano. etta ca gahaṭtado manassavasena aparāṭho hoti ti na eva atta ṭṭaṭhappabo. aparāṭhamakkisa pana attamanatākaraṇaṁ abhāven etaṁ vuttaṁ.

82 SN I 111: hitānukampī sambuddho yaṁ aññānaṁ anussāsati anurodhavirodhehi vippanutto tathāgato ti.

83 विकार ("doing nothing") might be a synonym of अनुक्रम ("equanimous"). विकार is a standard translation for अपेक्षित (noun) or अपेक्षित (adjective), but it can also mean "to give up," "to abandon." Upekṣhā is a state in which one does not react emotionally to whatever is sensed. In other words, one does not emotionally do anything with the object.

84 T 1, 693c–694a: (1) If murāsīya didacca isāvaṁ, paṭheta sānaṁ, satthā sāvakā na sussāsanti: "idaṁ yo hitāya, idaṁ yo sukhāyāya" ti. tassa ekacce sāvakā na sussāsanti (BJT CSCD; Ee sussāyanti). sotaṁ odahanti, tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato c' eva attamano hoti, na ca attamanatam paṭissāmyeveti; na ca attamanatam hoti, na ca anattamanatam paṭissāmyeveti. attamanatā ca anattamanatā ca tad ubhayāṁ abhinivajjāya so upēkkhakko viharati sato sampajāno. idaṁ, bhikkhave, dutiyāṁ satipaṭṭhānāyam yad ... arahati.

85 Pana c' aparāṁ, bhikkhave, satthā sāvakānaṁ dhāmaṁ deseti ... tassa sāvakā sussāsanti (BJT CSCD; Ee sussāyanti), sotaṁ odahanti ... tatra, bhikkhave, tathāgato c' eva attamano hoti, tammanatā ca paṭissāmyeveti. anuvassu sato viharati sato sampajāno. idaṁ, bhikkhave, tatiyāṁ satipaṭṭhānāyam yad ... arahati.
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upeksakas tatra tathāgato viharati smentah samprajñānā. idam dityaṃ smṛtyupasthānam yad āryaḥ sevate yad āryaḥ sevāmāno ṛhati ganām amūsāyitum. (3) punar aparām bhiksāvā yāvāc chāsane tatra tathāgatasya na nāndi bhavati na saamanmaṣyam na cetasu utplāviṣitatvan. nāvāhā naśoṣāntir nāṃpratayo na cetaso ‘nabhirāddihī, upeksakas tatra tathāgato viharati smentah samprajñānā. idam tṛṣṇyaṃ smṛtyupasthānam yad āryaḥ sevate yad āryaḥ sevāmāno ṛhati ganām amūsāyitum iti.

86 T 27, 160b: ...The order of the first four items is different. Its order is (2), (1), (4), (3).

87 T 25, 91b: ...The order of the first four items is different. Its order is (2), (1), (4), (3).

88 Hamilton (1996: 61) says, “We also read of conceptual activity of sāṁskāra as concept being deliberately used, ...” to give names to things or concepts in a way which conduces to subsequent ‘right thinking’.” The Patissambhidānāgga gives an example for passage B (quoted from Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1359): “To abide perceiving the repulsive in the unrepulsive, one pervades a (sensually) attractive person with the idea of the foulness of the body.” Many people may apperceive this person as attractive. This apperception of “the agreeable” is not deliberate, but an involuntary or habitual reaction of ordinary people. It is subjective, connected with the sense of “I am”, which is the root of pāpaṃcā-saṅkhyā as stated in Sn 916. In contrast, pervading this person with the idea of the
foulness of the body is forming a deliberate conception for the purpose of meditative training, in order to counteract the apperception of attractiveness, which may give rise to some emotions and to karma.

93 SN V 296: ettāvatā kho āvaso bhikkhuno catāro satipaṭṭhāṇā āraddhā honī tī.
95 SN IV 211–212: tassa ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno evam satassa sampajānasassa uppannatassassa atāpino pahītattassa viharato uppajjati sukkhā vedanā, so evam pajānati: ‘uppannā kho me ayaṁ sukkhā vedanā. sā ca kho paṭicca, no appaṭicca. kim paṭicca? imaṁ eva kāyaṁ paṭicca. ayaṁ kho pana kāya anticca sammakho paṭiccasaṁuppampanno, aniccaṁ kho pana saṅkhataṁ paṭiccasamuppampanno kāyaṁ paṭicca uppannā sukkhā vedanā kato nīcā bhavissatī tī. so kāye ca sukkhāya ca vedanāya aniccānuppāsī viharati, vayaṁnappāsī viharati, virāgānuppāsī viharati, nirodhanuppāsī viharati, paṭinissagganuppāsī viharati. tassa kāye ca sukkhāya ca vedanāya aniccānuppāsino viharato, vayaṁnappāsino viharato, virāgānuppāsino viharato, nirodhanuppāsino viharato, paṭinissagganuppāsino viharato, yo kāye ca sukkhāya ca vedanāya rāgānusayo, so paṭihātī.
96 DN II 277–279: “kathām paṭipanno pana, mārīsa, bhikkhu papañcasīnaṁ satīkhā-nirodha-sāruppa-gāminī-paṭipado paṭipanno hoṁ ti?” “somanassam p’ ahaṁ, devānāṁ inda, duvidhena vaddiṁ, sevitabbaṁ pī, asevitabbaṁ pī, domanassam p’ ahaṁ, devānāṁ inda, duvidhena vaddiṁ, sevitabbaṁ pī, asevitabbaṁ pī. upekkhāṁ p’ ahaṁ, devānāṁ inda, duvidhena vaddiṁ, sevitabbaṁ pī, asevitabbaṁ pī. somanassam p’ ahaṁ, devānāṁ inda, duvidhena vaddiṁ, sevitabbaṁ pī, asevitabbaṁ pī. atthā se pī ti iti kho pan’ etāṁ vuttaṁ, kiṁ c’ etāṁ paṭicca vuttaṁ? tattha yāṁ jānāṁ somanassāṁ: imaṁ kho me sonanassam sevato akusāla dhammā abhivadhitthi, kusalā dhammā parihāyantī ti, evarrūpam somanassam na sevitabbaṁ, tattha yāṁ jānāṁ somanassāṁ: imaṁ kho me sonanassam sevato akusāla dhammā parihāyantī, kusala dhammā abhivadhitthi ti, evarrūpam somanassam sevitabbaṁ. tattha yāṁ ca evacitakkaṁ saviccaraṁ, yaṁ ca avitakkaṁ aviccaraṁ, ye avitakke avicayē se paṭitātare. somanassam p’ ahaṁ, devānāṁ inda, duvidhena vaddiṁ sevitabbaṁ pī, asevitabbaṁ pī ti iti yan’ etāṁ vuttaṁ, idam etāṁ paṭicca vuttaṁ... domanassam... upekkhāmann...”
97 e.g. MN I 21–22, 181–182. The formula is included in the citation from SN V 213–215 in the note below.
98 I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for this reference.
99 SN V 213–215: idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno virocce’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṁ saviccaraṁ vivekaṁ pittakkoṁ paṭhamanā jhānaṁ upasampajjā viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṁ (uppannaṁ in Ee, BJT and CSCD) dukkhadīpīṁ aparisesam nirajjhatī... idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vitakkaviccharanāṁ vīpasamā ahi jhattharaṁ sampāsādanaṁ cetaso ekodhāyam avitakkaṁ aviccaraṁ sansābhiyāṁ pīṭhakkoṁ dāriyaṁ jhānaṁ upasampajjā viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṁ domanassindriyaṁ aparisesam nirajjhatī... idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu pīṭhā ca virāga upekkhako ca viharati sato ca sampajjana sukkhaṁ ca kāye paṭisayavedeti yāṁ taṁ ariyā acikkhatī ‘upekkhako satīma sukkhavārī’ ti tattaviṁ jhānaṁ upasampajjā viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṁ sukhibhāvī aparisesam nirajjhatī... idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukkhaja ca paṭahāṁ dukkhassa ca paṭahāṁ pabb’ eva somanassadomanassānaṁ atithagama adukkhasuksamukko upekkhāsatiṭṭhuddhīṁ catattuṁ jhānaṁ upasampajjā viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṁ somanassindriyaṁ aparisesam nirajjhatī... idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukkhassa ca paṭahāṁ dukkhassa ca paṭahāṁ pabb’ eva somanassadomanassānaṁ atithagama adukkhasuksamukko upekkhāsatiṭṭhuddhīṁ catattuṁ jhānaṁ upasampajjā viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṁ somanassindriyaṁ aparisesam nirajjhatī... idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sabbaṁ nevasaṁthānaṁ saṅkhāreyatissananiruddhaṁ upasampajjā viharati, ettha c’ uppannaṁ upekkhādīpīṁ aparisesam nirajjhatī.
NOTES


101 e.g. Vism 161. Here jhānupekkhā refers to the uppekkhā of the third jhāna, and pārisuddhupekkhā refers to the uppekkhā of the fourth jhāna. Both are said to be the same as tatramajjhättupekkhā.


104 T 28, 979b: 意根初靜滅無餘，意根二靜滅無餘。意根三靜滅無餘。樂根四靜滅無餘。


106 Here the pain faculty and the second jhāna are not mentioned.

107 T 2, 123b: “As Bhagavat says thus in the Avipariñña Sutta."

108 The following arguments on feelings are mainly cited from Kuan (2005b) with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.

109 Although worldly liberation (vimokkha) and unworldly liberation, etc. are also discussed in this text, they are treated in a different way and cannot be seen as feelings.

110 T 28, 312 a, b: "喜受依易。Both prṛti and saumanassya (somanassa) are translated as 喜, but they can be distinguished from the contexts.

111 This probably means “even more unworldly” as uppekkhā in the fourth jhāna refers to freedom from disturbances of both emotion and sensation, while uppekkhā in the third jhāna refers to freedom from emotional disturbances only.

112 T 2, 123b: "云何無食捨？謂比丘離喜食，捨心，住正念正知，安樂往彼聖說捨。是名無食捨。云何無食無食捨？謂比丘離苦思惟樂，憂先已離，不苦不樂，捨，靜念，一心，第四靜處足住。是名無食無食捨.

113 The commentary on the Majjhima Nikāya takes pārisuddhi (purity) to apply to both uppekkhā and sati: “Purity of mindfulness means pure mindfulness. Equanimity is also pure equanimity.” (Ps IV 90; satipārisuddhi ti parisuddhā sati yeva. uppekkhā pi parisuddhā uppekkhā). The Sarvāstivādins also say that the fourth dhyāna consists of four factors, including purity of equanimity (upekkhāpārisuddhi) and purity of mindfulness (satipārisuddhi). See the *Mahāvibhāga (T 27, 412a) and Ak-P 438. Accordingly, uppekkhāsatipārisuddhi should be translated as “purity of equanimity and of mindfulness.” This seems plausible since both sati and uppekkhā are mentioned in the third jhāna, and thus the term uppekkhāsatipārisuddhi might be intended to indicate that these two factors are both further elevated, or “purer.” In the fourth jhāna, however, the Vibhaṅga, a Theravāda Abhidhamma work, regards uppekkhā as the cause of satipārisuddhi: “By this equanimity, this mindfulness is uncovered as pure and clean. Therefore this is called uppekkhāsatipārisuddhi” (Vibh 261: ayaṃ sati imāya uppekkhāya vivaṭṭaḥ hoti parisuddhā pariyojātā. tena vuccati uppekkhāsatipārisuddhī ti).

114 Referring to the Uppatipāṭika Sutta, Cousins (1973: 125 and note 78) says: “In fact by the time the fourth jhāna is reached, physical pleasure, as well as both pleasant and unpleasant emotion, have been gradually eliminated.”

115 Quoted from Barnes, 1976: 172 and 175.

116 e.g. MN 4, 27, 39, 51. Other knowledges are added to the three knowledges in some texts, e.g. DN 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10.
I am indebted to Professor Peter Harvey for this idea.
NOTES

8 In these two passages anusavanti and anāsāveyyuṃ (flow in, flow upon) are used only in a figurative sense.
9 As I 122: cakkha-vuḍādī-rukkhaṇato dovārīko viya ca dattabho. Another simile comparing satī to a gatekeeper is found at AN IV 111.
10 SN IV 200: seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, puriso chappānake gahetvā nānāvisaye nānāgocare daṁñhya rajjaya bandheyya . . . đāhe kihle và thambhe và upanih- andheyya. atha kho te, bhikkhave, chappānka nānāvisayā nānāgocarā sakān sakān gocharavisayā avichayyā . . . yudd kho te, bhikkhave, chappānka jhättā assu kilantā, atha taṃ eva kihle và thambhe và upatīṭheyyaṃ, upanisīdeyyaṃ, upanipajiyyaṃ, evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci bhikkhuno kāygatā sati bhāvīta bahullakāta, taṃ cakkhunā nāvīchhati manaṅpiyesu rūpesu, amanāpiya rūpā na pāṭikāla honti . . . evam kho, bhikkhave, samvaro hoti. “đāhe kihle và thambhe và” ti kho, bhikkhave, kāygatāya satiyā etam adhivacanam.
11 e.g. SN IV 119–120, 184–186.
12 e.g. MN I 85.
13 A similar expression is found in the Cullaniddesa (p. 272): “Here someone sees a beautiful woman or girl. Having seen her he grasps at the sign in detail (anubyañjanaso nimittaṃ gatihi): ‘beautiful hair, beautiful mouth . . . ’.”
14 This is translated from saṅghāti-patta-cīvara-dhārane in the Pali Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN I 57). Saṅghāti refers to the upper robe of a Buddhist monk (CPED s.v. saṅghāṭi). Dhārana derives from dhāreti, which can mean “to carry” or “to wear” (PED s.v. dhāreti). Ven. Nānāmoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 147) translate saṅghāti-patta-cīvara-dhārane as “when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl.” But PED (s.v. cīvra) states: “In starting on his begging round the bhikkhu goes patta-cīvaram ādāya, that is literally ‘taking his bowl & robe.’ But this is an elliptical idiom meaning ‘putting on his outer robe and taking his bowl.’ A bhikkhu never goes into a village without wearing all his robes, he never takes them, or any one of the three, with him.”
15 e.g. MN I 57, SN V 142: abhikkante pāṭikkante sampajānakārī hoti, ālokite vilokite sampajānakārī hoti, sammāñjite pāsātite sampajānakārī hoti, saṅghātipata-cīvaradhāranī sampajānakārī hoti, asite pite khāyite sāyite sampajānakārī hoti, uccārapassāvakamme sampajānakārī hoti, gate tīthe nīsinne sattā jāgaretā bhāsīte tuṇḍhībhāve sampajānakārī hoti.
16 e.g. DN I 70; MN I 181, 269, 274.
17 He is said to have flourished around 50 BC to AD 100 by Johnston (1936: xvii), and around AD 100 by B. Bhattacharya (1976: 14–20).
18 The text does not give any particular heading to this section, but the topic can be inferred from the context (Saun XIII 30–XIV 45), where the four virtues Nanda possesses as stated at AN IV 166–168 are elaborated, the last virtue being mindfulness and full awareness.
19 Saun XIV 35 (p. 100): athāsānagatathānāpanakṣitavāhyātārādu samparajānaṃ kriyāḥ sarvāḥ nṛṣṭāṁ adhatāṁ arthas.
20 Ven. Anālayo (2003: 143–144) indicates that several of the activities listed in this formula occur as a set elsewhere in the suttas in the context of instructions given to monks regarding proper behaviour (e.g. MN I 460; AN II 123–124). These instances, however, make no mention of samparajāna.
21 Translated from caṇḍakaṃṇa adhiṭṭhāti. Ee gives another reading kaṇḍamaṃ adhiṭṭhāti, “performs action.”
22 AN III 325: idam pi chaṭṭham anussatīṭhānaṃ dhārehi. idh’ ānanda, bhikkhu sato va abhikkamati, sato va pāṭikkamati, sato va tiṭṭhī, sato va niṣidhā, sato va seyyāṃ kappeti, sato caṇḍakaṃṇa (va caṇḍamaṇa) adhiṭṭhāti, idam, ānanda, anussatīṭhānaṃ evam bhāvītaṃ evam bahullakataṃ satissamparajāṇāya samvatārā ti.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the same discourses given by the Buddha may have been memorised by different disciples in different ways, and recorded in different words or arrangements by the compilers. During this process, deviations and errors could have occurred due to lapses of memory or for other reasons. Therefore, comparing passages of different versions with standard accounts may help to clarify the meanings of these passages, or it may help to identify possible mistakes and rectify them.

Sampājāna is explained by the sati-sampājāna formula in sutta 2 of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, and by passage C in sutta 35 as mentioned before. It is noteworthy that these two texts are both entitled “Sāto,” and both explain sato and sampājāna.

As mentioned in Chapter I, dejection (domanassa) is a secondary feeling conditioned by cognition.

40 MN II 260: vano ti kho, suṇakkhatta, chaṃ' etam ajjhātikānāṃ āyatanānāṃ adhivacanam; visadiso ti kho, suṇakkhatta, avijjā' etam adhivacanam; sallān ti kho, suṇakkhatta, taṇhā' etam adhivacanam; esaññi ti kho, suṇakkhatta, satiṣyā' etam adhivacanam.

41 Horner (1964: 50f.) translates apilāpata as “not wobbling,” and its verbal form apilāpata “does not wobble.” Part of this account is quoted in the Āthasālīṇī, where apilāpata is translated by Maung Tin (1958: 160) as “not floating away.” As Norman (1988: 50) points out, other texts, even though they quote Mil (e.g. As 121 and Ps I 83), take this to be from plāvati, “to swim, float,” and explain sati as being “non-floating.” Gethin (2001: 38) suggests that this could be a misunderstanding or reinterpretation. Norman (1988: 51) indicates that apilāpeta, the causative of apilāpati, means “to cause to be recited, to enumerate” and then “to remind someone of something by enumerating it to them.”

42 Mil 37–38: (1) sati, mahārāja, uppaṭijānāṃ kusalākāsala-sāvajjānavajja hinaṇṇātha kanṭhasukka- sappatiḥbāga-dhamme apilāpeta “ime cattāro satipaṭṭhānaṁ, ime cattāro sammappadānaṁ, ime cattāro iddhipādā, imāni pañc’ indriyāni, imāni pañc’ āsava bhālāni, ime satta bojjanāgāya, āyaṃ arjio ājjanīkoggo maggo, āyaṃ samatho, āyaṃ vipassanā, āyaṃ vijā, āyaṃ vimuttaḥ” ti tato yogāvacaro sevitabbe dhamme sevati, asevitabbe dhamme na sevati. bhajitabbe dhamme bhajati abhajitabbe dhamme na bhajati. evam kho, mahārāja, apilāpapālakkaṁ sati ti . . .
(2) sati, mahārāja, uppaṭijānāṁ hitāhitānaṁ dhammadhammaṁ gatiyo samannesaṭi: “ime dhāṁmā hitā, ime dhāṁmā abhitā, ime dhāṁmā upakārā, ime dhāṁmā apamokā” ti tato yogāvacaro abithe dhamme apamudeti, hīte dhamme upagāhāti, anupakārā dhamme apamudeti, upakāre dhamme upagāhāti. evam kho, mahārāja, upagāhālakkaṁ sati ti.

43 This includes the cases where the verbal form anussaratī, rather than anusassati, is used. There are a few occurrences of a fivefold series, which is largely the same as the sixfold with one item missing, e.g. at AN I 207–211, where cūpī is omitted, and at AN V 335–337, where sangha is replaced by kalyāṇamitta and sīla is missing.

44 e.g. DN III 250, 280; AN III 284ff., 312ff., 452, V 329ff. cf. Lamotte (1970: 1329).

45 Only at AN I 30, 42 according to Lamotte (1970: 1329).


48 e.g. AN III 287: yathārāpaya saddhāya saṁmattātā devatā īto cuta tattha upapanṇā, mayham pi tathārāpā saddhā sañvijja... satīna... satīna... cāgana... paṭiḥāya...
I have checked all the references to these two terms given in PED and in the indexes to the four principal Nikāyas.

54 Sn 149–151 = Khp 8: mātā yathā niyam puttam āyusā ekapat tam anarākkhe, evam pi sabbahātesa mānasam bhāvaye aparimānaṃ mettaṃ ca sabbalokasaṃ. mānasam bhāvaye aparimānaṃ uddhāṃ adho ca tiriyaṃ ca asambhādham averam asapatam. tiṃṭham caraṃ nisino vā sayāno yāvāt’ assa vigatamiddho etoṃ satīn adhitthiyya, brahmam etoṃ vihāraṃ idha-n-āhu.

55 Sn 147: diṭṭhaṃ vā ye vā aditthā . . . bhūtāṃ vā sambhavesī vā—sabbe satīa bhavantu sukhitattā.

56 SN V 169: “so tathā nāyō” ti bhagavā avoca. “yathā medakathākā antevāśi ācariyaṃ avoca. attānaṃ, bhikkhave, rakkhissāni ti satipaṭṭhānam sevitabbā. paraṃ rakkhissāni (BJT, CSCD; Ee rakkhissamā) ti satipaṭṭhānam sevitabbā. attānaṃ, bhikkhave, rakkhante paraṃ rakkhati, paraṃ rakkhante attānaṃ rakkhati. kathāca, bhikkhave, attānaṃ rakkhante paraṃ rakkhati? āśeṇāya, bhāvanāya, bahullakkhēna—even kho, bhikkhave, attānaṃ rakkhante paraṃ rakkhati. kathāca, bhikkhave, paraṃ rakkhante attānaṃ rakkhati? khanṭiyā, avihīṇāya, mettātiyā, anubhāvyā”.

3 MINDFULNESS IN METHODICAL MEDITATION

1 SN IV 194–195.
2 AN I 43, MN III 94: yassa kassaci kāyaagatāsati bhāvītā bahuhīkatā, anto gahā tassa kusalā dhammā ye keci vijīabhāgīyā.
3 At AN III 334 and SN V 345 there are six wholesome states conducive to gnosis, which refer to six saṁhās, namely anicca samathā, anice dakkhasathā, dakkhā anattassathā, pahānasathā, virágasathā, and nirodhasathā. These six can be regarded as belonging to vipassanā.
4 I have checked all the references to these two terms given in PED and in the indexes to the four principal Nikāyas.
5 santo so bhagavā samathāya dhamman sameti.
6 Silasampadā, cittasampadā and paññāsampadā expounded in the Kassapapathānāda Sutta (DN I 171–174) refer to the same as silakkhandha, samādhi khandha and paññākkhandha in the Sūlu Sutta (DN I 206–208).
7 Adhitthassakkha, adhitissassakkha and adhipaṭṭassakkha that recur in the Nikāyas (e.g. AN I 229ff., DN III 219) also refer to the same as silakkhandha, samādhi khandha and paññākkhandha. As Buddhaghosa indicates in his Visuddhi magga (p. 4), these three trainings (sikkha) are shown by sīla, samādhi and paññā respectively.
9 MN I 56, SN V 183: samudayadhammanupassī (vā) kāyasmiṃ viharati, vayadhammanupassī (vā) kāyasmiṃ viharati, samudayavayadhammanupassī (vā) kāyasmiṃ viharati.
10 Paṭis II 236–237.
27 AN III 285ff., V 329ff.: (P1)

26 See Chapter 4, Section 1.1.

31 Vism 212:

30 Vism 212:

32 SN V 156:

22 e.g. MN I 181, 274:

21 MN I 273–274:

20 e.g. MN I 273–275.

19 e.g. MN I 180–181, 269.

18 e.g. DN I 70–71, 172, 207.

17 MN I 301: cattāro satipaṭṭhānā samādhanītā. I am grateful to Dr Alexander Wynne for this reference.

16 e.g. DN II 265; AN IV 410.

15 e.g. DN I 301: yo ca samamāyāyāma yā ca sammāsati yo ca sammāsamādhī ime dhammā samādhiṭṭhakhandhe saṅghuttā.

14 DN III 279, AN III 24: so kho panāhaṁ imaṁ samādhiṁ sato 'va samāpajjāmi, sato 'va vuttaḥkāmī ti.


12 e.g. MN I 56; SN V 143, 297.

11 e.g. Vin I 14, MN I 138–139, SN II 124–125.

NOTES
33 Spk III 205: *kismiti cid eva pasādanīye* pasādāvahe buddhādūsā anātarāsminiṁ thāne kanmatthānacittam thapetabbaṁ.

34 e.g. MN I 37–38: 38 Vetter (2000: 26) says, “In compounds such as MN I 207–209.

35 MN I 37–38: 34 e.g. SN II 69–70, V 343; DN II 93–94.

36 AN I 3: *Ānacentassa, anuppannaṁ eva thānaṁ dhāraṇī* anupajjati anuppanña ca thānaṁ dhāraṇī bhiyobbhāvāya vepulāya samvattati ti.

37 SN V 64–65, 103: *atthi, bhikkhave, arati tādi vijambhitā bhattasamamado cetaso ca ānattaṁ, tatttha ayoniṣomanaśikāraṇabhāvāyikāya āryam āhāro anuppannassa vā thānaṁdhāraṇāya uppaḍāya, uppannassa vā thānaṁdhāraṇāya bhiyobbhāvāya vepulāya.

38 Vetter (2000: 26) says, “In compounds such as marañsāsāṁha, aniccasāsāṁha, etc., saṁthā can be translated as ‘contemplation’.” I agree with him, and suggest that this also applies to our cases.

39 Sv III 1019: *saṁmādhiṁnītittam vaccaṁ atthikasenānādibhavāna adhīgato saṁmādhiyeva.*

40 Vism 193: *asubhāni subhagūṇo dasatasalocanena thutakitti yāni avoca dasavalaba ekakājānyānetti (VH; Ee *hetunī*) This verse is also found in the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgāṇi (As 198). Therefore it could have come from the old atthahatthāṁ in Singhalāse (LSC).

41 Vism 194: *yasmaṁ pana dasavrīde pi etasmiṁ asubhe... tasmaṁ paṁhamajjhānam ev’tthā hoti, na dutiyaṁti.*

42 SN V 150–152: *tassa kāye kāyānupassino viharato cittaṁ na samādhyāyati, upakkilesaṁ na pahiyantti, so taṁ nimittam na uggahāti, vedanāsu... citte... dhāmanesu dhammānupassī viharatī atāpī sampajāṇo satimā, vineyya loke abhiñjādamanassam, tassa dhammesu dhammānupassino viharato cittaṁ na samādhyāyati, upakkilesas na pahiyantti, so taṁ nimittam na uggahāti, sa kho so, bhikkhave, bālo avayoto akusala bhikkhu na eva ākkhī ḍhittī va dharmānubhāranānaṁ, na lābhī satisampajāhāslassaṁ, taṁ kisaṁ hetuṁ taṁ thāhi hi so, bhikkhave, bālo avayoto akusala bhikkhu sakasaṁ cittaṁ nimittam na uggahāti... iḥi ekacchipāṇḍito vyatto kusalo bhikkhu kāye kāyānupassī viharatī...\* 43 e.g. MN I 357: *catunnaṁ jhānānaṁ... dīṭṭhādhammasukhāvihārānaṁ.* See also MN I 40–41.

44 MN I 207–209.

45 MN III 157: *iddhi mayam, bhante, appamattā ātāpino paḥtatū vijāranti obhāsaṁ eva saṁjñāṇanaṁ dassanaṁ ca riṣṇānaṁ, so kho pana no obhāso na ciraśe eva antaradāhyāti dassanaṁ ca rūpaṁnaṁ, taṁ ca nimittam na paṭivijāhānaṁ ti.*

46 T. 1, 536c: "此等不達此相." 47 e.g. MN III 161: *yasmim kho ahaṁ samaye rūpaṁnītittam anasaṅkarītvā obhāsanītittam manasaṅkarōmi, obhāsaṁ hi kho taṁ samaye saṁjñāṇaṁ, na ca rūpāṁnaṁ passāmi. “On that occasion when I do not attend to the sign of forms but attend to the sign of radiance, then I conceive the radiance but do not see forms.” The Chinese version (T 1, 539a) also has “the sign of forms” 色相 (*rūpa-nimitta*) and “the sign of radiance” 光明相 (*avabhāsa-nimitta*).

48 MN III 157–160: *aham pi sudam, anaruddhā, pubbe va sambodhā anabhisambuddho bodhisattvo va samāno obhāsaṁ eva saṁjñāṇaṁ dassanaṁ ca rūpānaṁ, so kho pana me obhāso na ciraśe eva antaradāhyāti dassanaṁ ca rūpānaṁ... tassa mayham, anaruddhā, etad aho: vickicchā kho me udapādi, vickicchādākāriyam ca pana me samādhi cavi. saṁmādhiṁhi cute obhāso antaradāhyāti dassanaṁ ca rūpānaṁ..."
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... amanasikāro kho me udapādi ... vicikchā cittassa upakkileso ti ... amanasikāro cittassa upakkileso ti ...
49 e.g. the twenty-four suttas in the Anuruddha Samyutta of SN are all concerned with the four satipaṭṭhānas.
50 e.g. SN II 212–214 and 216–217; DN III 281.
51 In the Silakkhandha Vagga of the Dīgha Nikāya (vol. I), these six are achieved after attaining the four jhānas. In the Majjhima Nikāya (e.g. nos. 4, 27, 39, 51) the same is said of the three gnoses (vījāyā, or called three knowledges (nīn̄āta).
52 “Sign” is the standard translation of nīn̄āta, but its meaning is ambiguous. Nīn̄āta may refer to any phenomenon which is made an object of concentration. (RFG)
53 Vism 125: tass’ evam karontassa anukkamena nīvāraṇāni vikkhambhanti, kileśa sammiddhānti, upācārasamādhānāni cittām samādhīyati, paṭibhāgānīmittam upajāti.
54 At AN V 134–135, the Buddha says, “Sound is a thorn for the first jhāna; vitakka is a thorn for the second jhāna; breathing-in-and-out is a thorn for the fourth jhāna.” (cf. SN IV 217) The Abhidhamma (Kv XVIII 8, p. 572f.) infers from this passage that the five senses do not work in the jhānas. However, MN I 293 and AN IV 426–427 suggest that the first three formless attainments are to be perceived by a mind free from the functioning of the five senses, but make no mention of the jhānas.
55 MN III 136: (A) so ime pānca nīvāraṇā paññāya cetasosu upakkilese paññāya dubbarāne kāye kāyānupassī viharati ātāpi sampaṭṭhāno satimā vinayya loke abhiṣīhādo-muṇassaṃ, vedanāsu pe citte ... dhāmmente (BJT; Ee dhām menace) dhammanupassī viharati ātāpi sampaṭṭhāno satimā vinayya loke abhiṣīhādowanassam.
56 (B) seyyathāpi, aggivissana, hatthidamako mahānantam thambhāṃ paṭhiyiyam nikhanīvāārāṅnakassa nāgassa gīvāya upanibhandhati āraṅṇakānañci eva sīlānaṁ abhinimmañadānaṁ āraṅṇakānañci eva sarasaṅkappānañci (BJT; CSCD; Ee omits sara) abhinimmañadānaṁ āraṅṇakānañci eva darathakilamathaparipañhānaṁ abhinimmañadānaṁ gāmante abhiramāpanaćaṃ manussakacani silesu samādanaṇaya, evam eva kho, aggivessana, ariyāsavakassā ime catūro satipaṭṭhāna cetasosu upanibhandhānti hoti gehasitānañci eva sīlānaṁ abhinimmañadānaṁ gehastānañci eva sarasaṅkappānañci (BJT; CSCD; Ee omits sara) abhinimmañadānaṁ gehastānañci eva darathakilamathaparipañhānaṁ abhinimmañadānaṁ nāyassa adhiṣṭhānaṁ nibbānassa sacchikiriyāy.
57 (C) tam evam tathāgato uttarim vineti: eti tvam, bhikkhu, kāye kāyānupassī viharāhi mā ca kāyāpasaṅghitaṁ vitakkaṁ vitakke, vedanāsu vedanāpussi viharāhi mā ca vedenāpanaṁhitam vitakkaṁ vitakke, citte cittanupassī viharāhi mā ca cittapaṅgaṁhitam vitakkaṁ vitakke, dhammese dhammanupassī viharāhi mā ca dhammapaṅgaṁhitam vitakkaṁ vitakke ti.
58 e.g. MN I 181, 270.
59 As mentioned in Chapter 1, anupassim (contemplating) is often synonymous with saḥīhāntā.
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61 e.g. MN I 182: bhikkhu sukhasa ca pahānā dukkhasa ca pahānā, pubbe va samanassadomanassānaṃ arthatagamā, adukkham asukham upakkhasatipārissudhiṃ catuttham jhānaṃ upasamajja viharati.

62 MSA 143: smṛtiḥ samprajyaṃ ca upanibandhakāḥ ekena cittasyālambanā- visrātādvītyena visartraprajhātā.

63 Here dāmbhana ("object") refers to the meditation object since it is in the context of discussing the fourfold base for supernatural power (ādhipāda), which is said to be based on dhyānaṃ ("Pali jhāna"). See MSA 142 (verse 52): dhyānapāramiṃ aṣṭītya prabheda hi caturvādhah. . . The Chinese translation, although not very accurate, makes this point very clear: "Due to mindfulness, the mind in a state of concentration (*samādhi) is not separate from the object." (T 31, 643c: 由正念故心於定中不離所緣。

64 Paṭis-a II 478–479: upanibandhāti etāya ārammane cittan ti upanibandhānaṁ nāma sati.

65 Paṭis-a II 478: nimmattabhuṭam kāraṇabhūtaṃ nāsikaggaṃ vā mukhanimittaṃ vā.

66 e.g. SN V 323–324, MN III 83–85.

67 In my opinion, it is more likely that the Kāyagatāsati Sutta, on which the (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is based, borrowed the first four exercises from the scheme of sixteen exercises, because this text is, to a great extent, a late composite of extracts from other contexts. See Chapter 4.

68 e.g. MN I 425; AN V 111–112; Vin III 70–71.

69 MN I 56, DN II 291; T 1, 582c.

70 MN III 89; T, 555b.

71 Paṭisamvedi (nominative singular of paṭisamvedin) is derived from paṭisamvedeti, which can mean "to feel, experience, perceive" (PED s.v. paṭisamvedeti). Examples of paṭisamvedeti meaning "to perceive" can be found at DN II 336f. and AN IV 427. Bodhi (2000: 1765ff.) translates "experiencing." I translate "perceiving" for the following reasons. Firstly, in the Sanyukta Agama the word equivalent to paṭisamvedi is translated as "being aware, knowing" (覺知), e.g., T 2, 206, 208). The great translator Xuanzang also translates a similar term "覺了" in his translation of the Śrīvacakhaṇī (T 30, 432f.). Secondly, to translate citta-paṭisamvedi in the third tetrad as "experiencing mind" does not make good sense. Lastly, one may argue that one can experience something without noticing it. But in our case, one must be aware of those objects described in this practice of mindfulness.

72 e.g. SN V 323, MN III 83: bhikkhu dīgham vā assasanto "dīgham assaśāmi" ti pājāṇāti; dīgham vā passasanto "dīgham passasāmi" ti pājāṇāti; rassām vā assasanto "rassām assaśāmi" ti pājāṇāti; rassām vā passasanto "rassām passasāmi" ti pājāṇāti. "sabbakāyapatisamvedi assatisissati" ti sikkhati; "sabbakāyapatisamvedi passatisiṃati" ti sikkhati; "passambhayam kāyasankhāram assasissati" ti sikkhati; "passambhayam kāyasankhāram passasissati" ti sikkhati.

73 MN I 301, SN IV 293: assāsapassāsā . . . kāyasankhāro.

74 T 1, 580a: 出息、入息名為身行.

75 T 1, 582c: 學止身息息入；學止口息息出。

76 e.g. MN III 82; SN V 311; SN V 323; T 2, 206b; T 2, 208a.

77 SN IV 217: catuttham jhānaṃ samāpannassa assāsapassāsā niruddhā honti.

78 SN IV 217–218: catuttham jhānaṃ samāpannassa assāsapassāsā paṭippassadhā honti.

79 T 27, 136b: 止身行者是第四靜慮。

80 T 27, 136b: 止身行者調令息息漸漸微細乃至不生。

81 Vism 275: catutthajhāne atisahkhāno appevattim eva pāpūjāti ti.

82 I am grateful to Professor Peter Harvey for this suggestion.
NOTES

83 Patis I 185: iti kira “passambhayam kāyasankhārayaṃ passesassāmi” ti sikkhati, “passambhayam kāyasankhārayaṃ passesassāmi” ti sikkhati. evam sante vātāpaladdhiyā ca pabhāvanā na hoti, assāsapassāsaṇānaṃ ca pabhāvanā na hoti, ānāpānasatiyā ca pabhāvanā na hoti . . .

84 Patis I 185–186: . . . pathamaṃ olārikā assasapassāsā pavattanti; olārikānaṃ assasapassāsānaṃ nimittam suggahitattā samanasikkatattā sīpadhāritattā, niruddhe pi olārike assasapassāsē, atha pachā sukkhumakā assasapassāsā pavattanti.

85 e.g. SN V 323–324, MN III 84: “cittapaṇḍitaṃ” ti sikkhati, “pitatipatiyasaṇṇeyā” passesassāmi ti sikkhati, “abhippamodayaṃ” passesassāmi ti sikkhati.


87 MN I 301, SN IV 293: saññā ca vedanā ca cittasankhārapaṇḍitaṃ. But SĀ says that conception (“śamjñā”) and volition (“cetanā”) are called “mental formation.” (T 2, 150a: 想、思名為意行) If so, mental formation would have nothing to do with feelings, but just like the Pali Nikāyas, SĀ also arranges perceiving/calming mental formation under contemplation of feelings, the second satipaṭṭhāna (T 2, 208b).

88 MN I 290: sānātānena sirimanna sānāthānaṃ cāvattantī aññaṃ ca paraṃjananāṃ sāvatthānaṃ saññā sapassāsāmi. I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for the reference.

89 This text is attributed by Santati (Avs: Introduction 137–140) to the Sarvāstivāda school “in a broader sense comprising the doctrines, categories and controversies of both the Vaibhāsika and the Sautrāntika schools.” He says that the compilation of this text might have commenced before the first century B.C. (Avs: Introduction 65), and he dates the commentator, Vīraśrīdatta, to the eighth century A.D. (Avs: Introduction 133–134)

90 Avs 227: pratīṭṭhassambhayam vā cittasambhārayaṃ iti sākhmatanāṃ nayan kramenaṇāpiyaṃ samappattī-ṣanamāṇāyā, sarvāṇā ca praajanā nirodhasamāṇatti iti. I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for the reference.

91 MN I 249: satto sampajāno niddam okkantā ti.

92 AN III 251, Vin I 295: pañca ha bhikkhaṃ cī kākhamasi: “sabba cī nevasanānaṃ mānaṃ (BTJ; Ee "ānāpānasati"). sammānaṃ nissante, na sāvakānaṃ sāvakānaṃ. . . sāvakaṃ sāvakānaṃ samappajjatī . . .”

93 e.g. MN III 84. SN V 324: “cittapaṇḍitaṃ” passesassāmi iti sikkhati, “abhippamodayaṃ” passesassāmi iti sikkhati. “abhippamodayaṃ” passesassāmi iti sikkhati. “abhippamodayaṃ” passesassāmi iti sikkhati.

94 e.g. DN I 73, 182, 207: tass’ ha bhikkhaṃ cī kākhamasi: “sabba cī nevasanānaṃ mānaṃ” passesassāmi iti sikkhati, “abhippamodayaṃ” passesassāmi iti sikkhati.

95 cf. Gethin, 2001: 51

96 cf. Gethin, 2001: 51

97 MN I 296 and 297.
100 e.g. MN III 84, SN V 324: “āniccānupassī passassāsāmi” ti sikkhati, “vārāgānupassī passassāsāmi” ti sikkhati, “vārāgānupassī . . . nirodānupassī . . . paṭinissagānupassī passassāsāmi” ti sikkhati.

101 MN I 435–436: pāthamaṃ 乃至 upasampajja viharati, so yad eva tattha hoti rāpagaṇataṃ vedamaṇataṃ saṅghāṭaṃ saṅkhārataṃ viṁśaṅgaṇataṃ te dhamme aniccate dakkhato gaṇḍata sallato aghato dhāhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassati. so tehi dhammehi cittaṃ paṭivāpeti. so tehi dhammehi cittaṃ paṭivāpetvā amatāya dhātuṣṭa cittaṃ upasampaharati: “etam santaṃ etam pañiṇāṃ yad idam saṣassanikārasmatho sabbupadihaṃ paṭinissaggo tanhakkhaya vārāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ” ti . . .

102 The Chinese version of this text (T 1, 779c–780a) makes no mention of the deathless element.

103 See the Introduction.

104 Its author Asaṅga was originally a follower of the Sarvāstivāda school (T 50, 188b–c). Willemen et al. (1998: 61–62) also shows a close connection between the Mūlasarvāstivādaists and the Yogācāra bhūmi, of which the Śrīvakabhūmi forms a part.

105 Śrī B 231. Xuanzang’s translations of these four terms are 無常, 斷, 離欲 and 態。 (T 30, 432b).

106 See the Introduction.

107 T 1, 780a: 彼觀此覺無常, 視興衰, 視無欲, 鎖滅, 鎖斷, 鎖捨。

108 santaṃ etam padam paniṁ (BJT, CSCD; Ee phantam) etam padam, yad idam saṣassanikārasmatho sabbupadihaṃ paṭinissaggo tanhakkhaya (Ee BJT; CSCD tanhakkhaya) vārāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ. yā hi ‘ssa, bhante, paññadaassata assa paṭiṇiddantiyam.

109 MN I 436c: rāpasaṣṭhamānaṃ samatikkammā . . . ākāśanācayataṣṭaṃ upasampajja viharati.

110 As discussed by Schmithausen (1981: 224), there are three possible ways to render the compound ahaṭṭāvīdeto: (1) “attainment [to Liberating] Insight,” if ahaṭṭa is taken as accusative; (2) “penetration [into Truth by means of Liberating] Insight,” if ahaṭṭa is taken as instrumental; (3) “penetration [which is Liberating] Insight,” according to the Niddesa.

111 AN IV 426: yavaṭtā saññāsaṃāvatthi tavaṭtā ahaṭṭāvīdeto.

112 DN I 185: saññatipatto ca pana ṅaṭṭhapado hoti ti.

113 I am aware of a paradox in the Canon where insight seems to be concurrent with the attainment of cessation. A passage recurs thus: “One enters and dwells in the cessation of apprehension and feelings, and having seen with wisdom, his taints are destroyed.” (e.g. MN I 175; AN IV 454) This has been discussed by scholars in different ways. cf. Griffiths, 1981: 616; Harvey, 1995: 165.

114 The commentary on the foregoing sutta of AN says, “the nevaśaṇīnaṃ-saññāyatana is not called an “attainment with saññā” because of its subtlety.” (Mp IV 198: nevaśaṇīnaṃsaññāyatanaṃ pana sukhāṇā saññāsaṃāvatthi ti na vaccaṭi)

115 MN III 84–85: so yaṃ taṃ abhiṣīhādomanassānaṃ pahānaṃ taṃ paññāya disvā sādhukhaṃ ajjhapekkhitā hoti.

116 Vism 291: idam catuttacacarukkam suddhavipassāvanam eva vuttaṃ.


118 I am grateful to Professor Peter Harvey for reminding me of this point.
NOTES

4 KĀYAGATĀ SATI: MINDFULNESS DIRECTED TO THE EXPERIENCER

1 Footnote 1 at AN I 43 says, “Title in ChS: Kāyagatāsati Vaggo.”
2 Ps IV 144: puna ca param... pe... evam bhikkhave bhikkhu kāyagatam satiṁ bhāveri ti satipāṭhānā caddassavādhiṇena kāyānupassānā kathitā.
3 Vism 240: kathāṁ bhāvittā, bhikkhave, kāyagatā satī; kathāṁ bahullkatā mahapphalā hoti mahānissayaṁ idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu araññagato vā (quoted from MN III 89)
4 Vism 240.
5 This will be discussed later. The four glosses run thus: “He makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, steep, fill and pervade this body (kāya) . . .” (for the first āhuṁ); “He makes the rapture and pleasure born of concentration drench, steep, fill and pervade this body (kāya) . . .” (for the second āhuṁ), etc. (MN III 92–94, tr. Nāṇanomolī and Bodhi, 1995: 953f.)
6 Vism 197: kesādhibheda raṭapākāyaṁ gatā.
7 See the Introduction.
8 These practices are almost all identical to those in the section on contemplation of the body in the Sarvāstivāda version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. For an English translation of the two texts see Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.
9 PED s.v. kāya, pp. 207–208 takes this word in this case to mean “the self as experiencing a great joy,” “the whole being,” etc. DOP s.v. kāya, p. 670 gives a meaning: “the experiencer of sensation and feeling, either (i) generally (physically and/or mentally),” where it quotes a passage on the first āhuṁ from DN which is the same as that in the Kāyagatāsati Sutta.
10 Some scholars doubt that the Theravāda school of today is directly related to the original Theravāda (Sīhavīvāha) school. Ven. Yinshun (1994: 2000: 3) holds a similar opinion. But Dutt (1970: 53) contends that the Tāmṛasātīyas were Saṃkrāntivādins, out of which school arose the Sautrāntikas.
11 Winternitz (1933: 232–233) states: “In wording and in the arrangement of the texts, the Sanskrit Canon evinces great similarity to the Pāli Canon, but on the other hand, there are many points of difference too. A feasible explanation of this is that both canons had a common source, probably the lost Māgadhī Canon.”
12 According to CSCD, the title extracted from the uddāna in Ec is Udāyī. There is no parallel to this sutta in the Chinese Agamas. There are other discourses with the same title, e.g. SN IV 166, AN II 43.
13 For the translation of āhuṁ, cf. DOP s.v. anussati.
14 This is quoted in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.
15 The term anussati (Skt anusmṛti) derives from the verb anussarati (anus-śrīṛ), which means “to remember,” “to recollect” or “to call to mind” (DOP s.v. anussarati and anussati). In some contexts it can also mean the same as sati. Harrison (1992: 228) has pointed out the interchangeability of smṛti (sati) and anussṛti (anussati).
16 The first and the fifth are not counted here because, as will be shown later, the four āhuṁs in the Kāyagatā Sutta are fundamentally different from the anussatiṭṭhānas.
17 MN I 119–121: tesam pabhāṁ ajjhātām eva cittaṁ santitṭhāti sammihāyati. The Chinese counterpart of this text, the “Adhisattva Sūtra (增上心経) of the Madhyama Agama, also has a similar refrain: When the unwhole-some thoughts have disappeared, his mind becomes constantly steadied, still internally, and he becomes single-minded and attains concentration. (T 1, 588a–589a: 惺念減已，心便常住，在內止息，一意得定。)
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18 MN III 89–94: tassa evam appamattassa atāpīṇo paḥtitattassa viharato ye gehastā sarasankappā te paḥyanī, tesam paḥhānā aijhattam eva cittam santīṭhītī sanmīḍātāt ekodihotī samādhiyati. evam pi, bhikkhave, bhikkhu kāyaṅagatī samān bhāveti.

19 By searching CSCD.

20 MN III 111: bhikkhu ce pi ākanīkheyya: aijhattam suḥhataṃ upasampajjā viharēyaṃ ti, ten’ ānanda, bhikkhunā aijhattam eva cittam sanjīkapetaṃ bhāvitaṃ ekodātāvam sanādātāvam. kathā ca, ānanda, bhikkhu aijhattam eva cittam sanjīhapetī samādhiyati?

21 Ṛṣi is used to translate a word equivalent to Pali upākkilesa, e.g. T 1, 536c ff. = MN III 160–161.

22 T 1, 555a–556c: 如是比丘随其身行，便知上如真。彼若如是行，即決無放逸，修行精勤，斷煩諸患而得定心。得定心已，則知上如真。是謂比丘修習念身。

23 This text is included in the Chinese translation of the Madhyana Āgama, which belongs to the Sarvāstivādins.

24 Ṛṣi has been used to translate different words in Buddhist texts (see also next note).

25 Here Ṛṣi must be translated from a word equivalent to Pali vitakka in that the Pali counterpart of Ṛṣi in this passage is manasikarata (MN I 119, see quotation below), which supports the rendering of the word as “attending to” rather than “being mindful of.”

26 By searching CSCD and CBETA.

27 MN I 119: bhikkhuno yaṃ nimittaṃ āganma yaṃ nimittaṃ manasikarato upppājantī pāpakā akusalā vitakkā chandipasamhitā pi dosipasamhitā pi mohapasadhitā pi, tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhunā tathā nimittaṃ aikoḥ nimittaṃ manasikātābhīṃ kusalāpasamhitān, tassa tathā nimittaṃ aikoḥ nimittaṃ manasikarato kusalāpasamhitān ye pāpakā akusalā vitakkā chandipasamhitā pi dosipasamhitā pi mohapasadhitā pi te paḥyanīte abhavāhataṃ gacchanti. tesam paḥhānā aijhattam eva cittam santīṭhītī sanmīḍātāt ekodihotī samādhiyati.

28 T 1, 588c: 彼比丘便識識相著，舌通上頭，以心修心，受持、降伏……，彼三力士起一眾人，受持、降伏……

29 By searching CSCD and CBETA.

30 There are 34 suttas in the Dīgha Nikāya, 152 in the Majjhima Nikāya, 2889 in the Sānūṭṭa Nikāya, and 2344 in the Anguttara Nikāya. Thus the total number of suttas in the four main Nikāyas is 5419. However, von Hinüber (1997: 36 and 39) points out that these are the figures actually counted in the European edition, but according to the tradition there should be 7762 suttas in the Sānūṭṭa Nikāya, and 9557 suttas in the Anguttara Nikāya.
32 AN III 25–27.
33 I am grateful to Dr. Sarah Shaw for drawing my attention to this text.
34 The meaning of “reviewing-sign” is not clear. The passage quoted below is the only reference to it in the earliest stratum of the Pali Canon. Hare (1934: 19) in his translation of the Anguttara Nikāya comments on this passage thus: “Our simple does not appear to recur elsewhere.” The commentary glosses it as “reviewing-knowledge” (paccavekkhanā-nāṇa, Mp III 235), which is not helpful either. The term “reviewing-sign” is first explained in the Vibhanga as “reviewing-knowledge (paccavekkhanā-nāṇa) of one who has emerged from this or that concentration” (Vibh 334: tāmāh tāmāh samādhiṃhā vutṭhi-bhassa paccavekkhanānāṇam paccavekkhanānīmitthā.).
35 AN III 27: puna ca param, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno paccavekkhanānīmitthā suggaṭhitaṃ hoti sumanassitaṃ sāpādhāritaṃ suppatividdhaṃ paṭiśāya. sāyathā pī, bhikkhave, añño u aṅkham paccavekkheyya, ādito vā nissimmaṃ paccavekkheyya, nissino vā niṇnannaṃ paccavekkheyya. evam eva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno paccavekkhanānīmitthā suggaṭhitaṃ hoti sumanassitaṃ sāpādhāritaṃ suppatividdham paṭiśāya.
36 can mean “again, repeat” (再・重複), HDZ I, 466), and is likely to be translated from uttara. The meaning of this text is clear from the content of the Pali Dasuttara Sutta, which provides ten themes that serve as the framework repeatedly for different doctrinal subjects. (DN III 272ff.)
37 This text was translated by An Shigao in the second century A.D., much earlier than the complete translation of the Dīgha Āgama by Buddhayaśas and Zhu Fonian in A.D. 412–413, which is attributed to the Dharmaguptakas by many scholars (see the Introduction).
38 T I, 234b–c.
39 T I, 234c: 亦有道子受身觀諸, 已熟念·熟居·熟受, 譬如佳人觀坐人, 坐人觀卧人。
41 By searching CSCD and CBETA.
42 MN III 96–97: “yassa kassa ci, bhikkhave, kāyagata sati bhāvītā bahūlikatā, so yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikarati yassa dhammasa cittāṃ abhinūnāṃmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tātē eva sakkhibhavataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati ayyatane. sāyathā pī, bhikkhave, udakamanayako pūṛo udakassa saññitaṃ kākapeyyo ādhāre āhārā sī, evaṃ bālavā puriso yato yato āvajjeyya, āgaccheyya udakaṃ tī? evaṃ bhante.” “evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvītā bahūlikatā so yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikarati yassa dhammasa cittāṃ abhinūnāṃmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tātē eva sakkhibhavataṃ pāpuṇāti sati sati ayyatane, sāyathā pī same bhānībhāge caturassā pokkharaṇā ajībaddhā pūṛa udakassa saññitaṃ kākapeyyā, tām evaṃ bālavā puriso yato yato ālojan mukkeyya, āgaccheyya udakaṃ?” evaṃ bhante.” “evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvītā . . .” sāyathā pī, bhikkhave, subhiññiyam cārunmahāpāthe ājāṅvaraṇo yatto asa ādhiyuttaṃ, tām evaṃ dakkha yoggācariyo (BJT CSCD; Ēe yoggācariyo) assadhammasaṅrāthi abhirihuttaṃ vāmena hatthena rasmiyo gahetvā dakkhiṇena hatthena patodam gahetvā yen’ ichaṅkhaṃ yad ichaṅkhaṃ sāvēryyāpi paccāsāvēryyāpi (BJT CSCD; Ēe yen’ ichaṅkhaṃ sāvērya); evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvītā . . .”
43 AN III 27–28: “evam bhāvīte kho, bhikkhave, arīye pañcāṅkete sanmāsamaṇḍhīhī evaṃ bahūlikate yassa yassa abhiññāsacchikarati yassa dhammasa cittāṃ abhinūnāṃmeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tātē eva sakkhibhavataṃ pāpuṇāti sati . . .”

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sati āyatane. seyyatāthā pi, bhikkhave, udakamoṣaṭṭho ādhāre ṭhapito pūro udakassa samattitikā kākapeyyo. tam enam balavā puriso yato yato āvajeyya, āgaccheyya udakan" tī “evam, bhante.” “evam eva kho, bhikkhā, bhikkhu evam bhāvīte āriye paṭiccaṅgike samāsāmādhāṁhi evam bahuḷikate yassa yassa abhiññāsacchi-karanīyassa dhammassa cittam abhininnaṁeti abhiññāsacchikiriyāya, tatra tatr’ eva sakkhiḥbhābatam pāpuṇāṭi sati sati āyatane.

seyyatāthā pi, bhikkhā, same phāṇiṅghe pokkhaṁ catarassā āḷabdhā pārā udakassa samattitikā kākapeyya. tam enam balavā puriso yato yato ālīṁ muheyya, āgaccheyya udakāna’ tī “evam, bhante.” “evam eva kho, bhikkhā, bhikkhu evam bhāvīte āriye paṭiccaṅgike samāsāmādhāṁhi evam bahuḷikate... seyyatāthā pi, bhikkhā, suḥbhāmyaṃ cūṭumahāpate ājaññāraṭṭho yutto assa ṭhito odhastapadoto. tam enam dakkho yoggacāriyo assadammaspārthi abhīhīrīvā vāmema ṭhattenha rasmīyo gahetvā dakkhiṇena ṭhattenha patoddam gahetvā yen’ ichhakam yad ichhakam sāreyya pi paccāsāreyya pi. evam eva kho, bhikkhā, bhikkhu evam bhāvīte āriye paṭiccaṅgike samāsāmādhāṁhi evam bahuḷikate...

The third simile about a chariot is also found at SN IV 176, where it is applied to the restraint of the sense faculties.

45 By searching CSCD


47 e.g. SN II 212–214 and 216–217; DN III 281.

48 e.g. DN I 77 ff., 100, 124. An even closer resemblance between the passage in question and the standard formula on developing the six abhiññās can be found in the Gāth Sutta of the Anguttara Nikāya (IV 421–422), where a description of the nine meditative attainments is followed by a passage containing the passage in question and the six special faculties. See Kuan (2004: 143–144).

49 sakkhiḥbhāvayaṁ in A = sakkhiḥ-bhāvatām in X, Y.

50 This seems to mean that any meditative attainment could be a basis for developing supernormal knowledge. Similarly, according to the Mahāmālāyākaputta Sutta (MN I 435–436), the Ajītakaṇṭhā Sutta (MN I 350–352) and a suttā in the Anguttara Nikāya (AN V 343–346), one may attain the destruction of the taints, the sixth supernormal knowledge, after attaining any of the four jhānas and the first three formless attainments.

51 It is stated at AN I 43 that kāyagatā sati leads to seven benefits, including dīptadhannasukha-vāhāra, which refers to jhāna as mentioned in Chapter 3.

Among the four passages peculiar to the Chinese version, the fourth practice “with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate, restraining one mental state with [another] mental state” is admittedly related to the body. But “with teeth clenched and the tongue pressed against the palate” seems rather like a physical exercise than mindfulness of the body. It is not surprising that this practice is given as one of the ascetic practices which the Buddha tried out before his enlightenment (MN I 242; II 93, 212).

Both the four elements and the six elements are found in the Pali Majjhima Nikāya and the Chinese Madhyama Āgama, e.g. the four elements at MN I 185 = MA T 1, 464c, and the six elements at MN III 62 = MA T 1, 723b. Therefore both lists may go back to a very early period, probably before the schisms.

By searching CBETA, CSCD, PTC, and indexes to the different books of the Nikāyas.

Both readings 膀 and 泡 can mean bladder as 膀胱 (EDC VII 1063).

The references below are found by searching CSCD, PTC, and indexes to the different books of the Nikāyas.
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which adheres to the soul (jīva), was also present at the very earliest stage of Jain teachings as textually constituted.

72 According to CSCD. The title extracted from the uddāna in Ee is Bālena pandito.
73 SN II 23–24: avijjāvanānassa, bhikkhave, bālassa taṇhāya sampayuttassa evam ayaṃ kāyo samudāgato. iti ayaṃ ē' eva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ, itih' etān dvayaṃ, dvayaṃ paṭicca phasso, saḷeśvayanānī yehi phuttho bālo sakuddakkhaṃ paṭisamvedīvai etesaṃ vā aṇūtareṇa.
74 Spk II 38: ayaṇā ē' eva kāyo ti ayaṇā ē' assa attano savīthānako kāyo. bahiddhā ca nāmarūpaṃ ti bahiddhā ca pareṣam savīthānako kāyo. attano ca parassas ca pañcahi khandhehi chahi āvatahehi cāpi ayaṃ atha dīpetabbava.
75 PED s.v. devaka: “only in sa°-loka the world including the gods in general.” e.g. MN I 108. Another example is sa-Indā devā sa-Brahmākā sa-Pajápātikā (MN I 140). Here Inda, Brahṇā and Pajāpati are all included in devā, “gods.” cf. PED 329: “devā sa-indakā (the gods, including Indra . . .)”
76 e.g. SN III 18, 32; SN II 252, 253; III 80, 103; AN I 132; IV 53.
77 e.g. SN IV 73–74: rūpaṃ disvā satī muṭṭhā piyanimittam manasikaro . . . sadanā . . . gandhaṃ . . . rasanā . . . phassanā . . .
78 e.g. SN III 80, 103, 136, 169f.
79 e.g. SN IV 182; etc.
80 e.g. DN I 76; SN II 94.
81 Here are all the references to savīthānako kāyo (only in locative savīthānake kāye) I was able to find by searching CSCD: MN III 18, 19, 32, 36; SN II 252, 253; III 80, 103, 136, 169, 170; AN I 132, 133, 134; IV 53.
82 This is Bodhi’s (2000: 1429, note 209) interpretation of consciousness as compared to the lord of the city in the simile.
83 e.g. SN IV 186, 189–190, 120: bhikkhu cakkhusaṃ bhaṅgā dvayaṃ disvā piyarāpe rūpe nādhimuccati, apiyarāpe rūpe na vyāpajjati, upaṭṭhitakāyasatī ca viharati appamānacetaso, tañ ca cetovimuttam paṭiñño phuttho viharati yathā yathāyo yathāyo yathāyo yathā . . . sa te uppamā pāpakā akusala dhammattho aparisesā nirujjhanto . . . cf. MN I 270.

5 THE FOUR SATIPAṬṬHĀNAS: MINDFULNESS AS A COMPREHENSIVE PATH

1 I have searched CSCD.
2 Below are the references given by Gethin (2001: 31, note 9): sati upaṭṭhāpetabbā (DN II 141), satiṁ upaṭṭhatvavā (DN I 24; DN I 71; MN II 139; SN I 179; AN II 210; Th 946; Thī 182; etc.).
3 Norman (1983: 45) also says, “[T]he second portion dealing with the four truths . . . has a separate existence in the Majjhima-nikāya (141),” i.e. the Saccavibhaṭṭhanga Sutta.
4 As pointed out by Rahulā (2000: 69).
5 This will be discussed in Section 2.6.
6 This will be discussed in Section 2.1.
7 These refer to the practices described in the six sections under contemplation of the body stated above, where the sixth section contains nine practices.
8 T 1, 582b–584b. For the English translation, see Appendix 1.
9 See the Introduction.
11 See the Introduction.
13 The numbers in brackets refer to the numbers given above to the practices under:
I. Contemplation of the body or IV. Contemplation of dhānas in the (Mahā) satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.
14 Reviewing the body by way of the four elements, and contemplating a corpse in different states of decomposition.
15 But Lin (1949: 122–123) still regards kāya gatā sati as mindfulness of the physical body.
16 e.g. Ho, 2001: 140; Anālayo, 2003: 120.
17 DN I 79; I 232 (it should be 233); MN I 34, 69.
18 MN I 59; DN II 299: bhikkhu sarāgaṃ vā cittan sarāgaṃ cittan ti pajānati. viṭṭhānaṃ vā cittan viṭṭhānaṃ cittan ti pajānati . . . sadasaṃ . . . viṭosesaṃ . . . e.g. DN I 79–80, 233; DN III 281; MN I 34–35, 69; MN III 12, 98; SN II 121–122, 213; SN V 263, 304; AN I 255; AN III 17–18, 280.
19 The Chinese counterpart of this passage can also be found at other places in the Āgamas, where it refers to a special power among a list of achievements. e.g. T 1, 553b; T 2, 776b.
20 parasattanam parappagaldanam cetasan ceto paricca pajānati (or pajāneyyam, or pajānāmi, or pajānātha).
21 e.g. all the passages cited in note 19.
22 Norman (1983: 9) states: “We may deduce from the fact that versions of one and the same sutta or utterance in different parts of the canon sometimes differ, that the bhānakas responsible for the transmission of each text were quite independent, and were not influenced by the traditions of the bhānakas of other nikāyas.” Norman (1989: 34) also says, “the bhānakas did not merely recite texts, but also added to their collections.” Von Hinüber (1997: 25) also holds that bhānakas may have been the redactors of the texts.
23 MN I 56 ff.: iti ajjhattam vā kāye kāya nāpasā viharati, bhārdhā vā kāye kāya nāpasā viharati, ajjhattabhārdhā vā kāye kāya nāpasā viharati, samukayadharmānāpasā vā kāyasmi nīviharati, vayadhammānāpasā vā kāyasmi nīviharati, samukaya-vayadharmānāpasā vā kāyasmi nīviharati, atti kāya ti vā par’ assa sati paccupṭhitā hoti yāvad eva nānamlāla patissanāṭṭa, anissito ca viharati, na ca kiıci loke upādyati. evam pi, bhikkhave, bhikkhu kāye kāya nāpasā viharati.
25 e.g. SN V 183, 294–295, 297; AN III 450.
26 Pv 204–206. However, adhyātman is missing, most likely by mistake, in the section on mindfulness of breathing.
27 Sp 1428–1431.
28 These nine charnel ground contemplations are quite different from the Chinese version, but closer to the Pali.
29 Pv 206–207.
30 It is a scribal convention to write bhārdhā for bhārdhā.
31 Sp 1432–1434. The last charnel ground contemplation is referred to as adhyātman kāye, which must be a wrong reading.
32 “Thus a monk contemplates the internal body as a body, contemplates the external body as a body, and establishes mindfulness with regard to the body, possessing knowledge, vision, and gnosis. This is what is meant by ‘a monk contemplates the body as a body.’” (T 1, 582b ff.)
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34 Quotation from Gombrich (1990b: 24).
36 See the Introduction.
37 Although this formula is not found in the Chinese versions of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, it recurs in the Samyukta Agama (T 2, 171 ff.), mostly expanded by combining with “internal,” “external” and “internal and external.” This expanded version is also found in the Mahāyama Agama (T 1, 543c).
38 e.g. MN I 56; DN II 290: cattāro satipaṭṭhāṇā. katame cattāro? idha bhikkhave bhikkhu kāye kāyaṃpassi viharati atāpi sampajāṇo satimā vineyya loke ahījājhdamanassam, vedanāsu vedanāmpassī viharati atāpi sampajāṇo satimā vineyya loke ahījājhdamanassam, citte cittānupassī viharati atāpi sampajāṇo satinā vineyya loke ahījājhdamanassam, dhāmmasu dhāmānupassī viharati atāpi sampajāṇo satinā vineyya loke ahījājhdamanassam. cf. SN V 141; AN IV 457.
39 Ps I 241: kāye ti ca vatvā puna kāyaṃpassi ti datiyaṃ kāyaṃgaṇaṃ asammisato vavatthānagahaṇaṃ-vinibhogaḥ-dassanattham katan na veditabban, tena kāye na vedanāmpassī na cittādharmānupassī vā, atha kho kāyaṃpassi yevā ti kāyaṃsankhāte vattussāmāṃ kāyaṃpasaṇākārassī eva dassanāna asammisato vavatthānagahaṇaṃ dassitam hotī.
40 T 26, 475c ff.: 於此內身住身觀.
41 T 25, 402c ff.: 內身中住身觀.
42 T 1, 582b ff.: 観身如身.
43 The word anicca can be either an adjective, “impermanent,” or a noun, “impermanence.” PED s.v. nicca. “Far more freq. as anicca (adj.; anicca? nt. n.) unstable, impermanent, inconstant; (nt.) evanescence, inconstancy, impermanence.”
44 Ee and BJT has anabhīrata, which is a past participle or adjective, whereas CSCD has anabhīrati, which is a noun.
45 Like anicca, asubha and pañikkāla can be either nouns or adjectives. See PED s.v. asubha and pañikkāla. The two different readings (anabhīrata/anabhīrati) mentioned in the previous note suggest that either an adjective or a noun is expected to fit the context.
46 Translation based on Bodhi, 2000: 1175. SN IV 73.
47 Ps I 242: ayaṃ hi etasmāṃ kāye kāyaṃpassi yeva, nātthadhammānupassī, kiṃ vutto hoti? yathā anudakabhājeyya pu murdeyā udakānupassino hoti, na evaṃ ticcaudakkhānatta-asubbhāhute yeva inasmiṃ kāye nicca-sukha-attāsubbhāvānupassī.
48 The word vineyya can also be an optative (PED s.v. vineyyi). But its Sanskrit counterparts in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (MPS 200) and two Prajñāpāramitā texts (Ps 204; Sp 1427) are vīyā, which is no doubt an absolute.
51 MN I 55–56, DN II 290, SN V 167, 185: ekāyano ayaṃ, bhikkhave, maggo sattānāma visuddhiyā sokaparidevānām (*pariddavānām) samatikkamāyā dukkhadomanassānaṃ atthagānāma... 
52 The commentary on the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (Sv III 759) reads: ahījājhdamanassavinayena bhāvanābalam (same in CSCD) vuttan ti. This gloss also occurs in the commentary to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya (Ps I 244), but it has phala (same in CSCD) instead of bala. Ven. Nyānuttara probably refers to the reading in Ps rather than Sv. Searching CSCD, I only found one other occurrence of this expression at Paṭṭa I 177, which has phala instead of bala, agreeing with the reading of Ps.
53 Sn 143: karaṇyam attakusalena yan tum santam padoṃ abhisamecca.
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54 SN V 226; santam etam patham samainam (BJT, CSCD; Ee phanitam) etam padam, yad idam sabbasankhara samatho sabbhaphapanissago tanhakkhayo (Ee BJT; CSCD tanhakkhayo) virago nirodho nibbana. This is the only reference to santam padam in the earliest texts I found by searching CSCD. This passage is also cited in the Mahaniddesa (II 342) and Cullaniddesa (CSCD 127).

55 Sn 208: yo jata am ucchijja na ropayeeya jayantam assa nampappaveche. tam ahu ekam muni nanam carantam, addakkhi so santipadam mahesi. Sn 209: sakhaya vatthi paniya bijan, sineham assa nampappaveche. sa ve mani jatikhayantadasi, takkan pahava na upeti sakhana.

56 SN V 143: cattaro satipatthana ratiheha bhavayaisi.

57 e.g. SN V 297, 143: ajjhattam (vā) kāye kāyānupassī viharati (viharāhi) ātapi sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhadomanassam; bahiddh (vā) kāye kāyānupassī viharati (viharāhi) ātapi sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhadomanassam; ajjhattabahiddhā (vā) kāye kāyānupassī viharati (viharāhi) ātapi sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhadomanassam.

58 MN I 56ff.: ajjhattam vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, bahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, ajjhattabahiddhā vā kāye kāyānupassī viharati, . . . vedanāsu . . . citte . . . dhamesu . . . AN III 450: ajjhattam kāye . . . pe . . . bahiddhā kāye . . . ajjhattabahiddhā kāye . . . ajjhattam vedanāsu . . . bahiddhā vedanāsu . . . ajjhattabahiddhā vedanāsu . . . ajjhattam citte . . . bahiddhā citte . . . ajjhattabahiddhā citte . . . ajjhattam dhamesu . . . bahiddhā dhamesu . . . ajjhattabahiddhā dhamesu dhammānupassī viharitum.


60 DN II 216: idha bho bhikkhu ajjhattam kāye kāyānupassī viharati, atapi sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhadomanassam. ajjhattam kāye kāyānupassī viharanto tathā samā sammā sammahityati, samma vippasidati, so tattā samma samāhito samma vippasanno bahiddhā parakāye nāpadassanām abhinibbatteti. cf. T 1, 36a: अन्तर्देशः जीवान्तर्देशः तथा जीवात्मकः सम्पूर्ण्डितः किं नामितां बिभक्तिः।

61 Vinh 196: kalaḥ ca bhikkhu ajjhattabahiddhā vedanāsu vedanānupassī viharati? idha bhikkhu sukham vedanam “sukhā vedanā” ti pañjāni ti.

62 Ps I 252: Ajjhattabahiddhā vā ti kālena attano kālena paraśa vā catu-iryāyapathariparanāhana kāye kāyānupassī viharati (CSCD; Ee viharati).

63 SN V 183: bhikkhu samudayadhammānupassī kāyasmiṇī viharati, vayadham- mānupassī kāyasmiṇī viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī kāyasmiṇī viharati, atapi sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhadomanassam.

64 e.g. MN I 56ff.: samudayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṇī viharati, vayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṇī viharati, samudayavayadhammānupassī vā kāyasmiṇī viharati.

65 SN V 294–295.

66 SN V 145: te pi kāye kāyānupassino viharantī atāpiṇo sampajānā ekodibhūtā vippasannacittā samāhitā ekaggacittā . . .

67 MN I 194, 201: so tāya samādhisampaddaya attu’ ukkumsetti, paraṃ vabhānīti: ahaṃ asmi samāhitā ekaggacittā, ime pa’ añña bhikkhā asamāhāti vībhante ca ca tā.

68 MN I 21, 117: āraddhaṃ kho paṇa me viriṇī aho asaḷḷanāṃ, upaṭṭhitā sati asaṃmuttaṃ, passaddho kāyo asāraddho, samāhito cittaṃ ekaggam.
at the beginning of this passage, "body."occurs (same in Q and J).

In our context, two

82 e.g. SN II 94, 95: 

81 e.g. 

80 e.g. SN III 59:

79 SN III 86: 

78 SN III 59–61 and 62–64: 

77 The Chinese

76 SN V 184: 

75 T 27, 156c: 

74 Quoted from von Hinüber (1997: 81).

73 T 15, 175c: 

72 Zacchetti (2002: 75, note 7) points out that this text is clearly not a sūtra. I am grateful to Mr. L.S. Cousins for showing me this article.

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70 muñhassati asampajjano asamāhiyo vibhantacitto.

69 AN I 266, III 391–392; MN I 32: It 91: upāṭṭhisāsati sampajjāno samāhiyo ekaggacitto.

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69 AN I 266, III 391–392; MN I 32: It 91: upāṭṭhisāsati sampajjāno samāhiyo ekaggacitto.

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71 Pet 121: tattha pañcakkhandhā cattāri attahāvavatthūni bhavanti. yo rūpakkhandho, so kāyo attahāvavatthu. yo vedanakkhandho, so vedanā attahāvavatthu. yo saññakkhandho (Ee inserts so saññā attahāvavatthu. ye, which is omitted according to BJT and Nānāmoli, 1964: 166) ca (BJT; Ee omits) saññhārakkhandho ca (BJT; Ee omits) te dhannā attahāvavatthu. yo viññhārakkhandho, so cittaṃ attahāvavatthu.

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69 AN I 266, III 391–392; MN I 32: It 91: upāṭṭhisāsati sampajjāno samāhiyo ekaggacitto.
83 Commenting on a3, Bodhi (2000: 1928) states: “In this passage citta is taken to be synonymous with viññāṇa; nāmārūpa, being the condition for the latter, is the condition for the former as well.”
84 e.g. DN II 32, 62–63; SN II 104: viññāṇapaccaya nāmārūpa ti... nāmārūpa paccaya viññāṇa ti.
85 SN II 104: ettāvatā jáyetha và jīyetha (CSCD BJT; Ee jīyetha và jáyetha) và māyētha (CSCD BJT; Ee māyētha) và cāventha và upapajjetha và, yad idān nāmārūpa paccaya viññāṇa, viññāṇapaccaya nāmārūpa; nāmārūpa paccaya salāyatanasam; salāyatanapaccaya phasso...
86 DN II 63: viññāṇaṁ và hi, ānanda, mātā kucchim okkamatvā vokkamissattha, api nu kho nāmārūpaṁ itthattāya abhinibbettissathā ti?
87 cf. Kalupahana, 1975: 116–118; Johansson, 1979: 57. Kucchim okkamati is an idiom denoting conception (e.g. DN II 12; Thī 436).
88 SN II 102: āyatiṁ parabhavābhavīhāta hoti (“When this consciousness is established and grown, there is the production of renewed existence in the future.”). For other instances, see SN I 122, III 124.
89 SN V 369–370: tassa yo hi khv āyāṇaṃ kāyo rūpi... tam idhi eva kākā và khāḍanti gijjhā và khāḍanti... yaḥ ca khv āsas cittaṁ dhārātāmm saddhāparibhāvītaṁ silo-suta-cāga-paññā (CSCD; Ee omits paññā-paribhāvītaṁ tam uddhagāmi hoti visesagāmi.
90 SN I 38: taṅkhā janeti purisāṁ, cittam āsas viddhāvati. satto samsāraṁ āpādi, kammanā tassa parāyanaṁ ti.
91 SN II 95: yaṁ ca kho etāṁ bhikkhave, vuccati cittaṁ iti pi, mano iti pi, viññāṇaṁ iti pi, tαn rattiḻa ca dīvasassa ca aññad eva upapajjati aññad nirujjhati. SN II 94: yaṁ ca kho ētaṁ bhikkhave, vuccati cittaṁ iti pi, mano iti pi, viññāṇaṁ iti pi... ettaṁ bhikkhave assumatavo pathuṁjanassa... paraṁsaṁthaṁ “etaṁ mana, eso ‘ham asmi, eso me attā’ ti.
92 For a solution to this paradox, see Collins (1982: 214).
93 T 28, 615a: 云何心？若心、若意、识、六识身。
94 e.g. SN III 61: chayime, bhikkhave, viññānaṁ kāyo rūpi... tam idhi eva kākā và khāḍanti gijjhā và khāḍanti... yaḥ ca kho ētaṁ bhikkhave, vuccati cittaṁ iti pi, mano iti pi, viññāṇaṁ iti pi... ettaṁ bhikkhave assumatavo pathuṁjanassa... paraṁsaṁthaṁ “etaṁ mana, eso ‘ham asmi, eso me attā’ ti.
96 e.g. DN I 76; SN II 94.
97 e.g. SN III 1, V 369.
98 AN V 107 (= AN IV 339): manasikārasambhavā sabbe dhammā, phassasamudayā sabbe dhammā.
99 Similarly, Hamilton (1996: 30) suggests that the use of dhammas in the Satipaṭṭhāna Suttas is compatible with the understanding of dhammā as objective phenomena in general as in the context of dhammā being the object of the manodhātu.
100 e.g. SN IV 73–74: rāpaṁ disvā sati maṭṭhā piyanimittaṁ manasikarote... saddhā... gandhaḥ... rasaṁ... phassā... dhammaṁ...
101 e.g. MN I 119, 296; III 161.
102 As I 133: “manasikāro”... so sāramalakkhano, sampayuttanāṁ ārammaṁ (CSCD; Ee ārammāna) sampayojanaraso, ārammaṇaṁabhāmaṁkhabhāvapaccupaṭṭhāṇo.
103 cf. also Aung, 1910: 17.
104 e.g. DN I 76; SN II 94.
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105 e.g. DN I 124, 157; II 2, 76.
106 Although the Chinese version (T 1, 584a) makes no mention of the term "six external sense bases," they are actually implied in the text as forms (色) and mind-objects (法) are mentioned.
108 Similarly Warder (1971: 280) renders dhammas in the fourth satipaṭṭhāna as the "contents of thought," and says, "It could of course be suggested that any dhamma could be regarded as a thought-content in so far as it could be thought of, as an idea or concept, including physical phenomena."
109 It is of some interest to note a point Gethin (2001: 306) makes when he discusses a passage in the Visuddhimagga. He says, "[W]hen the mind is transcendent, when its object is nibbāna... In a sense the practice of all the satipaṭṭhānas involves the watching of dhammas... However, it is only when they are truly seen as dhammas, rising and falling, that there is dhammānupassanā; at that stage the point seems to be that practitioner sees not dhammas so much as dhamma itself, which, it seems, amounts to seeing nibbāna." Similarly, as he shows (p. 324), according to the Abhidharmakośa "This more advanced stage of dharma-smṛty-upasthāna unifies the watching of kaya, vedanā, citta and other dharmas," but "this kind of smṛty-upasthāna is not strictly confined to transcendent consciousness."
110 MN I 55–56; DN II 290; SN V 141, 167, 185: ekāyano ayaṁ bhikkhave maggo sattānaṁ visuddhiyā sokaparidevānām ("pariddavānām") samatikkamāya dukkhadomanasamānaṁ atthagamāya nāyassa adhigamāya nibbānassa sacchikiri-yāya, yad idaṁ cattāro satipaṭṭhānā.
111 The Chinese translation equivalent to ekāyano maggo is 一乘道。But 一乘 is a standard translation for ekayāna, "one vehicle." The translator probably confused ekāyana with ekayāna.
112 T 2, 147b: 如來，應，等正覺所知所見，說四如意足，以一乘道淨眾生，滅苦惱，斷憂悲。何等為四？欲定斷行成就如意足，精進定、心定、思惟定斷行成就如意足。
113 T 2, 143b–144a: 佛，世尊，如來，應，等正覺所知所見，說六法出苦處，昇於勝處，說一乘道淨諸眾生，離諸惱苦，憂悉善滅，得真如法。何等為六？謂聖弟子念如來，應，等正覺... 念於修法... 念於戒德... 念施法... 念於天德... I am grateful to Professor Paul Harrison for providing this information.
114 T 2, 147b = SN V 271–273. T 2, 143b–144a = AN III 314–317, where (p. 314) occurs a passage almost identical to the ekāyana formula without the words ekāyano ayaṁ maggo.
115 T 2, 147b = SN V 271–273. T 2, 143b–144a = AN III 314–317, where (p. 314) occurs a passage almost identical to the ekāyana formula without the words ekāyano ayaṁ maggo.
116 “That sūtra” must refer back to 契經 (“sūtra”) found at T 27, 943a, from which the ekāyana formula is cited.
117 T 27, 943c: 正斷、神足、根、力、覺支、道支為一趣道不？若是者，何故彼到非唯願住名一趣道，不滅餘耶？
118 MN III 94. AN I 43: seyyathā pi, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ca mahāsaṁuddo cetass’ phuto, ataggadā tassa kunnadiyo yā kāci sa saññaddantamā, evam eva kho, bhikkhave, yassa kassa ci kāyagatā sati bhāvītā bahūlikatā, ataggadā tassa kusalā dhammā ye ke ci viññābhītāyā.
119 BU 2.4.11; 4.5.12: sa yathā sarvāsāt aparī samudra ekāyano evāṁ... 120 SN V 163: attadāpā viharatha attasaraṇā anāhārasaraṇā, dhammadāpā dhammasaraṇā anāhārasaraṇā, kathā ci cānanda bhikkhu attadāpā viharati attasaraṇo anāhārasaro, dhammadāpā dhammasaraṇo anāhārasaro? idhānanda bhikkhu kāye kāyaṁ pakṣi viharati... vedanā... citta... dharmasu...
NOTES

121 SN V 154: ye hi keci ānanda etarahi vā maṃ’ accaye vā attadīpā viharissanti attasarpanā . . .


123 SN V 162: disā pi me na pakkhaṇyanti, dhammā pi maṃ na paṭibhandi ‘āyasma sāriputta parinibbuto’ ti sutvā.


125 Th-a III 120: abbhatassahāyassā ti apagatasahāyassā, kalyāṇānittarāhitissa ti attho.

126 T.W. Rhys Davids, 1903: 27; DPPN I 642.

127 Dhp-a III 224ff.

128 e.g. Foucher, 1963: 205–206; Strong, 2001: 117.

129 A similar view has been expressed by Yamada (1953: 248). Thomas (1927: 115, note 2) even says, “It is doubtful if Buddha ever went so far west as Kosambi.”

130 For the above locations, see the map near the front of the book.

131 e.g. DN no. 15; MN no. 75; SN II 92, 107; AN V 29–30.

132 Dutt (1970: 135) states: “The Sarvāstivādins selected Mathura as the venue of their early activities and it was from this place that they fanned out to Gandhāra and Kashmir . . .” Mathurā is very near to the south of the Kuru country, which is halfway between Mathurā and Kashmir. Several inscriptions dated from 100 BC to AD 200 or 300 also confirm the presence of the Sarvāstivādins in Mathurā (Lamotte, 1988: 523).


134 This setting is unlikely. See discussion below.

135 e.g. Bv-a 4: bhagavā hi paṭhamabhodiyaṃ visati vassāni amibaddhavāso huvā yattaḥ yattaḥ plāṣukṣaṃ hoti, tatva tatthā eva gunvā vasi ti. tato paṭṭhamā pana sāvatthīṃ veva upanissāya jātavanamahāvīhare ca pubbārāme ca dhuvaparībhogavasena vasi.

136 The number cited by Schopen (1997: 578) is ninety-four, which is mistaken.

137 Equivalent to sūtra 622 of SĀ (T 2, 174a–b).

138 No equivalent in SĀ.

139 Equivalent to sūtra 498 of SĀ (T 2, 130c–131a).

140 Equivalent to sūtra 639 of SĀ (T 2, 177a–b), but the setting is *Madhurā (Pali Mathurā).

141 Apart from the above two suttas in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sānyutta and the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, the only reference to the Buddha’s staying at Ambapālī’s Grove is AN IV 100, from which we cannot tell whether this is a different visit from that recorded in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta.

142 Scholars agree in this point, e.g. DPPN I 155; Hirakawa, 1990: 36; An, 2003: 68, note 8.

143 DPPN II 178.

144 DN II 87–88, Vin I 229.

145 Searching CSCD, I found the following references: MN I 349ff., II 163; SN V 15, 16; AN III 57f., V 342, 347.

146 MN II 162.

NOTES

CONCLUSION

1 e.g. SN V 198.
2 e.g. MN III 252.
3 Spk II 126–127: mayam nijjñanakā sukhāvipassakā, paññāmatten’ eva vimutta ti.
4 MN I 477: katamo ca, bhikkhave, puggalo paññāvimutto? idha, bhikkhave, ekacco puggalo ye te santā viñakkha atikamma rūpe āruppe te na kāyena phassitvā viharati.
5 e.g. MN I 477, SN II 121–123.
6 Sv II 512: so sukhāvipassako ca paññāvissajjā anuttararasmīṃ jhātvā arahattamo patto cāti ti pañcavidhi hoti.
7 The abhiññās are developed after attaining the four jhānas according to several suttas in the Silakkhandha Vagga of DN.
8 T 2, 97a: (sic, also in J and Q) Here, “arising,” could be a misprint for “transcending.” This emendation can be supported by Xuanzang’s translation of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, where “transcending” (sa) is used (T 29, 146a).
9 T 1, 751b: The same definition of “liberation by wisdom” is also found in Sf, e.g. T 2, 240a.
10 Dhs §§ 248–250.
11 Dhs §§ 204, 205.
12 e.g. Vibh 206: siyā sativikkasaviccarā, siyā avitakkavicca-aviccarā, siyā pittasahagatā, siyā sukhasahagatā, siyā upekkhāsahagatā.
13 Vibh 206: satiñ ca (CSCD; Ee satim ca; BJT satim) khv āhan bhikkhave sabbattihīkan vaddāmi ti.

APPENDIX 1 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA VERSION OF THE SATIPATTĀNA SUTTA

NOTES


4 These three editions refer to the Zifu edition (普濟藏) in the Song Dynasty, Puning edition (寶蔵藏) in the Yuan Dynasty and Jiaying edition (嘉興藏) in the Ming Dynasty. See 《中華大藏經（漢文部分）》內容簡介 (A Brief Introduction to the Contents of the Tripitaka of China (Chinese Part)), p. 4.


6 Tong, 1997: 12.


8 《中華大藏經（漢文部分）》內容簡介 (A Brief Introduction to the Contents of the Tripitaka of China (Chinese Part)), p. 5.

9 At the beginning of the 65th Sūtra (T 1, 506b) of the Madhyama Āgama there are the following words: “The second day’s chanting is called ‘the small earthen city; there are four and a half chapters, containing 52 sūtras in total.’” (第二日講名小土城，有四半部，含五十二經。) At the beginning of each of the first 64 sūtras we can find the words: “chanted on the first day” (初一日講). It is presumed that the first 64 sūtras were chanted on the first day of the council; then the following 52 sūtras, including our text, were chanted on the second day. I am grateful to Mr. Yuwen Yang for the reference and suggestion.

10 轉 literally means “travel,” “play.” In MĀ, however, this character is often used to translate the word equivalent to viharati (“to dwell,” “to abide”) in the Pali counterparts.

11 稱 is obviously translated from a word equivalent to karuṇā in the Pali, which is the locative plural of kura, meaning “among the Kuruśas.”

12 立心正住於四念處 is very likely to have been translated from words equivalent to catusu satipaṭṭhānesu suppatītihañciṭṭhātā in Pali, which recurs in the Nikāyas in an almost identical context (tr. Bodhi, 2000: 1642): Whatever Arahants, Perfectly Enlightened Ones arose in the past, all those Blessed Ones had first abandoned the five hindrances, corruptions of the mind and weakeners of wisdom; and then, with their minds well established in the four establishments of mindfulness, they had developed correctly the seven factors of enlightenment; and thereby they had awakened to the unsurpassed perfect enlightenment. (The same is said of “whatever Arahants, Perfectly Enlightened Ones will arise in the future” and “the Blessed One, who is at present the Arhat, the Perfectly Enlightened One.”) SN V 160–1 = DN II 83 = DN III 101: ye pi te, bhante, ahesam atītam addihānaṃ arahanto sammāsambuddhā, sabbe te bhagavanto paṭcena nivārane paṭhāya, cetaso upakkilese paṭiñāya dubbakkaraṇe, catusu satipaṭṭhānesu suppatītihañciṭṭhātā, satta bhodiya yathābhoidham bhāvetvā, anuttaraṃ sammāsambodhima abhisambuddhīyaṁ.) cf. AN V 195.

13 有明有達 is literally means “possessing 明, possessing 達.” Since both 明 and 達 can render gnosia (viññā), 有明有達 may simply mean “possessing gnosia.” In the Chinese Madhyama Āgama, the word equivalent to Pali tevijja (triple gnosia) is normally translated as 三明, but sometimes as 三達 or even 三明達 (For example, T 1, 688c: 三達有明達 = MN II 144: tevijjo bho katham hoti: T 1, 610b: 九十比丘得三明達 = SN I 191: saññhī bhikkhā tevijjā).

From the context we can also infer that 有明有達 means possessing gnosia (viññā). This phrase is preceded by 有知有見, “possessing knowledge (ñāṇa), possessing vision (dassana),” while ñāṇadassana is synonymous with the triple gnosia according to the Vinaya. (e.g. Vin IV 26: ñāṇadassanā ti tiśso viññā. Vin III 91: ñāṇan ti tiśso viññā. dassanā ti yanīṃñāṇa taṃ dassanāṃ, yanīṃ dassanāṃ taṃ ūnāṇa.)
One may ask why “possessing gnosis” is not translated simply as 有明 or 有達 or 有明達. This can be explained by the following reason. As Wan (2002: 65) indicates, during the period of the Six Dynasties (from early third century to late sixth century) translation of Buddhist texts often used a style that formed a rhythm of four syllables in prose. In order to follow this style, 有明有達 was adopted in our context (立念在身，有知有見，有明有達).


**NOTES**

14 *Saṅghāti* refers to the upper robe of a Buddhist monk (CPED s.v. *saṅghāti*), which is one of his three robes (PED s.v. *saṅghāti*).

15 This phrase (善著僧伽梨及諸衣鉢) is apparently translated from the equivalent to *saṅghāti-patta-cīvara-dhārane* in the Pali *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* (MN I 57). *Dhārana* derives from *dhāreti*, which can mean “to carry” or “to wear” (PED s.v. *dhāreti*). Ven. Nāṇamoli and Ven. Bodhi (1995: 147) translate this compound as “when wearing his robes and carrying his outer robe and bowl.” But PED (s.v. *cīvara*) states: “In starting on his begging round the bhikkhu goes *patta-cīvaramāṇā ṣādāya*, that is literally “taking his bowl and robe.” But this is an elliptical idiom meaning “putting on his outer robe and taking his bowl.” A bhikkhu never goes into a village without wearing all his robes, he never takes them, or any one of the three, with him.”

16 Thich Minh Chau’s (1991: 88) translation for *以心治心治斷滅止* is “uses his mind to *rectify* his mind, to cut off, to extinguish, to stop.” 治斷滅止 also occurs in the previous section, which he translates as “to rectify, to cut off, to extinguish, to stop” (p. 88). There is a problem in his translation. He translates 治 as “to rectify.” In this section 治 occurs twice, but he only translates the first one instead of translating the whole phrase as “uses his mind to *rectify* his mind, to *rectify*, to cut off, to extinguish, to stop.” In my opinion, 治斷滅止 should be taken as 治 and 滅止, which must be translated from two Indic words rather than from four words, just as in its Pali counterpart, and hence there is no repetition of the verb 治. The Pali phrase for 以心治心治斷滅止 is *cetasā (以心) cittan (心) abhinipphetabban (治) abhinippiletubban (治斷) abhisantanpetubban (滅止) (MN I 120). In addition, Zhu (1992: 124–129) says that in this period (Medieval China) there was a new development in the Chinese language, namely, using two or more syllables (i.e. characters) to form new vocabulary, and the Chinese translation of the Buddhist texts contributed a lot to this development. Moreover, as mentioned above, when this text was translated, translation of Buddhist texts often used a style that formed a rhythm of four syllables in prose, which requires each of the two Indic words to be translated into two Chinese characters in our case. (齋齋相著，舌著上齋；以心治心，治斷滅止。) In the Pali all of the three verbs — *abhinipphetabban, abhinippiletubban, abhisantanpetubban* — qualify *cittan*, but in the Chinese the last two verbs 治斷 (= *abhinippiletubban*) and 滅止 (= *abhisantanpetubban*) do not seem to qualify 心 as they come after it. This is an example of trying to fit the rhythm in Chinese at the sacrifice of the original meaning in the Indic text. Thich Nhat Hanh’s (1990: 153–154) translation also agrees with my opinion, although it is a bit free: “[T]aking one part of his mind to restrain (治) another part of his mind, he counterbalances (治斷) a thought and transforms (滅止) it.”

17 覺 can mean “randomly.” See HDC 6-1608, s.v. 覺. 混乱. 随意.

18 T and J read 覺, which means “to learn,” while S, Y, M and Q read 覺, which means “to feel” or “to perceive.” The whole sentence is 學覺一切身息. 學覺一切身息出. I suppose that the original could have both words occurring twice.
in this sentence that both words occur twice in the Pali, viz. sikkhati, “to learn” (=चिन्तामणि, and paripasange, “perceiving (adjective, =धरति)” (MN I 56).

19 T, J, Q all read [口] (verbal), which must be a wrong reading for [口] (bodily) since the Pali has käya (bodily) instead of “verbal” (MN I 56), and the statement “He trains thus: ‘I will breath in calming (passambahayam) bodily formation’; he trains thus: ‘I will breath out calming bodily formation.’” is a phrase found at many places in both the Pali canon and the canon in Chinese translation, e.g. MN III 82; SN V 311; SN V 323; T 2, 206b; T 2, 208a.

20 This sentence is a bit different from its Pali counterpart at MN III 94: so iman eva käyaṃ parisuddhena cetasā pariyyodadāna pharitvā nisimo hoti. (“He sits pervading this body with a pure bright mind.” Tr. Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 954.) I translate 意解 (literally “mind-berate” or “mind-understand”) as “resolve upon” because 意解 is usually used to translate words derived from adhi-imuc (Skt 1047 s.v. Muc). “to resolve upon.” For example, a passage in MA reads: “right understanding, the monk who knows the place of the mind, resolves upon it as exalted.” Tr. Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 1003) Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 156) translates: “A practitioner who is aware of body as body, envelops the whole of his body with a clear, calm mind, filled with understanding.” Thich Minh Chau (1991: 90) translates: “With a pure mind and comprehending (sic) consciousness, the monk pervades all over this body and dwells in it.”

21 成就級, “attaining [and] dwelling.” could be translated from words equivalent to upasampajja viharati. This is a stock expression employed to describe attaining the jhānas in the usual jhāna formula. e.g. T 1, 657c: 初禪成就級 = MN I 181: pathanam jhānam upasampajja viharati. Apart from jhāna, this expression also applies to “internal emptiness” at T 1, 738c: 丙空成就級 = MN III 111: aijjhattam suññatam upasampajja viharitum.

22 意念 has been used to translate different words in Buddhist texts. It is a standard translation for words derived from ñaṭṭha like snrti (Pali satti), but it is also a translation for words derived from manas-/kṣ (e.g. SJD s.v. manaskāra). The Pali counterpart of 意念 in this passage is manasikaro (AN III 323), which supports the rendering of the word as “attending to” rather than “being mindful of.”

23 “Free from entanglement” (無有繫) could be translated from a word equivalent to aparīyuṭṭhāna in Pali (Skt aparīyuthāna, SJD s.v. parīyuthāna gives the meaning 與). But the Pali counterpart of this passage (AN III 323) has aparīyovadha (unenveloped) rather than aparīyuṭṭhāna.

24 Here 意念 is translated as “attends to” rather than “is mindful of” because its Pali counterpart is manasikatam (AN III 27). See note 22 above.

25 身際 could be translated from words equivalent to iman käyaṃ yathādhitiṣati (all accusatives) in the Pali Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (MN I 57) or yathā yathāṣya kāyaḥ sthito bhavati in Sanskrit (Pv 204), which means “however this (his) body is placed.” However, both of them are in a different context from the Chinese. The Pali occurs at the beginning of the paragraph on contemplating elements, while the Sanskrit occurs in the paragraph on understanding the four postures.

26 意念 could be translated from words equivalent to praṇīta aprāṇīta vā at P 204, which is preceded by the above-mentioned phrase yathā yathāṣya kāyaḥ sthito bhavati in the paragraph on understanding the four postures. Praṇīta can mean “wished, desired” or “good (as food)” (MW 660, s.v. praṇī). Conze’s (1961:
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140) translation “whether in a good way or not” obviously takes the latter meaning of *pratītya*, while the Chinese translation apparently takes the former. From the context, the Chinese translation seems more plausible. *此身随住, 随其好恶* (however this body is placed as he likes or dislikes) is translated by Thich Minh Chau (1991: 90) as “this body, which is now living, following its likes and dislikes,” and by Thich Nhat Hanh (1990: 157) as “this body exists due to the inter-dependence of the parts of the body.”

27 “Rough [and/or] smooth thin skin, skin” is translated from 末細薄膚, *phlegm,* but J and T read “gall bladder.” The latter word may have been influenced by the Sarvāstivāda doctrines as its author Asanga was originally a follower of the Sarvāstivāda school (see *The Biography of Master Vasubandhu*, T 50, 188b–c). Willemmen *et al.* (1998: 61–62) also shows a close connection between the Mīlasarvāstivādas and the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of which the *Śrāvakabhūmi* forms a part. Therefore, it is very likely that the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* also has “dust, dirt” as is characteristic of the Sarvāstivāda list of bodily parts. Dust and dirt are not included in the list of bodily parts in the Pali version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta;* nor are they found in the other Chinese parallel to this *sutta*.


29 Q, S, Y and M read 脈 “phlegm,” but J and T read 膽 “gall bladder.” The latter reading must be wrong since it does not fit the context where liquid parts are enumerated, and phlegm (*senha*, MN I 57) is found in the Pali, but not gall bladder.

30 The Pali counterpart only mentions four elements, with the omission of space and consciousness elements. The *Dharmaskandha* also has six elements (T 26, 476a–b) like the Chinese version of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. The addition of the consciousness element in these Sarvāstivāda texts does not seem plausible since consciousness cannot be seen as an element of the body. This can be explained by the following reason. As discussed in Chapter 5, the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* could have been composed on the basis of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, when *kāyagatā sati* came to be understood as mindfulness of the physical body. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, *kāyagatā sati* was not so considered when the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* was composed. The Chinese version of this text preserves those practices irrelevant to mindfulness of the body, which were included in the version antecedent to the Chinese and Pali versions. The antecedent version of the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* probably had the six elements (including consciousness) as preserved in the Chinese version since *kāya* of *kāyagatā sati* originally referred to the individual that possesses consciousness, *savīthānako kāya*, as discussed in Chapter 4. When *kāyagatā sati* came to be understood as mindfulness of the body and the *Kāyagatāsati Sutta* provided the basis for composing the first *satipaṭṭhāna* in the
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Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, reflecting on the six elements naturally fell into the first satipaṭṭhāna, contemplation of the body.

This description is not found in the Pali version. A more detailed description occurs in the Chinese translation of the Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra: “The remaining bones are scattered on the ground. Several hundred or several thousand years later, their appearance turns blue, like the colour of doves.” (T 7, 79b: 餘骨散地，經多百歲或千百年，其相變青，狀如鴿色。)

少少, lit. “little little,” can mean “soon,” “very little,” “slightly” and 覓視年少者 “to despise young people” (HDC 2,1647), but none of these meanings seems to fit the context. I suggest that it could be a literal translation from a term like stokastokam in Sanskrit or thokam thokam in Pali, which is composed of double “little” and means “little by little.”

食, lit. “food,” must be translated from a word equivalent to sāmisa in the Pali counterpart (MN I 59), which means “of the flesh,” “mixed with other food” (DOP s.v. āmisa). Sāmisa is composed of the prefix sa and āmisa, which means “flesh,” “food” (DOP s.v. āmisa). This word is better translated as “worldly” in this context, as it is by Nānamoli and Bodhi (1995: 149).

非食, literally “non-food,” must be translated from a word equivalent to nirāmisa in the Pali (MN I 59), which is opposite to sāmisa and is better translated as “unworldly,” as it is by Nānamoli and Bodhi (1995: 149).

眼緣色, literally “eye condition form,” could be a word-for-word translation from an expression equivalent to Pali cakkhu pañca rūpā, “depending on the eye and forms” (e.g. MN I 111). Therefore, it should be understood as “with the eye and forms as condition” or “conditioned by the eye and forms.”

The Pali counterpart of (there is a residue) is sati upādi (MN I 62), which means “if there is a residue (sesa) of clinging (upādi).”

M omits this sentence.

Appendix 2 An Annotated Translation of the Sarvāstivāda Version of the Kāyatātāsatī Sutta

1 The following annotated translation is mostly cited from Kuan (2007) with kind permission of BJK Institute of Buddhist and Asian Studies.

2 This refers to Dīghānu (or Dīghāyu), a king of Kosala. cf. Vin I 343ff.

善具善行 is probably translated from words equivalent to ācāra-gocara-sampanna, “possessed of the practice of right conduct” (cf. PED s.v. ācāra). This Pali phrase occurs at AN I 63f. Its Chinese counterpart is 善具善行 (T 1, 448c). A similar phrase 善具善趣 is found in another sūtra (T 1, 772a) in a similar context, namely the practice of morality (或, sīla). In our case, 善具善行 may also refer to the practice of sīla, and the following phrase refers to the practice of samādhi. Thus two of the three trainings (sikkhā) are meant here. 善具 (“to well possess”) apparently translates a word equivalent to Pali sampanna, and ācāra-gocara is translated as 善行 (“good conduct”), 善修 (“good practice”) or 善趣 (“good action”) in the above instances. In Chinese a verb normally precedes its object, which is the case with 善具善行 and 善具善趣. Chinese translations of Buddhist texts, however, occasionally put verbs after their objects under the influence of Indic syntax, as in the case of 善修善具. Another example is the phrase “well grasping the reviewing-sign,” which is 観相善受 in our text (see the eleventh practice below), but 善受善相 in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (T 1, 583a).
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4 随时 refers to 3 to 5 o’clock in the afternoon.

5 随其身行 can be rendered literally as “to follow his body-action” or “according to his body-action,” but neither makes good sense in this context. It is very likely that this phrase is parallel to 此身随住 in our text (see the twelfth practice below). As discussed in Appendix 1, 此身随住 could be translated from words equivalent to imam eva kāyaṃ yathāḥṣṭhātam in Pali or yathā yathāsya kāyaḥ shitto bhavati in Sanskrit, which means “however this (his) body is placed.” Since 行, apart from meaning “action,” is also a standard translation for gata in the four postures, 随其身行 in our case could be translated from words equivalent to imam kāyaṃ yathāṣṭhātam in Pali or yathā yathāsya kāyaḥ gato bhavati in Sanskrit. Thus it can mean “however this (his) body behaves” as gata can mean “behaved” (PED s.v. gata). On the other hand, 随 can mean 聆任 (HDC 11, 1102), “to let someone do whatever he likes.” Thus 随其身行 may be translated as “Let his body behave in whatever manner he likes.”

6 為 is used to translate a word equivalent to Pali upakkilesa, e.g. T 1, 536c ff. = MN III 160–161.

7 Sanghāṭi refers to the upper robe of a Buddhist monk (CPED s.v. sanghāṭi), which is one of his three robes (PED s.v. sanghāṭī).

8 For my translation of 以心治心，治斷滅止, see Appendix 1.

9 It is likely that the original had both 學 (“to learn”) and 覺 (“to feel” or “to perceive”) occurring twice in this sentence, but 覺 was missing at some point during the process of transcribing the text. This is inferred from the following facts. Both words occur twice in the Pali version, viz. sikkhati, “to learn,” and paññasamvedi, “perceiving (adjective)” (MN III 89). This passage is also found in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, where different readings are found: T and J read 學 (“to learn”), while S, Y, M and Q read 覺 (“to feel” or “to perceive”). See Appendix 1.

10 (verbal) must be a wrong reading for 身 (bodily). See Appendix 1.

11 The wording here is slightly different from its counterpart in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

12 The sentence “resolves upon pervading the body with the pure state of mind, attaining and dwelling [therein]” is missing in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

13 For my translation of 念 as “attending to,” see Appendix 1.

14 好持 “well holds” is not found in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

15 For my translation of 此身随住 as “however his body is placed,” see Appendix 1.

16 Q, Y and M read 癡 “phlegm,” but J and T read 慳 “gall bladder.” The latter reading must be wrong, since it does not fit the context where liquid parts are enumerated, and phlegm (semha, MN III 90) rather than gall bladder is found in the Pali version.

17 The expression “barley, wheat, big and small sesames and beans” is not found in the Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta.

18 The Chinese version of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta has “wolves” (猱) instead of “dogs” (獵).

19 This paragraph is not very clear. Its Pali counterpart reads: “Monks, just as whoever has pervaded the great ocean with his mind, for him whatever streams flow into the ocean are included, so whoever has developed and cultivated kāvagatā sati, for him whatever wholesome states are conducive to gnosis are included.” (MN III 94).

20 耆婆句 is probably translated from words equivalent to Māra pāpimā in Pali (e.g. SN I 103), “Māra the evil one.”

21 According to M; “the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh” in T Q J.
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22 According to M; “called the eighth benefit” in T Q J.
23 According to Q J S Y M; “once” in T.
24 如其像定 can be literally translated as “concentration [which has] resemblance to its/his image.” It recurs in the Chinese Madhyama Agama, e.g. T 1, 559c, 596a, 620b. A similar term 如其像三昧, “samādhi [which has] resemblance to its/his image,” is also found in the Chinese Samyuktā Agama at T 2, 139b. In the Pali counterparts of the above four references, no such expressions can be found (AN IV 85, MN I 33–36, MN I 332, SN V 294–297). Nakamura explains 如其像定 as “entering meditation without moving like a statue.” (BDJ 1060, s.v. 如其像定). I would suggest that 如其像定 could mean “such concentration” for the following reason. 如其像三昧 recurs in the 傳說梵網六十二見經 (T 1, 266a–c), “The Sūtra on the Brahmā Net of Sixty-two Views Expounded by the Buddha,” which is an independent translation of a text equivalent to the Brahmajāla Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya. The Pali counterpart of the expression 如其像三昧 is tathārūpaṃ cetossamādhiṃ, “such mental concentration” (DN I 13–16). In our case, 如其像定 could also have been translated literally from tathārūpaṃ samādhiṃ as tathā can mean “likewise” (如) and rūpa can mean “image” (像), while tathārūpa means “such.”
25 According to M; “twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth” in T J Q.
26 According to M; only “eighteenth” in T J Q.
27 M omits this sentence.
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